RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES Jean-Paul Sardon I.N.E.D Population 2006/3 - Vol. 61 pages 197-266 ISSN 0032-4663 Available online at: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://www.cairn-int.info/journal-population-2006-3-page-197.htm -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- How to cite this article: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Jean-Paul Sardon "Évolution démographique récente des pays développés", Population, 2006/3 Vol. 61, p. 197-266. DOI : 10.3917/popu.603.0227 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Electronic distribution by Cairn on behalf of I.N.E.D. I.N.E.D. All rights reserved for all countries. Reproducing this article (including by photocopying) is only authorized in accordance with the general terms and conditions of use for the website, or with the general terms and conditions of the license held by your institution, where applicable. Any other reproduction, in full or in part, or storage in a database, in any form and by any means whatsoever is strictly prohibited without the prior written consent of the publisher, except where permitted under French law.
Recent Demographic Trends in the Developed Countries Population-E 2006, 61(3), 197-266 Jean-Paul SARDON* I. Population change (1) The population of Europe (including the Caucasian successor republics of the former USSR) stood at 745.2 million on 1 January 2005 almost 3 million more than on 1 January 2000. Despite this apparent rise, which partly reflects adjustments made after the most recent wave of censuses (2), the continent s population has remained broadly unchanged since the early 1990s. This is the outcome of very diversified population trends across the continent: a rise in western Europe contrasting with a decrease in the continent s other broad geographical regions. Europe s population would be in decline were the natural decrease not offset by net immigration (Table A). Across the whole continent, an excess of deaths over births produced an annual average loss of 976,000 people over the period 2000-04. This loss increased over time, though slowed somewhat in 2004 when natural change fell from 1.12 to 0.68 million (3). The sharpest population decline is to be found in the former socialist states, mainly those resulting from the break-up of the former USSR (especially Russia), where the birth deficit is compounded by negative net *Institut national d études démographiques and European Demographic Observatory. Translated by Glenn Robertson. (1) All data are taken from the European Demographic Observatory s (EDO) database, which holds the set of population data collected jointly by international organizations (the Council of Europe, Eurostat and the United Nations), and the published figures of national statistical offices. For all those who have in any way contributed to this endeavour, especially Genevieve Houriet-Ségard and Rachid Ouarraou, without whose invaluable assistance the task of maintaining and updating the EDO s database could not be properly done, this work stands witness to my thanks and recognition for their efforts. Minor inconsistencies may be discerned between the (rounded-off) values shown in the tables and the narrative, which is based on the precise values. (2) Hence the decision to show the five-year average in Table A instead of just the values for the last data year. (3) The apparent precision of this and all other tables, may be deceptive, because the quality of migration data is quite poor and may well be underestimated. This would affect the figures for emigration in central and eastern Europe, and immigration in western Europe. Population estimates may also be subject to some uncertainty.
198 J.-P. SARDON migration. A notable improvement occurred in 2004 however, with a reduction in the excess of deaths over births, and an increase in the excess of births over deaths where they occurred, both in all these regions and in the European entities distinguished here. The year-on-year decline in the natural increase in western Europe and in both the 15-member and the 25-member European Union since 2000 was reversed in 2004: at 560,000, natural increase returned to values not seen since the early 1990s. This growth notwithstanding, the Union is hardly thriving, insofar as the natural increase in 2004 remains nearly four times lower than that recorded in the United States (4). The ratio of natural increase in the United States to that of the 25-member EU is 5.5 over the period 2000-04. Across the continent, population trends remain widely diversified (Table A). While growth rates in 2000 ranged from 4.0 in western Europe to 6.5 in eastern Europe, the difference in 2005 was from 5.8 in western Europe to 4.8 in Russia. Since 1989, in both 15 and 25-member UE, net migration has exceeded natural increase. The share of net migration in total population growth in the EU has exceeded 80% on average since 2000. There has been continuing population growth in western Europe as a whole, apart from Germany where the reduced net inflow of migrants since 2003 has ceased to counterbalance the excess of deaths over births. Continuing population growth in western European countries is also being driven by their strong appeal for foreign populations. Almost all central and eastern European countries have recorded population falls, apart from a handful of central European countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Slovakia), Azerbaijan, but also Croatia, the Czech Republic and Armenia where the decline bottomed out in 2004 (Table 1). In all these countries where population is declining, natural growth is negative. While the western European countries are all immigration countries to differing degrees, this is anything but the case in central, and especially eastern, Europe, a fact that is hastening the pace of population decline. In eastern Europe, only Russia and Belarus have kept positive net migration, though the balance is declining steadily (Table 13). Some central European countries Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, in particular still have a certain pull factor. Migration in this region is highly specific in character. It is not just a matter of outflows to wealthy countries and inflows from the former Soviet bloc, but also intra-regional migratory exchanges, usually of ethnic minorities or stemming from the break-up of the old federal states (5). Integration into the European Union by countries in the region may be changing the fundamentals of migration somewhat, but agreements limiting freedom of movement have been put in place. We may (4) Absolute natural growth in the enlarged 25-member European Union is 7.3 times lower than in the United States, for a population 1.7 times greater. (5) For more details, see Jean-Paul Sardon, Europe centrale: des trajectoires démographiques inquiétantes, Le courrier des pays de l Est, no. 1035, La Documentation française, May 2003.
RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 199 TABLE A. POPULATION OF SELECTED BROAD GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS Population size (millions) 1 January 2000 1 January 2005 Annual average change 2000-04 (millions) Due Total to natural increase Annual average growth rate 2000-04 (per 1,000 population) Due Total to natural increase Western Europe 387.3 397.6 + 2.1 + 0.4 + 5.2 + 1.0 Central Europe 121.6 119.4 0.4 0.1 3.7 1.0 Eastern Europe 86.6 83.5 0.6 0.4 7.4 4.3 Russia 145.6 143.5 0.4 0.9 2.9 6.3 Total Europe 742.3 745.2 + 0.6 1.0 + 0.8 1.3 United States 280.7 295.2 + 2.9 + 1.6 + 10.0 + 5.7 Japan 126.9 127.6 + 0.1 + 0.2 + 1.1 + 1.2 15-member EU 375.4 385.3 + 2.0 + 0.4 + 5.2 + 1.0 New Member States 74.9 74.2 0.2 0.1 2.1 1.1 25-member EU 450.3 459.5 + 1.8 + 0.3 + 4.0 + 0.7 Western Europe: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, France, Ireland, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Central Europe: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia and Yugoslavia. Eastern Europe: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine. 15-member EU: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, France, Ireland, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. New Member States: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta. 25-member EU: 15-member EU plus new Member States. Source: EDO. witness a rise in the presence of nationals of western European countries, and an increase in the pressure on the borders of these countries, since integration should boost their economies and hence their appeal. While the main immigration countries in western Europe are Germany and the United Kingdom, and increasingly Spain and Italy in southern Europe (6), the highest net migration rates are observed in Spain, Ireland, Italy, Austria and Switzerland, but most of all Cyprus. Among non-european countries, Israel, Canada and Australia have far higher rates than the United States, which even so is the next-biggest receiving country after the European Union. The EU currently has a population of 459 million. Five Member States have populations over 40 million, one (Poland) is close to this figure, and thirteen have under 10 million. Enlargement significantly increased the share of small-population states, reducing the per-country average from 25 to 18 million people. (6) France s balance of migration is the fifth highest in the Union, although by population size, it ranks now only fourteenth of 15 members, or eighteenth of 25.
200 J.-P. SARDON TABLE B. POPULATION GROWTH FACTORS IN EU COUNTRIES (2004) Growth Growth rate (per 1,000 population) Total Natural Natural Migration Total increase increase Migration Germany 30,822 112,649 81,827 0.37 1.37 0.99 Austria 66,402 4,676 61,726 8.12 0.57 7.55 Belgium 49,431 14,119 35,312 4.74 1.35 3.39 Denmark 13,646 8,591 5,055 2.55 1.63 0.92 Finland 16,879 10,158 6,721 3.23 1.94 1.29 France 361,200 261,016 100,184 5.98 4.32 1.66 Ireland 81,441 33,533 47,908 20.02 8.24 11.78 Luxembourg 3,400 1,874 1,526 7.50 4.13 3.37 Netherlands 47,494 57,454 9,960 2.92 3.53 0.61 United Kingdom 234,425 131,205 103,220 3.92 2.19 1.73 Sweden 35,722 10,396 25,326 3.97 1.16 2.82 Spain 692,693 84,470 608,223 16.23 1.93 14.29 Greece 35,563 713 34,850 3.21 0.06 3.15 Italy 574,130 1,586 572 544 9.87 0.33 9.53 Portugal 54,570 7,288 47,282 5.20 0.70 4.50 Slovenia 1,157 562 1,719 0.58 0.28 0.86 Hungary 19,193 37,355 18,162 1.90 3.70 1.80 Poland 16,773 7,391 9,382 0.44 0.19 0.25 Czech Rep. 9,122 9,513 18 635 0.89 0.93 1.82 Slovakia 4,769 1,895 2,874 0.89 0.35 0.53 Estonia 4,069 3,821 248 3.02 2.83 0.18 Latvia 12,769 11,690 1,079 5.52 5.05 0.47 Lithuania 20,533 10,921 9,612 5.98 3.18 2.80 Cyprus 19,100 3,455 15,645 23.07 4.17 18.90 Malta * 1,882 783 1,099 4.95 2.19 2.76 15-member EU 2,236,174 514,430 1,721,744 5.81 1.37 4.44 New Member States 37,307 75,120 37,813 0.50 1.01 0.51 25-member EU 2,198,867 439,310 1,759,557 4.79 0.99 3.80 * Figures for 2003. Note: The net migration figures in this table are calculated as the difference between total and natural increase; they may differ from those shown in Tables 13 and 14, which are based on recorded migration flows. Source: EDO. Its total population of 459 million has made the European Union one of the most populous integrated regional entities, second only to the 535 million people in ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations, comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Laos and Burma), but ahead of the 429 million population of NAFTA (comprising just three countries, Canada, the United States and Mexico) and the 223 million of MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). But it still lags quite far behind population powerhouses like China and India which, as individual countries with 1.3 and 1.1 billion inhabitants, respectively, are integrated on an entirely different scale to what is possible in the EU, whose role is currently confined to that of a large economic marketplace.
RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 201 In 2004, the population of the European Union grew by 2.2 million people, with 80% of growth coming from net migration, which has more than tripled since 1997, whereas natural increase has declined slightly since 2000. Enlargement has further widened the range of situations within the Union, following the entry not only of central European countries with declining populations, but also of Cyprus, with a steady rate of mainly migration-driven growth. Hence, of the ten new members, five lost population in 2004 (Table B). Seven have smaller populations in 2005 than in 2000. Each of the former eastern bloc countries, apart from Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Slovakia, has an excess of deaths over births, mostly since the early 1990s, but in Hungary since the beginning of the 1980s. Many of these have long been traditional sending countries, but the situation is now tending to change. Croatia, Slovenia and Belarus have registered more arrivals than departures since the late 1990s. Net migration in Hungary and Slovakia has been positive since the start of the 1990s, and in the Czech Republic since the early 1970s. Population growth in the Union thus mainly stems from the older members, especially those with the strongest pull factor, whether traditional destination countries like Germany and the United Kingdom, or new receiving countries like Italy and Spain. The latter two countries, along with France (7) which is characterized by a high natural increase and the United Kingdom, account for most of the Union s growth. Germany s contribution has declined significantly since 2002 due to a sharp rise in the deficit of births over deaths and a drop in net migration. Following Italy and Greece s return to a net births surplus in 2004, Germany remains the only country of the old European Union to record a natural decrease. In all, eight of the EU s 25 Member States are at risk of population decline over the long term, though, in half of them, positive net migration is counterbalancing or limiting the births deficit. Closer scrutiny of the growth rates paints a somewhat different picture. Ireland and Cyprus record the strongest growth 3 to 4 times above the EU average followed by Spain and Italy, supported by some of the Union s highest net migration rates. Ireland has the highest crude rate of natural increase, double that of the second-ranking country, France. At the other end of the scale, the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) registered the sharpest population declines due to a marked births deficit compounded by net emigration. (7) For more detail on population trends in France, see F. Prioux, Recent Demographic Developments in France, Population-E 60 (4), pp. 371-414.
202 J.-P. SARDON II. Migration (8) Migration has recently become a significant component of population growth in the European Union. The most populous countries like Germany and Spain, which received 780,000 and 685,000 people in 2004, respectively (Table 13), are the main destination countries. Spain has moved up rapidly to join Italy as a major receiving country. Italy itself ranks fourth with 445,000 arrivals, behind the United Kingdom (518,000), but ahead of Austria and Switzerland with 127,000 and 120,000 arrivals, respectively. Russia, which was still receiving major inflows at the end of the 1990s (367,100 in 1999), has lost much of its pull factor arrivals had fallen to 80,000 by 2004. In terms of total population size, it is small-population countries that top the league (Table 14). Cyprus has the highest annual inflow relative to population size, accounting for close to 3% (29.7 ) of population in 2004, ahead of Luxembourg (27.6 ), Iceland (18.3 ) and Switzerland (16.3 ). The leading big country is Spain (16.0 ), followed by Austria (15.6 ) and Ireland (12.3 ), while Germany and the United Kingdom register immigration rates of just 9.5 and 8.7, respectively. At the other end of the EU scale, Finland (3.9 ), Portugal (1.6 ) and Malta (1.2 ) have the smallest proportionate annual inflows, among those countries that publish figures, at any rate. The most populous countries may attract most migrants, but also record most departures (Table 13). Nearly 700,000 people left Germany in 2004 91,000 up on 2001 while total arrivals fell by 99,000 over the same period. Next came the United Kingdom with 310,000 departures, the Netherlands (110,000), Switzerland (80,000), Austria (77,000) and Italy (65,000). Spain ranked in seventh place with just 55,000 departures, although in second place for arrivals. The countries with the highest proportion of departures are Luxembourg, with a crude emigration rate of 24.1 in 2004, followed by Iceland (16.5 ), Switzerland (10.8 ), Austria (9.4 ), Germany and Cyprus (8.5 ), Denmark (8.3 ) and the Netherlands (6.8 ). The southern European countries have become the most attractive countries of the EU, and of the European continent as a whole, and this has helped expand their populations. With a net balance of 629,500 immigrants in 2004, Spain records the highest net immigration, ahead of Italy (379,700) and the United Kingdom (207,700). This is a complete reversal of the situation for the southern European countries which, until recently, were sending countries. Germany has also undergone a significant change: its net balance of (8) This analysis uses figures taken from the migration data collected by international organizations (Council of Europe, Eurostat, United Nations), which explains France s omission from the migration flow statistics, despite being a major receiving country. For a detailed analysis of immigration in France, see Xavier Thierry, Recent Immigration Trends in France and Elements for a Comparison with the United Kingdom, Population-E, 59 (5), September-October 2004, pp. 635-672.
RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 203 more than 200,000 immigrants in 2001 and 2002, was down to just 82,500 in 2004, i.e. little different from Austria (50,600) whose population is ten times smaller. This sharp reduction in Germany s net migration since 2001 is the combined product of a slight fall in arrivals and a slight rise in departures. Even so, it remains the main receiving country (780,200 in 2004), ahead of Spain (684,600), the United Kingdom (518,100), Italy (444,600), Austria (127,400), Switzerland (120,200) and France (100,000) (9). In the late 1990s, Russia still had one of Europe s highest net immigration rates, close to that of Germany or the United Kingdom, probably in part due to re-migration by Russians after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Its balance of migration was divided by 4.7 between 2000 and 2004, and is not far off that of Switzerland. In western Europe, only the Netherlands has recorded net emigration since 2003, the product of a fall in new arrivals and an increase in return migration following the implementation of a more restrictive entry and settlement policy. Net migration is generally negative in central and, especially, eastern Europe. From being a traditional sending region, central Europe s place in international migratory flows has changed radically over the last decade. In the early years of the transition towards a market economy, migration was concentrated first among ethnic groups, then among asylum seekers before extending to include more temporary migration (10). While emigration to western Europe and North America has increased over the last decade, the prospect of integration into the European Union of a number of these countries, followed by their effective integration, has strengthened the presence of western country nationals, and likewise of illegal immigrants from further away who see the region as a stopover on their route towards the wealthiest countries. Relative to population size, Cyprus population growth owes most to immigration, with a net immigration rate of 21.3 in 2004, ahead of Spain (14.7 ), Ireland (7.8 ), Italy (6.5 ), Austria (6.2 ) and Switzerland (5.5 ). Other countries, mostly in central and eastern Europe, record more departures than arrivals, but rates are generally low: 2.8 in Lithuania, 2.4 in Armenia and 1.5 in Moldova (Table 14). As well as adding to population growth or decline in the countries concerned, these migration flows are behind the formation of sub-populations of foreign origin, whose size varies with immigration intensity and history. Counting these populations of immigrant origin is a difficult (and sensitive) task. Most national statistics merely distinguish people by nationality, seldom by country of birth. Each of these criteria has its specific limits. On a like-forlike annual flow basis, the total foreign population of a country largely depends on its naturalization policies. Here, there is a contrast between the (9) Data for France are not shown in Table 13, as INSEE records neither arrivals nor departures from the country. (10) For further details, see Jean-Paul Sardon, Europe centrale: des trajectoires démographiques inquiétantes, Le courrier des pays de l Est, op. cit.
204 J.-P. SARDON French jus soli and the German jus sanguinis. Also, while people born abroad are generally of foreign nationality, some may also count as nationals of the country, especially where citizens of former colonies are concerned. Germany had the largest population of foreign nationality at 1 January 2005, standing at 6.2 million, or 7.5% of the total population (Table 15), followed by France (3.6 million and 6.3% in the 1999 census), Spain (3.4 million, 7.8% of the population), the United Kingdom (2.7 million in 2004, 4.6%), Italy (1.5 million in 2001, 2.5%), Switzerland (1.5 million, 20.6%), Belgium (0.9 million in 1996, 9.0%), Austria (0.8 million, 9.3%) and the Netherlands (0.7 million, 4.3%). While the most populous countries tend to have the biggest foreign populations, they account for much larger shares of the total population in countries like Luxembourg, where they make up a third of the total, Switzerland (20.6%), Austria (9.3%) and Belgium (9.0%). A distinction needs to be made between receiving countries for citizens of other European Union states (e.g. Luxembourg (11) ), and those like Germany and France, whose foreign populations mainly consist of third country nationals (12). 1. Births III. Births, fertility For the whole continent, over 7.7 million births were registered in 2004. While this is slightly up (by nearly 300,000) on its lowest total in 2001, it is still short of its 1996 level. Even so, the rise recorded in 2003 and 2004 contrasts sharply with the stability of the period 1999-2002. Over the longer term, the annual number of births has fallen by 5.9 million ( 43%) compared with 1960, by 3.3 million ( 30%) compared with the average for the decade of the 1980s, and by 1.9 million ( 24%) since 1990. This represents a crude birth rate of approximately 10.4 per 1,000 inhabitants in 2004. The last decade s relative stagnation in continent-wide birth totals, followed by a slight rise in the past two or three years, conceals wide disparities between different countries in Europe. For example, births have risen more slowly since 2002 in all the countries that joined the European Union on 1 May 2004 than in the older member countries (1.6% against 2.3%). As the previous decline had been sharper in those countries, the share of births in the ten new Member States relative to the enlarged 25-member EU has fallen, dropping from 16.9% in 1995 to 14.6% in 2004. (11) 85% of foreign residents in Luxembourg were nationals of a country in the 15-member EU at 1 January 2004. (12) The proportion of third country nationals stood at 27% in Germany in 2005 and 37% in France in 1999.
RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 205 Ireland is one of the very few European Union countries whose birth total rose steadily over the past decade, despite a levelling off from 2003 to 2004. Sweden and Spain have been similarly placed since 1999, with total births up by 14.5% and 19.6%, respectively, between 1999 and 2004, i.e. slightly higher than Ireland over the same period (14.4%). In the rest of Europe, Russia registered the sharpest rise between 1999 and 2004 with a 24% increase. Outside Europe, Israel alone has recorded a steady rise in total births since the mid-1980s (13), standing at 10.1% since 1999. A comparison of births in 2004 and the uneventful year of 1999 shows births to be still rising in absolute numbers in some western European countries Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Iceland, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Greece and Italy and in eastern Europe in Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine and some Caucasian republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), although this admittedly followed a very pronounced previous decline in the European countries of the former socialist bloc. Outside Europe, Israel, the United States and Australia also saw births rise over the period. In some countries, like Switzerland ( 6.8%) and Portugal ( 5.8%), the decline between 1999 and 2004 is quite pronounced. It is sharper still, dropping by between 10.8% and 15.8%, in Albania and the successor states of former Yugoslavia (except for Slovenia), as well as Poland ( 6.8%), Romania ( 7.8%) and Lithuania ( 16.5%). The United States has consistently recorded a higher annual birth total than that of the former 15-member EU every year since 1999, despite having a quarter fewer inhabitants (295 versus 385 million). This more vigorous population growth, combined with higher net immigration, is an obvious advantage for the United States future economic development. In Europe, especially within the European Union, the role and importance of population growth for the future were long disregarded, but now appear to be achieving some recognition among Europe s policy makers, to judge by the Green Paper published by the European Commission in March 2005 (14). Population featured as a factor in the European debate only to establish procedures for representation of the different States within the European institutions, or to examine the sustainability of pension systems. There is also a need for policies to promote fertility, notably by making it easier to reconcile work and family life so that couples can achieve their desired family sizes. An analysis of crude birth rates, which are affected by variations in the age structure between countries, prompts similar observations. The birth rate varied by a factor of more than two in Europe (Table 2) in 2004, ranging from 6.5 in Malta to 19 to Turkey, where the rate has dropped by more than (13) Part of the rise stems from immigration. (14) European Commission, Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity between the generations, Green Paper, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2005, 29 p.
