Case 1:08-cv JEB Document 64 Filed 05/30/13 Page 1 of 13 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Case 1:08-cv-01289-JEB Document 64 Filed 05/30/13 Page 1 of 13 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DICK ANTHONY HELLER, et al. ) ) Plaintiffs ) ) v. ) No. 1:08-cv-01289 (JEB) ) THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al. ) ) Defendants ) PLAINTIFFS REPLY TO DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS TO STRIKE EXPERT REPORTS OF MARK D. JONES, CATHY L. LANIER, AND JOSEPH J. VINCE, JR. Defendants Omnibus Opposition to Plaintiffs Motions to Strike Expert Reports of Mark D. Jones, Cathy L. Lanier, and Joseph Vince, Jr. (Doc. 63) ( Opp. ), presents an odd assortment of arguments designed to rescue three expert reports ( Expert Reports ) that are palpably insufficient on their face under Fed. R.Civ. P. 26(a)(2) and Fed. R. Evid. 702, under the prevailing case law, and under the specific commands of the D.C. Circuit governing this case on remand. Specifically, Defendants argue that the Motions to Strike are premature, and the compliance of the proffered testimony should only be determined at trial after full crossexamination (Opp. 8), in connection with a Rule 56 motion (Opp. 3), or after the putative experts have been deposed (Opp. 3) that is, at any time but the present. They assume, without demonstrating, that the standards governing reliability of expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) are somehow inapplicable here (adverting in passing to cases like this one, where the Daubert factors do not apply...). Opp. 7. Most importantly, the Opposition does nothing to address the principal deficiency of these 1

Case 1:08-cv-01289-JEB Document 64 Filed 05/30/13 Page 2 of 13 reports pointed out by Plaintiffs in the Motions to Strike: the entire, complete, and utter lack of any facts or data on which the expert reports are allegedly based. Defendants contend that the three reports are "rife with facts and data (Opp. 6), but a simple examination of the three reports reveals that they are devoid of any data at all, and the few facts that make a fleeting appearance are always of an anecdotal, unscientific character. These experts do not even attempt to apply scientific principles or methodologies to any data or facts (there being no data to which to apply a methodology), and had they attempted to do so their experience in law enforcement would not provide the necessary expertise to apply such methodologies. Because the expert reports do not meet the requirements of Rule 26(a)(2), the principles enunciated in case law, or the specific requirements imposed by the D.C. Circuit for this remand, they must be stricken and any testimony based thereon by these purported experts must be excluded. ARGUMENT 1. The standards enunciated by the D.C. Circuit for this remand are highly relevant to the adequacy of the Expert Reports. Defendants state that plaintiffs appear to argue that the Court should strike the Expert Reports because they fail to satisfy the District s evidentiary burden to justify the firearms regulations under intermediate scrutiny, as articulated by the D.C. Circuit in Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Circuit 2011)... This is clearly not the standard for compliance with Rule 26(a) or a Motion to Exclude under Rule 37(c). Opp. 3. They then argue on this basis that Plaintiffs are making premature summary-judgment arguments that go to weight, not admissibility. Opp. 4. That is not what Plaintiffs argued in their Motions to Strike, and these statements by 2

