Congressional Oversight Manual

Order Code RL30240 Congressional Oversight Manual Updated May 1, 2007 Frederick M. Kaiser and Walter J. Oleszek Government and Finance Division T.J. Halstead, Morton Rosenberg, and Todd B. Tatelman American Law Division

Congressional Oversight Manual Summary The Congressional Oversight Manual was developed about 30 years ago following a three-day December 1978 Workshop on Congressional Oversight and Investigations. The workshop was organized by a group of House and Senate committee aides from both parties and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) at the request of the bipartisan House leadership. The Manual was produced by CRS with the assistance of a number of House committee staffers. In subsequent years, CRS sponsored and conducted various oversight seminars for House and Senate staff and updated the Manual as circumstances warranted. The last revision occurred in 2004. Worth noting is the bipartisan recommendation of the House members of the 1993 Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress (Rept. No. 103-413, Vol. I): [A]s a way to further enhance the oversight work of Congress, the Joint Committee would encourage the Congressional Research Service to conduct on a regular basis, as it has done in the past, oversight seminars for Members and congressional staff and to update on a regular basis its Congressional Oversight Manual. Over the years, CRS has assisted many Members, committees, party leaders, and staff aides in the performance of the oversight function, that is, the review, monitoring, and supervision of the implementation of public policy. Understandably, given the size, reach, cost, and continuing growth of the modern executive establishment, Congress s oversight role is even more significant and more demanding than when Woodrow Wilson wrote in his classic Congressional Government (1885): Quite as important as lawmaking is vigilant oversight of administration. Today s lawmakers and congressional aides, as well as commentators and scholars, recognize that Congress s work, ideally, should not end when it passes legislation. Oversight is an integral way to make sure that the laws work and are being administered in an effective, efficient, and economical manner. In light of this destination, oversight can be viewed as one of Congress s principal responsibilities as it grapples with the complexities of the 21 st century. To revise a document of this size and scope requires the contributions of many people. Five CRS specialists, listed on the title page, were responsible for organizing and writing this version of the Manual. In addition, other CRS personnel assisted in the preparation and publication of this report, along with staff of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

Contents I. Purposes, Authority, and Participants...1 Purposes...2 A. Ensure Executive Compliance with Legislative Intent...2 B. Improve the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Economy of Governmental Operations...2 C. Evaluate Program Performance...2 D. Prevent Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives and Powers...2 E. Investigate Alleged Instances of Poor Administration, Arbitrary and Capricious Behavior, Abuse, Waste, Dishonesty, and Fraud...2 F. Assess Agency or Officials Ability to Manage and Carry out Program Objectives...3 G. Review and Determine Federal Financial Priorities...3 H. Ensure That Executive Policies Reflect the Public Interest...3 I. Protect Individual Rights and Liberties...3 J. Other Specific Purposes...3 Authority to Conduct Oversight...5 A. United States Constitution...5 B. Principal Statutory Authority...6 C. Responsibilities in House and Senate Rules...11 Congressional Participants in Oversight...15 A. Members and Committees...15 B. Staff of Member Offices and Committees...16 C. Congressional Support Agencies and Offices...17 Selected Readings...18 II. Oversight Coordination and Processes...20 Oversight Coordination...20 A. General Techniques of Ensuring Oversight Coordination Include...20 B. Specific Means of Ensuring Oversight Coordination Include...20 Oversight Processes...21 A. The Budget Process...21 B. The Authorization Process...22 C. The Appropriations Process...23 D. The Investigatory Process...24 E. The Confirmation Process...25 F. The Impeachment Process...27 Selected Readings...29 III. Investigative Oversight...32

A. The Legal Basis for Oversight...32 B. The Tools of Oversight...33 1. The Subpoena Power...33 2. Staff Depositions...34 3. Congressional Grants of Immunity...35 C. Enforcement of the Investigative Power...36 1. The Contempt Power...36 2. Perjury and False Statements Prosecutions...38 D. Executive Privilege and Common Law Testimonial Privileges...39 1. The Presidential Communications Privilege...40 2. Common-Law Testimonial Privileges...46 E. Investigative Oversight Hearings...50 1. Jurisdiction and Authority...50 2. Rules Applicable to Hearings...50 3. Conducting Hearings...51 F. Specialized Investigations...52 G. Role of Minority-Party Members In the Investigative Process...56 Selected Readings...62 Appendix A...65 Appendix B...75 Appendix C...76 IV. Selected Oversight Techniques...77 A. Determine Laws, Programs, Activities, Functions, Advisory Committees, Agencies, and Departments Within Each Committee s Jurisdiction...77 B. Orientation and Periodic Review Hearings With Agencies...77 C. Casework...78 D. Audits...79 E. Monitoring the Federal Register...81 F. Special Studies and Investigations by Staff, Support Agencies, Outside Contractors, and Others...81 G. Communicating with the Media...82 a. Wire Services...82 b. Daily Newspapers...82 c. Magazines...83 d. Trade Periodicals...83 e. Television...83 f. Radio...85 g. Press Conferences...85 h. News Releases...86 i. The Internet and the Media...86 H. Statutory Offices of Inspector General: Establishment and Evolution...87 Responsibilities...87 Authority and Duties...88 Reporting Requirements...88 Independence...88

