Indo-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Cooperation in Indian Ocean

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Policy Feeds (May 2016) Head Office Pakistan House Nordic Pakistan House UK House No. 9-B, Street 12, Ruten, 33, 1. TV. 2700 Bronshoj 115 Bath Street, Glasgow, G2 2SZ F-7/2, Islamabad Denmark United Kingdom Pakistan Indo-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Cooperation in Indian Ocean www.pakistanhouse.net Indian Ocean, a grave threat for India. India also sparked questions on developments such as the docking of Chinese submarines in Colombo and Karachi and China's ulterior motives in Indian Ocean. China claims that its submarine deployments are part of its counter-piracy missions but India considers this establishment as China's expended undersea presence in the Indian Ocean. In recent days, Indian Ocean is featuring more prominently in debates among United States, Japan and India. Indian Ocean covers one-fifth of water on the Earth's surface and generates significant long-term trade flows and energy interests in Asia. Therefore, Indian Ocean is one of the focus area within the growing trilateral cooperation between India, U.S. and Japan. The tension between India and China in Indian Ocean is increasing as India is more concerned about the expansion and deployment of People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine in its backyard. The Indian Defense Ministry report of 2013 constituted Chinese submarine deployments in In these circumstances, India is responding with a stronger hand in space, emerging from its so-called maritime blindness with the hope of being more than just a continental power. In March 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Mauritius and gave a far-reaching vision for space while putting Indian Ocean at the top of PAKISTAN HOUSE 2016 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 1

India's foreign policy priorities and promised to defend India's maritime interests. In this regard, India is planning to spend almost 61 billion dollars in next 12 years to expand its navy. Furthermore, India is also adding 100 new warships in its 137-ship fleet and is now focusing on undersea domain while building its first antisubmarine force. Indian Navy has also decided to add six nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines in its naval capabilities. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has promised to bolster maritime security cooperation, and the United States and Japan are cooperating with India in this regard. Obama's visit to India in 2015 on India's Republic Day parade led to the U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean Region as well as U.S.- India Defense Framework. The agreement expanded defense cooperation and sent a strong signal that the two countries want to work together and achieve a vision in the maritime space. Moreover, India and Japan also decided to sign a defense pact that may include cooperation on maritime surveillance. For the first time, Japan became a permanent member of the annual U.S.-India Malabar exercises in the Bay of Bengal in 2015 and the three countries conducted anti-submarine warfare exercises. Also, U.S. military recently announced that it will hold joint naval exercises with Japan and India near South China Sea. In addition, tri-lateral cooperation could extend into the technology realm. During the annual U.S.- Japan Security Seminar in Washington in April 2016, Vice Admiral Umio Otsuka, president of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force Command and Staff College stated that China's increasing undersea presence increases the need for more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to better monitor China's intentions. Japan has extensive experience in the fields of robotics that could prove crucial, especially if unmanned underwater vehicles come increasingly into play in the Indian Ocean. PAKISTAN HOUSE 2016 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 2

military reactors. Opaqueness and transparency does not exist among these three streams. Critically some safeguarded Indian facilities may produce weapons usable materials that could contribute to Indian nuclear stockpile. Technological advances will add a new dimension to the undersea environment and India, Japan and U.S. are thinking to deal with the new instabilities that can arise in that domain. This depicts that it will be even more important to fashion an update regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. On the other hand, expanding undersea operations, complicated by a nuclear deterrent, put the whole region in a strategic flux that is unlikely to diminish in near future. The way in which these three states are integrated into the larger Indo-Pacific picture is crucial as it would destabilize the Indian Ocean Region. Sadaf Sultana (Research Associate) IAEA Safeguards and Indian Reactors India has a unique safeguards agreement with IAEA and additional protocol. The separation plan divides the reactors into two streams of civilian and military reactors but rather it has established three streams unsafeguarded civilian reactors, safeguarded civilian reactors and The complexities will mature further with the rapid development of Indian nuclear industry as India has envisaged plans for new reactors. Further, with the expansion of Indian nuclear power program, it will solely be up to India whether to put new built facilities under continuous safeguards or not. Evidence suggests that the 500MW Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor that has achieved criticality in April 2016, does not comes under IAEA safeguards and will surely contribute to unsafeguarded weapons grade plutonium by acting as a new pathway for electricity and plutonium production (see figure 1.0 that provides the figures of annual loading and discharge of the aforementioned reactor). The estimates provide clear indication that how PAKISTAN HOUSE 2016 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 3

