strategic asia 2003 04 fragility and crisis Edited by Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg with Michael Wills Country Studies Pakistan: A State Under Stress John H. Gill restrictions on use: This PDF is provided for the use of authorized recipients only. For specific terms of use, please contact <publications@nbr.org>. To purchase the print volume in which this chapter appears please visit <http://www.nbr.org> or contact <orders@nbr.org>. 1414 NE 42nd Street, Suite 300 Seattle, Washington 98105 USA 206-632-7370 the national bureau of asian research
Pakistan 209 PAKISTAN A STATE UNDER STRESS John H. Gill ABSTRACT Pakistan faces two critical near-term regional security issues: bilateral tensions with India and the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Developing and sustaining Pakistan s progress toward political moderation and economic modernization looms as an equally important security challenge in the medium term. The most direct threats to Pakistan stem from internal problems. Violent Islamists with a variety of domestic, Afghan, Kashmiri, and millenarian agendas undermine the state, endanger its citizens, and threaten its neighbors. Disturbing social indicators compound the growing radicalism and rising anti-american sentiment. Pakistan s future will therefore rest upon its ability to defeat the forces of extremism and to direct its resources toward pressing domestic issues such as education, rule of law, poverty, and population growth. The international community can help by supporting the rebuilding of Pakistan s civil society and governing institutions, but Pakistan s behavior on issues relating to terrorism, proliferation, and democracy will be crucial in determining the level of external assistance that is available. John (Jack) Gill is a U.S. Army South Asia Foreign Area Officer on the faculty of the Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He would like to express his appreciation to Stephen Cohen, Richard Ellings, Aaron Friedberg, Neil Joeck, Deepa Ollapally, Marvin Weinbaum, Michael Wills, and an anonymous reader for their insights in reviewing this chapter.
210 Strategic Asia 2003 04 Introduction Pakistan finds itself at the intersection of two immediate and vital South Asian security issues: bilateral tensions with India and the reconstruction of Afghanistan. If these two issues dominate the short term, a third crucial issue for South Asian and indeed global security looms in the medium term: developing and sustaining Pakistan s progress toward political moderation and economic modernization. 1 While the India-Pakistan question has been discussed in the preceding chapter, this chapter will address internal threats to Pakistan s national stability and coherence in the context of the situation in Afghanistan and its critical ramifications for Pakistan. From the U.S. perspective, Pakistan will also continue to be a crucial pillar in the global war on terrorism through the short term. Additionally, the danger of proliferation will attract high-level attention from Washington and other capitals for the foreseeable future. Domestic Challenges: The Threat from Within Pakistan in the early twenty-first century is a country under severe pressure. Although the rivalry with India colors much of Islamabad s worldview and its responses to challenges, the most direct threats to the Pakistani state and society stem from internal problems, especially from militant extremists who seek to promote their causes through violence, often under the cloak of radical Islam. These extremists threaten Pakistan s domestic order and international standing from three directions: continuing terrorism in Afghanistan, domestic sectarian violence, and insurgency in Kashmir. 2 They also endanger the tentative attempts to revive Pakistan s economy. Often loosely termed jihadis, many of the groups and individuals involved in these causes are closely interlinked and move across the porous inter-group boundaries with ease. Using violence as their means of expression, they foster a culture of radicalism and intolerance, defying government control and fraying the fabric of Pakistan s civil society. In the wake of the October 2002 elections, some of these groups now have a significant voice in Pakistan s national policy-making as well as in the local governments of the two provinces bordering Afghanistan. Moreover, the severe challenges posed by radical groups threaten to undermine progress made across the border in Afghanistan just as they complicate relations with India, the United States, and the rest of the world community. To some extent, these problems are manifestations of the definitional questions concerning the role of the military and religion in the state that have dogged Pakistan since its inception, problems that have become more acute since September 2001 and will remain key variables in Pakistan s political calculus as the military government attempts to incorporate some