Appropriations...89 Appointment and Removal...89 Supervision...89 Coordination and Controls...89 Establishment...90 Recent Initiatives...93 I. Reporting, Consultation, and Other Sources of Information...93 1. Reporting Requirements...94 2. Prior Consultation...95 3. Other Significant Sources of Information...95 a. Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (104 Stat. 2838)...95 b. Government Performance and Results Act (107 Stat. 285)...96 c. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 857-874)...97 d. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (109 Stat. 163)...97 e. Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) of 1982 (96 Stat. 814)...97 f. Cash Management Improvement Act of 1990 (104 Stat. 1058)...98 g. Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 679)...98 h. Federal Advisory Committee Act...98 i. Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002...99 j. Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002...99 k. Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996...99 l. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995...99 m. Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act...100 J. Resolutions of Inquiry...100 K. Limitations and Riders on Appropriations...101 L. Legislative Veto and Advance Notice...104 M. Independent Counsel... 105 Selected Readings...109 V. Oversight Information Sources and Consultant Services...114 A. Congressional Research Service (CRS)...114 Analytical and Research Services...114 CRS Products...116 Divisions...118 Offices...120 B. Congressional Budget Office (CBO)...125 1. Helping Congress Develop a Plan for the Budget...126 2. Helping Congress Stay Within Its Budget Plan...128 3. Helping Congress Assess Federal Mandates...129 4. Helping Congress Consider Budget and Economic Policy Issues...129 C. Offices of Senate Legal Counsel and House General Counsel...131 A. Senate Legal Counsel...131 B. House General Counsel...134 D. Government Accountability Office (GAO)...136 1. Accountability...136

2. Integrity...137 3. Reliability...138 4. Additional Services...138 5. Obtaining GAO Services...140 E. Office of Management and Budget (OMB)...140 Capabilities...140 Limitations...142 F. Budget Information...142 G. Beneficiaries, Private Organizations, and Interest Groups...144 Selected Readings...146 Appendix D...149 Congressional Oversight Video Series...149 List of Tables Table 1. Special Investigative Authorities of Selected Investigating Committees...54 Table 2. Statutes Authorizing Inspectors General Nominated by the President and Confirmed by the Senate, 1976-Present...90 Table 3. Designated Federal Entities and Other Agencies with Statutory IGs Appointed by the Head of the Entity or Agency...92 Table 4. Tabulation of Existing Federal Establishments, Entities, or Agencies with IGs Authorized in Law...93

Congressional Oversight Manual I. Purposes, Authority, and Participants Throughout its history, Congress has engaged in oversight of the executive branch the review, monitoring, and supervision of the implementation of public policy. The first several Congresses inaugurated such important oversight techniques as special investigations, reporting requirements, resolutions of inquiry, and use of the appropriations process to review executive activity. Contemporary developments, moreover, have increased the legislature s capacity and capabilities to check on and check the Executive. Public laws and congressional rules have measurably enhanced Congress s implied power under the Constitution to conduct oversight. Despite its lengthy heritage, oversight was not given explicit recognition in public law until enactment of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. That act required House and Senate standing committees to exercise continuous watchfulness over programs and agencies within their jurisdiction. Since the late 1960s, according to such scholars as political scientist Joel Aberbach, Congress has shown increasing interest in oversight for several major reasons. These include the expansion in number and complexity of federal programs and agencies; increase in expenditures and personnel, including contract employees; the rise of the budget deficit; and the frequency of divided government, with Congress and the White House controlled by different parties. Major partisan disagreements over priorities and processes also heighten conflict between the legislature and the executive. Oversight occurs in virtually any congressional activity and through a wide variety of channels, organizations, and structures. These range from formal committee hearings to informal Member contacts with executive officials, from staff studies to support agency reviews, and from casework conducted by Member offices to studies prepared by non-congressional entities, such as statutory commissions and offices of inspector general.

