one Introduction OnSeptember11,1996,Boris Sergeev,thedirectorofanimport export companybasedinromeandfatheroftwo,astockymaninhislateforties, arrived in Moscow to finalize a valuable contract for the importationoffrozenmeat.therussianpartnerswereagroprom,agiantsoviet agriculturalconcernthatwasnowinprivatehands,andtwoprominent banks, the Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano and Promstroybank. Th e former hadasomewhatbumpyhistory itsceorobertocalviwasfoundhanging from beneath Blackfriars Bridge in London in 1982 but was now undernewmanagementandaggressivelytryingtoentertherussianmarket.promstroybankofsaintpetersburgwasasafebet formerlythelargeststatebankinthesovietunionandnowajoint stockcompany.even VladimirPutinoncesatonitsboard.SometwentymillionU.S.dollars wereatstake.sergeevhadseveralmeetingswithtopofficialsatbothbanks andtheministryofagriculture.hismostvaluedcontactinthepolitical worldwasasoviet erapoliticianwhohadtakenpartinthecoupthattried tooustmikhailgorbachevinaugust1991andwasnowalobbyistfor agro industrialinterests. Bytheendoftheweek,Borishadsecuredthefundingandfeltconfident.Despitefearsvoicedbyhisfamilybeforethetrip,nothingbadhad happened.hecouldrelaxandspendthelastfewnightsinhisnativecityin style.hetookasuiteatanupscalehotellocatedonthecentraltverskaya Ulitsa,thestreetafewyardsfromRedSquarethatrunsnorthwestfromthe ManegetowardSaintPetersburg.OnthenightofSeptember23,hewassippingpredinnerdrinksatthebaronthefourthfloorwhentwomenentered
2 chapterone thehotellookingforhim.evenwiththeclosed circuittelevisionsystem andheavilyarmedguardsthatpatrolledthehotel sgranitelobby,entrywas notdifficult.thepairshowedabogushotelpassandboardedtheelevator tothefourthfloor.sexforsalewasondisplayatthebar.yettheymovedon, pastthegaggleofwomenflauntingtheirheavymakeupandcheapjewelry. TheystoppedinfrontofBoris stableandextractedtwottpistolswitha silencer.theirvictimwashitintheheadbyfourbullets(somereportssay five). The killers, who were seen on the closed circuit television camera, calmlytooktheelevatorbacktothelobby,walkedontothebusytverskaya,andclimbedintoanoldzhigulithatwaswaitingforthem.th ey wereinthehotelfornomorethansixminutes,between6:55and7:01p.m. Inthemeantime,somefifteenhundredmilesaway,aspecialunitofthe Italianpolicewaspickingupalotofchatterontheseveraltelephonelines thatitwastapping.moredetailsonthemurderemerged.boris sbrother, Sasha,wholivedinVienna,hadjoinedhimandwassittingonthesame sofawhenboriswasshot.at7:51p.m.moscowtime,sasha,stillinshock, calledboris swife,nadia,inromefromthepolicestationwherehewas beinginterrogated.atfirstshethoughthewasjoking,butthensheasked ifitwasa Georgian whohadshotboris.sashareplied: Ithappenedvery fast,butthemanwasdarkskinned. Thenextdaytheyspokeagain.Boris s distraughtwifecouldnotcomprehendhowthemurdercouldhavehappenedinoneofthebesthotelsofthecity,infrontofsomanypeople,with noreactionwhatsoeverfromthehotel security. Thepolicesay, replied Sasha, thatthemurderhadthehallmarksofaprofessionallyplannedoperation,withtheintentionofsendingaclearmessagetoothersaswell. Nadia,believeme,thereisnochancetheculpritswilleverbefound. Thevictiminquestionwasnoordinarybusinessman.BorninRussiain 1948,hehadusedatleastfouraliasesintheprevioustenyears.Hemoved toromein1993tosetupanimport exportcompany.bythen,hehad already been prosecuted in Italy, Austria, and France on several charges related to the possession of weapons, forgery, polygamy, and fraud. He wasrumoredtoownalargevillainviennaandholdbankaccountsworth atleastthirtymillionu.s.dollars.officialpapersstatethathiscompany, Global Trading,dealtintheimportandexportoffrozenmeatandother foodproductsalongwithoil,alcohol,timber,andcoal.thecompanyalso conducted, so the papers claim, market research. Intent on covering his tracks, Boris had taken a rather roundabout way to reach Moscow:
