Chapter 5. Pokhran II and the U.S. Response

Chapter 5 Pokhran II and the U.S. Response The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led coalition government that came to power in India in March 1998, decided to carry out five nuclear tests in the deserts of Pokhran (Rajasthan) in May 1998. As stated in the previous chapter, Pokhran had also been the site of India s first nuclear tests also (in 1974). Therefore, the 1998 tests came to be known as Pokhran II. The U.S., as could be expected, reacted strongly against Pokhran II as it was against the non-proliferation regime that it was trying to promote. This chapter will analyse the causes and consequences of Pokhran II and the U.S. response to Pokhran II. The impact of Pokhran II on India-U.S. relations will be the focus of study in this chapter. Why Pokhran II? The BJP, known particularly in Western circles as a right-wing nationalist party, went to the 12th general elections to the Indian Parliament, with an election manifesto 1 that promised to keep India s nuclear options open if it was voted to power. In these elections, the BJP emerged as the single largest political party with 182 seats. The other major contender for the government, the Congress (I) won only 141 seats. The President of India, K. R. Narayanan, invited the leader of the BJP led coalition, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), Atal Behari Vajpayee, to form the government. Vajpayee assumed the office of the Prime Minister on March 19, 1998 as the head of a coalition that comprised fifteen political parties (including the BJP). 2 In its election Manifesto, the BJP focused mainly on two issues : Hindutva, which may be paraphrased as Hindu nationalist ideology, and India s security. If analysed, one perceives a direct linkage between the two. The Manifesto stated that the BJP believed that in the ideology of Hindutva, enormous scope for nation building and the resurgence of the Indian state remained latent. Hindutva instills patriotism and consciousness for the 1. See in this connection, BJP Central Office, Bharatiya Janata Party Ka Chunav Ghosana Patra : 1998 (in Hindi), [ Election Manifesto : 1998 ], (New Delhi, All India General Secretary, Manifesto Committee, 1998), p. 4. English translations and transliterations are by the researcher. 2. Political parties like the Haryana Lok Dal, the National Conference and the Telegu Desam Party joined the NDA coalition after the election. Initially, there were twelve political parties in the pre-poll NDA coalition. For details, see, Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (eds.), Indian Politics and the 1998 Election: Regionalism, Hindutva and State Politics (New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1999), pp. 34-35.

148 nation among individuals. 3 The Manifesto devoted two complete chapters (7 and 8) on Our Foreign Policy (Chapter7) and Our National Security (Chapter 8). 4 With regard to India s foreign policy, the Manifesto clearly stated that the BJP did not believe in any differential attitude in matters of national security. The BJP, according to the Manifesto, would oppose any big brotherly attitude in international politics through treaties like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 5 The Manifesto further stated that we would not accept any diktat from anybody in matters of India s national security. 6 In the chapter entitled Our National Security, it hinted at the party s resolve to establish a National Security Council, which would be the apex body to suggest security policies to the government. The proposed council would review India s security perspectives in detail and suggest appropriate measures for strengthening national security. 7 The Manifesto also stated that if the BJP came to power, the party would review India s nuclear policy, and keep the option open for building nuclear weapons. The party would favour strengthening the Agni missile range by enhancing its strike capacity and accuracy. 8 The Manifesto was also critical of the previous Congress and Janata Dal governments for neglecting India s security concerns and pledged that the BJP would strengthen India s security if it was voted to power. 9 It declared that the BJP possessed appropriate plans and the necessary political will, to transform India into a powerful nation in the first decade of the 21st century. 10 The Nuclear Tests Within two months of assuming office, the BJP led NDA government exercised India s nuclear option. It conducted three tests in the deserts of Pokhran on May 11, 1998. Two more nuclear explosions followed on May 13, 1998 in the same place. 11 Prime 3.See, BJP s Chunav Ghosana Patra, n. 1., pp. 4-5. 4.Ibid 5.Ibid, p. 29 6.Ibid 7.Ibid, p. 31. 8.Ibid, pp. 31-32 9.Ibid 10. Ibid, p. 33 11. It may be mentioned in this context that the Narasimha Rao government had also decided to conduct nuclear tests in 1995, but cancelled it under U.S. pressure. See in this connection, Strobe Talbott, Engaging India : Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb (New Delhi : Penguin Books, 2004), p. 48.

149 Minister Vajpayee announced to the media at a very brief press conference after the successful tests on May 11, Today at 15.45 hours, India conducted three underground nuclear tests in the Pokhran range. The tests conducted were with three devices, a fission device, a low-yield device and a thermo-nuclear device. The measured yields are in line with expected results. Measurements have also confirmed that there was no release of radio activity into the atmosphere. 12 The Prime Minister congratulated the scientists for the successful tests. 13 Brajesh Mishra, the Prime Minister s Principal Secretary, later told a press conference that India would be willing to adhere to some provisions of the CTBT, provided the country obtained evidence of reciprocity. 14 Mishra said the country now had a very credible nuclear deterrent, but did not mention whether a decision had been taken at the official level to induct nuclear weapons. 15 On May 13, 1998, India conducted two more underground nuclear tests in the Pokhran range. After the tests, a brief official announcement noted that in continuation of the planned programme of underground nuclear tests begun on May 11, two more sub-kiloton nuclear tests were carried out at the Pokhran range at 12:21 P.M. on 13 May This completes the planned series of tests. Government of India reiterates the offer to consider adhering to some of the undertakings in the CTBT in the framework of the proposal in its statement of 11 May. 16 After Pokhran II, the Indian Prime Minister (unilaterally) declared India to be a nuclear-weapons state and added that India would demand acceptance as the sixth nuclear power in the world. 17 Vajpayee reiterated that Pokhran II was in line with the BJP s agenda of transforming India into a strong nuclear power. In an interview with a weekly news magazine, the Indian Prime Minister said that he had been advocating the cause of India going nuclear for a long time. He said, My party, the BJP and earlier the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, had been raising this demand consistently and forcefully for long. Now that we are in the government, people expect us to translate our long standing commitment into action. And we have shown them we mean business. 18 After the tests, the Vajpayee 12 See, India Conducts Three N-tests The Statesman (Calcutta), 12 May 1998, p.1 13. Ibid 14. Ibid 15. Ibid 16. See, Two More N-tests, Sanctions Imposed, The Statesman (Calcutta), 14 May, 1998, p.1 17. Ibid 18. See, India Today (New Delhi), 15 May, 1998, p.39.

