Testimony Submitted to the House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Indian, Insular and Alaska Native Affairs

Testimony Submitted to the House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Indian, Insular and Alaska Native Affairs For the hearing of April 22, 2015 on BIA Proposed Recognition Regulations By United South and Eastern Tribes, Inc. Jamestown S'Klallam Tribe, W. Ron Allen, Chairman Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians California Association of Tribal Governments Council of Athabascan Tribal Governments Inter Tribal Association of Arizona Maniilaq Association Midwest Alliance of Sovereign Tribes Native American Rights Fund 1 May 6, 2015 United South and Eastern Tribes, Inc., the Jamestown S'Klallam Tribe, the Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians, the California Association of Tribal Governments, the Council of Athabascan Tribal Governments, the Inter Tribal Association of Arizona, the Maniilaq Association, the Midwest Alliance of Sovereign Tribes, and the Native American Rights Fund jointly submit this statement for the record of the Subcommittee's hearing of April 22, 2015 concerning Bureau of Indian Affairs Proposed Federal Recognition Regulations. Specifically we respond to the testimony of Don Mitchell that the Secretary of Interior has never been delegated authority to recognize Indian tribes and his strong inference that such tribes should be stripped of federal recognition as their recognized status lacks any legal merit. We refute that theory. We ask that the Subcommittee review this material and disavow Mr. Mitchell's testimony. 1. Congress has repeatedly acknowledged the Secretary's authority to extend federal recognition to Indian Tribes, including through the Part 83 process. Congress has explicitly acknowledged that the Secretary of the Interior may extend federal recognition to Indian tribes, including through the regulatory procedures at Part 83. In enacting the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act in 1994, Congress specifically included in its findings as follows: Indian tribes presently may be recognized by Act of Congress; by the administrative procedures set forth in part 83 of the Code of Federal Regulations denominated "Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe;" or by a decision of a United States court; [and] a tribe which has been recognized in one of these manners may not be terminated except by an Act of Congress[.] 1 A description of the entities joining in this Testimony is provided in the Addendum at the end of the Testimony. 1

Pub L. No. 103 454, 103, 108 Stat 4791(1994), 25 U.S.C. 479a note (emphasis added). As part of that Act, Congress also enacted definitions governing Title 25 of the United States Code, codified at 25 U.S.C. 479a, providing that "The term 'Indian tribe' means any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village or community that the Secretary of the Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe." We note that the present Chairman of this Subcommittee was a co-sponsor of the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act. Many other statutes enacted by Congress over the years acknowledge the Secretary's authority to extend federal recognition to Indian tribes: In enacting the Mohegan Nation of Connecticut Land Claims Settlement Act, Congress expressly found that "The Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut received recognition by the United States pursuant to the administrative process under part 83 of title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations." 25 U.S.C. 1775(a). In enacting the Massachusetts Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, Congress similarly stated "The Secretary has acknowledged the existence of the Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc. as an Indian tribe and Congress hereby ratifies and confirms that existence as an Indian tribe with a government to government relationship with the United States." 25 U.S.C. 1771. Congress also defined the term "Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc." in that Act as "the tribal entity recognized by the Secretary of the Interior as having a government to government relationship with the United States." 25 U.S.C. 1771f. In the Timbisha Shoshone Homeland Act, Congress found that the Timbisha Shoshone Tribe "achieved Federal recognition in 1983" and identified that Tribe as "a tribe of American Indians recognized by the United States pursuant to part 83 of title 25, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling)." Pub. L. No. 106-423, 1, 4, 114 Stat. 1875 (2000). For purposes of Chapter 14A of Title 15, Aid to Small Business, Congress defined the term "Indian reservation" to exclude "any lands that are located within a State in which a tribe did not exercise governmental jurisdiction on December 21, 2000, unless that tribe is recognized after December 21, 2000, by either an Act of Congress or pursuant to regulations of the Secretary of the Interior for the administrative recognition that an Indian group exists as an Indian tribe (part 83 of title 25, Code of Federal Regulations)." 15 U.S.C. 632. In the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Congress specifically exempted "the initial reservation of an Indian tribe acknowledged by the Secretary under the Federal acknowledgment process" from a prohibition on certain gaming activities on lands acquired in trust by the Secretary after October 17, 1988. 25 U.S.C. 2791. Moreover, Congress has appropriated funding for new Tribes recognized by the Department of the Interior, thereby acknowledging the validity of the Secretary's authority to extend federal recognition to Indian Tribes. For example, the House Committee on Appropriations reported with respect to the Indian Health Service appropriations in the FY 2015 Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill: "The Committee recommends $7,948,000 to begin providing services to Tribes recently receiving 2