206 J.-P. SARDON 3 points since 2000. Next to Turkey are Azerbaijan (15.8 ) and Ireland (15.2 ), followed by Iceland and Albania. Western European birth rates, which almost all exceed 10, contrast sharply with eastern Europe, where the birth rate in the countries that joined the European Union in the recent enlargement is 1.3 points below that of the older members. In eastern Europe, only the Caucasian republics, Albania and Macedonia have rates above 11. While the EU s birth rate, more specifically that of its western part, seems relatively favourable in the larger European context, it still falls well short of that recorded in the non-european developed countries, where it was almost universally above 12 in 2004: 14.0 in the United States, 14.1 in 2003 in New Zealand, and 12.6 in Australia. But at 10.5, it is very close to that of Canada (10.6 in 2002) and well above that of Japan (8.8 ). This higher birth rate in the overseas English-speaking countries deserves closer investigation (15), for while the age structure is certainly advantageous to the new world countries, total fertility rates show that on a like-for-like basis in terms of age structure, these countries, particularly the United States and New Zealand, retain an advantage that cannot be explained by higher immigrant fertility alone. Israel, however, has the highest birth rate of all at 21.3, i.e. above that of Turkey. 2. Fertility The computation of total fertility rates (TFR) unaffected by the background effect of age structure variations makes it possible to add detail to the observations based on the crude birth rate. The estimated TFR for the 25 European Union countries increased by 3 hundredths in a year to stand at 1.51 children per woman in 2004 (Table 3). It has remained broadly unchanged since 2000, at its highest level since 1993, since when the annual average TFRs of the 25-member EU has stood at 1.47 children per woman, i.e. just 70% of the replacement rate. In approximately 18 years time, therefore, and for at least 12 years thereafter, this 30% shortfall will result in 30% fewer young adults than today, assuming zero net migration in the cohorts concerned (1993-04) (16). Fertility in the ten new Member States of the European Union declined steadily from the mid-1980s, but also rose slightly from 1.23 children per woman in 2003 to 1.25 in 2004. Fertility in the new Member States has been below that of the former 15-member EU since 1997 (Table C). A country-by-country analysis reveals that fertility generally has begun to recover over the past two years. Whereas the TFR for 2002 was lower than that for 2000 in 25 of the 38 European countries for which recent data are available, this was the case for only 19 mainly eastern European countries (15) An initial expression of which will be found in the special subject of this chronicle. (16) Assuming a mean age at childbearing of 30 and if the situation persists for 12 years (30 12 = 18).
RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 207 TABLE C. TOTAL FERTILITY RATE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (CHILDREN PER WOMAN) 15-member EU New Member States 25-member EU Source: EDO. 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1.46 1.46 1.47 1.50 1.49 1.50 1.52 1.55 1.42 1.36 1.32 1.31 1.27 1.24 1.23 1.25 1.47 1.45 1.46 1.48 1.46 1.46 1.48 1.51 in 2004. In western Europe, only Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, Switzerland and Portugal remain below the 2000 TFR in 2004. In all, only two western European countries (Ireland and Portugal) and five central and eastern European countries (Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Belarus and Georgia) recorded a drop in the TFR over the period 2002-04. Fertility outside Europe mirrors this trend closely, with a slight recovery since 2002, except in Japan, Israel and Turkey. In the latter two countries, fertility remains very high. Turkey s ongoing demographic transition is reflected in a steadily declining TFR, down by a half-child per woman since 1992. Israel, now the highest fertility country of all those for which data are available, paints a very different picture: fertility has been broadly unchanged since 1995 at between 2.90 and 2.95 children per woman, after levelling off at around 2.6 in the first half of the 1990s. The fertility trend, which may be driven by a combination of immigration and a demographic war between the different communities populating the country, deserves closer scrutiny. Japan s total fertility rate has declined still further it has dropped 6 hundredths since 2000, and now stands at 1.29 children per woman in 2003 (17). In recent years, the strongest recovery has been seen in countries which had previously recorded a sharp fertility decline. Armenia and Ukraine (where the TFR rose from 1.11 and 1.10 children per woman to 1.38 and 1.22, respectively, between 2000 and 2004), Estonia and Russia are all cases in point. Azerbaijan recorded a sharp rise in 2004 (+0.24 children per woman compared with 2002, its all-time low, although still well above the lowest values recorded in eastern Europe). The European Union s sharpest rise was in Sweden, which has added 0.21 children per woman since 2000, bringing the TFR to 1.75. Ireland and France still remain the Union s highest fertility countries, with 1.93 and 1.91 children per woman, respectively (18). Outside the EU, Iceland s level stands even higher, at 2.04 children per woman. Fertility fell to its lowest level in most western European countries in the 1990s; in none of the twenty or so central and eastern European countries did this happen before 1998, and not until 2002 for 13 of them. One notable exception was the United Kingdom, whose fertility very closely mirrored that of France until about 1997, diverging slightly with the onset of the French rise. However, since falling to a minimum in 2001, the TFR in the United (17) Fertility decline in the Republic of Korea not one of the countries covered regularly by our chronicle is even more pronounced. It fell from 1.47 to 1.17 children per woman between 2000 and 2002, with a modest recovery in 2003 (1.19). (18) In France, the only country for which we have data on the number of births in 2005, the TFR continued to increase, reaching 1.93 children per woman.