CRS-2 Purposes Congressional oversight of the Executive is designed to fulfill a number of purposes: A. Ensure Executive Compliance with Legislative Intent Congress, of necessity, must delegate discretionary authority to federal administrators. To make certain that these officers faithfully execute laws according to the intent of Congress, committees and Members can review the actions taken and regulations formulated by departments and agencies. B. Improve the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Economy of Governmental Operations A large federal bureaucracy makes it imperative for Congress to encourage and secure efficient and effective program management, and to make every dollar count toward the achievement of program goals. A basic objective is strengthening federal programs through better managerial operations and service delivery. Such steps can improve the accountability of agency managers to Congress and enhance program performance. C. Evaluate Program Performance Systematic program performance evaluation remains a relatively new and stillevolving technique in oversight. Modern program evaluation uses social science and management methodologies, such as surveys, cost-benefit analyses, and efficiency studies, to assess the effectiveness of ongoing programs. D. Prevent Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives and Powers Beginning in the late 1960s, many commentators, public policy analysts, and legislators argued that Presidents and executive officials overstepped their authority in various areas such as impoundment of funds, executive privilege, war powers, and the dismantling of federal programs without congressional consent. Increased oversight as part of the checks and balances system was called for to redress what many in the public and Congress saw to be an executive arrogation of legislative prerogatives. E. Investigate Alleged Instances of Poor Administration, Arbitrary and Capricious Behavior, Abuse, Waste, Dishonesty, and Fraud Instances of fraud and other forms of corruption, the breakdown of federal programs, incompetent management, and the subversion of governmental processes arouse legislative and public interest in oversight.

CRS-3 F. Assess Agency or Officials Ability to Manage and Carry out Program Objectives Congress s ability to evaluate the capacity of agencies and managers to carry out program objectives can be accomplished in various ways. For example, numerous laws require agencies to submit reports to Congress; some of these are regular, occurring annually or semi-annually, for instance, while others are activated by a specific event, development, or set of conditions. The report requirement may promote self-evaluation by the agency. Organizations outside of Congress, such as offices of inspector general and study commissions, also advise Members and committees on how well federal agencies are working. G. Review and Determine Federal Financial Priorities Congress exercises some of its most effective oversight through the appropriations process, which provides the opportunity to review recent expenditures in detail. In addition, most federal agencies and programs are under regular and frequent reauthorizations on an annual, two-year, four-year, or other basis giving the authorizing committees the same opportunity. As a consequence of these oversight efforts, Congress can abolish or curtail obsolete or ineffective programs by cutting off or reducing funds or it may enhance effective programs by increasing funds. H. Ensure That Executive Policies Reflect the Public Interest Congressional oversight can appraise whether the needs and interests of the public are adequately served by federal programs, and thus lead to corrective action, either through legislation or administrative changes. I. Protect Individual Rights and Liberties Congressional oversight can help to safeguard the rights and liberties of citizens and others. By revealing abuses of authority, for instance, oversight hearings can halt executive misconduct and help to prevent its recurrence, either directly through new legislation or indirectly by putting pressure on the offending agency. J. Other Specific Purposes The general purposes of oversight and what constitutes this function can be stated in more specific terms. Like the general purposes, these unavoidably overlap because of the numerous and multifaceted dimensions of oversight. A brief list includes: 1. review the agency rulemaking process; 2. monitor the use of contractors and consultants for government services; 3. encourage and promote mutual cooperation between the branches;

CRS-4 4. examine agency personnel procedures; 5. acquire information useful in future policymaking; 6. investigate constituent complaints and media critiques; 7. assess whether program design and execution maximize the delivery of services to beneficiaries; 8. compare the effectiveness of one program with another; 9. protect agencies and programs against unjustified criticisms; and 10. study federal evaluation activities. THOUGHTS ON OVERSIGHT AND ITS RATIONALE FROM... James Wilson (The Works of James Wilson, 1896, vol. II, p. 29), an architect of the Constitution and Associate Justice on the first Supreme Court: The house of representatives... form the grand inquest of the state. They will diligently inquire into grievances, arising both from men and things. Woodrow Wilson (Congressional Government, 1885, p. 297), perhaps the first scholar to use the term oversight to refer to the review and investigation of the executive branch: Quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of administration. It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function. John Stuart Mill (Considerations on Representative Government, 1861, p. 104), British utilitarian philosopher:... the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers questionable...

CRS-5 Authority to Conduct Oversight A. United States Constitution The Constitution grants Congress extensive authority to oversee and investigate executive branch activities. The constitutional authority for Congress to conduct oversight stems from such explicit and implicit provisions as: 1. The power of the purse. The Constitution provides that No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law. Each year the Committees on Appropriations of the House and Senate review the financial practices and needs of federal agencies. The appropriations process allows the Congress to exercise extensive control over the activities of executive agencies. Congress can define the precise purposes for which money may be spent, adjust funding levels, and prohibit expenditures for certain purposes. 2. The power to organize the executive branch. Congress has the authority to create, abolish, reorganize, and fund federal departments and agencies. It has the authority to assign or reassign functions to departments and agencies, and grant new forms of authority and staff to administrators. Congress, in short, exercises ultimate authority over executive branch organization and generally over policy. 3. The power to make all laws for carrying into Execution Congress s own enumerated powers as well as those of the executive. Article I grants Congress a wide range of powers, such as the power to tax and coin money; regulate foreign and interstate commerce; declare war; provide for the creation and maintenance of armed forces; and establish post offices. Augmenting these specific powers is the so-called Elastic Clause, which gives Congress the authority To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. Clearly, these provisions grant broad authority to regulate and oversee departmental activities established by law. 4. The power to confirm officers of the United States. The confirmation process not only involves the determination of a nominee s suitability for an executive (or judicial) position, but also provides an opportunity to examine the current policies and programs of an agency along with those policies and programs that the nominee intends to pursue. 5. The power of investigation and inquiry. A traditional method of exercising the oversight function, an implied power, is through investigations and inquiries into executive branch operations. Legislators often seek to know how effectively and efficiently programs are working, how well agency officials are responding to legislative directives, and how the public perceives the programs. The investigatory method helps to ensure a more