Federal recognition by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, as requested." 2 In the Explanatory Statement to the final FY 2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, the Appropriations Committees noted with respect to the Bureau of Indian Affairs appropriation: The agreement supports the requested amount of $463,000 for new Tribes and notes the challenge of reconciling the timing of the tribal recognition process with the annual budget formulation process. If additional Tribes are recognized during fiscal year 2015 beyond those contemplated in the budget request, the Bureau is urged to support their capacity building efforts to the extent feasible. 3 2. The courts have repeatedly affirmed that the Secretary of the Interior has properly exercised an Executive function or acted pursuant to delegated Congressional authority in promulgating regulations governing federal recognition. The courts have consistently recognized that 25 U.S.C. 2 and 25 U.S.C. 9, as affirmed in the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act in 1994, authorize the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate procedures governing federal recognition. 4 These judicial statements cannot be 2 H. Rep. No. 113-551 at 85 (2014). 3 160 Cong. Rec. H9764 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2014). The New Tribes funding is a line item appearing under "Operation of Indian Programs/Tribal Government" in the BIA Budget Justification each year. See, e.g., United States Department of Interior, Indian Affairs, Budget Justifications and Performance Information, Fiscal Year 2015 at IA-TG 1, 5. 4 See, e.g., Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, 708 F.3d 209, 211 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ("In 1978, pursuant to broad authority delegated by the Congress, Interior promulgated regulations establishing a formal recognition procedure (Part 83 process).") (internal footnotes omitted); Robinson v. Salazar, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1024-25 (E.D. Cal. 2012) ("Congress delegated to the Department of the Interior the authority to adopt regulations to administer Indian affairs and to clarify departmental authority by regulation under 25 U.S.C. 2, 9; see James v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Services, 824 F.2d 1132, 1137 38 (D.C. Cir. 1987). As a result, in 1978, the Department of Interior exercised its delegated authority and promulgated regulations establishing a uniform procedure for 'acknowledging' American Indian Tribes. 25 C.F.R. 83.1 et seq."); Cherokee Nation Of Oklahoma v. Norton, 389 F.3d 1074, 1076 (10th Cir. 2004), as amended on denial of reh'g (Feb. 16, 2005) ("The law governing Federal recognition of an Indian tribe is, today, clear. The Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994 provides Indian tribes may be recognized by: (1) an 'Act of Congress;' (2) 'the administrative procedures set forth in part 83 of the Code of Federal Regulations[;]' or (3) 'a decision of a United States court.'"); Burt Lake Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. Norton, 217 F. Supp. 2d 76, 77 (D.D.C. 2002) ("Congress authorized DOI and its Bureau of Indian Affairs ('BIA') to regulate and manage all matters relating to Indian affairs under the direction of the Executive Branch. See 43 U.S.C. 1457 (2000); 25 U.S.C. 2 (2000). Pursuant to this delegation of authority to the DOI, BIA promulgated regulations establishing procedures for federal recognition of Indian groups as Indian tribes. See 25 C.F.R. 83 (2001)."); United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F.3d 543, 549 (10th Cir. 2001) ("The BIA has been delegated the authority to determine whether recognized status should be accorded to previously unrecognized tribes."); Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 59-60 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Congress delegated to the executive branch the power to prescribe regulations for carrying into effect statutes relating to Indian affairs, see 25 U.S.C. 9 This is a question at the heart of the task assigned by Congress to the BIA and should be answered in the first instance by that agency."); W. Shoshone Bus. Council For & on Behalf of W. Shoshone Tribe of Duck Valley Reservation v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1052, 1057-58 (10th Cir. 1993) ("We are strongly persuaded by a similar case, James v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Services, 824 F.2d 1132 (D.C.Cir.1987). It reasoned that Congress has specifically authorized the Executive Branch to regulate Indian affairs, and that the Department of the Interior has developed procedures expressly for determinations of tribal status."); James v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 824 F.2d 1132, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Congress has specifically authorized the Executive Branch to prescribe regulations concerning Indian affairs and relations. 3