150 government also cited security and political reasons for conducting India s second nuclear tests in 24 years. 19 Pokhran II The Official Position In fact, national security concerns were cited as the primary reason by the NDA government for its decision to go nuclear. Prime Minister Vajpayee was of the opinion that the tests were in India s supreme national interests and that they were guided by long-term imperatives based on a sound appraisal of regional and global security conditions. He felt that the tests were India s response to a regional and global reality that had evolved over the last 50 years. 20 According to Vajpayee, we live in a world where India is surrounded by nuclear weaponry. No responsible government can formulate a security policy for the country on abstract principles disregarding ground realities. Nor can policy be based on anything but the supreme consideration of national interests. 21 Unlike the 1974 nuclear test, which was officially declared by the then government of India as peaceful, 22 no such label was put on the 1998 tests, and the objectives of the tests were clarified by the Prime Minister himself: India is now a nuclear weapons state with the capacity for a big bomb. 23 Vajpayee was very categorical in declaring that Pokhran II was not viewed by his government as peaceful. He said, neither my own statement of 11 May, nor the larger official text released later that day has characterized the nuclear tests as peaceful. 24 This was probably done with two objectives: first, to convey the message to the outside world that India was pursuing a determined nuclear policy. Second, to undertake a deliberate shift from the Congress party s policy (the Congress government of Indira Gandhi conducted the 1974 tests) of declaring weaponization programme as peaceful. 19.Brajesh Mishra said, these tests provide reassurance to the people of India that their national security interests are paramount and will be promoted and protected. Mishra also highlighted political reasons behind the nuclear tests, when he said that the nuclear tests fulfilled the promise given by the BJP Manifesto. See in this context, The Statesman, May 12, 1998, p.1. 20 India Today, n. 18, p. 40. 21.Ibid 22.After the 1974 test, the then Defence Minister of India, Jagjivan Ram had said that the test had no military intentions and was nothing but part of India s ongoing efforts to harness the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. See in this connection, India Rules out Atomic Arms use, The New York Times (New York), 23 May, 1974, p. 5. 23.See, India Today, n. 18, p. 40. 24.Ibid

151 The change in the official position, from declaring the first nuclear test in 1974 as peaceful, and the second nuclear tests in 1998 as not for peaceful purposes, was clear and perceptible. The BJP (in line with its election Manifesto) wanted to deliver the message that the nuclearization of India was done to augment her security strength. According to Pramod Mahajan, Political Adviser to the Indian Prime Minister, the tests were not conducted for academic purposes. 25 At the same time the Prime Minister said that the nuclear programme was not directed against anyone and hinted that India was committed to a no first use policy. But he also added that if the country s security required it, India would not hesitate to use its nuclear power, although in a second strike mode. 26 These statements pointed to a clear and unambiguous policy taken by the BJP led NDA government, that is, nuclear weaponization, if national security demanded it. Mahajan, in fact, declared that weaponization was the end result of the Pokhran tests, 27 removing the otherwise vague and ambiguous peaceful label from the Indian nuclear programme. An official version of the rationale for India s nuclearization was also given by Jaswant Singh, a senior Adviser on Defence and Foreign Affairs to the Indian Prime Minister, a Member of Parliament for the BJP, and later India s Foreign Minister. In a lengthy article in Foreign Affairs, he justified India s nuclear tests and linked them to India s national security concerns. 28 According to Singh, the presence of a nuclear China and a belligerent Pakistan in India s neighbourhood and the on-going military cooperation between the two had prompted India to think in terms of strengthening her security. Singh noted that if total global disarmament could not be achieved, national security concerns would remain paramount. 29 As such, India s nuclear policy remained firmly committed to a basic tenet - that the country s national security in a world of nuclear proliferation lies either in global disarmament or in exercise of the principle of equal and legitimate security for all. 30 Singh 25.Quoted in The Statesman, 16 May, 1998, p.1. 26.Ibid 27.Ibid 28.Jaswant Singh, Against Nuclear Apartheid, Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol. 77, No. 5, September October, 1998, pp.41-52. 29.Ibid 30.Ibid., pp. 41-42.