208 J.-P. SARDON Kingdom has started rising again and reached 1.76 in 2004, thus reducing the gap from 0.25 to 0.15 children per woman. Fertility fell to its low point in Portugal in the same year. Luxembourg s lowest point so far was attained in 2002-03, that of Austria and the United Kingdom in 2001. Ukraine, the country with Europe s lowest TFR since 1999, yielded bottom place to Belarus (1.20 against 1.22 hildren per woman) in 2004, followed by the Czech Republic and Poland with 1.22 and 1.23 children per woman, respectively, Slovakia and Latvia (1.24), Slovenia and Moldova (1.25), Lithuania (1.26) and Hungary (1.28). Hence, eight of the ten lowest-fertility European countries are now members of the European Union. Greece has western Europe s lowest TFR with 1.29 children per woman, followed by Spain (1.32) and Italy (1.33). At the opposite end of the scale, Israel and Turkey with TFRs of 2.9 and 2.43 children per woman, respectively, in 2003, are ahead of the United States with 2.06. The general TFR trend elsewhere is below replacement: only Iceland is close with 2.04 children per woman. As mentioned, the European Union is headed by Ireland (1.93) and France (1.91) (19), followed by Norway (20) (1.83), Finland (1.80), Denmark (1.78), United Kingdom (1.76) and Sweden (1.75), confirming the relatively robust fertility of the Scandinavian countries, where proactive policies have led to significant improvement in the work-family life balance and gender equality. By contrast, the fertility trend in the three Mediterranean countries (Spain, Greece and Italy) is disturbing, notwithstanding a modest improvement in recent years. In these countries, family formation appears to be delayed not just until relatively permanent employment is found, but also until home purchase, as in Spain. Moreover, there is societal disapproval of births outside marriage, similar to that in Germanic societies like Germany and Switzerland (21). 3. Completed fertility In almost all European countries, and elsewhere in the industrialized world, a decrease in completed fertility is observed among women born from the late 1950s, or even the late 1930s, so rare are the countries recording a significant rise in cohort fertility in the post-war period. Some countries have escaped this general trend, however. In Denmark, where completed fertility rose slightly among women born in the second half of the 1950s (22), it seemed to have levelled off at 1.93 children per woman, though it is rising slightly again among women born in the late 1960s, the last birth cohorts for which (19) We will not dwell here upon the uncertainties surrounding the real fertility level in France due to under-estimation of the population in the 1999 census (cf. J.-P. Sardon, Recent Demographic Trends in the Developed Countries, Population-E, 59 (2), March-April 2004, pp. 263-314. (20) Switzerland is not member of the European Union. (21) These countries are also among western Europe s lowest-fertility countries. (22) Raising completed fertility from 1.84 to 1.91 over five birth cohorts.
RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 209 the estimates are sufficiently robust (Table 4). The situation in Luxembourg is closely comparable, with a marked rise between the 1953 and 1966 cohorts, raising completed fertility from 1.68 to 1.86 children per woman; the trend has reversed with subsequent cohorts however, and 1969 cohort fertility is estimated at 1.80. These figures must nevertheless be viewed with caution, as the small population size may be a source of significant random fluctuations. Generally, it is in Luxembourg that the continent s sharpest recent rise in cohort fertility has been recorded. The United States also witnessed a slight rise in completed fertility between the 1954 and 1958 birth cohorts. It then picked up further momentum, with women born in 1967 reaching replacement level at 2.09 children per woman. Apart from countries where the onset of the fertility decline was late Iceland, where completed fertility of the 1969 birth cohort was 2.24 children per woman, and Ireland, where that of the 1967 birth cohort was 2.13 Norway today has the highest completed fertility (2.04 in the 1969 birth cohort). In France, completed fertility dropped below 2 children per woman with the 1968 birth cohort, and stood at 1.97 in the 1969 birth cohort. But these values probably somewhat underestimate the real intensity of fertility in the most recent birth cohorts, as the estimation method used does not take fully into account births deferred beyond age 35. Elsewhere in Europe, completed fertility exceeds 2 children per woman only in the Balkans, with Albania at 2.37 (for the 1968 birth cohort), Macedonia (2.17) and Serbia- Montenegro (2.02). In Azerbaijan, lifetime fertility is still 2.11 children per woman in the 1970 birth cohort. At the other end of the spectrum stand a number of western, southern and eastern European countries where cohort fertility has fallen to all-time lows. In eight European countries, completed fertility among the 1969 birth cohort will not be above 1.6 children per woman, and as low as 1.39 in Germany, 1.59 in Austria, 1.55 in Spain (women born in 1967), 1.59 in Greece, 1.47 in Italy (1967 birth cohort), 1.54 in Russia and also doubtless in Ukraine. And in all these countries, as in almost all others, fertility is continuing to decline. Despite their sharp fertility decline since the end of the 1980s, completed fertility in the European Union s newest members remains higher than that in the former 15-member EU; it falls below replacement level only among women born in the 1960s, i.e. more than ten cohorts behind the 15-member EU. As a result, completed fertility is slightly higher in the new 25-member EU than in the old EU, standing at 1.77 and 1.74 children per woman, respectively, for the 1964 birth cohort. Generally speaking, cohort fertility in the non-european industrialized countries is higher than in Europe. Completed fertility in the 1967 birth cohort in the United States, Australia and New Zealand is 2.09, 1.99 and 2.24 children per woman, respectively. In Canada and Japan, however, lifetime fertility among women born in the 1960s is unlikely to be higher than in most European countries: 1967 birth cohort fertility stands at 1.71 and 1.47 children per woman, respectively.
