Understanding democracy (LOI) Jonathan Baron Democracy is a human invention, a design that serves certain functions. Our hypothesis is that citizens do not understand it very well, and, as a result, they often fail collectively to take full advantage of what it can do. Our goal in the proposed research is to study understanding of democracy. We want to characterize it both in terms of what people understand and fail to understand, and also how best to describe such understanding theoretically. We would also carry out experiments on possible educational interventions to improve understanding. Background in prior research The current project grows out of my interest in parochialism, which I define (following others) as decisions in which people support their in-group even when the consequences are worse for them individually and worse for everyone on the whole (Baron, 2001; Baron, Altman & Kroll, 2005). The immediate precursors of this proposal are three recent papers (in order of completion, Baron, 2012a; Baron, Ritov & Greene, 2013; Baron, 2012b), which had two main results. One was that people not only showed parochialism in hypothetical voting decisions but also believed that this was their moral duty. We showed this, among other ways, in a study of Jewish and Palestinian students in Israel. The second result grew out of an incidental observation. Many subjects thought that their moral duty was to vote for their individual self-interest, regardless of their in-group or the world. The 1
2012b paper confirmed this finding and found that, among Americans, those who held this view were opposed to taxation and to government spending that did not seem to benefit them personally. I argued that both parochialism and self-interest voting are supported by a naïve theory of democracy, which is that it is means of self-defense, either through defense of an in-group or of oneself. This is a misunderstanding, because democracy is extremely inefficient at achieving this goal, and there are much better ways to achieve it. It is inefficient because of the small effect of any individual action on the final outcome, hence the small effect on any one person s interests (Downs, 1957). The usual demonstration of this inefficiency involves calculation of the expected self-interested utility of voting, with the assumption that voting has no effect unless the vote is pivotal, in which case the probability of an effect is roughly proportional to 1/N, where N is the number of voters. But the line of reasoning is essentially the same if vote share matters too. The effect of a vote is diluted by a factor of N. But, if people have altruistic goals, concern about the good of others, democratic voting provides a counterweight to this minuscule effect on self-interest, namely, the large number of people affected by the outcome (Edlin, Gelman & Kaplan, 2007, 2008). In a utilitarian calculation, the effect must be multiplied by N, assuming that only voters are affected by the outcome. This multiplication totally cancels the dilution caused by being one voter among N. And the total effect can be orders of magnitude larger if we think in terms of effects on those who do not vote, such as children, foreigners, and future people who do not exist. The larger the circle we consider, the more the effect of a vote is magnified. Thus, voting is most efficient as a way of realizing our altruistic concerns for humanity, just as it is least efficient as a means of self-defense. 2
Theoretical approaches To start, we will apply the framework provided by Perkins (1986), summarized in Baron (2008, pp. 22 29). Perkins (in the spirit of Wertheimer, 1959) asks what it means to understand a design, such as a button. 1 It consists (roughly) of knowing: the structure of a button (including the central idea of a button hole, which is actually a slit), the purposes served by that structure (fastening in a way that holds firm under tightening, allows easy undoing,... ), and the arguments about why the structure serves (or fails to serve) these purposes (can rotate button to get it through the hole, but it holds firm once it is flattened,... ). Full understanding involves comparing a design to alternatives (zippers, Velcro, laces). A second relevant theoretical approach is the idea of actively open-minded thinking (AOT, Baron, 2008), which fits the Perkins scheme well. This is based on an analytic framework for describing thinking in general, in terms of search and inference. Search is for possibilities (structures, designs), goals (purposes) and evidence (arguments). Thinking often suffers from insufficient search and from biased search and inference ( myside bias ), favoring possibilities already strong. Myside bias is countered by AOT, the propensity to search for reasons against favored options, alternative possibilities, and goals not yet considered. Failure to understand may result from insufficient search or myside bias. Failures of democracy could result from just such failures to understand its design and perceive its functions. A populace with a clearer understanding of these features of democracy might be able to utilize the virtues of the system more effectively. 1 Perkins also argues that essentially all knowledge can be seen as design. This is irrelevant here because democracy is a design. 3