152 argued that India s May 1998 tests violated no international treaty obligation and he firmly declared India as a nuclear weapons state. 31 Realising the adverse repercussions that Pokhran II would have on Indo-U.S. relations, the Indian Prime Minister wrote a letter to the U.S. President after the May 11 tests justifying the reasons for the tests. In this letter, Vajpayee cited an atmosphere of mistrust in India s neighbourhood as one of the reasons behind India s tests. 32 He wrote to Clinton, We have an overt nuclear-weapon state in our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. 33 In an obvious reference to the clandestine China-Pakistan nuclear links, 34 Vajpayee noted that to add to the distrust, that country has materially helped another neighbour of ours to become a covert nuclear weapon state. At the hands of this bitter neighbour, we have suffered three aggressions in the past 50 years. 35 In this letter, Vajpayee reiterated India s commitment to participate in global disarmament measures by citing India s acceptance of the U.N. Biological and Chemical Weapons Treaties and assured that India would continue to work with America to promote nuclear disarmament. 36 The official Indian rationale for conducting the Pokhran II nuclear tests emphasized India s security interests. The presence of a nuclear China and an antagonistic Pakistan were cited as reasons for the nuclear tests. India published its own nuclear doctrine on August 17, 1999. National security and minimum deterrence were cited as the most important reasons behind India s nuclearisation. 37 The Preamble to the Nuclear Doctrine (Section 1.4) published by the government stated that India s security is an integral component of its development process. India continuously aims at promoting an ever expanding area of peace and stability around it 31.Ibid 32. For a full text of this letter, see, The New York Times, May 13, 1998, p.5. 33. Ibid 34. China had been exporting nuclear technology to Pakistan over a long period. The U.S. intelligence services reported in 1970 that China had supplied Pakistan with the test design of its fourth nuclear weapon which could be carried by an aircraft like the Mirage III, the F-16 or by a missile like the SS-4. China had helped Pakistan in every aspect of nuclear activity - providing experts, developing reprocessing plants, helping in the enrichment of uranium, supply of missiles that can carry nuclear warheads, providing technical know-how in the development of Pakistan s ballistic missiles etc. See in this context, Nilofar Suhrawardy, The U.S. and Chinese Role in Pakistan s Nuclear Drive, The Statesman, June 17, 1996, p.9. Also see, Nalini Kant Jha, U.S., Pokhran II and South Asia, India Quarterly New Delhi, Vol. 55, Nos. 1-2, January-June, 1999, pp. 8-11; also, Aneek Chatterjee, Nuclear Proliferation, South Asia, and the U.S. Dilemma, Socialist Perspective (Calcutta) Vol. 24, Nos. 3-4 December 1996- March 1997, pp. 50-51. 35. See, The New York Times, n. 32. 36. Ibid 37. Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India, Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine (New Delhi), August 17, 1999, pp. 1-24.

153 so that development priorities can be pursued without disruption. 38 In the objectives section of the Draft Report on the Nuclear Doctrine, the theory of a credible minimum nuclear deterrence was presented. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 of the Report stated that India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. In this policy of retaliation only, the survivability of our arsenal is critical The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any state or entity against India and its forces. 39 It was made clear in the Doctrine that Indian nuclear weapons would only be used as a second-line of defence. An analysis of the official Indian position on Pokhran II leads us to a set of justifications put forward by India after the tests. First, the nuclear tests were conducted in the background of perceived security threats in India s neighbourhood which included a nuclear China and Pakistan, a threshold-nuclear state and India s traditional adversary. Second, the failure of the non-proliferation regime and the absence of a total global disarmament policy led different nation-states of the world to ponder over and strengthen their respective national security. In this security-conscious environment, nuclear weapons were seen as a key element of state power and a currency frequently in operation in the world. 40 India was only exercising its rights over this currency. Third, Pokhran II did not violate any international treaty obligations as India was not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the CTBT. Fourth, India committed herself to a no-first use strategy so far as nuclear weapons are concerned. India would view her nuclear weapons as a second-strike capability. This would imply that India s weapons were for self-defence only, and not meant to be weapons of aggression. Fifth, although India believed in restraint and its nuclear devices were not meant to be weapons of aggression, Pokhran II was conducted not for any peaceful purpose. India kept the option open to induct nuclear weapons into its arsenal. 41 Sixth, with Pokhran II, India had become a nuclear-weapons state. Ground reality demanded that India must be considered as the sixth nuclear weapons state in the world, no matter whether the five existing nuclear states (as per the NPT) recognized it as such. 38. Ibid 39. Ibid 40. Jaswant Singh, in his article in the Foreign Affairs put forward these reasons behind India s nuclear tests. See Jaswant Singh, n. 28, pp. 41-42 41.Prime Minister Vajpayee and his Political Advisor, Pramod Mahajan hinted at this possibility. See in this connection, India Today, n. 18. 47. Ibid 48. Don t claim credit for tests : Mulayam, The Statesman,May 16, 1998, p.1.