brushed aside as mere "dicta," lacking in legal significance, as Mr. Mitchell represented in his testimony. "A statement is dictum if it could have been deleted without seriously impairing the analytical foundations of the holding and being peripheral, may not have received the full and careful consideration of the court that uttered it. However, if the statement is necessary to the result or constitutes an explication of the governing rules of law, it is not dictum." 5 Or, as the Supreme Court has put it, "When an opinion issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound." 6 In Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana, Inc. v. Babbitt, 7 the Miami sought a ruling that the Secretary's 1978 federal acknowledgment regulations as promulgated exceeded the Secretary's statutory authority. As a part of that analysis, the district court found it necessary to address "whether the 1978 regulations were promulgated pursuant to a congressional delegation of authority" in order to determine how much deference to afford the Secretary of the Interior's own interpretation of the applicable statutes. 8 In answering that question, the district court held: The court agrees with the James court's conclusion that the 1978 regulations have been promulgated pursuant to authority granted in 25 U.S.C. 2 and 9. See James v. United States Dept. of Health and Human Services, 824 F.2d at 1137 1138. The 1978 regulations were promulgated under Congress' delegation of authority to the President and to the Secretary to prescribe regulations concerning Indian affairs and relations. See 25 U.S.C. 2 and 9. To the extent that a regulation is considered "legislative" in the sense of having been promulgated pursuant to a specific grant by Congress of authority to regulate the area in question, the court agrees that the 1978 regulations, which establish procedures for federal recognition of Indian tribes, "certainly come within the area of Indian affairs and relations." James v. United States Dept. of Health and Human Services, 824 F.2d at 1138. 9 The district court's ruling was upheld on appeal by the Seventh Circuit. 10 In Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 11 a group brought claims under the Nonintercourse Act for the restoration of aboriginal and reservation lands, which required the group to make a showing that it was an Indian tribe. Rather than decide for itself whether the group was an Indian tribe, the Second Circuit deferred to the Bureau of Indian Affairs to determine the plaintiff's tribal status based on the doctrine of primary Regulations establishing procedures for federal recognition of Indian tribes certainly come within the area of Indian affairs and relations."). 5 U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 761 F.3d 409, 427-28 (5th Cir. 2014), as revised (Sept. 2, 2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 6 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996). 7 887 F. Supp. 1158, 1162 (N.D. Ind. 1995). 8 Id. at 1164-65. 9 Id. at 1165 (some internal quotations and citations omitted). 10 Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 255 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2001). 11 39 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1994). 4

jurisdiction. In doing so, the Second Circuit reasoned: "Whether there should be judicial forbearance hinges on the authority Congress delegated to the agency in the legislative scheme. The BIA has the authority to prescribe regulations for carrying into effect any act relating to Indian affairs. See 25 U.S.C. 9 (1988). This is a question at the heart of the task assigned by Congress to the BIA and should be answered in the first instance by that agency." 12 In United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 13 the Tenth Circuit explained that the application of another legal doctrine the "ultra vires" exception to sovereign immunity hinged again on whether or not the Secretary acted pursuant to delegated authority in making federal recognition decisions. In that case, the United Tribe of Shawnee Indians sought a ruling that the Secretary was required to include it on the list of federally recognized tribes due to an 1854 treaty, but the Secretary asserted sovereign immunity from suit. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that "the ultra vires doctrine is grounded on the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient." In assessing whether the ultra vires doctrine could be invoked by the United Tribe of Shawnee Indians in that case, the Tenth Circuit went on to hold: The BIA has been delegated the authority to determine whether recognized status should be accorded to previously unrecognized tribes. See H.R. Rep. No. 103 781, at 3 & n. 10 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3768, 3769 70; see also 25 C.F.R. Pt. 83. Thus any action taken by the BIA with respect to determining whether UTSI is entitled to recognized status is within its delegated authority, and therefore not ultra vires, notwithstanding UTSI's assertion that the BIA is wrongfully withholding such status. In each of these cases, the fact that the Secretary had legitimate legal authority to extend federal recognition to Indian tribes pursuant to the Secretary's own procedures was a necessary component of the court's reasoning. Unfortunately, Mr. Mitchell was not questioned about these cases in the course of his testimony, nor did