PSC 783 Comparative Foreign Policy Policy Options Paper Policy Option Paper 5 November 2014 U.S. foreign policy towards Russia after the Republican midterm victory in Congress Implications and Options for Poland I. Executive Summary With the Republican Party in control of both houses, this paper suggests to anticipate a more forceful anti-russian U.S. foreign policy. Under section II, the paper offers a short background description of the current crisis between Russia and the West and why it applies to Poland. Section III then analyses Poland s fears and foreign policy interests while section IV examines the implications of the GOP s control of the Congress for the U.S. government s foreign policy agenda towards Russia. Section V offers three possible policy options (A, B, C) for Poland on how to react to a more forceful anti-russian U.S. foreign policy strategy. The paper recommends Policy Option C as the best way forward suggesting to firstly observe developments within the Republican Party and secondly, to embrace those U.S. policies that further Poland s national security while making a strong case for the necessity of strong diplomatic ties between the EU, in which Poland has big aspirations, and the Russian Federation.
II.Background Russia s deployment of military forces on Ukrainian territory, its annexation of Crimea, its continued rhetorical as well as its recent strategic provocations, such as last week s incursions into European air space causing British fighter jets to scramble 1, have not only sparked but also fuelled the most serious crisis in the Russian Federation s relations with the West since the end of the Cold War. Since then, the U.S. and the EU have politically isolated Russia and issued targeted sanctions against Russian banks and individuals freezing assets and imposing visa bans. These policies send a strong signal to President Putin and have caused the Russian economy to face weaker direct investment and soaring capital flight leaving it on the brink of a recession. 2 While incepted in Ukraine, the crisis has reinstated underlying tensions between the U.S. and Russia and has left Europe, and especially Poland, in the midst of another great power game with a potential of morphing into a greater conflict between Russia and the West. III.Importance For and Interests of Poland For Poland, the crisis that has unfolded in its direct neighborhood bears direct consequences for its national security. As our country shares a long and painfully turbulent history with Russia, and its predecessor, the Soviet Union, Poland particularly fears: 1) Further Russian provocative behavior sparked by President Putin s sharp rhetoric 3 and political intimidation by Russian expansion attempts 2) Russian covert actions in Poland, similar to the operation Little Green Men in Crimea, inciting Russian minorities in Poland 3) Economic intimidation by Russia using Poland s weaker geo-economic power and dependency on Russian energy as leverage As set out in the Polish Foreign Policy Priorities 2012-2016, Poland currently adheres to the following key foreign and security policy interests in regards to these developments. 1) Maintaining and deepening Poland s integration in Western institutional frameworks, such as NATO and EU 2) Maintaining and developing Poland s own defense capabilities as a contribution to the security of the North Atlantic Alliance 1 Birnbaum, M. (2014). NATO says Russian jets, bombers circle Europe in unusual incidents. The Washington Post (October 29, 2014). Retrieved from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/nato-says-russian-jets-bombers-circle-europe-inunusual-incidents/2014/10/29/6098d964-5f97-11e4-827b-2d813561bdfd_story.html. 2 BBC News Europe (2014). How far do EU-US sanction on Russia go? (September 15, 2014). Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28400218. 3 Refers to President Putin s alleged remarks to Ukrainian President Poroshenko in September 2014: If I wanted, in two days I could have Russian troops not only in Kiev, but also in Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn, Warsaw and Bucharest. Retrieved from Sueddeutsche.de (September 18, 2014). http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/berichte-des-ukrainischen-praesidenten-putin-solleuropa-massiv-gedroht-haben-1.2134168
3) Enhancing command and crisis response structures in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) under EU supervision to complement NATO resources 4) Fostering a close partnership with the U.S., especially in times where our European allies are bound by their economic interests with Russia 5) Developing pragmatic, preferably, good relations with Russia on the basis of reciprocity, given the close geographic proximity between our countries 6) Fostering strong relations with our strategic partner Ukraine with specific focus on Ukraine s relationship with the EU and deepening NATO-Ukraine relations Based on this, we strongly feel that every adjustment in the U.S. approach to Russia is important for Poland and therefore needs to be observed carefully. IV. Implications of Yesterday s Mid-term Election Result on US Foreign Policy towards Russia As the latest election results come in, it becomes apparent that the Republicans have swept the polls in the mid-term elections seeing their biggest showing in the House of Representatives since WWII. With it also gaining control of the Senate by winning 7 seats, the GOP is now in control of both Houses of Congress having created a potentially lame duck President, who is now stuck with only two options: 1) Vetoing any incoming bills from a Republican dominated Congress and by doing so, being perceived guilty of a continued listless second term, or 2) Accommodating the Republicans and pushing for more bipartisan action, therefore accepting strong Republican influence in policy outcomes. President Obama is likely to opt for the latter, thus moving away from domestic policies and focusing on foreign policy instead. He will try to keep up appearances and to avoid the tag lame duck a phrase that would be particularly damaging for a President who came to power shouting Yes, we can! and who now faces a Republican controlled Congress saying No, you can t!. Given these circumstances, it is likely that the Obama administration will pledge to work across party-politics and adjust its allegedly weak foreign policy reaction towards Russia s provocative actions. It is expected that the Republicans will bolster harsher anti- Russian policies, such as brought forward by Senators John McCain 4 and Mitch McConnell 5 in the Senate Bill S.2277 Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014, calling for: Military, including lethal, assistance for Ukraine 4 Senator John McCain is expected to become Chairman of the influential Senate Armed Services Committee 5 Senator Mitch McConnell is likely to be the next Senate Majority Leader