154 Pokhran II The Non-official Reaction Mixed reactions came from different political parties in India over Pokhran II. While most political parties congratulated the Indian scientists responsible for conducting the tests, not all of them approved the decision of the Vajpayee government to go nuclear. However, the response of the Congress(I), the main opposition party was positive. 42 The leader of the opposition in the Indian Parliament, Sharad Pawar, said that the Prime Minister had informed him about the tests. He congratulated the government and the Indian scientists for the tests. 43 The two major left parties in Indian politics, the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) also congratulated the Indian scientists responsible for the successful nuclear tests at Pokhran. They however, wanted the Vajpayee government to adhere to the policies pursued so far on nuclear disarmament and avoid a nuclear arms race in South Asia to ensure peace and security in the region. 44 Other left parties like the Forward Block (FB) and the Socialist Unity Centre of India (SUCI), were however, critical of the role of the Vajpayee government. The National Secretary of the FB, M. G. Devarajan said that the nuclear tests were a threat to the peaceloving people of the subcontinent and it would further aggravate the unethical arms race. 45 He accused the government of trying to create a smoke-screen before the people in order to divert attention from its inability to fulfill poll promises. 46 The SUCI strongly condemned the nuclear tests at the Pokhran range saying that the tests would lead the people of India to further hardships. 47 The Samajvadi Party (SP) chief Mulayam Singh Yadav, criticized the Prime Minister for extracting political mileage out of the tests. He opined that the Prime Minister should not have held a press conference after the tests. He asserted that repercussions of going public over the tests have increased tension in the subcontinent. He said that the nuclear tests were inevitable, but no party should take credit for the tests, because that would be an insult to the Indian scientists. 48 The United Front (UF) spokesman, 42, Cong. Congratulates Govt. and Scientists, The Statesman, 12 May 1998, p.1. 43. Ibid 44. See, CPI-M, CPI hail scientists, The Statesman, May 13, 1998, p.1. 45. Ibid 46. Ibid 47. Ibid 48. Don t claim credit for tests : Mulayam, The Statesman, May 16, 1998, p.1.

155 S. Jaipal Reddy also congratulated the Indian scientists and added that nuclear testing had always been under active consideration by successive governments. 49 Among non-political groups, many of India s defence experts hailed the nuclear tests and viewed nuclear weapons as an effective deterrent. Defence experts like Jasjit Singh, the then Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), K. Subrahmanyam, former Director of the IDSA, N. C. Suri, C. Uday Bhaskar and D. Banerjee of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies held the view that by conducting the tests, India had not violated any treaty obligation and the immediate gain of the tests would be their high deterrent effect. 50 They supported the government position that the unfavourable security scenario in South Asia compelled the Indian government to conduct the nuclear tests. They also emphasized that India must not sign either the NPT or the CTBT. 51 Many academics and social activists however, warned about increased tension in South Asia due to the nuclear tests. In a thought-provoking article, Kanti Bajpai argued that Pokhran II would not solve all security problems for India and that India must cooperate with her neighbours in future to gain advantage from her nuclear tests. 52 In a scathing attack on Pokhran II, two social activists opined that it was a disastrous decision by the government of India and it would spell gloom for South Asia. 53 A leading American academic of Indian origin also shared the same opinion. He cited domestic politics as the main reason behind Pokhran II. 54 However, other US based academics of Indian origin, Sumit Ganguly and T. V. Paul considered security threats as the primary motive behind India s nuclear tests. 55 Unofficial Indian reactions to Pokhran II, in political and non-political quarters were, 49. See, The Statesman, n.42. 50. See the news item, Deterrent effect immediate gain: Defence Experts, The Statesman,12 May, 1998, p. 6. The deterrent factor was also highlighted by Ashley J. Tellis, a leading Expert on International Relations. See in this context, Ashley J. Tellis, India s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 251-303. 51. Ibid. 52. Kanti P. Bajpai, India s Nuclear Posture After Pokhran II, International Studies (New Delhi), Vol. 37, March 2000, pp. 267-301. 53. Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, South Asia on a Short Fuse : Nuclear Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament (New Delhi : Oxford University Press), 1999. 54. Ashok Kapur, Pokhran and Beyond: India s Nuclear Behaviour (New Delhi : Oxford University Press), 2001, pp. 67-68. 55. Sumit Ganguly, India s Pathway to Pokhran II, International Security (Cambridge, Massachussets), Volume. 23, Spring, 1999, pp. 148-77; also see, T. V. Paul, The Systemic Basis of India s Challenge to the Global Nuclear Order, Nonproliferation Review (California) Vol. 6, Fall, 1999, pp. 1-11.

156 therefore, mixed. 56 What is pertinent however to the present dissertation is the U.S. response to Pokhran II and its impact on Indo-U.S. relations. The U.S. Response One main agenda of President Clinton s foreign policy as noted in earlier chapters, was non-proliferation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). For this purpose, President Clinton had vigorously pursued the CTBT and he had been the first Head of government to sign it. India on the other hand, had very different perceptions about nonproliferation. As mentioned earlier, although India was among the first nations in the world to call for universal disarmament, she viewed treaties like the NPT and the CTBT as discriminatory, because they allowed the nuclear-weapon states to retain their monopoly on nuclear technology. India, therefore, had consistently refused to sign either the NPT or the CTBT. The different perceptions on nonproliferation had created a gap in India-U.S. bilateral relations for a long time. President Clinton had been even more concerned about nonproliferation in South Asia during his second tenure. 57 While this issue had remained an irritant during the term of I.K.Gujral as Prime Minister, the Gujral Doctrine which had envisaged an easing of tensions with India s neighbours including Pakistan and China, had helped to build confidence in the U.S., which had applauded India s efforts to promote peace in the region. Therefore, the news of India s nuclear tests came as a rude shock to the Clinton administration. The immediate American reaction to Pokhran II was of disappointment and anger as the Indian tests, in the American view, undermined global nonproliferation efforts. Mike McCurry, President Clinton s official spokesman announced to the press in Washington, D.C. on May 11 that the United States is deeply disappointed by the decision of the government of India to conduct three nuclear tests This runs counter to the efforts the international community is making to promulgate a comprehensive ban on such testing. 58 Hinting at the 56.For more Indian views on the tests, see, Major Sulakshan Mohan (ed.), India s Nuclear Leap (Delhi, Indian Publishers Distributors, 2000); articles of importance in this book are by R. Venkataraman, and Dipankar Banerjee. Also see, J.K.Chopra, Global Implications of India s Nuclear Explosion (Jaipur, Pointer Publishers, 1998). 57. Strobe Talbott, n.11, p.28. 58. See, The US is deeply disappointed, says McCury, in Facts on File World News Digest (Washington, D.C., Rand McNally), May 14, 1998, p.431.