introduction 3 heflewfromrometomilan,thencrossedtheswissborderinarented car,andfinallytookaplanefromzurichtotherussiancapital.whilein Moscow,hecarriedagunatalltimes.TheItalianauthoritieswerecertain thatglobaltradingwasafrontforthesolntsevskaya,themostimportant crimegrouptoemergefromthecollapseofthesovietunion.th erussian mafiahadcreatedanoutpostinafarawayterritoryandwasexpandingfast. Itwashightimethatsomeonetooknotice.WhenIwasshownthefilesfor thisinvestigation,almosttenyearsago,idecidedtodevotemyresearch tothestudyofmafias abilitytotransplantinnewanddistantterritories. Thisbookistheresult. OnereadingoftheTverskayahotelmurderwouldsupporttheconventionalwisdomonglobalizationand transnationalorganizedcrime that has emerged in recent years, especially thanks to authors such as Claire Sterling(Crime without Frontiers),ManuelCastells(The Rise of the Network Society),MoisesNaim(Illicit),LouiseShelley(Global Crime Inc.),andPhil Williams,andisinfluentialamongpolicymakers:organizedcrimemigrates easily,duetothespreadofglobalizationandpopulationmigration,and criminalmultinationalcorporationsareincreasinglyunattachedtoaspecificterritory. Internationalorganizedcrime, writesshelley,thedirector ofthetransnationalcrimeinstituteinwashington,dc, hasglobalized itsactivitiesforthesamereasonsaslegitimatemultinationalcorporations. Shemaintainsthat justasmultinationalcorporationsestablishbranches aroundtheworldtotakeadvantageofattractivelabourorrawmaterial markets,sodoillicitbusinesses. 1 ForWilliams,organizedcrimenow can migrateeasily. 2 Castells,whoalsodescribesthisphenomenon,listsanumberoflocalitieswhere(hethinks)well knownmafiashaveopenedoutposts, such as Germany for the Sicilian mafia, Galicia for Colombian cartels, andthenetherlandsforthe Chinesetriads. 3 Theseandotherauthors go further by arguing that the notions of territorial entrenchment and controlarebecomingobsoletefora GlobalCrimeInc. that transcends the sovereignty that organizes the modern state system. 4 Factors often citedtoexplaintheglobalizationofcriminalactivitiesandthegeographical expansionofcriminalfirmsincludetechnologicalinnovationincommunicationsandtransportationalongwithdisappearinglanguagebarriers. 5 Thispositionreflectsthebroaderdebateonthenatureandconsequences ofglobalization,andisconsistentwiththeviewadvancedbyauthorswho emphasizethede territorializationofeconomicpower. 6
4 chapterone The transnational organized crime consensus is influential among policymakers.mafiashavenowbecome liquid, asarguedinarecentreportbytheitaliananti MafiaParliamentaryCommission(CPA).Liquidityinthiscontextdoesnotrefertotheavailabilityofcashbutinsteadto aversionofmodernitywherecontrolofaterritoryhasbeensuperseded byaratherunspecifiedfluidity.politiciansfrombothendsofthepolitical spectrumfindammunitionintheassertionspromotedbytheconsensus: sectionsoftherightpeddleunqualifiedfearsofmigrants,whilesomeon theleftareonlytoohappytoblameglobalizationand neoliberalpolicies forlocalstatefailures. Theworldofinternationalcrimeismorecomplicatedthantheseauthors wishtoadmit.chapter4andchapter7willexpandonthecontextofthe Tverskayahotelmurderandunpackitsmechanics.HereIwishtodirectthe reader sattentiontothefactthatmostauthorsinterpretglobalizationasa processthatfacilitatesmovementandeventuallytransplantation.inorder toevaluatetheeffectofglobalizationonorganizedcrimegenerallyandmafiasmorespecifically,oneneedstospelloutthemotivationsforagroup to open a branch abroad and the effects that different motivations have onhowthoseoutpostsarecreatedaswellasexplorewhetherglobalization mighthavetheoppositeeffect namely,thatofenablingamafiatoacquire resourcesproducedinothercountriessimplybybuyingthemontheopen marketratherthanbysettingupforeignbranches.furthermore,notallattemptsattransplantationaresuccessful.tooutsiders,amafiagroupmight