he choose to address them. 3. The Executive Branch has long exercised authority to extend federal recognition to Indian tribes through various means, and the Secretary's federal recognition regulations are not ultra vires or unconstitutional. Mr. Mitchell has testified that the Secretary's federal recognition regulations were and are ultra vires and violate the separation of powers doctrine because Congress has not provided any specific standards or principles to govern the Secretary's decision-making with respect to the recognition of Indian tribes. The constitutional doctrine referred to in Mr. Mitchell's testimony, known as the nondelegation doctrine, is intended to ensure that Congress does not impermissibly 12 Id. at 59-60. In Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 379 (1st Cir. 1975), the First Circuit determined that the Passamaquoddy Tribe was an Indian tribe for purposes of the Nonintercourse Act, but noted that "Congress or the executive branch may at a later time recognize the Tribe for other purposes within their powers, creating a broader set of federal responsibilities[.]" 13 253 F.3d 543 (10th Cir. 2001). 5

delegate its exclusive legislative power to an Executive agency. Congress can avoid an unconstitutional delegation of power by providing "intelligible principles" to guide the Executive Branch in implementing federal laws. In 2001, the Supreme Court noted that "In the history of the Court we have found the requisite 'intelligible principle' lacking in only two statutes[.]" 14 Even the cases cited by Mr. Mitchell recognize that Congress has a great deal of flexibility in determining the scope of a delegation of power to the Executive Branch. 15 A general delegation of powers, like those found in 25 U.S.C. 2 & 9, is not unconstitutional merely because "the determination of facts and the inferences to be drawn from them in the light of the statutory standards and declaration of policy call for the exercise of judgment, and for the formulation of subsidiary administrative policy within the prescribed statutory framework." 16 The Supreme Court has also found that "In many circumstances, where the Government's freedom to act is clear, and the Congress or the President has provided general standards of action and has acquiesced in administrative interpretation, delegation may be inferred" even in the absence of a specific delegation for the action taken. 17 The Secretary of the Interior's authority to act in the area of Indian Affairs is clear, and the Secretary has long used that authority to extend federal recognition to Indian tribes. On appeal in Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana, Inc. v. Babbitt, the Seventh Circuit stated that not only were the Secretary's recognition regulations clearly authorized by Congress, but it was not clear that the regulations even had to be authorized by Congress. The Seventh Circuit explained: "Recognition is, as we have pointed out, traditionally an executive function. When done by treaty it requires the Senate's consent, but it never requires legislative action, whatever power Congress may have to legislate in the area." 18 Many other cases recognize the history of Executive recognition of Indian tribes through, for example, Executive Order. 19 As one magistrate judge considering a nondelgation doctrine challenge to the Secretary's federal recognition regulations has recently stated, [25 U.S.C. 2 and 25 U.S.C. 9], enacted in 1832, provide the framework for comprehensive oversight of Indian affairs and have done so for nearly two centuries. The delegation of authority to the Executive and to the Department of Interior, specifically, have been interpreted by judicial opinion for centuries. Ever since these statutes were enacted in the 1830's, they have served as the source of DOI's plenary administrative authority in discharging the federal government's 14 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001). The Court went on to observe: "In short, we have almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law." Id. at 474-75. 15 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409-10 (1928); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424-426 (1944). 16 Yakus, 321 U.S. at 425. 17 "Thus, even in the absence of specific delegation, we have no difficulty in finding, as we do, that the Department of Defense has been authorized to fashion and apply an industrial clearance program which affords affected persons the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination." Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 506 (1959). 18 Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 255 F.3d 342, 346-47 (7th Cir. 2001). 19 Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, 708 F.3d 209, 211 (D.C. Cir. 2013); California Valley Miwok Tribe v. United States, 515 F.3d 1262, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 6