157 prospect of American economic sanctions upon India, McCurry said, These tests underscore the importance of (a non-nuclear) international regime we will continue to spare no effort in encouraging countries to both promulgate and ratify the comprehensive test ban. 59 The next day, President Clinton himself spoke about the Indian nuclear tests and condemned Pokhran II outright: I want to make it very clear that I am deeply disturbed by the nuclear tests India has conducted. The USA strongly opposes any nuclear testing. 60 In an obvious reference to economic and military sanctions, he pointed out that the U.S. had very stringent provisions signed into law by me in 1994, in response to nuclear tests by non-nuclear states. I intend to implement that fully. 61 In this connection, it may be noted that the U.S. Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1994 (details of which have been provided in Chapter 6 of this dissertation) provides for the imposition of economic and military sanctions against nonnuclear weapons states that engage in nuclear proliferation. Clinton called the U.S. Ambassador to India, Richard Celeste for consultations. One of the main fears that the U.S. apparently had was that these tests would unleash a nuclear arms race in South Asia. It was well known that Pakistan had also been developing nuclearweapons capability for some time, 62 and the apprehension was that it would follow the Indian path. President Clinton therefore, also urged India s neighbours not to follow the nuclear path and start an arms race in South Asia. 63 Two more nuclear tests on May 13 after the initial three tests on May 11, made the U.S. government severely critical of India. Clinton condemned the tests as a terrible mistake and said that the Indian nuclear explosions have created a dangerous instability in the South Asian region. 64 Clinton also announced on May 13, 1998, that economic and military sanctions would be imposed on India under the AECA. The sanctions would stop U.S. economic and military assistance to India, which in May 1998, amounted to more than $140 million. However, the U.S. government left humanitarian aid to India out of the purview 59. Ibid 60. Quoted in The New York Times (New York), May 13, 1998, p.1. 61. Ibid 62. See Strobe Talbott, n. 11, pp. 61-62. 63. See The New York Times, n. 54, p. 1. 64. Ibid

158 of sanctions. 65 The sanctions as applicable to India after the May 1998 tests, covered the following areas: (1) foreign assistance; (2) foreign military sales, exports, and financing; (3) government credits, credit guarantees, and other financial assistance, including those provided by the Export-Import bank; (4) bar on US support for international financial assistance, like those from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF),the International Development Bank (IDA) etc; (5) bar on private bank loans; and, (6) exports of nuclear and missile-related items, and other dual-use items. 66 The Clinton administration rejected outright India s rationale for the nuclear tests and her security concerns vis-à-vis China and Pakistan. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Karl Inderfurth, told the U.S. Congress after the May 13 tests that specifically, they have pointed to unresolved border problem with China, to great concern over China s ties with Pakistan. We can not see how any of these concerns will be addressed by testing nuclear weapons. 67 The U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, warned both India and Pakistan 68 about the economic consequences of security augmentation. According to him, security has an economic dimension as well as a military one. Before India and Pakistan decide to replicate the U.S.-Soviet nuclear stand off, they should consider the price tag maintaining the American nuclear capability cost the United States just under $ 5.5 trillion The tense military situation generated by a nuclearized subcontinent would further drive up overall military budgets a trend already in evidence. 69 Talbott held that the May 1998 explosions by India derailed an initiative by the United States to put its relations with India on sounder footing. 70 The U.S. Congress also expressed its anger over India s nuclear tests. Almost all Congressmen, some considered close to India, denounced Pokhran II. Senator Jesse Helms 65.The Statesman,14 May 1998, p. 1 66.U.S. Department of State, Presidential Determination No. 98-22, A Memorandum for the Secretary of State (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, May 13, 1998), pp. 1-3. 67.The Washing ton Post (Washington, D.C.), May 15, 1998, p.1. 68.In response to India s nuclear tests, Pakistan exploded five nuclear devices on May 28, 1998 in the Chagai Hills. A sixth explosion followed the next day. The US also imposed sanctions on Pakistan under the AECA provisions. See in this context, Dilip H. Mohite and Smita Panwar, Pokhran Vs. Chagai Hills: The Nuclear Dilemma for India and Pakistan (Delhi, Kalinga Publications, 2001). 69. Strobe Talbott, Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia, Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol. 78, No. 2, March-April 1999, pp. 117-18. 70. Ibid, pp. 110-11.