Research to be done The first component of the research is to expand the limited model of the purposes, structure and arguments of democratic government beyond what was just described. Other purposes aside from insuring the best outcome for all would include things like preventing civil conflict, promoting respect for law, protecting minorities, and insuring predictable legal standards. Some of these purposes are served by additions to the basic structure, such as federalism, constitutional limitations of the majority, and a separate judiciary. Many of these tweaks were instituted exactly because of the recognition of purposes not being achieved by a simpler structure. To assess these elements, we will conduct open-ended interviews and then develop a questionnaire (as done by Adelson, 1971). The questionnaire will ask directly about purposes, structure, and arguments, possibly in true/false form (like multiple choice but with more than one plausible answer). We will also extend the framework to various aspects of the structure of democratic electoral systems: representation vs. referendum; federalism and local control; terms and term limits; limits on campaign spending, duration, and contributions; rules on media coverage; and voting rules (plurality, majority, runoffs, etc.). Each of these may be considered as a design, a piece of a larger design. Each serves certain purposes, some of which are not well served by a simpler design without them. Once we have developed a questionnaire, we will use it to study development. First we will compare college freshmen and seniors, and we will examine the effects of college major (to look at specific education effects). If time allows, we will examine change over one year as a function of courses taken. We will also recruit a sample of high-school students from both public and private schools, again with a view to comparing freshmen and seniors. This research addresses key question #2. 4
A second reseaerch component is to examine the contribution of alternative theories (key question #1). I have emphasized the idea of naïve theories, but it is not clear whether these theories have been formed as a result of prior thought or whether they are constructed on the spot when people are faced with questions they have never thought about before. We will ask explicitly about prior beliefs. In this context, the idea of mental models implies some sort of simplification, so it is roughly equivalent to naïve theories. A third component, done after the others, is to develop brief training modules and examine their effect on our questionnaire, both immediately and after a delay. In particular, we will study the effects of asking people to engage in additional search for goals and arguments. We shall also examine the effects of direct instruction in arguments based on the probability/altruism argument described earlier. (This may be a challenge, but suitable visual materials might help meet it.) Budget, conclusions, and extensions I am open to suggestions about the budget, but my current thought is to ask for money to pay subjects in web studies, a part-time assistant to conduct interviews, a graduate student (Emlen Metz, 50%), and travel for the required meetings. In future research, the general approach could be extended to economic aspects of government, including the role of government in providing public goods, social insurance, protection of property, and taxation. If successful, this proposal could lead to the development of new educational approaches for teaching citizenship. A better understanding of democracy could improve the functioning of governments around the world. Such improvements in understanding could be low-hanging fruit in the effort to improve the world situation. 5
References Adelson, J. (1971). The political imagination of the young adolescent. Daedalus, 100, 1013 1050. Baron, J. (1997). The illusion of morality as self-interest: a reason to cooperate in social dilemmas. Psychological Science, 8, 330 335. Baron, J. (2001). Confusion of group-interest and self-interest in parochial cooperation on behalf of a group. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45, 283 296. Baron, J., Altman, N. Y., & Kroll, S. (2005). Parochialism and approval voting. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49, 895 907. Baron, J. (2008). Thinking and deciding (4th ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press. Baron, J. (2012a). Parochialism as a result of cognitive biases. In R. Goodman, D. Jinks, & A. K. Woods (Eds.), Understanding social action, promoting human rights, pp. 203 243. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Baron, J. (2012b). The culture of honor in citizens concepts of their duty as voters. Rationality and Society, 24, 37 72. Baron, J., Ritov, I., & Greene, J. D. (2013). The duty to support nationalistic policies. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 26, 128 138. Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper and Row. Edlin, A., Gelman, A., & Kaplan, N. (2007). Voting as a rational choice: Why and how people vote to improve the well-being of others. Rationality and Society, 19, 293 314. Edlin, A., Gelman, A., & Kaplan, N. (2008). Vote for charity s sake. The Economists Voice, 5, (6), article 6. Perkins, D. N. (1986). Knowledge as design: Critical and creative thinking for teachers and learners. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Wertheimer, M. (1959). Productive thinking (rev. ed.). New York: Harper & Row (Original work published 1945) 6