obligations to Indians. In charging the DOI with broad responsibility for welfare of Indian tribes, Congress must be assumed to have given him reasonable powers to discharge it effectively. This Court does not find that delegation to the DOI to determine tribal recognition violates the non-delegation doctrine. Plaintiffs' citations to generalized legal authorities are inapplicable in light of the vast statutory authority before this Court and including centuries of history and judicial opinions adjudicating and upholding the DOI regulations. 20 The power and ability to identify federally recognized tribes eligible for federal services and protections is a necessary and proper component of the Secretary of the Interior's authority to carry out Acts of Congress and Executive policies relating to Indian Affairs. 21 This includes the authority to promulgate regulatory procedures consistent with those Acts and policies for the purposes of extending federal recognition, and the promulgation of such regulations is not and has never been found to be ultra vires or unconstitutional. 4. The Secretary's federal recognition authority extends to Alaska tribes. The principles and precedents described above apply with equal force to the 229 federally recognized tribes in Alaska, which Congress has consistently included in federal Indian legislation, including the List Act. The Indian Reorganization Act was extended to Alaska tribes in 1936, authorizing them to organize governments and draft constitutions approved by the Secretary. 22 The Indian Child Welfare Act, enacted in 1978, specifically includes Alaska Native villages in its definition of "Indian tribe." 23 The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 defines "Indian tribe" to include "any Alaska Native village... which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians." 24 The Interior list ratified by the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act contained some 226 Alaska tribes. 25 And, as discussed above, that Act acknowledges the Secretary's authority to recognize an Indian tribe, defined as "any Indian or Alaska Native tribe... that the Secretary of the Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe." 26 The Alaska Supreme Court has consistently followed the body of federal law discussed above and affirmed the Secretary's authority to recognize Alaska tribes on behalf of the United States. In the landmark case of John v. Baker, the Court rejected an argument that the Native Village of Northway was not a sovereign government with inherent authority over cases 20 Robinson v. Salazar, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1037 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (internal citations omitted). 21 For example, "After passage of the Indian Reorganization Act recognition proceedings were necessary because the benefits created by it were made available only to descendants of 'recognized' Indian tribes. See 25 U.S.C. 479." Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1994). 22 Act of May 1, 1936, codified at 25 U.S.C. 473a. 23 25 U.S.C. 1903(8). 24 25 U.S.C. 450b(e). 25 58 Fed. Reg. 54364 (Oct. 21, 1993). 26 25 U.S.C. 479a. 7

involving the welfare of its children. "If Congress or the Executive Branch recognizes a group of Native Americans as a sovereign tribe," the Court held, "we must do the same." 27 Mr. Mitchell himself had the opportunity to convince the Alaska Supreme Court that the state contains no tribes validly recognized by the United States. In 2009, he filed suit on behalf of a contractor alleging breach of contract by Ivanof Bay Village, arguing that the Village's defense of sovereign immunity failed because the Village's federal recognition was defective. The Alaska Superior Court disagreed and dismissed. On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Mr. Mitchell's argument that the clear statement from John quoted above was dictum. 28 The Court reaffirmed that John's "conclusion regarding the Executive Branch's tribal recognition and Congress's approval through the Tribe List Act was carefully considered and adopted by the entire court." 29 Conclusion In sum, Mr. Mitchell's testimony has no legal basis, relying primarily on his own conclusions about history and appropriate policy. As the authorities adduced above make clear, however, all three branches of the federal government have long understood the Secretary to have the authority to identify and acknowledge those tribes eligible to participate in governmentto-government relationships with the United States. 27 John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 749 (Alaska 1999) (emphasis added; citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also In the Matter of C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849, 851 n.5 (Alaska 2001) ("In John, we affirmed the Native Village of Northway's sovereignty based on the village's inclusion in the Department of the Interior's 1993 tribe list and the 1994 Tribe List Act."). 28 McCrary v. Ivanof Bay Village, 265 P.3d 337, 340 (Alaska 2011). 29 Id. Mr. Mitchell has unsuccessfully raised similar arguments in Alaska federal courts. For example, in 2003 he filed two lawsuits in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska challenging the Secretary's authority to recognize Alaska villages as Indian tribes. See Lieb v. Orutsararmiut Native Council, No. A03-0223 CV; Sitton v. Native Village of Northway, No. A03-0134 CV. These did not result in decisions on the merits of the recognition argument. 8