Case 1:08-cv-01289-JEB Document 64 Filed 05/30/13 Page 3 of 13 Defendants do not reveal an understanding of why the D.C. Circuit s directives on remand are important. The D.C. Circuit s directives are important because that Court enunciated the issues to be considered on remand. It also specified the kinds of evidence that the District must present to attempt to justify the District s firearms registration requirements. The Expert Reports do not comply with Rule 26(a)(2), and that non-compliance is especially clear in light of the statements by the D.C. Circuit regarding the issues and evidence on remand. It must be recalled that this case concerns a fundamental, enumerated constitutional right. As noted by the D.C. Circuit, the challenged restrictions all "impinge" upon the ability of "a person lawfully to acquire and keep a firearm, including a handgun, for the purpose of self-defense in the home-'the core lawful purpose' protected by the Second Amendment [citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008)]." Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ( Heller II ). That Court noted that for purposes of intermediate scrutiny review of those restrictions, the District had identified two important governmental interests: to protect police officers and to aid in crime control." Heller II at 1258. In prior proceedings in this case, for example, the District asserted that "studies show" that guns involved in multiple sales are more frequently used in crime, and that the one handgun a month restriction is "designed" to reduce flow of guns in the illegal market and across state lines. Heller II at 1258-59. However, the D.C. Circuit noted disapprovingly that the District neither identifies the studies relied upon nor claims those studies showed the laws achieved their purpose, nor in any other way attempts to justify requiring a person who registered a pistol to wait 30 days to register another one." Id. at 1259 (emphasis added). The District also offered "cursory" rationales for some of the other requirements, but the District fails to present any data or other 3

Case 1:08-cv-01289-JEB Document 64 Filed 05/30/13 Page 4 of 13 evidence to substantiate its claim that these requirements can reasonably be expected to promote either of the important governmental interests it has invoked." Id. (emphasis added). In addition, there must be a tight fit or close fit between the District s registration requirements and the interests it asserts those requirements promote. Id. at 1258-59. Thus, the key issue to be considered on this remand is whether the District s laws, or laws similar to them, actually promote or achieve their purpose of advancing the asserted governmental interests. To show that, the D.C. Circuit was quite clear regarding the kinds of evidence the District must provide; namely, data and studies that demonstrate that the measures adopted actually advance the stated goals. Mere assertions will not suffice. Id. at 1259. 2. The opinions of Defendants putative experts cannot be based on unsupported professional opinion as opposed to reliable studies. Whether laws such as the District s registration requirements actually result in crime reduction is an empirical question that is susceptible to proof (one way or the other) by empirical studies by social scientists and criminologists. Daubert discusses at some length the standards under which scientific evidence is to be evaluated by the courts in determining its relevance and reliability. In submitting these three reports, Defendants have wholly disregarded the D.C. Circuit s admonition that the alleged nexus between the District s laws and crime control be supported by studies or data. Defendants rely principally on two cases to try to exempt themselves unilaterally from the requirements of Rule 26(a)(2), Rule 702, and Daubert. Groobert v. President & Directors of Georgetown Coll., 219 F.Supp.2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2002); Barnes v. Dist. of Columbia, 4

Case 1:08-cv-01289-JEB Document 64 Filed 05/30/13 Page 5 of 13 Civ. No. 06-315 RCL, 2013 WL 541148, at *17 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2013). Neither case is apposite. Unlike the Expert Reports here, both the Barnes and Groobert courts permitted expert testimony based solely on the proffered expert s personal experience simply because no other data existed or the subject matter did not lend itself to scientific research methodology. In Groobert, expert testimony regarding future earning potential for stock photographers based on the expert s extensive experience in the photography industry was permissible because [t]he court cannot penalize the plaintiff for the lack of scientific or academic studies and published reports on the topic of stock photographer incomes because if it did, no plaintiff could ever present their own tests or recover damages relating to this industry. Id. at 11. In Barnes, the Court allowed highly specialized and specific experiential expert testimony that was not amenable to analysis under the Daubert factors. Barnes at *21. This specialized testimony regarding whether inmates were over-detained was based on ten years of personally reviewing data for hundreds of individual inmates and familiarization with Department of Corrections data collection systems and methods. Testimony on that subject did not lend itself to analysis of reliability based on Daubert factors because of apparent lack of information on the subject. Id. The Barnes court noted that there was not a single reported case that certified an expert who provided testimony about whether an overdetention occurred. Id. at *21. However, there is no lack of studies or data regarding the efficacy of laws such as the firearms registration requirements adopted by the District. On the contrary, there is an extensive body of academic and criminological studies, extending back at least for four or five decades, regarding whether specific measures actually reduce crime which is the issue for which this case 5