CRS-6 responsible bureaucracy, while supplying Congress with information needed to formulate new legislation. 6. Impeachment and removal. Impeachment provides Congress with a powerful, ultimate oversight tool to investigate alleged executive and judicial misbehavior, and to eliminate such misbehavior through the convictions and removal from office of the offending individuals. THE SUPREME COURT ON CONGRESS S POWER TO OVERSEE AND INVESTIGATE McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177, and 181-182 (1927): Congress, investigating the administration of the Department of Justice during the Teapot Dome scandal, was considering a subject on which legislation could be had or would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit. The potential for legislation was sufficient. The majority added, We are of [the] opinion that the power of inquiry with the process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. Eastland v. United States Servicemen s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509 (1975): Expanding on its holding in McGrain, the Court declared, To be a valid legislative inquiry there need be no predictable end result. B. Principal Statutory Authority A number of laws directly augment Congress s authority, mandate, and resources to conduct oversight, including assigning specific duties to committees. Among the most important, listed chronologically, are 1. 1912 Anti-Gag Legislation and Whistleblower Protection Laws for Federal Employees. a. The 1912 act countered executive orders, issued by Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, which prohibited civil service employees from communicating directly with Congress. b. It also guaranteed that the right of any persons employed in the civil service... to petition Congress, or any Member thereof, or to furnish information to either House of Congress, or to any committee or member thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with. 37 Stat. 555 (1912) codified at 5 U.S.C. 7211 (1994). c. The Whistleblowers Protection Act of 1978, as amended, makes it a prohibited personnel practice for an agency employee to take (or not take) any action against an employee that is in retaliation for disclosure of information that the employee believes relates to violation of law, rule or regulation or which evidences gross mismanagement, waste, fraud or abuse of authority (5 U.S.C. 2302 (b) (8)). The prohibition is explicitly intended to protect disclosures

CRS-7 to Congress: This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the withholding of information from the Congress or the taking of any personnel action against an employee who disclosures information to the Congress. d. Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (P.L. 105-272) establishes special procedures for personnel in the Intelligence Community, to transmit urgent concerns involving classified information to inspectors general and the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence. e. Section 818 of the Treasury, Transportation et al. Appropriations Act of 2005, P.L. 109-115, 119 Stat. 2500, prohibits the payment of the salary of any officer or employee of the Federal Government who prohibits or prevents or attempts or threatens to prohibit or prevent, any other Federal officer or employee from having direct oral or written communication or contact with any Member, committee or subcommittee. This prohibition applies irrespective of whether such communication was initiated by such officer or employee or in response to the request or inquiry of such Member, committee or subcommittee. Further, any punishment or threat of punishment because of any contact or communication by an officer or employee with a Member, committee, or subcommittee is prohibited under the provisions of this act. f. Section 820 of the Treasury, Transportation et al. Appropriations Act of 2005, P.L. 109-115, 119 Stat. 2500, prohibits the expenditure of any appropriated funds for use in implementing or enforcing agreement in Standard Forms 312 and 4414 of the Government or any other non-disclosure policy form, or agreement if such policy, form, or agreement that does not contain a provision that states that the restrictions are consistent with and do not supercede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligation, rights and liabilities created by E.O. 12958; 5 U.S.C. 7211 (Lloyd-LaFollette Act); 10 U.S.C. 1034 (Military Whistleblower Act); 5 U.S.C. 2303 (b)(8) (Whistleblower Protection Act); 50 U.S.C. 421 et seq. (Intelligence Identities Protection Act); and 18 U.S.C. 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 and 50 U.S.C. (783)(b). 2. 1921 Budget and Accounting Act Establishing the General Accounting Office (GAO), renamed the Government Accountability Office in 2004. a. Insisted that GAO shall be independent of the executive departments and under the control and direction of the Comptroller General of the United States. (Emphasis added.) 42 Stat. 23 (1921) b. Granted authority to the Comptroller General to investigate, at the seat of government or elsewhere, all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds. (Emphasis added.) 42 Stat. 26 (1921)