safeguarded material can be utilized to produce unsafeguarded plutonium. India has a limited additional protocol that is restricted mainly to Indian export activities. Currently there are eight nuclear reactors that come under the stream of unsafeguarded civilian reactors and India s additional protocol does not extend to theses reactors. Furthermore, the agreement lacks any formal verification that whether the civilian unsafeguarded stream is contributing to Indian nuclear program in form of unsafeguarded plutonium. There is a strong reason that India could use its unsafeguarded work on to achieve a fuller separation of its civilian and military reactors. Furthermore, proliferation-sensitive components of Indian nuclear power industry should be placed under permanent safeguards. India should renounce its options that facilitate the use of safeguarded items to produce unsafeguarded nuclear material. IAEA safeguards should be used to assure the concerned states that elements of Indian nuclear buildup are not contributing to fissile material production that would only increase further by assistance of nuclear suppliers. Figure 1.0: Figures for the annual loading and discharge of India s Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor pressurized heavy water reactors for building more nuclear weapons material like it did in the late 1990 s that could significantly feed the military stream of Indian reactors. Saman Choudary (Research Associate) This unique nature of IAEA safeguards should be considered by the international community and NSG before giving membership to India as it could prove problematic to the nuclear suppliers. NSG member states should understand that nuclear cooperation with India would further fuel arms race in South Asia. India should extensively PAKISTAN HOUSE 2016 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 4

Is Heart of Asia Process on the Right Track? The Heart of Asia or the Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation (HoAP) for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan was co-initiated by Afghanistan and Turkey in 2011 with an aim to encourage the countries in immediate or extended neighborhood of Afghanistan to play a positive role in the stability and prosperity of Afghanistan and of the whole region. It is important to note that the Heart of Asia is not a single region or a new geographic entity. Afghanistan finds itself right at the centre of South and Central Asia, the Middle East, and the western periphery of the Far East. The HoAP borrows countries from adjacent regions and clusters them around the troubled Afghanistan. This Process is loosely based on the 2002 Kabul Declaration of Good Neighborly Relations which recognizes certain fundamental issues such as fighting terrorism (especially dismantling terrorist bases), respect for territorial integrity in the region, and noninterference policy. The process is designed to bring the region together to discuss and attempt to solve challenges pertinent to the broader region with a distinct focus on Afghanistan and is predominantly being driven by the complex and unique security environment of Afghanistan in particular and of the region in general. The complexity and uniqueness of this environment is mainly attributed to the vicious conduct of non-state actors and its transnational impact which requires new collective security arrangements and increased political dialogue. It is also driven by the potential of Afghanistan to offer positive externalities and economic derivatives upon stability. As a geopolitically vulnerable state with low levels of socio-economic development, Afghanistan relies much on the goodwill of its broader neighborhood and the agendas of regional powers. The Heart of Asia Process allows Afghanistan to lead a process where it sways more authority and permits it to better determine its own agenda from a regional perspective and also helps the other members to understand the challenges that Afghanistan faces do not merely affect itself and neither are they solely the produce of Afghanistan. It appears to be a useful institutional vehicle for Afghanistan to propagate the concerns and opportunities it sees for itself and the broader region, particularly in light of the possible complete withdrawal of US-led NATO-ISAF PAKISTAN HOUSE 2016 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 5

forces. The problem is that there are too many diverging interests between regional countries, and between states outside the immediate region and those within, which overshadow the spirit of process and leads it to a stalemate. In addition to this a quite large pool of members leads to the watering down of the effectiveness of the Process. The speed and efficiency of reaching consensus and initiating confidence building measures and projects is largely undermined by the politics of conflicting interests by the member states. HoAP participating as well as supporting countries and organizations will never stop looking at Afghanistan s existing woes and post withdrawal potential troubles through the lens of their own national interest and concerns which HoAP does not satisfactorily accommodate. As Kabul co-stewards the Process, it has to better incorporate the interests and calculations of immediate regional powers and to an extent those of extra-regional powers. The current Afghan administration has not shown sufficient political will and dedication to kindle the Process at the highest levels. For the Process to thrive, political solidarity in Kabul is key. Kabul has to face the challenge of convincing member geopolitical actors that the Afghan regime is not under US tutelage. and/or other Western powers use this forum to lighten their burden or shift responsibility, rather they may use it for their own political tradeoffs. In order to alleviate distrust among the member countries the government of Afghanistan should interact with participating countries more closely and secure bilateral as well as multilateral agreements issues like border management, eradication of drug trafficking and human smuggling etc. It should also try to secure long-term soft loans to stabilize its economy. Maybe the best way to strengthen the HoAP in the Afghan regional environment is to strongly associate it with the ECO. This includes Afghanistan s entire neighborhood and two Turkic states, i.e. Turkey (the coinitiator of HoAP) and Azerbaijan. Although the ECO is not a success story but it is at least a mechanism that seems relatively free of the diplomatic and geopolitical games associated with the HoAP. Waqas Waheed Malik (Researcher) Some participating countries will not endorse the Process, if they feel that the US PAKISTAN HOUSE 2016 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 6

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