seemlikeagiantandunbeatableoctopusabouttotakeovertheworldfrom itsheadquartersinanunreachableeasterneuropeancity.lookedatfrom thegroundup,transplantationisfraughtwithdifficulties. Does it follow that mafias can never be found in faraway territories? BothPeterReuterandDiegoGambetta,arguablytheforemostscholars inthefieldofmafiastudies,haveemphasizedthattheseorganizationsare hardtoexportandtendtobelocalinscope.anillegalorganizationopeningabranchabroadwouldfinditdifficulttomonitoritsagentsindistant localities.outsidetheirhomeregion,mafiosiwouldstruggletocorrupt thepoliceandcollectreliableinformation.finally,itmightbetaxingto makevictimsbelievethatthepersonstandinginfrontofthembelongstoa menacing,foreignmafia.areputationforviolencedependsonlong term relations,cementedwithinindependentnetworksofkinship,friendship, andethnicity.itisnexttoimpossibletoreproducetheminanewland. 7
introduction 5 Andyetunderparticularconditions,mafiagroupshavebeenableto openbranchesindistantterritories.inthe1950s,membersofthecalabrese`ndranghetamigratedtothenorthernitalianregionofpiedmont, managed to penetrate the construction sector of some towns outside Turin,andsoonbecameentrenched.In1995,thepresidentofItalydisbandedthecitycouncilofBardonecchia,whichhostedthe2006Winter Olympics,asaresultofthe`Ndrangheta senduringinfluence.thiswasan unprecedenteddecisionforatowninthenorthofitaly.anattemptbythe `NdranghetatosetupabranchintheVenetoregionataroundthesame time,however,failed. Similardyads,althoughneglectedintheliteratureonorganizedcrime, arenotthatrare.moststrikingly,themigrationtotheunitedstatesofitalians,somewithmafiaskills,attheturnofthenineteenthcenturygaverise toasetofpowerfulmafiagroupsknownasthe fivefamilies innewyork City.Italianmigrationtoanotherseaport,thecityofRosarioinArgentina, failedtogeneratelong lastingcriminalgroupsofitaliandescent.aftera relativelybriefspell,the RosarioMafia disappearedandisnowaforgottenepisodeoflocalhistory.why?thecentralquestionofthisbookiswhy insomecasesmafiatransplantationsucceededwhileinothersitfailed.in ordertoanswerthisquestion,ihaveusedawiderangeofdataandtraveled toseveralpartsoftheworldduringthepasttenyears. Below I consider cases of both successful and unsuccessful attempts bymafiastoopenbranchesoutsidetheirterritoryoforigin.chapter3is amatchedcomparisonbetweenbardonecchiaandverona,whilechapter 4isastudyofeffortsbytheSolntsevskayatocreatesubsidiariesinRome andbudapest.chapter5takesusbacktotheturnofthetwentiethcentury withamatchedcomparisonbetweennewyorkcityandrosario.th efinal chapterofthisbookexploresthemovementofhongkongandtaiwanese triadstomainlandchina.inchapter7,ioutlineageneralperspectiveof mafia emergence and transplantation, and offer some considerations on therelationbetweendemocracyandmafias. BeforeIproceedfurtherandanticipatetheconclusionsIreach,Ishould sayafewwordsontheunitofanalysis(mafia),thephenomenon(transplantation),andthestructureoftheargument.ifocusbelowonaspecific typeofcriminalorganization,definedasagroupthatsuppliesprotection intheterritoryoforigin.the`ndrangheta,thesiciliancosanostra,the
6 chapterone ItalianAmericanmafia,theHongKongandTaiwanesetriads,theSolntsevskaya and other Russian gruppirovki, and the Japanese yakuza are essentially providers of extralegal governance, and can be collectively referred toasmafias. 8 Thesegroupsengageinextortion theforcedextractionof resourcesinexchangeforservicesthatarenot provided. 9 Butsuchbehavior isnottheirdefiningfeature. 10 Rather,theyaregroupsthataspiretogovern othersbyprovidingcriminalprotectiontoboththeunderworldandthe upperworld. 