210 J.-P. SARDON 4. Mean age at childbearing While lifetime fertility is falling relatively quickly almost everywhere, an analysis of the cohort trend in age at childbearing reveals transient differences between regions in the various phases of demographic transition and post-transition. Hence, in western Europe, the decline in completed fertility was no longer accompanied by an earlier mean age at childbearing for women born in the mid-1940s onwards; in central and especially eastern Europe, the trend began to reverse only much later, with the cohorts born in the mid-1960s (Table 5). But within these groups, some countries have followed a distinctive pattern. In Ireland and the Mediterranean countries (excluding Italy), the onset of the trend reversal came with women born in the mid-1950s, i.e. a gap of ten birth cohorts from the rest of western Europe. The same evolution occurred at about the same time in the successor states of former Yugoslavia, and in Hungary and the Czech Republic. Elsewhere, age at childbearing did not begin to rise until the birth cohorts of the mid-1960s. Some countries of the former Soviet Union, like Moldova, Ukraine and the Caucasian republics seem not yet to have entered this new phase. The rapid rise in the age at childbearing in western and southern Europe after the trend reversal was not really mirrored in central and eastern Europe. Age at childbearing has risen significantly only in Romania and Bulgaria, and especially Slovenia, where the behaviour of couples seems to more closely mirror that of western Europe. Elsewhere, the rise is hesitant and often follows a lengthy period of near-stabilization, even where the reversal is reasonably long-established, as in the former Yugoslavia, Hungary or the Czech Republic. This, at least for the time being, is a characteristic specific to the European countries of the former socialist bloc. These differences in the timing of change have widened the gap in mean ages at childbearing between eastern and western Europe, although probably only temporarily. In western Europe the mean age is around 28-29 years, but is still only around 24-25 years in the European countries of the former Socialist bloc. The mean age at childbearing is still rising in all western European countries. It now exceeds 30 years in the Netherlands and Ireland. But the rise is slowing down in most countries, especially Scandinavia, and more recently the United Kingdom and Luxembourg. The gaps may be wide between western and eastern Europe, but they are not insignificant within western Europe, as the age at childbearing in Greece and Portugal is on average more than two years younger than in Ireland and the Netherlands. 5. Age at first birth Information is given here only for those countries that record birth order among all births to a mother. This excludes three of the most populous western European countries that record birth order in the current marriage (Germany and the United Kingdom (23) ) or used to do so (France) (24).
RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 211 Mean age at first birth and mean age of childbearing evolve in similar ways; but mean age at first birth tends to anticipate (25) and amplify the changes in the age at childbearing, all parities combined, which is a weighted average of the age at childbearing at different parities. A reduction in completed fertility tends to increase the weight of the first birth, even if the proportion of childless women grows. Maternal age at first birth is rising rapidly in most western European countries for which data is available. In the Scandinavian countries, the increase slowed down substantially with women born during the 1960s, mirroring, but at a slower rate, the trend towards stabilization observed for all births (Table 6). In central and eastern Europe, these changes began later, with only a moderate rise in age at first birth from cohorts born in the late 1960s. Only Slovenia stands out from its neighbours, with a rise of 3.2 years in age at first birth between the 1958 and 1973 cohorts. In the remainder of former Yugoslavia, the increase is slow and relatively longer-standing, having begun with the post-war birth cohorts. In Russia, the decrease in mean age at first birth has been rapid and prolonged. Bulgarian women, who were traditionally the youngest at their first and all subsequent births, have now been caught up or overtaken by women in different countries (Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Baltic States and Russia). Central and eastern European women have their first child on average 3 to 4 years earlier than their western counterparts, at around 23-24 years of age. While age at first birth among women born at the end of the 1960s seldom exceeds 24 in the former Socialist bloc countries apart from Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia-Montenegro, it is never below 26 in western Europe and is even approaching 29 in the Netherlands. This postponement of first motherhood to such advanced ages raises questions about the risks of involuntary childlessness run by couples, despite the advances in assisted reproductive technology (ART) (26). 6. Permanent infertility Permanent infertility (27) has already risen to very high levels in a number of western and central European countries (28). At least one in five of the women born at the end of the 1960s will remain childless in Austria, Finland, England and perhaps also soon in Ireland and the Netherlands (Table 7), plus (23) An omission offset by the General Household Survey data for England and Wales, however. (24) To fill this gap, we used the biological birth order estimates for these countries established and published by France Prioux: L infécondité en Europe, in Démographie européenne, Dynamiques démographiques, vol. 2 Paris: INED/John Libbey Eurotext, 1993, pp. 231-251. (25) Stabilization of the mean age at first birth precedes that of the mean age at childbearing. (26) The cost and complexity of ART restricts its use to necessarily limited, specific indications. (27) Permanent infertility refers to the proportion of women who have never had a liveborn child in the course of their reproductive life. (28) The data for eastern Europe are very incomplete.