159 (R - NC) who chaired the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee and was considered to be an ardent supporter of improved Indo-U.S. ties, noted that The Indian government has not shot itself in the foot it has most likely shot itself in the head. 71 According to him, by conducting the Pokhran nuclear tests, India has made a major miscalculation The Indian government has deluded itself into the absurd assumption that the possession of nuclear weapons will make India a superpower when hundreds of millions of India s people are in poverty. 72 He supported the imposition of sanctions on India by the Clinton government and said that Indian tests constituted an emerging nuclear threat to the territory of the USA, because India had a space-launch capability which could be readily configured as an intercontinental ballistic missile. He believed that India s actions underscored the importance of American nuclear deterrent for United States national security. 73 Senator Sam Brownback (R-KA) Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on South Asia, suggested that Pokhran II could damage Indo-U.S. bilateral relations. He told the U.S. Congress, overnight, the U.S. relationship with India has changed, for the worse A relationship that should have been blooming is in crisis. 74 Senator Joe Biden (D- DEL) also believed that these tests are sure to alter fundamentally the U.S.-India relationship which had begun to blossom in recent years after a lengthy chill. 75 These quotations suggest a common card of India s tests across the board, with both Republican and Democratic party members criticizing India s actions. However, a new angle was provided to the American reaction on Pokhran II by Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House of Representatives, who criticized the Clinton administration as being one-sided in declaring economic sanctions against India. He was of the opinion that there should be no difference in America s treatment of India and China in nuclear matters. 76 From the overall reaction of the U.S. Congress to India s nuclear tests, it became evident that the U.S. law makers, like the U.S. administration had a very adverse opinion of the May 1998 tests. Gingrich s was a lone voice that spoke for equal treatment of India and China on nuclear issues. The main issues in America s objection to Pokhran II were : first, India s nuclearisation would jeopardize the global non-proliferation regime. As mentioned earlier, 71. Quoted in the Congressional Record (Washington, D.C., Library of Congress), May 12, 1998, p. S4681. 72. Ibid 73. Ibid 74. Ibid., p. S4682. 75. Ibid 76. Quoted in the Congressional Record (Washington, D.C., Library of Congress), May 15, 1998, p. H 6823.

160 President Clinton himself raised this issue when he said that Pokhran II challenged all efforts to stop proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and the global nonproliferation regime. Second, by conducting the tests, India made, according to President Clinton terrible mistakes because it could generate an arms race and encourage the transfer of nuclear technology. Third, the Indian nuclear tests would severely disturb regional stability in south Asia. With Pakistan attempting nuclear parity with India, the already precarious security balance in South Asia would be endangered further. Fourth, by going overtly nuclear, India only invited economic and military sanctions from the U.S. and other countries. As President Clinton himself pointed out, since the U.S. had very stringent laws with regard to nuclear tests by non-nuclear countries, the U.S. administration had to automatically impose economic and military sanctions on India. Fifth, the Indian argument that security threats from China and Pakistan prompting India to go nuclear was treated with disbelief in the U.S. administration. As noted earlier, President Clinton s Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Karl F. Inderfurth went on record saying that India s border problems with China or the China - Pakistan security proximity could never be sufficient enough cause for India to go nuclear. The U.S. administration, as such, rejected the Indian rationale for Pokhran II. An immediate U.S. response to the May 1998 nuclear tests was to urge India to sign the CTBT and the NPT. The U.N. Security Council, at the behest of the U.S. deplored India s nuclear tests and urged India to sign the CTBT and the NPT without delay and without conditions. 77 The U.S. was apparently behind a UN Security Council criticism of India, which also urged the country to sign the treaties immediately. President Clinton too, urged India to sign the CTBT. In a radio address to the nation on the Indian nuclear tests, the U.S. President said, the Indian government has put itself at odds with the international community over these nuclear tests. I hope India will reverse course from the dangerous path it has chosen by signing the CTBT immediately and without conditions. 78 Finally, the U.S. believed that Pokhran II had put bilateral relations under strain. 79 Even after one year of the tests, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Karl F. Inderfurth told the 77. See, UN Chronicle Vol. XXXIV, No.2, (New York, June-August, 1998), p.32. Also see, The Statesman, May 15, 1998, p. 1. and Strobe Talbott, n. 69, pp. 112-17. In this article Talbott advocated the benefits of the CTBT and the NPT and argued how India wrongly misinterpreted them. Though not directly calling India to sign these treaties, Talbott, in this article, called adherence to the NPT a matter of international good citizenship. 78.President Clinton s Radio Address to the Nation on the Indian Nuclear Tests and the Test Ban Treaty, May 11, 1998, source: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty site, http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/coalition/ctindia. Accessed on December 18, 2002. 77. See, UN Chro nicle Vol. XXXIV, No.2, (New Yor k, Ju ne-august, 1 998), p.32. Also se e, The Sta tesman (Ca lcutta), Ma y 15, 1998, p. 1. and Strobe n. 66, pp. 112-17. In this article Talbott advoc ated the be nefits of t he CTBT and the NP T and argued how India wrongly m isinterpreted the m. Thou gh not directly calling India to s ign these treaties, Talbot t, in this article, called adhe rence to the NPT a m atter of international good c itizenship. 79. Strobe Talbott, n. 69, pp. 112-17.