Major non-nato ally status for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova Expanded support for Poland and the Baltic states Accelerating implementation of European and NATO missile defense efforts Additional sanctions in the event of increased Russian aggression Crimea annexation non-recognition European and Eurasian energy independence 6 V. Foreign Policy Options for the Republic of Poland Assuming that the Obama administration will adopt a more forceful approach towards Russia, similar to the Senate Bill S.2277, the Polish Foreign Ministry is advised to adopt one of the following policy options: Policy Option A Embracing a more forceful U.S. foreign policy towards Russia Supporting the U.S. in a more forceful policy towards Russia is certainly in line with many Polish national security and foreign policy interests (see above). In particular, it accommodates our country s objectives to maintain a strong relationship with the U.S. and our aspirations to develop our own defense capabilities. Furthermore, Poland would welcome expanded support for our armed forces through forward-based NATO forces that would be permanently based in our country. Additionally, we would support U.S. efforts in making Eastern Europe more energy independent from Russian gas and oil. Unconditionally embracing a more forceful U.S. foreign policy against Russia, however, would also bear some unintended consequences for Poland, especially considering our administration s ambitions to be a strong player within the EU since EU and U.S. interests are not always on the same line and Poland could potentially loose influence in important foreign policy frameworks, such as the Weimar Triangle. Additionally, our necessary goal of developing pragmatic relations with Moscow, that are based on reciprocity, could be endangered by blindly following every U.S. suggestion in regards to Russia. Poland is advised to keep in mind that the U.S. first and foremost follows its own agenda with its own national interest in mind, i.e. preserving its status as hegemonic power against what it perceives as a daunting challenge to U.S. leadership. Policy Option B Reject a more forceful U.S. foreign policy towards Russia This option would certainly be welcomed by Russia and would allow for a boost in Polish- Russian relations. Following this Russia could also be encouraged to abstain from using its gas and oil exports to Poland as political leverage. However, entirely rejecting the new approach of 6 This list is not exhaustive. For full list please see integrated hyperlink.
the U.S. government towards Russia is not in the national security interest of Poland. Given Poland s historic legacy with Russia and in times where the fear of further Russian expansion efforts amongst the Polish populations is growing, the Polish government is expected to send a strong signal to the East. Otherwise it will sharply loose in trust and legitimacy amongst its electorate. Turning the back on the major European security guarantor, i.e. the U.S., would furthermore undermine Poland s strong alliances and rebuff our NATO allies. Additionally, it would indirectly reaffirm and indeed legitimize the Russian administration s wrong assumption of having justified demands in the post-soviet realm. Policy Option C Wait and see, then partly welcome a more forceful U.S. foreign policy towards Russia while balancing Polish and U.S. interests 1) While options A and B are taking a more forceful U.S. foreign policy towards Russia for granted, option C firstly suggest to wait and observe the developments not only between the Obama administration and the Republicans but also within the Republican Party first. While Senator McCain and Senator McConnell will certainly push for their anti-russian agenda, it is important not to underestimate the influence of the isolationist stance of libertarian wing of the Republican Party that heavily opposes American involvement into other countries and advocates American isolationism. It is therefore too early to take any far-reaching decision in adjusting our foreign policy. 2) Once the internal differences within the GOP are overcome, and assuming that advocates of Senate Bill S.2277 are setting the agenda, Poland needs to strike the balance between embracing those U.S. policies that will further its national security while not becoming a marionette for U.S. interests in the region. It can do so by focusing its crisis response management within the EU-CSDP framework. This channel not only offers an alternative to U.S.-influenced NATO policies but also the opportunity for more open negotiations with Russia, as well as the possibility for Poland to further enhance its standing within the EU while gaining public support from its electorate. VI.Recommendation In light of these developments and the presented option, this paper strongly recommends Policy Option C as it not only allows the Polish Foreign Ministry to adjust its reaction in a timely manner but also to achieve several goals at once: 1) Prioritizing national security, 2) maintaining close relations with the U.S, 3) developing pragmatic relations with Russia, 4) enhancing Poland s position within the EU, and 5) gaining public support.