Pakistan 211 democratic reforms without losing ultimate authority over key policy decisions. 3 At its founding in 1947, Pakistan was faced with vital security concerns, but lacked a strong civilian institutional base and quickly lost its key civilian leaders. As a result, the military, specifically the army, played a disproportionate role in setting the country s priorities and has ruled Pakistan directly or indirectly for most of its history. The appropriate role of the uniformed services in governance has never been resolved satisfactorily, but the military s institutional interests have often dominated the government s domestic and foreign agendas. This issue lies at the heart of the current debate between the regime of President and Chief of the Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf and opposition members of the National Assembly. Similarly, the relationship of the state to Islam has been a subject of debate since 1947. Established as the putative homeland for the subcontinent s Muslims, Pakistan still struggles to reconcile competing interpretations of Islam with the demands of domestic governance (most visibly in the legal code and banking practices) and international affairs. The question of how Islam relates to the functions of the state is also linked to the national legislature, which was re-established through elections in October 2002. For the first time, Islamist parties are strongly represented in the legislature, and they have been among the most vocal opponents of President Musharraf s domestic and international policies. Trouble on the Western Frontier: Continued Support for the Taliban Pakistan has been central to the success of coalition military operations in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom) and the U.S. war on terrorism. By providing transit, logistical, and basing support to coalition forces and by cooperating in the apprehension of several hundred terrorist suspects, including some very senior Al Qaeda operatives, Islamabad has garnered lavish praise from Washington for its absolutely magnificent assistance. 4 Beyond comforting words, Pakistan has gained substantial economic relief since aligning itself with the United States in the war on terrorism, most dramatically in the form of the five-year $3 billion package announced during Musharraf s June 24, 2003 visit to Camp David. Even before the Camp David meeting, Islamabad had benefited from measures such as a $600 million grant that gave critical balance-of-payment and budget support (November 2001), the extension of payment terms for $3 billion in credits (August 2002), the provision of credits through the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, U.S. support in international lending institutions, and forgiveness of $1 billion in debts. Furthermore, Washington has established a five-year, $100 mil-
212 Strategic Asia 2003 04 lion education project and a $73 million program to assist in border control. The latter included provision of helicopters, surveillance aircraft, communications equipment, and 1,000 ground vehicles. Of course, in the long run, the greatest benefit to Islamabad is that the 400 to 500 individuals captured thus far are no longer free to foment unrest or perpetrate terrorist acts in Pakistan. As U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage has noted, Pakistan has very high stakes in the outcome of the war on terrorism, as success in that war has a direct bearing on the stability of Pakistan itself. 5 In addition to arresting terrorists inside Pakistan, coordination between U.S. and Pakistani forces along the rugged Afghan-Pakistan border has been, and will remain, an important element of American operations in Afghanistan. The United States continues to regard the Pakistani government as a partner, but the presence of some key Taliban figures in Pakistan and recurring attacks against coalition and Afghan troops by former Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other extremists based in Pakistan could become a serious point of friction between the two capitals. 6 Indeed, the former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General Dan K. McNeill, has criticized Islamabad for not controlling the movement of terrorists and militants across the border from their havens in Pakistan. 7 Afghan President Hamid Karzai and UN representative Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi have also complained to Pakistan. Terrorism was a major theme during Karzai s April 2003 visit to Islamabad, and he returned to Kabul with promises of greater cooperation in the arrest and extradition of criminals of war against the Afghan people, as well as plans for biannual consultations on bilateral security issues and a new trilateral commission with the United States and Pakistan to work on border matters. Border clashes, the attack on the Pakistani embassy in Kabul, and flares in rhetoric, however, show that Pakistan- Afghan relations remain tentative and vulnerable to shocks. 8 These challenges on its western border illuminate a vital national security interest for Islamabad: the promotion of stability and development in Afghanistan. For some in Pakistan, especially in the border provinces of Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), however, the Taliban represented a desirable political order that should be replicated in Pakistan. These groups saw the swift coalition victory as a dire threat. Historically opposed to U.S. global and regional policies, they have responded to events in Afghanistan with intense anti-americanism and continued support or tolerance for attacks against coalition forces and the Karzai government. Many of these Pakistanis are ethnic Pushtuns, and their links to fellow Pushtuns in Afghanistan reinforce their inclination to counter the U.S. presence on their borders and derail reconstruction efforts under the new Afghan administration. They are particularly angered by what they