Case 1:08-cv-01289-JEB Document 64 Filed 05/30/13 Page 6 of 13 has been remanded. That this body of studies exists is shown by the fourth expert report submitted by Defendants, which Plaintiffs have not moved to strike. The expert report of Daniel W. Webster, a member of the faculty of Johns Hopkins University, cites eighteen studies or data sources, most of which relate to the ostensible effects of particular gun laws and most of which have been published in professional or academic journals. See list of references, attached as Exhibit 1 hereto, which appears at the end of Prof. Webster s report. He discusses those research studies at some length in his seventeen page report. While Plaintiffs generally do not agree with Prof. Webster s conclusions, and have submitted a rebuttal to his report by Dr. Gary Kleck, a renowned criminologist at Florida State University, Prof. Webster s list of references demonstrates that multitudinous research studies in this area have been conducted and published. See also the list of references, attached as Exhibit 2 hereto, which appears at the end of Dr. Kleck s report. Thus, Defendants cannot justify reliance on professional opinion, unsupported by data or research, due to a lack of studies or data in the field as in Groobert and Barnes. Defendants contend that the Expert Reports are rife with facts and data, just not in the form that plaintiffs expected to see, which was apparently academic or empirical studies. Opp. 6. Defendants may assert that the Expert Reports contain data, but reviewing those reports confirms that they contain no data whatsoever. Any facts, which are few and far between, are purely anecdotal in nature, and cannot form the basis for opinion evidence regarding whether registration requirements such as the District s have the empirical effect of actually reducing crime. The pertinent point, of course, is not whether Plaintiffs expected to see academic or empirical studies, but whether the D.C. Circuit expects to see such studies. As noted above, it plainly directed the District to proffer such studies to support the proposition that the D.C. 6

Case 1:08-cv-01289-JEB Document 64 Filed 05/30/13 Page 7 of 13 registration laws actually advance the asserted governmental interests. To test that contention, data needs to be gathered, and the effects measured through proper social science techniques. But the Expert Reports do not even attempt to do that, and thus do not address the relevant issues (whether the District s registration laws in fact advance the governmental interests asserted) and do not contain the kinds of evidence the D.C. Circuit required ( meaningful evidence, not mere assertions ). Heller II at 1259. Defendants misapprehension of the nature of the evidence required by the D.C. Circuit is encapsulated in their assertion that the District s experts are not attempting to make any predictive judgments at all... Opp. 5 n.6. But predictive judgments are precisely what the D.C. Circuit required the District to support on remand. Passing a law in the expectation that it will have certain effects is a predictive judgment on the part of a legislature. Heller II at 1259 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997)). On remand, the D.C. Circuit directed, the District needs to present some meaningful evidence, not mere assertions, to justify its predictive judgments. Id. (emphasis added). If expert testimony regarding the validity or efficacy of these registration requirements could be based on nothing more than the unsupported professional experience of current or retired law enforcement officers, the requirements of Rule 26(a)(2) and Rule 702 that expert testimony be based on actual data, and on reliable analysis of that data according to accepted scientific principles, would be rendered nugatory. Each side in a dispute over the constitutional validity of firearms regulations could simply hire a retired ATF agent, a retired FBI agent, a current or former police official, or other law enforcement personnel, to engage in a swearing match. One law enforcement official acting as an expert would swear that his professional 7

Case 1:08-cv-01289-JEB Document 64 Filed 05/30/13 Page 8 of 13 experience told him that the laws were reasonable, effective, and advanced an important governmental interest. The opposing expert would swear that his professional experience told him the opposite. Neither expert would be required to support his position by data, and neither would be required to engage in any scientific analysis of the (non-existent) data. It is hard to see how such a swearing contest would assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue as Rule 702 prescribes. 3. The Expert Reports contain no data or facts on which the opinions are allegedly based, and contain no reliable principles to form the basis for the opinions. The D.C. Circuit required the District to produce meaningful evidence, consisting of studies and/or data, to demonstrate that its registration requirements furthered an important governmental interest such as crime control. Furthermore, Rule 26(a)(2) requires that an expert report must contain the basis and reasons for the expert s opinions, and the data or other information considered by the witness in forming his opinions. As set forth at greater length in the Motions to Strike, the Expert Reports are wholly lacking in data and in other information sufficient to support an expert opinion on the efficacy of the District s firearms registration laws. Defendants state that the Expert Reports are "rife with facts and data (Opp. 6), but do not favor the Court with any actual examples of data included in these reports. Instead, Defendants depart on a tangent about how experts may offer opinions that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation. Opp. 7 (citing Daubert at 592). But that statement is nearly a legal truism, reflecting the longstanding distinction between lay testimony, which must be based on 8