CRS-8 3. 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act a. Mandated House and Senate committees to exercise continuous watchfulness of the administration of laws and programs under their jurisdiction. (Emphasis added.) 60 Stat. 832 (1946) b. Authorized for the first time in history, permanent professional and clerical staff for committees. 60 Stat. 832 (1946) c. Authorized and directed the Comptroller General to make administrative management analyses of each executive branch agency. 60 Stat. 837 (1946) d. Established the Legislative Reference Service, renamed the Congressional Research Service by the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act (see below), as a separate department in the Library of Congress and called upon the Service to advise and assist any committee of either House or joint committee in the analysis, appraisal, and evaluation of any legislative proposal... and otherwise to assist in furnishing a basis for the proper determination of measures before the committee. (Emphasis added.) 60 Stat. 836 (1946) 4. 1968 Intergovernmental Cooperation Act a. Required that House and Senate committees having jurisdiction over grants-in-aid conduct studies of the programs under which grants-inaid are made. 82 Stat. 1098 (1968) b. Provided that studies of these programs are to determine whether: (1) their purposes have been met, (2) their objectives could be carried on without further assistance, (3) they are adequate to meet needs, and (4) any changes in programs or procedures should be made. 82 Stat. 1098 (1968) 5. 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act a. Revised and rephrased in more explicit language the oversight function of House and Senate standing committees:... each standing committee shall review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution of those laws or parts of laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of that committee. (Emphasis added.) 84 Stat. 1156 (1970) b. Required most House and Senate committees to issue biennial oversight reports. 84 Stat. 1156 (1970) c. Strengthened the program evaluation responsibilities and other authorities and duties of the Government Accountability Office. 84 Stat. 1168-1171 (1970)

CRS-9 d. Redesignated the Legislative Reference Service as the Congressional Research Service, strengthening its policy analysis role and expanding its other responsibilities to Congress. 84 Stat. 1181-1185 (1970) e. Recommended that House and Senate committees ascertain whether programs within their jurisdiction could be appropriated for annually. 84 Stat. 1174-1175 (1970) f. Required most House and Senate committees to include in their committee reports on legislation five-year cost estimates for carrying out the proposed program. 84 Stat. 1173-1174 (1970) g. Increased by two the number of permanent staff for each standing committee, including provision for minority party hirings, and provided for hiring of consultants by standing committees. 84 Stat. 1175-1179 (1970) 6. 1972 Federal Advisory Committee Act a. Directed House and Senate committees to make a continuing review of the activities of each advisory committee under its jurisdiction. 86 Stat. 771 (1972) b. The studies are to determine whether: (1) such committee should be abolished or merged with any other advisory committee, (2) its responsibility should be revised, and (3) it performs a necessary function not already being performed. 86 Stat. 771 (1972) (Advisory committee charters and reports can generally be obtained from the agency or government organization being advised.) 7. 1974 Congressional Budget Act, as amended a. Expanded House and Senate committee authority for oversight. Permitted committees to appraise and evaluate programs themselves or by contract, or (to) require a Government agency to do so and furnish a report thereon to the Congress. 88 Stat. 325 (1974) b. Directed the Comptroller General to review and evaluate the results of Government programs and activities, on his own initiative, or at the request of either House or any standing or joint committee and to assist committees in analyzing and assessing program reviews or evaluation studies. (Emphasis added.) Authorized GAO to establish an Office of Program Review and Evaluation to carry out these responsibilities. 88 Stat. 326 (1974) c. Strengthened GAO s role in acquiring fiscal, budgetary, and program-related information. 88 Stat. 327-329 (1974)

CRS-10 d. Required any House or Senate legislative committee report on a public bill or resolution to include an analysis (prepared by the Congressional Budget Office) providing an estimate and comparison of costs which would be incurred in carrying out the bill during the next and following four fiscal years in which it would be effective. 88 Stat. 320 (1974) e. Established House and Senate Budget Committees and the Congressional Budget Office. The CBO director is authorized to secure information, data, estimates, and statistics directly from the various departments, agencies, and establishments of the government. 88 Stat. 302 (1974) 8. Other noteworthy statutory provisions Separate from expanding its own authority and resources directly, Congress has strengthened its oversight capabilities indirectly, by, for instance, establishing study commissions to review and evaluate programs, policies, and operations of the government. In addition, Congress has created various mechanisms, structures, and procedures within the executive that improve the executive s ability to monitor and control its own operations and, at the same time, provide additional information and oversight-related analyses to Congress. These statutory provisions include a. Establishing offices of inspector general in all cabinet departments, larger agencies and numerous boards, commissions, and government corporations Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, 5 U.S.C. Appendix 3 b. Establishing chief financial officers in all cabinet departments and larger agencies Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, 107 Stat. 2838 (1990) c. Improving the government s ability to manage its programs Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 814-815 (1982) d. Improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and equity in the exchange of funds between the federal government and state governments Cash Management Improvement Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 1058 (1990) e. Increasing efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability within the government Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 285-296 (1993) f. Improving the executive s stewardship of federal resources and accountability Government Management and Reform Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 3410 (1994)