11 Theycansupplygenuineserviceslikeprotectionagainst extortion; protection against theft and police harassment; protection for thieves;protectioninrelationtoinformallyobtainedcreditandtheretrieval of loans; the elimination of competitors; the intimidation of customers, workers,andtradeunionistsforthebenefitofemployers;theintimidation oflawfulrightholders;andthesettlementofavarietyofdisputes.forexample,inhisclassicstudyofchicagoorganizedcrimepublishedin1929, theu.s.ethnographerjohnlandescohighlightedtheenforcementofcartel agreementsasaserviceprovidedbymafiagroups.producershaveanincentivetoenterintocartelagreementsbutalsotoundercutfellowconspirators, placingthemselvesinaclassicprisoner sdilemma.th emafiaofferstoenforcethecartelagreementamongproducers,therebydeterringconspirators fromcheatingonthedeal. 12 Itaketheword transplantation tomeantheabilityofamafiagroup tooperateanoutpostoverasustainedperiodoutsideitsregionoforigin androutineoperation. 13 Althoughinprinciplethenewterritorycouldbe contiguousorfaraway,iwillfocusmostlyonterritoriesthatarenotcontiguous(abetterwordfortransplantationincontiguousterritoriesmight beexpansion).theactorsinvolvedare made membersoftheorganizationoforigin;inotherwords,theyarebonafidemafiosiwhohavegone through an initiation ritual in the territory of origin. If transplantation succeeds,suchritualsmaycometobeperformedinthenewenvironment andrecognizedbythegroupoforigin.mafiosimightfindthemselvesin thenewterritorybyanaccidentofhistory,suchasmigration,orbecause theyhavebeenforcedtoresidetherebyacourtorder.insuchcases,their presenceisduetoexogenousfactorsratherthananexplicitex ante plan tosetupshopinanewregion.alternatively,orinaddition,themafiaof originmightconsciouslydecidetoopenabranchinanewland.inboth scenariosthe foreign mafiosiactivelyworkatcreatinganewgroup,relyingontheskillsacquiredbeforehand.thenewentityor family iseither
introduction 7 affiliatedtoorabranchofanestablishedexistingmafiafamily.th eoutpost mightbecomefinanciallyautonomousandabletogenerateitsownprofit, orcontinuetorelyontransfersfromthecenter.arathercrudeindicator ofthephenomenoniswhetherthemafiosiinquestionresideinthenew territory,althoughtheymightbeseenoccasionallytotravelback home. Over time, the branch organization might drift away from the original firm andbecomefullyautonomousaswellasfinanciallyindependent,or retainadegreeofdependencywiththehomeland. Theabovedefinitionhelpsdistinguishtransplantationproperfromseveralphenomenathatareoftenlumpedtogetherinthecategoryoftransnationalorganizedcrime.Criminalscrossingaborder(physicallyorvirtually,asinthecaseofInternetfrauds)withanillicitgoodorapersondo notautomaticallyqualifyaseithermafiaortransplantationbutratherasa formofillegaltrade,andneedtobeplacedinaconceptualboxthatdiffers from attempts to control markets or territories abroad. Similarly, members of mafia groups traveling abroad do not constitute transplantation ofthegroup,nordoconspiraciesbetweenmafiosiandforeigncriminals tosmuggleworkers,drugs,weapons,andotherillegalcommoditieseither intooroutoftheircountry. In this work, I try to identify distinctive factors in the narratives that I present.oneisthegeneralizedmigrationofthepopulationfromterritorieswheremafiasarewellestablished,suchaswesternsicilyandcalabria. Itseemsplausiblethatwhenlargegroupsofindividualsmigratefromterritorieswheremafiasarepervasive,somewithcriminalskillswouldalsorelocateandbemorelikelytoengageinmafiaactivitiesinthenewterritory(I amreferringheretoresettlementpromptedbynon mafia relatedreasons). Asecondpossibleboosttomafiatransplantationmightbethemigration ofpeoplespecificallytrainedinviolenceandwithmafiaskills.inthecase ofitaly,wecanevaluatethisdynamicthankstosoggiorno obbligato,apolicy thatpunishedconvictedmafiosibyforcingthemtorelocateoutsidetheir area of origin. Third, I consider the extent to which members of mafia groupsarepushedtomigrateinordertoescapemafiawarsorprosecution intheirareasoforigin,orwhethertheyareinsearchofparticularresources orinvestmentopportunities. Ineachchapter,Ithendiscusstheconditionsunderwhichmafiagroups are likely to become entrenched. A key dimension is the presence of a