Case 1:08-cv-01289-JEB Document 64 Filed 05/30/13 Page 9 of 13 first hand knowledge of the facts to which the witness is testifying, and expert opinions which may be founded on the application of reliable principles to facts or data supplied to the expert. It does not excuse an expert from relying on any facts or data at all. Indeed, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly states that an expert opinion may be admissible if (1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles or methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. These three reports contain no data or facts, other than a few vague or anecdotal facts. They identify no principles and methods used to formulate the opinion, much less any substantiation that those principles and methods are reliable in general. Finally, these reports contain no evidence that those non-existent principles and methods have been applied reliably to the non-existent facts. Presumably, Rule 26(a)(2) requires expert reports to disclose the data on which the report is based because that rule dovetails with similar principles set forth in Rule 702. Without disclosure of such data, the Expert Reports are completely insufficient under Rule 26(a)(2), and any testimony that does not rest on sufficient facts and data, and does not result from the application of reliable principles, cannot possibly qualify as an expert opinion under Rule 702 (with the narrow exception for fields where there are no studies or data). This court has enforced the requirements of Rule 26(a)(2), and has stricken expert reports that do not disclose the facts and data on which the opinion is allegedly based. In United States ex rel. Mossey v. Pal-Tech, Inc., 231 F.Supp.2d 94, 97 (D.D.C. 2002) the defendant moved to strike plaintiff s expert witness report for failure to meet the requirements of Rule 26(a)(2) of 9

Case 1:08-cv-01289-JEB Document 64 Filed 05/30/13 Page 10 of 13 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court struck the report for non-compliance with the rule, including the report s failure to provide the bases and reasons for the expert s opinions, and because it did not adequately identify the data or information [he] considered in forming his opinions. Id. at 98. In addition, the court struck the report because it contained nothing more than legal opinions and unsubstantiated assessments of the evidence. Id. Equally, the requirement that some reliable methodology be employed is enforced by the courts in considering motions to strike expert reports. See, e.g., Elder v. Tanner, 205 F.R.D. 190, 193-94 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (expert reports stricken where they state the experts' ultimate opinions... generally, the authorities and evidence upon which they rely, but without any elaboration or reasoning. It is not sufficient simply to list the resources they utilized and then state an ultimate opinion without some discussion of their thought process. ); Bethea v. Equinox Fitness Club, 544 F. Supp. 2d 398, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) aff'd in part sub nom. Mass v. Equinox Fitness Club, 354 F. App'x 556 (2d Cir. 2009) (motion to strike granted where much of the report was simply argument uninformed by any apparent specialized knowledge or reliable methodology and thus, [i]n all respects, it is inadmissible. ). Defendants argue that an expert opinion based solely on the professional experience of the asserted expert is permissible, noting that Plaintiffs will be able to cross-examine the District s experts on the factual bases of their opinions... Opp. 8. But here no facts are identified in the reports. The only basis for their opinions in unsupported assertion, which is precisely what Rule 26(a)(2), Rule 702, and the D.C. Circuit hold to be insufficient. 10