161 U.S. Senate that security concerns continued to strain relations between the U.S. and India. 80 The same view was also expressed by the U.S. Congress. 81 The United States viewed Pokhran II as a direct challenge to a successful global nonproliferation campaign. Moreover, according to one author, the Clinton administration also feared that the Indian tests would strengthen the position of arms control sceptics within the U.S. Senate and jeopardize the CTBT and the FMCT, which were viewed by the Clinton administration as critical steps in arms control. 82 However, the question at this point is whether bilateral relations suffered due to Pokhran II and the subsequent imposition of American sanctions on India. Pokhran II and Indo-U.S. Relations The Indian nuclear tests provoked instant and angry reactions from the U.S. government and the American Congress. According to an Indian viewpoint, the nuclear tests also hurt America s pride quite apart from American self-interests. 83 This political analyst expressed the view that American anger also resulted from the failure of its well endowed intelligence apparatus to predict or warn about the tests. That failure was a function of a strong American cultural presumption that India would not dare defy the U.S. both because of the latter s hegemonic position in a unipolar system and because of the certainty of American economic sanctions that would follow. 84 The U.S. President imposed economic and military sanctions on India, mandated by section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act on May 13, 1998. Some of the sanctions imposed on India were: termination of $ 21 million economic development assistance for the fiscal year 1998; postponement of $ 1.7 billion in lending by international financial institutions; prohibition on loans or credit from U.S. banks to India; and termination of foreign military sales under the Arms Export Control Act. Humanitarian assistance, food and other agricultural commodities were exempted from sanctions under the U.S. law. 85 It 80. See, U.S. Department of State, Inderfurth s Senate Statement on U.S. India Relations, in News from the USIA Washington File (Washington D.C., 25 May, 1999), p. 1. 81. See,Congressional Record, n. 71 and n. 76 82. See, James Sperling, Ideals or Self-Interest? The Indian Nuclear Deterrent and American Foreign Policy, in Ashok Kapur, Y. K. Malik, Harold A. Gould and Arthur G. Rubinoff (eds.), India and the United States in a Changing World (New Delhi : Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 459-460. 83. Baldev Raj Nayar, U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Nuclear India : Implications for Economic Liberalsm and Democratic Peace Theory, in Ashok Kapur, et al (eds.), n.82, p.351. 84. Ibid 85. Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India, US Ban on Exports to India for Non-proliferation, Foreign Affairs Reports (New Delhi), Vol. 47, Nos. 9-10, September-October 1998, pp. 1-16.

162 was also believed that the American sanctions would hit India s bid to acquire know-how from the U.S. to make sophisticated ammunition. 86 The government of India s response to the U.S. sanctions was full of angry criticism. A Press Release by the Indian government on the U.S. sanctions noted that, we consider it regrettable that these implements have been placed in the way of the growing economic cooperation between India and the U.S. Coercive measures such as these interfering with the free flow of trade, investment and technology are unjustified and counter productive. 87 After Pokhran II, both the U.S. and India were engaged in angry rhetoric, not witnessed since the end of the Cold War. There were allegations and counter-allegations by both the governments about each other s intentions. Very often, even the Heads of the government of the two nations were involved in mounting direct allegations. For instance, President Clinton, in a radio address to his nation from the G-8 summit in Birmingham, England, said, the major nations here, along with friends and allies around the world, have joined us in condemning India s actions India has pursued this course at a time when most nations are working hard to leave the terror of the nuclear age behind. So in this instance, India is on the wrong side of history. 88 The Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee told the Lower House of the Indian Parliament in his reply to the discussion on Pokhran nuclear tests that we are disappointed that the U.S. has displayed a lack of appreciation of India s legitimate security concerns. 89 As for the U.S. demand after Pokhran II that India must sign the CTBT immediately and unconditionally, India was in no mood to oblige. The Prime Minister told the Lok Sabha on August 04, 1998, In 1996, we stayed out of the CTBT principally with national security as our only guide. That remains entirely unaltered. 90 Another instance of acrimony between India and the U.S. after Pokhran II could be noticed in the government of India s response to the U.S.-China Joint Statement on South Asia. A Press Release from the Indian government noted that India categorically rejects the 86. Sanjukta Banerji Bhattacharya, Of Vital Interests, Pokhran II and Indo-US Relations, in Anindyo J. Majumdar (Ed.), Nuclear India into the New Millennium (New Delhi, Lancer s Books, 2000), p. 282. 87. See, Embassy of India, Washington, D.C., Government of India s Response to the U.S. Government s Sanctions, by Shiv S. Mukherjee, Minister (Press, Information and Culture), June 18, 1998. Visit, http: www.indianembassy.org.press_release121902.asp. Accessed on December 19, 2002. 88. See, President Clinton s Radio Address to the Nation on the Indian Nuclear Tests and the Test Ban Treaty, Birmingham, May 16, 1998, visit : http://www.clw.org/pnb/clw/coalition/ctindia.htm. Accessed on December 19, 2002. 89. See, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Lok Sabha Debates, 12th Series, Vol. IV, No. 8, (New Delhi, May 29, 1998), p. 87. 90. See, Prime Minister s Statement on CTBT in Lok Sabha on August 4, 1998, Source : Website of the Indian Embassy in Washington, D.C. : http://www.indianembassy.org/pmindia-ctbt. Accessed on December 19, 2002.

163 notion of these two countries arrogating to themselves, joint or individual responsibility for the maintenance of peace, stability and security of the region. This approach reflects the hegemonistic mentality of a bygone era and is completely unacceptable in the present day world. 91 That India would not hesitate to launch a diplomatic assault on the U.S. or other powers to defend her policies was amply clarified. The Press Release was highly critical of both the U.S. and China for their dubious roles on nuclear issues. It further stated that It is most ironical that two countries that have directly and indirectly contributed to the unabated proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in our neighborhood, are now presuming to prescribe norms for nonproliferation. 92 The bitterness in India-U.S. bilateral relations following Pokhran II was manifested in such statements from both the governments. What it implied was that there was a major difference of perception in the two countries. For India, Pokhran II was a matter of national security and defence; for the U.S., it was defiance of the U.S.-led non-proliferation regime (and indirectly perhaps, American supremacy) by India. Faith in Diplomacy Despite an unprecedented low in their bilateral relationship since the end of the Cold War, the fact India and the U.S were still interested in engaging each other was demonstrated in the diplomatic talks which began within a month of India s nuclear explosions. Both India and the U.S. had sound reasons to go for diplomatic talks. From the Indian point of view, antagonizing the U.S., the only surviving super power and India s largest trade partner, would be unwise. From the American point of view, diplomacy was the most suitable and acceptable route to diffuse further tension in South Asia. Avoiding a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan would be a matter of success to an apparently failed U.S. nonproliferation policy. Diplomacy was the best possible way to avoid such a conflict. From June 11, 1998, diplomatic negotiations began on nuclear and security issues. The Indian side was represented by Jaswant Singh, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission and later, the Foreign Minister of India.The U.S. was represented by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs. The dialogues were based mainly 91. Embassy of India, Washington, D.C., India Denounces U.S. - China Joint Statement on South Asia, Press Release, June 27, 1998. Visit : http://www.indianembassy.org/uschinajs. Accessed on December 19, 2002. 92. Ibid