8 chapterone demandforcriminalprotectioninthenewplace.thepresenceoflargeillegalmarkets,boomsinconstruction,anexport orientedeconomy,incentivestocreatecartelagreements,ortheinabilityofthestatetosettlelegal disputes quickly and effectively usually generate such a demand. I also examinewhetherlackoftrustandlowlevelsofcivicengagementwould predictahigherlikelihoodofmafiaentrenchment. Letmeanticipatethemainconclusionsofthisstudy.Inallthecasesnarratedinthisbook,mafiosifindthemselvesinthenewlocalenotoftheir ownvolition;theyhavebeenforcedtomovetherebycourtorders,toescapejusticeormafiainfightingandwars.theyarenotseekingnewmarkets ornewproductsbutareinsteadjustmakingthemostofbadluck.ihad notanticipatedthisresult,andcertainlydidnotchoosethecasesinorder toconformtothisfinding.whatmightappeartheproductofglobalizationisinfacttheconsequenceofstaterepressionexportingtheproblem toothercountries(evenmafiainfightingcantoanextentbetheproduct ofpressureputonthegroupbythestate).th isfindingdoesvindicatean aspectoftheperspectivesuggestedbyreuterandgambetta namely,that mafiaswouldnotnormallymoveoutoftheirterritory.anadditionalissue Iexploreisthateveniftheydonotmovewillingly,theycanstilltoanextentchoosewheretomove.Ifindthattheymovetoplaceswheretheyhad apreviouscontact,atrustedfriendorarelative. Is the presence of mafiosi in a new territory enough for a mafia to emerge?no.aspecialcombinationoffactorsmustbepresent.first,no other mafia group(or state apparati offering illegal protection) must be present.itistoomuchofanuphillstruggleforanincomingmafiatoset upshopinthepresenceofapowerfullocalcompetitor.second,amafia groupismostlikelytosucceedintransplantingwhenitspresencecoincideswiththesuddenemergenceofnewmarkets.tothedegreethatthe stateisnotabletogovernnewmarkets,thepossibilityofmafiaemergence orentrenchmentfromabroadisstrong.statesmightbeunabletoclearly defineandprotectpropertyrights,andmarketoperatorshencewoulddevelopademandforalternativesourcesofprotection.inaddition,statesby definitioncannotprotectdealersofillegalcommodities.inbothinstances, significantopportunitiesexistformafiastogovernaccesstovaluablemarkets,offergenuineservicesofdisputesettlementandprotection,enforce
introduction 9 cartel agreements, reduce competition, and thus serve the interests of a sectorofsociety.theseopportunitiescanbeeasilytakenupwhenasupply ofpeopletrainedinviolence,eitherlocalorfromabroad,isathand. The presence of a supply of mafiosi and the inability of the state to governmarketsarethekeyfactorsthatlinkcasesofsuccessfultransplantation,suchasthe`ndranghetainbardonecchia(chapter3)andtherussianmafiainhungary(chapter4).inbardonecchia,disenfranchisedmigrantworkersfromoutsidetheregionacceptedillegalemploymentover unemployment,therebyforgoingmembershipintradeunionsandmore generallystate sponsoredprotection.entrepreneursnotonlyhiredillegal workers but also schemed to restrict competition. The structure of the locallabormarketandtheboomingconstructionindustry(inwhichfirms competelocallyandthereisastrongincentivetoformcartels)ledtothe emergenceofademandforillegalprotection.membersofthe`ndranghetamazzaferroclanresidedinthisterritory.th eyofferedcertainfirms privilegedaccesstothismarket,andwereabletosettledisputesbetween workersandemployers. AlthoughPiedmontdoesnothaveanewmarketeconomylikethoseof EasternEurope,astrikingparallelexistsinthesuccessfultransplantationof the Russian mafia s Solnstevo criminal group in Budapest(chapter 4). In thatinstancethestatefailedtocreateasystemtoadjudicatedisputesquickly and effectively, thereby leaving significant sectors of the emerging market