Case 1:08-cv-01289-JEB Document 64 Filed 05/30/13 Page 11 of 13 4. The Motions to Strike the Expert Reports are not premature. Defendants assert that the Motions to Strike are premature (Opp. 3, 8) but are uncertain as to what would be the right time to consider the sufficiency of the Expert Reports. At one point they argue that the validity of the expert testimony should be considered at trial after full crossexamination. Opp. 8. At other points, they indicate that Plaintiffs objections to the reports are really addressed to the sufficiency of the evidence in connection with a Rule 56 motion (Opp. 3), or that consideration of compliance with Rule 26(a)(2) can only be addressed after the depositions of the putative experts. Opp. 3. None of these contentions is correct. If there were some minor problem with the Expert Reports, there could be grounds for waiting to see if the problem would be cleared up at the experts depositions. But the problems here are not susceptible to being cured. It is not that a particular report is lacking a basis in facts or data for some particular issue. The reports are comprehensively lacking in any data or facts whatsoever. There is not a lack of clarity or deficiency in some particular regarding the reasoning, principles, or methodology applied to the facts. Rather, there is no basis or reason for the opinions at all; no principles or methodologies underlying the conclusions, much less reliable ones, have been identified at all. Defendants point to the fact that Mr. Vince has testified as an expert in several firearmrelated cases as evidence that his personal experience is sufficient to sustain his expert report. Opp. 5-6. However, none of those cases presented issues in which the efficacy of novel firearms regulatory statutes in advancing governmental important interests was attempted to be measured empirically. Although these individuals may be accomplished or respected in their particular fields, 11

Case 1:08-cv-01289-JEB Document 64 Filed 05/30/13 Page 12 of 13 service as an ATF agent or a police chief does not equip an individual with the scholarly tools to opine on studies relating to the efficacy of firearms registration requirements for crime control. In fact, in this cases these individuals have not even attempted to do so. Beyond the citation of a tiny handful of studies almost as afterthoughts, they have not cited any research they have done personally, and do not attempt to evaluate any research by qualified scholars. Thus, there is nothing that requires any waiting period before the compliance of the Expert Reports with Rule 26(a)(2) should be determined. Neither is there any merit to Defendants plea that the appropriate course at this juncture of the litigation would be an order allowing resubmission of the reports, to correct the alleged errors. Opp. 10. No supplementation or deposition testimony can cure the fundamental defects of these reports and the opinions in them. The only way to cure the defects in these Expert Reports is to base them on actual data instead of no data, employ a reliable methodology instead of no methodology, and have them submitted by individuals who are experts in social scientific research instead of by individuals who are not. Instead of being premature, it is important to decide now whether these expert reports should be stricken. If the reports are not stricken now, the parties will have to move ahead with depositions of these three purported experts, and depositions are expensive and time-consuming. Furthermore, in arguing any motions for summary judgment or in preparing for trial, expenditures of time, money, briefing space, and effort will have to be made to respond to expert testimony when the status of that testimony remains in limbo. There is no rule stating that a decision on striking an expert report must be delayed past some particular point in the pretrial proceedings. See, e.g., Mossey at 95-99 (court decided motion to strike expert report at same time it decided motion to dismiss Count in complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and motion to dismiss 12

Case 1:08-cv-01289-JEB Document 64 Filed 05/30/13 Page 13 of 13 counterclaim under Rule 12(b)(6)). Defendants contend that at the proper time the plaintiffs may attempt to show that there is an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered, citing General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). Since the reports contain no data, it requires no sophisticated analysis to conclude that the opinions have nothing to support them but a gap. Before wasting further time and resources of the parties and the Court, these wholly deficient expert reports should be stricken. CONCLUSION The Expert Reports of Lanier, Vince, and Jones should be stricken. Respectfully submitted, Dick Anthony Heller Absalom F. Jordan, Jr. William Carter William Scott Asar Mustafa By counsel /S/Stephen P. Halbrook Stephen P. Halbrook D.C. Bar No. 379799 /S/ Richard E. Gardiner Richard E. Gardiner D.C. Bar No. 386915 Suite 403 3925 Chain Bridge Road Fairfax, VA 22030 (703) 352-7276 (703) 359-0938 (fax) 13