164 on the following agenda: (1) India s proposal for a voluntary moratorium on underground nuclear explosions after the May 1998 tests; (2) India s willingness to move towards de-jure formalization of this proposal; (3) a ban on future production of fissile material; (4) a more stringent system of export controls of sensitive materials and technology; and (5) security and defence issues export controls of sensitive materials and technology issues vital to the interests of both countries. 93 Prime Minister Vajpayee informed the Indian Parliament on December 15, 1998 on the progress of the India-U.S. dialogues. He said, Both teams have worked purposefully to narrow gaps of perception and to establish common ground. These exchanges have been marked by sincere attempts to understand each other s concerns and point of view In these talks, we have firmly put across our security concerns and the imperative of maintaining a minimum, credible, nuclear deterrent The talks have focused on issues related to disarmament and nonproliferation. It is agreed that regional issues shall be kept distinctly apart. 94 The Prime Minister also informed the House that after six rounds of talks from June to December 1998, the areas of dialogue had narrowed and focussed on four major issues : the CTBT, the FMCT, Export Controls and defence posture. Vajpayee further touched upon Indo-U.S. relations after Pokhran II. He said, I have been in regular correspondence with President Clinton. Our correspondence have touched not only upon issues under discussion between our Representatives, but also on larger aspects of Indo-U.S. relations. It is my view that the future of Indo-U.S. relations is much larger than the four issues under consideration. President Clinton has also expressed to me, his desire for a broad-based relationship with India that befits the two largest democracies of the world. I have fully reciprocated these sentiments. Indeed, our ongoing dialogue with the United States is geared towards that end. 95 The talks however, could not break any impasse initially, at least in 1998, because the heat of Pokhran II was on. Subsequently though, they helped in easing the tension and animosity between the two countries. 96 As decided by the Singh-Talbott negotiations, Export Control talks between India and the U.S. started in November 1998. In the first round of talks held on 9-10 November, discussions were held on a more stringent control of nuclear related 93. The Prime Minister of India gave these details to the Indian Parliament on December 15, 1998. See in this context, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Lok Sabha Debates, 12th Series, Vol. VII, No. 12, (New Delhi, December 15, 1998), pp. 116-17. 94. Ibid 95. Ibid 96. See, P.S. Jayaramu, Indo-U.S. Strategic Dialogue, News from Non-aligned World Bulletin (New Delhi), Vol. 20, No. 24, April 13, 1999, pp. 1-4.

165 technology. The second round of Export Control talks was held on 29-30 March, 1999 in New Delhi. Measures for further stricter control on the export of nuclear related technology were discussed in the second round of talks. The U.S. delegation to the talks was led by Gregory Suchan, and the Indian delegation by Alok Prasad, Joint Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India. The Export Control talks also continued in 1999 and 2000. Both India and the U.S. pinned their hopes on these bilateral talks. In his speech at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on September 24, 1998, the Indian Prime Minister referred to these talks and hoped that they would strengthen the efforts of nonproliferation: as a responsible state committed to nonproliferation, India has undertaken that it shall not transfer these weapons or related know how to other countries. We have an effective system of export controls and shall make it more stringent where necessary. 97 It became clear that there were numerous converging grounds between India and the U.S. in matters of nuclear and security issues. After Pokhran II, the U.S. wanted India to follow strict Export Control norms. India assured the U.S. that she was ready and willing to follow the Export Control regime. India also offered a voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosions after May 1998, and a ban on the production of fissile materials. India therefore, accepted the FMCT in principle without signing the Treaty. India also clarified her position on Pokhran II to the U.S. through the Singh-Talbott talks (More details of these talks are presented in the next chapter). India s acceptance of several provisions of the nonproliferation regime (strict export controls, ban on the production of fissile materials, moratorium on nuclear explosions) gradually softened the U.S. attitude and helped to restore normalcy in bilateral relations. Sensible diplomacy prevented a total deterioration of India U.S. relations after Pokhran II. 98 The U.S. Response After Pokhran II : An Assessment Pokhran II raised many questions within India and outside. Foremost among them was why the Vajpayee government decided to carry out the nuclear tests. Several opinions have been expressed in this area: promises in the election manifesto; garnering an edge in domestic politics; national security interests; ambition for power and nuclear state status; 97. See, Indian Prime Minister s September 24 speech at the United Nations, Website of the South Asia Section of the Global Reporting Network of the New York University; visit: http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/southasia.html. Accessed on December 20, 2002. 98. For similar views, see, Annapurna Nautiyal, Post-Pokhran Indo-US Relations, Politics India (New Delhi), Vol. 3, No. 1, May, 1999, pp. 39-40.