economyunprotectedbythelaw,aswasthecaseforimmigrantworkersin Bardonecchia.Whenvastnumbersofeconomicagentsoperateinanunprotectedmarket,theydevelopademandfornonstateformsofprotection.In bothbardonecchiaandbudapest,skilledcriminalswereavailabletoorganizeamafiagroupandofferavarietyofservices,suchasthesettlementof disputesandeliminationofcompetitorsinlocalmarkets. ApowerfulsetofmafiagroupsemergedintheUnitedStatesaround 1910becauseoftheunintendedconsequencesofpolicereformanditwas abletoexpandlaterthankstoprohibition(chapter5).untilthen,illegal marketswereprotectedbyacombinationoflocalpoliticiansandcorrupt policeofficers.whenthemayorofnewyorkenactedfar reachingreforms thatcurbedgrandgraft,illegalmarketssuchasgamblingandprostitution wereinsearchofnewprotectors.inlegalmarkets,likegarmentproduction,poultry,garbagecollection,andconstruction,existingoperatorswere
10 chapterone onlytoohappytoturntoanagencyabletoensurethecontinuationof cartelization.unemployedimmigrantworkers,mostlyfromsouthernitaly andequippedwithsomemafiaskills,steppedin. ThecaseofChinaallowsustospelloutingreaterdepthsomecrucial mechanisms.thestatehasbeenunabletoofferswiftandefficientavenues ofdisputesettlementforthenewplayersintherapidlyemergingmarket economy,andasignificantsectoroftheworkforceoperatesintheinformal economy, where state protection is absent. In addition, large illegal markets,suchasinprostitution,gambling,anddrugtrafficking,havedevelopedsincetheopeningofthechineseeconomyinthe1980s.onthe supply side ofthestory, brothers (triadsmembers)fromhongkong andtaiwanhavemovedtothemiddlekingdom.theyhavefailed(sofar) to become entrenched and offer generalized protection, however. Why? Chapter6showsthatinChina,apowerfulactorisalreadyinplacetooffersuchservices thatis,corruptfragmentsofthestateapparatus,which workasthe protectiveumbrella forbothlegalandillegalbusinesses.in thecasesofsuccessfultransplantation,noothermafia(orbentstateapparatus)wasalreadyonthegroundtocompetewiththeoutsiders. Globalizationhindersmafiatransplantationinawaythathasescaped mostcontributors.inthecaseoftwoofthefailedattemptstotransplant mafias,thelocaleconomiesreliedonexports Veronaonexportedfurniture,andRosarioonexportedagriculture.Thereisnodemandforcartels in the export oriented sector of the economy since producers export to differentpartsoftheworld.inordertostopcompetitionforproducera in,say,northerneurope,themafiawouldneedtoscareawayproducersin avarietyofdifferentcountrieswhoallexporttonortherneurope.th us,as economiesbecomemoreexportorientedduetoglobalization,thelikelihoodthatmafiaswilltransplantthemselvesmaydiminish. Migrationassuchisclearlynotacauseofmafiatransplantation.Despite roughlysimilarpatternsofmigrationfromthesouthtothenorthofitaly, asouthernmafiadidnottransplantitselfineitherromeorothertowns of Piedmont. Only when migration is coupled with illegal employment andtheabsenceofstateprotectiondoesademandforcriminalprotection emergethatcanbemetbyamafia.inotherwords,migration evenfrom regionswithahighmafiadensity doesnotnecessarilycarrytheseedofa newmafia.rather,itisthestate sfailuretooffereffectivelegalprotection
introduction 11 andthelackofavenuesforlegitimateemploymentthatsetinmotiona chainofeventsthatmightgiverisetoanewmafia. TheItalianpolicyofsoggiornoobbligato,flawedasitmighthavebeen, cannotbeblamedforsuccessfultransplantation.inthecaseofbardonecchia, the supply of foreign mafiosi went hand in hand with a genuine demandforcriminalprotection.whenitdidnot,transplantationfailed. Moreover,otherpartsofPiedmontandnorthernItalyalsoexperiencedan influxofskilledmobstersforcedtomigrateduetothesoggiornopolicy, butmafiasdidnotdevelop.similarly,therussiansinromefailedtoestablishasuccessfulgroupbecausetherewasnodemandfortheirservices. Evenasupplyofspecializedcriminals(asdistinctfromgeneralizedmigration)isnotenoughtoproducesuccessfultransplantation. ContrarytowhatissuggestedbytheseminalworkofRobertD.Putnam,ahighlevelofgeneralizedtrustand