Case 1:08-cv-01289-JEB Document 64-1 Filed 05/30/13 Page 1 of 3 Exhibit 1

Case 1:08-cv-01289-JEB Document 64-1 Filed 05/30/13 Page 2 of 3 References American Academy of Pediatrics. Safety and Prevention: Gun Safety: Keeping Children Safe. http://www.healthychildren. org/english/ safety -preventi on/ all-around/pages/gun-s afety Keeping-Children-Safe.aspx. Accessed February 8, 2013. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). 2000. Following the Gun. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Treasury. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). 2002. Crime Gun Trace Reports (2000): The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Treasury. Cummings P, Grossman DC, Rivara FP, Koepsell TD. 1997. State gun safe storage laws and child mortality due to firearms. Journal of the American Medical Association. 278: 1084-1086. Grossman DC, Mueller BA, Riedy C, Dowd MD, Villaveces A, Prodzinski J, Nakagawara J, Howard J,Thiersch N, HarruffR. Gun storage practices and risk of youth suicide and unintentional firearm injuries. Journal of the American Medical Association. 2005 Feb 9;293(6):707-14. Hepburn L, Azrael D, Miller M, Hemenway D. The effect of child access prevention laws on unintentional child firearm fatalities, 1979-2000. Journal of Trauma 2006;61:423-428. Kellermann AL, Rivara FP, Somes G, et al. 1992. Suicide in the home in relation to gun ownership. New England Journal of Medicine 327:467-472. Miller M, Azrael D, Hemenway D, Vrinitotis M. 2005. Firearm storage practices and rates of unintentional firearm deaths in the United States. Accident Analysis & Prevention 661-667. National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Fatal Injury Reports and Nonfatal Injury Reports. Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System (WISQARS), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Accessed February 1,2013. National Rifle Association. NRA Gun Safety Rules. http://training.nra.org/nra-gun-safetyrules.aspx. Accessed February 8, 2013. United State's General Accounting Office. Firearms Purchased From Federal Firearm Licensees Using Bogus IdentifIcation. Washington, DC, GAO-OIA27NL Mar 19,2001. Webster, Daniel W., Jon S. Vernick, and Lisa M. Hepburn. 2001. "The Relationship Between Licensing, Registration and Other State Gun Sales Laws and the Source State of Crime Guns." Injury Prevention 7: 184-189. 16

Case 1:08-cv-01289-JEB Document 64-1 Filed 05/30/13 Page 3 of 3 Webster, Daniel W., Jon S. Vernick, and Maria T. Bulzacchelli. 2009. "Effects of State-Level Firearm Seller Accountability Policies on Firearms Trafficking." Journal of Urban Health 86: 525-537. Webster DW, Vernick JS, Zeoli AM, Manganello JA. 2004. Effects of youth-focused firearm laws on youth suicides. Journal of the American Medical Association 292:594-601. Webster, Daniel W. and Jon S. Vernick. 2013 "Spurring Responsible Firearms Sales Practices through Litigation: The Impact of New York City's Lawsuits Against Gun Dealers on Interstate Gun Trafficking" In Reducing Gun Violence in America: Informing Policy with Evidence and Analysis, Daniel W. Webster and Jon S. Vernick, Eds. Baltimore, MD: Jolms Hopkins University Press. Webster Daniel W., Jon S. Vernick, Emma E. McGinty, and Ted Alcorn. 2013 "Preventing the Diversion of Guns to Criminals through Effective Firearm Sales Laws." In Reducing Gun Violence in America: Informing Policy with Evidence and Analysis, Daniel W. Webster and Jon S. Vernick, Eds. Baltimore, MD: Jolms Hopkins University Press. Webster DW, Starnes M. Reexamining the association between child access prevention gun laws and unintentional firearm deaths among children, Pediatrics, 2000;106:1466-1469. Wintemute, Garen J., Philip J. Cook, Mona A Wright. (2005) Risk factors among handgun retailers for frequent and disproportionate sales of guns used in violent and firearm related crimes. Injury Prevention 11 :357-363... --1 17