CRS-11 g. Controlling federal paperwork requirements Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 109 Stat. 163 (1995) h. Establishing the position of chief information officer in federal agencies to provide relevant advice for purchasing the best and most cost-effective information technology available Information Technology Improvement Act, 110 Stat. 679 (1996) i. Establishing uniform audit requirements for state and local governments and nonprofit organizations receiving federal financial assistance Single Audit Act of 1984, as amended, 98 Stat. 2327 (1984) and 110 Stat. 679 (1996) j. Creating a mechanism, the Congressional Review Act by which Congress can review and disapprove virtually any federal rule or regulation Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 857-874 (1996), codified at 5 U.S.C. 801-808 (2000) C. Responsibilities in House and Senate Rules 1. House Rules a. House rules grant the Committee on Government Reform a comprehensive role in the conduct of oversight (Rule X, clause 4). For example, pertinent review findings and recommendations of this committee are to be considered by the authorizing committees, if presented to them in a timely fashion. In addition, the authorizing committees are to indicate on the cover of their reports on public measures that they contain a summary of such findings when that is the case (Rule XIII, clause 3). b. The Committee on Government Reform has additional oversight duties to (1) review and study on a continuing basis, the operation of government activities at all levels to determine their economy and efficiency (Rule X, clause 3); (2) receive and examine reports of the Comptroller General and submit recommendations thereon to the House (Rule X, clause 4); (3) evaluate the effects of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative and executive branches of the government (Rule X, clause 4); (4) study intergovernmental relationships between the United States and states, municipalities, and international organizations of which the United States is a member (Rule X, clause 4); and

CRS-12 (5) report an oversight agenda, not later than March 31 of the first session of a Congress, based upon oversight plans submitted by each standing committee and after consultation with the Speaker of the House, the majority leader, and the minority leader. The oversight agenda is to include the oversight plans of each standing committee together with any recommendations that it or the House leadership group may make to ensure the most effective coordination of such plans (Rule X, clause 2). c. House rules mandate or provide authority for other oversight efforts by standing committees: (1) Each standing committee (except Appropriations and Budget) shall review and study on a continuing basis the application, administration, and execution of all laws within its legislative jurisdiction (Rule X, clause 2). (2) Committees have the authority to review the impact of tax policies on matters that fall within their jurisdiction (Rule X, clause 2). (3) Each committee (except Appropriations and Budget) has a responsibility for futures research and forecasting (Rule X, clause 2). (4) Specified committees have special oversight authority (i.e., the right to conduct comprehensive reviews of specific subject areas that are within the legislative jurisdiction of other committees). Special oversight is akin to the broad oversight authority granted the Committee on Government Reform, by the 1946 Legislature Reorganization Act, except that special oversight is generally limited to named subjects (Rule X, clause 3). (5) Each standing committee having more than 20 members shall establish an oversight subcommittee, or require its subcommittees, if any, to conduct oversight in their jurisdictional areas; a committee that establishes such a subcommittee may add it as a sixth subcommittee, beyond the usual limit of five (Rule X, clauses 2 and 5). (6) Committee reports on measures are to include oversight findings separately set out and clearly identified (Rule XIII, clause 3). (7) Costs of stenographic services and transcripts for oversight hearings are to be paid from the applicable accounts of the House (Rule XI, clause 1). (8) Each standing committee is to submit its oversight plans for the duration of a Congress by February 15 of the first session to the Committee on Government Reform and the Committee on

CRS-13 House Administration. Not later than March 31, the Government Reform Committee must report an oversight agenda (discussed above). In developing such plans, each standing committee must, to the extent feasible (Rule X, clause 2): (a) (b) (c) consult with other committees of the House that have jurisdiction over the same or related laws, programs, or agencies within its jurisdiction, with the objective of ensuring that such laws, programs, or agencies are reviewed in the same Congress and that there is a maximum of coordination between such committees in the conduct of such reviews; and such plans shall include an explanation of what steps have been and will be taken to ensure such coordination and cooperation; give priority consideration to including in its plans the review of those laws, programs, or agencies operating under permanent budget authority or permanent statutory authority; and have a view toward ensuring that all significant laws, programs, or agencies within its jurisdiction are subject to review at least once every 10 years. (9) Each committee must submit to the House, not later than January 2 of each odd-numbered year, a report on the activities of that committee for the Congress (Rule XI, clause 1): (a) (b) Such report must include separate sections summarizing the legislative and oversight activities of that committee during that Congress. The oversight section of such report must include a summary of the oversight plans submitted by the committee at the beginning of the Congress, a summary of the actions taken and recommendations made with respect to each such plan, and a summary of any additional oversight activities undertaken by that committee, and any recommendations made or actions taken thereon. d. The Speaker, with the approval of the House, is given additional authority to appoint special ad hoc oversight committees for the purpose or reviewing specific matters within the jurisdiction of two or more standing committees. (Emphasis added.) (Rule X, clause 2) 2. Senate Rules a. Each standing committee (except for Appropriations and Budget) must review and study on a continuing basis, the application,