212 J.-P. SARDON Germany, at least in its western part. Should the trend continue, it could also spread to southern Europe. The same situation is occurring, but with a slight lag, in eastern Europe. It is not until the cohorts born in the early 1970s that similar high values will be reached in most central European countries. Poland is almost there now, but in the longer term, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and the Baltic States could well join the group of countries with high permanent infertility. Women born in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the old Socialist bloc countries are now adopting patterns of behaviour very close to those of western European women, and the levels of infertility between the two parts of the continent are rapidly becoming very similar. While the estimation procedure used, based on incidence rates, probably tends to underestimate the later recovery (29), the situation in these countries remains worrying, especially with the rapid rise in infertility (30). In Poland, nearly one in five of the women born in 1971 is likely to remain childless an increase of 9 points in eleven cohorts. The rapid rise in infertility, especially in central Europe (Poland, Croatia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria) and in Latvia, even if overstated by the estimation method used, nevertheless indicates that these already very high levels could rise further still. Conversely, permanent infertility could be below 10% in Portugal, though the very low values recorded, for the mid-1960s cohorts in particular, prompt the suspicion that as in Bulgaria, all of former Yugoslavia, and possibly Romania the data may induce (or may have induced) a severe underestimation of permanent infertility levels. Note that permanent infertility is not gaining ground in the Scandinavian countries where it remains below 15%, except in Finland, with the same level as in the United States. IV. Marriage and divorce While total fertility rates have evolved more or less uniformly, either falling or at best stabilizing, since the beginning of the 1990s, nuptiality has, with the odd exception, presented a more mixed picture which may reflect changing behaviours, at least in western Europe (Table 8) (31). (29) The Table 7 figures in roman typeface can be regarded as comparatively certain, as they include an estimated component of less than 5% of the total at most. The somewhat less robust estimates of permanent infertility, still with an estimated component of no more than 15%, are shown in italics. (30) For a more detailed analysis, see T. Frejka and J.-P. Sardon, The impact of first birth trends on fertility in developed countries: A cohort analysis, paper given to the Population Association of America annual conference, Los Angeles, 30 March 1 April, 2006. A slightly amended version has been published under the title First birth trends in developed countries: A cohort analysis in the series MPDIR Working Paper, WP-2006-14. (31) Even so, the period first marriage rates in Table 8, that concern only de jure marriages and not all forms of union, must be interpreted with caution, since the weight of new and competing forms of cohabitation varies widely throughout Europe. Furthermore, traditional religious marriages in some Balkan states (Albanian populations in Macedonia and Kosovo) and Caucasian republics (Georgia) are registered in the vital records only belatedly, if at all.
RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 213 The general decline in marriage rates seems to have abated more or less all across western Europe, sometimes quite recently, as in Germany, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and in some European countries of the former socialist bloc (Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania), where the rate reached its low point in 2001-02. There are singular exceptions to this stabilization Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Poland where the last data year is the lowest point recorded since World War Two. The situation is relatively comparable in Spain and the Czech Republic, where the low point was reached in 2003. Elsewhere, despite slight year-on-year variations, the female first marriage rate remains slightly higher than in the 1990s, at least in northern Europe and France (32). Even so, in a number of countries where marriage rates had begun to rise slightly, the female first marriage rate has fallen again, to the very low levels recorded in the 1990s in some cases (Spain and Italy), although not in others (France). The aggregate result of these changes since 2001 has been a significant stabilization in the overall rate at its lowest level for both the 15-member and 25-member European Union. Hence, for the 15-member EU, it has returned to its mid-1990s level (566 in 2004). The marriage rate is somewhat lower in the new Member States of the Union (544 ). The lowest female first marriage rates today are found in the European Union s most recent new members Slovenia (405 ), Estonia (438 ), Hungary (453 ) and Latvia (465 ), although they are not much higher among the older members (461 in Belgium in 2003). The picture in central and eastern Europe is so mixed, for marriages at least, that the region also includes countries with the highest first marriage rates. Hence, all countries with a female first marriage rate above 700 apart from Malta (808 ) and Denmark (746 ) (33) are found in the region: Macedonia (826 ), Azerbaijan (801 ), well ahead of Romania (736 ) and Serbia-Montenegro (727 ). There are probably a wide range of reasons for this, as the popularity of marriage has never declined in some countries in the group like Macedonia, whose lowest rate was 772 (34) in 2001, while Azerbaijan s rate rose from 519 to 801 between 1999 and 2004. While western Europe s lowest-ever level (411 in Sweden in 1998 (35) ) is higher than Slovenia s current rate (405 ), still lower rates were recorded in Estonia in 1998 (351 ), Armenia in 2000 (336 ) and Georgia in 2001 (36) (323 ). (32) A change in the system used for processing vital records, introduced in 1998, has resulted in a much lower degree of exhaustivity. The INSEE estimates that in 1998, 4% of marriages, 1.2% of deaths and 0.3% of births went unregistered, while the quality of monthly marriage data has dropped sharply. (33) Discounting Cyprus, where the measure of nuptiality is distorted by the large number of marriages of non-resident foreigners celebrated there. (34) And possibly also, but to a lesser extent, in Serbia-Montenegro and Romania, whose low points were reached in 1999 and 2001, with 621 and 634 respectively. (35) It would be misleading to include the 312 observed in 1991 in the GDR at the height of the turmoil which followed the fall of the Berlin Wall.