Country: Ivory Coast National Commission of Inquiry 2011 (6 months renewable) Non-judicial inquiry constituted to carry out investigations on violations of human rights and international humanitarian rights committed anywhere in the country during the post-electoral period between 31 October 2010 15 May 2011. Categories of killing included for investigation are; summary executions, enforced and involuntary disappearances, death in custody, torture/cruel and unusual punishment leading to death and infliction of wounds leading to death. Time frame of violations: Permanent constitutional body Background 1. Legal basis Presidential decree No 2011-176 2. Terms of Reference Genesis of terms of reference: Public negotiation (pressure from civil society and international organisations to investigate the post-election violence). The Commission was set up to investigate all cases of Human rights violations that occurred in the post electoral crisis of 2010-2011. The Commission was also required to produce a report highlighting the investigation into the severe Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law violations that occurred in the 2010-2011 postelectoral violence and the responsibilities of the authors involved. 3. Applicable law
The Constitution of Ivory Coast of 2000. The Ivorian National Commission of Human Rights Act No 2004-302, International Humanitarian Law Principles. The Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocols. Commission of Enquiry (CoI) General 1. Powers of CoI The commission was empowered to do inspections in loco, hear expert witnesses and receive written submissions. 2. Independence The Commission was created as an independent body according to its report. However, the majority of commissioners were government representatives, representing the various ministries, which could be seen as problematic since some of the authors of the Human Rights violations were current President's supporters. 3. Impartiality From the wording of the mandate and final Report, the commission seems to have been impartial. 4. Transparency The hearings were held in public and the final report was made available to the public. 5. Invocation of ubuntu/related concept No mention of ubuntu or any related concept.
6. Gender mainstreaming 7. Interrelationship with other accountability mechanisms The commission collected and analysed all reports on Human Rights violations in Ivory coast produced by national and international organizations including the UN, it also took into account all claims and other actions published in the national and international press. Linked also to the National Dialogue on Truth and Reconciliation. Another transitional justice mechanism was the Special Investigative Cell within the Ministry of Justice which was charged with investigating attacks against state security, economic crimes, and violent crimes. Though the cell was designed as an impartial judicial body, expected to indict forces on both sides of the conflict, this balance has not been achieved. More than 150 Gbagbo supporters have been accused of crimes and arrested, but few from the Ouattara side have been similarly charged and detained, leading observers to point to the cell s politicized leadership and a strong current of victor s justice. In July 2013, the Indictment Chamber of the Abidjan Tribunal confirmed charges against 84 of Gbagbo s close associates. 8. International representation There was no international representation among the commissioners but all reports by international organisations on human rights violations in Ivory Coast were taken into account. 9. Adequate staffing The commission is reported to have had adequate staffing with 20 teams of investigators from various sectors. Process 1. Standard of proof The commission only had a fact finding mission and no judicial powers so a standard of proof was not in play. 2. Method of case selection
The commission was to investigate all human rights violations that occurred during the post-electoral crisis. 3. Data collection Extensive on site investigations were conducted involving lawyers, doctors, cartographers, statisticians, and sociologists. 4. Witness participation and protection According to the final report, 15 875 people were interviewed and their protection was ensured by security agents. There are no further details available. 5. Special protection and participation measures The final report mentions the protection of investigation sites without further details. 6. Financial resources The commission was funded by government. 7. Location of hearings All 112 localities/sectors, identified as having been zones of conflicts; mainly Abidjan. Findings 1. Norms relied on (re legitimate killing) The Commission found serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including summary executions, enforced and involuntary disappearances, rape, torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, arbitrary arrests, indiscriminate and targeted attacks against unarmed civilians including women and children, for their political or ethnic affiliation, attacks against mosques and other religious buildings, calls to murder and hate.the commission held that these violations against the right to life amounted to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