CRS-14 administration, and execution of all laws within its legislative jurisdiction (Rule XXVI, clause 8). b. Comprehensive policy oversight responsibilities are granted to specified standing committees. This duty is similar to special oversight in the House. The Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, for example, is authorized to study and review, on a comprehensive basis, matters relating to food, nutrition, and hunger, both in the United States and in foreign countries, and rural affairs, and report thereon from time to time (Rule XXV, clause 1a). c. All standing committees, except Appropriations, are required to prepare regulatory impact evaluations in their committee reports accompanying each public bill or joint resolution (Rule XXVI, clause 11). The evaluations are to include: (1) an estimate of the numbers of individuals and businesses to be affected; (2) a determination of the measure s economic impact and effect on personal privacy; and (3) a determination of the amount of additional paperwork that will result. d. The Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs has the following additional oversight duties (Rule XXV, clause 1k): (1) review and study on a continuing basis the operation of government activities at all levels to determine their economy and efficiency; (2) receive and examine reports of the Comptroller General and submit recommendations thereon to the Senate; (3) evaluate the effects of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative and executive branches of the government; and (4) study intergovernmental relationships between the United States and states, municipalities, and international organizations of which the United States is a member. (5) On March 1, 1948 of the 80th Congress, the Senate adopted S. Res. 189, which established the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the then titled Committee on Government Operations. The Subcommittee was an outgrowth of the famous 1941 Truman Committee (after Senator Harry Truman) which investigated fraud and mismanagement of the nation s war program. The Truman Committee ended in 1948, but the chairman of the Government Operations Committee made

CRS-15 the functions of the Truman panel one of his subcommittees: the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Since then this subcommittee has investigated scores of issues, such as government waste, fraud, and inefficiency. Congressional Participants in Oversight A. Members and Committees 1. Members. Oversight is generally considered a committee activity. However, both casework and other project work conducted in a Member s personal office can result in findings about bureaucratic behavior and policy implementation; these, in turn, can lead to the adjustment of agency policies and procedures and to changes in public law. (a) (b) Casework responding to constituent requests for assistance on projects or complaints or grievances about program implementation provides an opportunity to examine bureaucratic activity and operations, if only in a selective way. Sometimes individual Members will conduct their own investigations or ad hoc hearings, or direct their staffs to conduct oversight studies. Individual Members have no authority to issue compulsory process or conduct official hearings. The Government Accountability Office or some other legislative branch agency, a specially created task force, or private research group might be requested to conduct an investigation of a matter for a Senator or Representative. 2. Committees. The most common and effective method of conducting oversight is through the committee structure. Throughout their histories, the House and Senate have used their standing committees as well as select or special committees to investigate federal activities and agencies along with other matters. (a) (b) (c) The House Committee on Government Reform and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, which have oversight jurisdiction over virtually the entire federal government, have been vested with broad investigatory powers over government-wide activities. The House and Senate Committees on Appropriations have similar responsibilities when reviewing fiscal activities. Each standing committee of Congress has oversight responsibilities to review government activities within their jurisdiction. These panels also have authority on their own to establish oversight and investigative subcommittees. The establishment of such

CRS-16 subcommittees does not preclude the legislative subcommittees from conducting oversight. (d) Certain House and Senate committees have special oversight or comprehensive policy oversight of designated subject areas as explained in the previous subsection. B. Staff of Member Offices and Committees 1. Personal Staff. Constituent letters, complaints, and requests for projects and assistance frequently bring problems and deficiencies in federal programs and administration to the attention of Members and their personal office staffs. The casework performed by a Member s staff for constituents can be an effective oversight tool. (a) (b) (c) Casework can be an important vehicle for pursuing both the oversight and legislative interests of the Member. The Senator or Representative and the staff may be attuned to the relationship between casework and the oversight function. This is facilitated by a regular exchange of ideas among the Member, legislative aides, and caseworkers on problems brought to the office s attention by constituents, and of possible legislative initiatives to resolve those problems. If casework is to be useful as an oversight technique, effective staffing and coordination are needed. Casework and legislative staffs maximize service to their Member s constituents when they establish a relationship with the staff of the subcommittees and committees that handle the areas of concern to the Member s constituents. Through this interaction, the panel s staff can be made aware of the problems with the agency or program in question, assess how widespread and significant they are, determine their causes, and recommend corrective action. Office procedures enable staff in some offices to identify cases that represent a situation in which formal changes in agency procedure could be an appropriate remedy. Prompt congressional inquiry and follow up enhance this type of oversight. Telephone inquiries reinforced with written requests tend to ensure agency attention. 2. Committee Staff. As issues become more complex and Members staffs more overworked, professional staffs of committees can provide the expert help required to conduct oversight and investigations. Committee staff typically have the experience and expertise to conduct effective oversight for the committees and subcommittees they serve. Committees may also call upon legislative support agencies for assistance, hire consultants, or borrow staff from federal departments. Committee staff, in summary, occupy a central position in the conduct of oversight. The informal contacts with executive officials at all levels