socialcapital amongthelawabidingpopulationisnotenoughtopreventtransplantation.thestudyof Bardonecchiasuggeststhathighlevelsoftrustamongthegeneralpopulationarenotsufficienttopreventtransplantationandsocialcapitalmight remainhighwhileamafiaflourishes.th emafiawasabletooffertoalarge enoughsectionofthelocalpopulationprotectionagainstcompetition,a workforcecheapenoughtoreaptheopportunitiesgeneratedbytheconstructionboom,andmoregenerallycapitalandemployment.th osewho rejectedthisstateofaffairs,recognizingthatitwasbuiltonviolenceand disrespectforthelaw,weresoonostracizedandmarginalized. Not only do I show that a mafia can transplant itself in highly civic northern Italy and that some local groups can rally to its defense. I also establishthatinveronathedensenetworkofsocialtrustallowedthedrug trade to operate without recourse to third party enforcers. Th is network reducedthedemandforthird partyenforcementbythemafiaandthereby inhibitedmafiamigration.themoregeneralpointisthatsocialcapitalcan beusedforgoodorilldependingonthegoalsoftheactorsinvolved. Inallthecasesnarratedinthisbook,mafiosiwereforcedtomove,but onceinthenewterritory,startedinvestinginthelocaleconomy,asthe RussianmafiadidinRomeandthetriadsdidinChina.Yetinvestments alonearenotsufficienttoleadtolong termtransplantation.wheninvestmentscombinewithasupplyofmafiosiandaspecificdemandforprotectionservices,agroupcanbecomeentrenched.
12 chapterone Finally,theincentivestoopenoutpostsabroadinordertoobtainresourcessuchaslabor,intelligence,andspecializedequipmentarefew,and decreaseasthemobilityofgoodsandpeopleincreases.globalizationwill increasetheabilityofmafiagroupstoobtainsomeoftheresourcesthat theyneedwithouthavingtomove.toputitmoregenerally,globalization willaffectthewaycrimeiscommittedinagivenlocale.forinstance,labor mobility toward traditional mafia territory can well increase, allowing mafiastoimportlaborfromtrustedsuppliers.afeatureofglobalization thatweobserveinlegitimatefirms theabilitytooutsourcework,such asopeningcallcentersinindia willnotbeanoptionformafiagroups; workerscannotbelocatedinindiatorunprotectionracketsinnewyork City.Totheextentthatmafiasseekspecializedtechnicalequipment,like arms,globalizationcouldincreasethenumberofinternationallocations fromwhichamafiagroupobtainsitsresources,butwillreducethemotivationtoopenoutpostsabroad. Cantheconclusionsontransplantationformthebasisofageneralperspectiveofmafiaemergenceandtransplantation?Arelativelyrecentbody ofresearchhasshownthatmafiasemergeinsocietiesthatareundergoing asuddenandlatetransitiontothemarketeconomy,lackalegalstructure thatreliablyprotectspropertyrightsorsettlesbusinessdisputes,andhave a supply of people trained in violence who became unemployed at this specificjuncture.thisperspective Icallitthe property righttheoryof mafia emergence has been applied to cases such as Sicily, Japan and post SovietRussia,toexplainhowmafiasmightemergeintimesofrapid butflawedtransitionstothemarketeconomy.isuggestthatthisperspectiveisaspecialcaseofabroaderphenomenon.mafiasemergeandtransplantwhencertainkeystructuralconditionsarepresentintheeconomy. Thecriticalfactorisproximitytoasuddenmarketexpansionthatisnot properlyregulatedbythestateandthepresenceofpeoplewhocanstep in to regulate such markets. In a nutshell, opportunities in the market economy bring about mafias. Effective states can ensure the orderly development of markets, and hence neutralize a mafia s transplantation or emergence.inchapter7,iaddresstheunintendedconsequencesofsome statepoliciesalongwiththecomplexrelationshipbetweendemocracyand mafias.ialsoreturntoboris smurderatthetverskayahotelandoffera cluetoidentifytheculprit.