2. Challenges The amount of data and information available was weak compared to the severity of the crisis. All the members of the commission were appointed by the president which affected their credibility and impartiality. The investigation period was marked by a large number of displaced persons; which is likely to bias the results of the survey. The precarious security situation reduced the effectiveness of the commission. 3. Findings After interviewing 15,875 victims and witnesses, the Commission recorded 3,248 killings during the crisis attributed in the following proportions: 1,452 deaths attributed to pro-gbagbo forces, 727 deaths attributed to the FRCI, 200 deaths attributed to the Dozos, and 52 deaths attributed to nonconventional forces.29 They also recorded 8,141 cases of ill-treatment, 345 cases of torture, 194 cases of rape, 265 cases of enforced disappearance, and 260 cases of arbitrary detention. The commission found that approximately 3248 people were killed during the post-electoral violence. Around 700 were reportedly killed by the pro Alassane forces and around 1400 were killed by Gbagbo sympathizers. These killings were attributed to the conventional forces (military, police and gendarmes), foreign mercenaries, militia, self-defence groups and other civilian groups. Most of the victims were from Abidjan and the western part of the country. The investigation also found that the manipulation of ethnic, religious and political identity of the people coupled with a culture of impunity, were the major catalysts of the post-electoral violence. The Commission also noted that the youth in the post-election period, were used as a tool of political violence by political leaders and community actors.the youth was armed for war, galvanized by hate speech from officials and calls to revenge. 4. Recommendations The commission recommended the publication of results of the survey, a stronger fight against impunity, psychological and social support for victims by the Government. Moreover, the Commission also makes recommendations on land, national cohesion, media, youth, the Armed Forces and the Police and measures directed at helping the vulnerable of the society such women and children. 4. Politics of memory no indication thereof 5. Incorporation of local justice mechanisms No specific mention to local justice mechanisms in this commission, but the commission put at the centre grass root reconciliation and community involvement therein. Report
1. Availability The final Report was made public and is readily available. 2. Impact State institutions were held responsible for hate speech, incitement to violence and the ensuing killings.1452 people were killed by government forces controlled by President Gbagbo and 727 people were killed by the Republican Forces of Côte d' Ivoire ( FRCI ) under Alassane Ouattara's control. Although the results of these three justice mechanisms have been disappointing to date, the broader effort to address past abuses features small but growing bright spots. In May 2013, a warlord who fought with pro-ouattara forces was arrested. While he was detained on the grounds that he was illegally living in a protected forest, he is accused by several domestic and international human rights groups of being responsible for the massacres of hundreds of people in western Côte d Ivoire during and after the postelection crisis. Also in May, bodies from 57 mass graves across Abidjan were exhumed, and at least 36 of the sites contained bodies of people killed during the postelection violence. Separately, the Ivoirian government has announced plans to reform the justice system by 2015. Implementation and consequences 1. Institutional framework for implementation no specific institutional measures put in place as a result of this commission. 2. Fulfilment of Mandate President Ouattara submitted the Commission s report to his Prime Minister to pursue further measures, but progress has been slow and biased. Only three of the 207 investigations opened following the Commission s report related to pro-ouattara forces. Nonetheless, the report was a laudable attempt to create a truthful record of the post-election atrocities. 3. Government response President Ouattara spoke on behalf of the government and acknowledged state responsibility for the violations of human rights and promised to hold accountable, the individuals who committed these crimes through prosecution.
4. Civil society response The findings were generally well received by the population and various local NGO who applauded the president of the commission Mrs Paulette Badjo for the commission's work. The report was found to be relatively objective showing both sides (Ouattara and Gbagbo) and their participation in the crisis. However, some felt the findings were not detailed enough and the work of the commission should only be seen as the first stage of fact finding and truth seeking. 5. CSO galvanisation Genuine progress and ultimate success depend in large part on a vigilant and engaged civil society. Independent civil society organizations monitor official justice mechanisms to enhance their work, highlight their constraints, and serve as a check against abuses, bias, and negligence in the implementation of their mandates. Civic groups also contribute by conducting high-risk investigations to expose ongoing adverse actions by security forces and flawed judicial processes that perpetuate rights abuses and distrust, and by insisting on specific security-sector reforms, including immediate personnel vetting and increased oversight. Only civil society is in a position to develop new means of reaching out to victims and convincing the wider population to abandon a culture of silence and fear. Finally, civil society uses the official transitional justice institutions to champion victims claims. This includes intensified efforts by lawyers to file court cases on behalf of victims from different sides of the conflict, to correct what increasingly appears to be a one-sided process.