CRS-17 constitute one of Congress s most effective devices for performing its continuous watchfulness function. C. Congressional Support Agencies and Offices 1. Of the agencies in the legislative branch, three directly assist Congress in support of its oversight function. (See Section V below for further detail on each): (a) (b) (c) Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress, and Government Accountability Office (GAO), formerly the General Accounting Office. 2. Additional offices that can assist in oversight are (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) House General Counsel s Office, House Parliamentarian s Office, House Clerk s Office, Senate Legal Counsel s Office, and Senate Historian s Office and Senate Library

CRS-18 Selected Readings Aberbach, Joel D. Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1990. JK585.A63 Congressional Oversight: Methods and Techniques. Committee Print, Prepared for the Subcommittee on Oversight Procedures of the Senate Committee on Government Operations by the Congressional Research Service and the General Accounting Office, 94 th Congress, 2 nd session. Washington: GPO, 1976. Ehlke, Richard. Congressional Access to Information From the Executive: A Legal Analysis. CRS Report 86-50A, March 10, 1986. Fisher, Louis. Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1997, 4 th Revised Edition. KF4565.F57 1997 Foreman, Christopher H. Signals from the Hill: Congressional Oversight and the Challenge of Social Regulation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. JK585.F68 Hamilton, James. The Power to Probe: A Study of Congressional Investigations. New York: Vintage Books, 1976. Harris, Joseph P. Congressional Control of Administration. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1964. JK1061.H3 History of the United States House of Representatives, 1789-1994. H.Doc. 103-324, 103 rd Congress, 2 nd session. Washington: GPO, 1994. Chapter XI, Oversight, pp. 233-266. Kaiser, Frederick M. Congressional Oversight. CRS Report 97-936, January 2, 2001.. Congressional Oversight of the Presidency. Annals, vol. 499, September 1988, pp. 75-89. Leading Cases on Congressional Investigatory Power (Compiled by the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations). Committee Print, 94 th Congress, 2 nd session. Washington: GPO, 1976. Maskell, Jack H. and Morton Rosenberg. Congressional Intervention in the Administrative Process: Legal and Ethical Considerations. CRS Report RL32113, September 25, 2003. Mayhew, David R. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991. JK2261.M36

CRS-19 McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz. Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrol Versus Fire Alarms. American Journal of Political Science, vol. 2, February 1984, pp. 165-79. National Academy of Public Administration. Panel on Congress and the Executive. Beyond Distrust: Building Bridges Between Congress and the Executive. Washington: NAPA, 1992. Ogul, Morris S. Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy: Studies in Legislative Supervision. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976. JK585.048 Oleszek, Walter J. Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process, 6 th ed. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2004. Chapter 10, Legislative Oversight. KF4937.O44. A Perspective on Congress s Oversight Function. CRS Report RL32617, September 30, 2004. Ornstein, Norman F. and Thomas E. Mann. When Congress Checks Out. Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, 2006, pp. 67-80, Rosenberg, Morton. Congress s Prerogative Over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration s Theory of the Unitary Executive. George Washington Law Review, vol. 57, January 1989, pp. 627-703.. Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Update and Assessment of the Congressional Review Act After Ten Years. CRS Report RL30116, March 29, 2006.. Investigative Oversight: An Introduction to the Law, Practice and Procedure of Congressional Inquiry. CRS Report 95-464 A, April 7, 1995. Rosenbloom, David H. Building a Legislative-Centered Public Administration: Congress and the Administrative State, 1946-1999. Tuscaloosa, Ala.: The University of Alabama Press, 2000. KF1601.R58 Schlesinger, Arthur M. and Roger Bruns, eds. Congress Investigates: A Documented History, 1792-1974 (5 vols.) New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1975. JK1123.A2S34 Study on Federal Regulation: Congressional Oversight of Regulatory Agencies. Senate Doc. 95-26, 95 th Congress, 1 st session. Washington: GPO, 1977. U.S. General Accounting Office. Investigators Guide to Sources of Information. GAO Report OSI-97-2. Washington: GAO, 1997. West, William F. Controlling the Bureaucracy: Institutional Constraints in Theory and Practice. Armonk, New York and London, England: M.E. Sharpe: 1995. JK421.W44