Case 1:08-cv-01289-JEB Document 64-2 Filed 05/30/13 Page 1 of 3 Exhibit 2

Case 1:08-cv-01289-JEB Document 64-2 Filed 05/30/13 Page 2 of 3 20 also reviewed) References (Sources cited in the Webster report may be found on pp. 16-17 of that report, and were Author s unpublished analysis of Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). 2013. Study 4572-2004 Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities. Machine-readable dataset. Ann Arbor, MI: ICPSR (attached and entitled Kleck Analysis of Survey of 2004 Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities ) Full dataset available upon request. DeZee, Matthew R. 1983. "Gun control legislation: impact and ideology." Law and Policy Quarterly 5:367-379. Hepburn, L., Deborah Azrael, Matthew Miller, and David Hemenway. 2006. The effect of child access prevention laws on unintentional child firearm fatalities, 1979-2000. Journal of Trauma 61:423-428. Kleck, Gary. 1991. Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America. NY: Aldine de Gruyter. Kleck, Gary. 1997. Targeting Guns: Firearms and their Control. NY: Aldine de Gruyter. Kleck, Gary, and Don B. Kates. 1997. The Great American Gun Debate. San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute. Kleck, Gary, and Don B. Kates. 2001. Armed. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. Kleck, Gary, and E. Britt Patterson. 1993. "The impact of gun control and gun ownership levels on violence rates." Journal of Quantitative Criminology 9:249-288. Kleck, Gary, and Shun-Yung Wang. 2009. The myth of big-time gun trafficking and the overinterpretation of gun tracing data. UCLA Law Review 56(5):1233-1294. May, David C. and G. Roger Jarjoura, 2006. Illegal Guns In The Wrong Hands. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Murray, Douglas R. 1975. "Handguns, gun control laws and firearm violence." Social Problems 23:81-92. National Rifle Association. 2010. Compendium of State Laws Governing Firearms 2010. Fairfax, VA: NRA Institute for Legislative Action.

Case 1:08-cv-01289-JEB Document 64-2 Filed 05/30/13 Page 3 of 3 21 Sheley, Joseph and James D. Wright. 1996. In The Line Of Fire. NY: Aldine de Gruyter. U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). 2000. Following the Gun: Enforcing Federal Laws Against Firearms Traffickers. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). 2013. ATF: District of Columbia. http://www.atf.gov/files/statistics/download/trace-data/2011/2011-trace-datadistrict-of-columbia.pdf. U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2013. State-to-State Migration Flows Table 2011, available at Census Bureau website, http://www.census.gov/hhes/migration/data/acs/state-tostate.html. U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics. 2012. Firearms Stolen During Household Burglaries and Other Property Crimes, 2005 2010. NCJ 239436. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. FBI. 2013. Uniform Crime Reports website at http://www.fbi.gov/statsservices/crimestats. Webster, Daniel W., Jon S. Vernick, and Maria T. Belzacchelli. 2009. Effects of state-level firearm seller accountability policies on firearms trafficking. Journal of Urban Health 86:523-537. Webster, Daniel W., Jon S. Vernick, and Lisa M. Hepburn. 2001. The relationship between licensing, registration, and other state gun sales laws and the source state of crime guns. Injury Prevention 7:184-189. Webster, Daniel W., Jon S. Vernick, Emma E. McGinty, and Ted Alcorn. 2013. Preventing the diversion of guns to criminals through effective firearm sales laws. In Reducing Gun Violence in America. Edited by Daniel W. Webster and Jon S. Vernick. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins. Wellford, Charles F., John V. Pepper, and Carol V. Petrie (eds.). 2005. Firearms and Violence: A Critical Review. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. Wintemute, Garen J., Philip J. Cook, and Mona A. Wright. 2005. Risk factors among handgun retailers for frequent and disproportionate sales of guns used in violent and firearmrelated crimes. Injury Prevention 11:357-363.