Addendum The above testimony is submitted on behalf of the following tribes and tribal organizations: United South and Eastern Tribes, Inc. is an inter-tribal organization that collectively represents its 26 federally recognized member Tribes at the regional and national level. Since its founding in 1968, USET has developed into a nationally prominent and respected organization due to its broad policy platform and influence on the most important and critical issues facing all of Indian Country. Supporting all of USET's advocacy is a foundation built upon the goals of promoting and protecting the inherent sovereignty rights of all Tribal Nations, pursuing opportunities that enhance Tribal Nation rebuilding, and working to ensure that the United States upholds its sacred trust responsibilities to Indian Country. Jamestown S'Klallam Tribe was the second Tribe to be extended federal recognition under the Secretary of the Interior's acknowledgment regulations, though the Tribe's relationship with the United States government extends back to 1855, when the Point No Point Treaty was signed. Since achieving federal recognition, the Jamestown S'Klallam Tribe has worked hard to rebuild its land base, create new programs and services to assist Tribal citizens, and build an economic base for the future. Led by Tribal Chairman W. Ron Allen, the Jamestown S'Klallam Tribe has emerged as a national leader in successfully implementing and promoting tribal selfgovernance. Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians (ATNI): In 1953, farsighted tribal leaders in the Northwest formed the Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians, and dedicated it to tribal sovereignty and self-determination. Today, ATNI is a nonprofit organization representing nearly 50 Northwest tribal governments from Oregon, Idaho, Washington, Alaska, California and Montana. ATNI is an organization whose foundation is composed of the people it is meant to serve the Indian peoples. California Association of Tribal Governments (CATG) is a tribal-chartered non-profit association of tribal governments in the State of California. CATG promotes understanding of tribal self-government, self-determination, and economic interests consistent with the common bonds of culture, history, trade, and association among all California tribes. CATG activities strengthen tribal government relations with the federal and state government, preserve tribal lands and resources, protect tribal reserved rights, and build tribal economies, each a separate sovereign government involved in providing for the health, safety, and welfare of its tribal members. Its mission is to protect and nurture the sovereign rights of California tribes and provide a dialogue between tribes themselves, the state of California, and the federal government. 9

Council of Athabascan Tribal Governments is a tribal consortium located in the remote Yukon Flats of interior Alaska. The Council was founded in September 1985 to serve the Gwich in and Koyukon peoples of the region utilizing the principals of tribal self-governance. The Council's ten member Villages are: Arctic Village, Beaver Village, Birch Creek Tribe, Canyon Village, Chalkyitsik Village, Circle Native Community, Native Village of Fort Yukon, Rampart Village, Native Village of Stevens, and Village of Venetie. Inter Tribal Association of Arizona (ITAA) provides a united voice for tribal governments located in the State of Arizona to address common issues of concern. Members of the ITAA are the highest elected officials from the following tribes: Ak-Chin Indian Community, Cocopah Indian Tribe, Colorado River Indian Tribes, Fort McDowell Yavapai Nation, Fort Mojave Indian Tribe, Gila River Indian Community, Havasupai Tribe, Hopi Tribe, Hualapai Tribe, Kaibab Band of Paiute Indians, Pascua Yaqui Tribe, Pueblo of Zuni, Quechan Tribe, Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, San Carlos Apache Tribe, San Juan Southern Paiute Tribe, Tohono O'Odham Nation, Tonto Apache Tribe, White Mountain Apache Tribe, Yavapai- Apache Nation, Yavapai-Prescott Indian Community. Maniilaq Association is a non-profit corporation representing twelve federally recognized tribes in Northwest Alaska, including the Native Village of Ambler, Native Village of Buckland, Native Village of Deering, Native Village of Kiana, Native Village of Kivalina, Native Village of Kobuk, Native Village of Kotzebue, Native Village of Noatak, Noorvik Native Community, Native Village of Point Hope, Native Village of Selawik, and Native Village of Shungnak. Maniilaq Association provides health and social services to approximately 6,500 people and coordinates tribal and traditional assistance programs and environmental and subsistence protection services to serve its member Villages. Midwest Alliance of Sovereign Tribes The Midwest Alliance of Sovereign Tribes, (MAST), founded in 1996, represents the 35 sovereign tribal nations of Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Michigan. Altogether, MAST represents nearly 134,000 American Indian people. MAST's mission is to "advance, protect, preserve, and enhance the mutual interests, treaty rights, sovereignty, and cultural way of life of the sovereign nations of the Midwest throughout the 21st century." The organization coordinates important public policy issues and initiatives at the state, regional and federal levels, promotes unity and cooperation among member tribes and advocates for member tribes. Native American Rights Fund (NARF), founded in 1970, is the oldest and largest nonprofit law firm dedicated to asserting and defending the rights of Indian tribes, organizations and individuals nationwide. NARF's practice is concentrated in five key areas: the preservation of tribal existence; the protection of tribal natural resources; the promotion of Native American human rights; the accountability of governments to Native Americans; and the development of Indian law and educating the public about Indian rights, laws, and issues. 10