Tie Breaking in STV. 1 Introduction. 3 The special case of ties with the Meek algorithm. 2 Ties in practice

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Tie Breaking in STV 1 Introduction B. A. Wichmann Brian.Wichmann@bcs.org.uk Given any specific counting rule, it is necessary to introduce some words to cover the situation in which a tie occurs. However, such ties are only a practical concern for small elections. For instance, it has been reported that a tie has never occurred with the rules used in the Irish Republic. Probably the most common form of a tie is when the two smallest first preference votes are the same. Unless both candidates can be excluded, a choice must be made, although in very many cases, the candidates elected will be the same. This note proposes that when a computer is used to undertake a count, all the possible choices should be examined and that the result is produced by computing the probability of election of the candidates. 2 Ties in practice It is clear that the propensity to produce a tie will depend largely on the number of votes. However, some estimate can be obtained from a collection of election data that has recently been revised [1]. The data base consists of over 700 elections, but for this paper we exclude artificial test cases. The figures obtained from the other cases, which are like real elections, with three counting rules ([4, 2, 7]) are as in the table on page 4. Hence, although with the Church of England rules, only 59 out of 299 involved a tie-break, the average number of tie-breaks in those 59 was actually 9.9. The average number of votes in those 59 cases was 102, while the average for the remaining 240 cases was 12,900. It is important to note that Meek only has ties on an exclusion of a candidate, while the hand-counting rules also have ties on the choice of the candidate whose surplus is to be transferred. For reasons not relevant to this note, the number of cases run with each rule is different. (Larger cases have only been run with Meek.) It is clear that a small number of votes increases the risk of a tie. Also, given that a tie occurs, the Meek algorithm has only half the risk of a subsequent tie arising, almost certainly due to the higher precision of the calculation. 3 The special case of ties with the Meek algorithm Brian Meek s original proposal rests upon the solution of certain algebraic equations. The algorithm given in [7] provides an iterative solution of those equations. The mathematical nature of the equations implies that there is substantial freedom in handling exclusions, since, once a candidate is excluded, it is as if the candidate had never entered the contest. Hence it is not necessary for two implementations of Meek to handle exclusions in the same way the same candidates will be elected. (In contrast, the hand counting rules need to be specific on exclusions since it affects the result; ERS97 insists on as many as allowable, while CofE insists on only one at a time.) As an example, David Hill s implementation of Meek in comparison with my own has revealed differences. We both exclude together all those candidates having no first preferences. David Hill also excludes the nextlowest candidate also (assuming it is safe to do so), while I do not. I will exclude more than one candidate at a time when it is safe to do so, while David Hill sticks to one at a time. Hence both our implementations report a random choice has been made when it is certainly possible to avoid this. Such reporting is undesirable since it might give the impression that those elected have been chosen at random, when this is not the case. Both of us have introduced a tie-breaking rule 1

similar to that in many hand-counting rules based upon the votes in previous stages (but in opposition to that advocated in [5]). Two other aspects are relevant to the Meek algorithm. The cases reported in [6] indicate that an implementation can report a tie even though in mathematical terms, one candidate is ahead (but by too small an amount to be computed). This situation is not thought to arise in practice. Perhaps somewhat more disturbing is that an algebraic tie can be computed differently, giving one candidate ahead of another. Two implementations of Meek with such a case can even break the actual tie by rounding in different directions. However, since there is a real tie, breaking it by the rounding in the implementation, is not so bad. 4 Results of the proposed method The only practical method to implement this proposal is to modify software that already implements an existing counting rule. Since I have my own implementation of Meek, I have modified this to analyse all choices when a tie occurs. The modification works by executing the algorithm once for every possible choice when the rules require a random choice. For my version of Meek, I have provided an option to remove the first-difference rule so that when this rule would otherwise be invoked, a random choice is made 1. As an example, consider a real (simple) election, R033, having four candidates (A1... A4) for one seat. At the first stage, A2 and A3 have the smallest number of votes: if A2 is excluded, then A1 is elected; if A3 is excluded, then there is a tie between A2 and A4 for the next exclusion. These two alternatives also result in A1 being elected. So the final result is: Probability from 5 choices from 3 passes. Candidate Excluded? Probability A1 no 1 A2 yes 0 A3 yes 0 A4 yes 0 We now know that the election of A1 is not dependent upon the random choices made. The computation 1 The first-difference rule is a method of breaking a tie by examining the votes in all previous stages, starting at the first stage and selecting the one which has the fewest votes at the first stage at which there is a difference. Of course, if the earlier stages give no difference, then a random method must be used to break the tie. involved three election runs. The middle column indicates that the candidates A2, A3 and A4 were all selected in one of the runs for random exclusion. A more complex example is given by R009, electing 2 from 14 candidates with 43 votes. Here, the final table reads: Probability from 1364 choices from 264 passes. Candidate Excluded? Probability A1 no 1/ 4 A2 yes 0 A3 yes 0 A4 yes 0 A5 no 0 A6 yes 0 A7 yes 0 A8 yes 0 A9 no 1 A10 yes 0 A11 no 3/ 4 A12 yes 0 A13 yes 0 A14 no 0 Here we see that only the candidates A1, A5, A9, A11 and A14 were never subject to random exclusion. Nevertheless, A5 and A14 were never elected. However, the above result was using the variant of Meek without the first-difference rule. If the firstdifference rule had been applied, then A1 would not have been elected in any circumstances. Note that in this case, a large number of passes had to be made due to many of the stages resulting in a tie. Hence this technique is only really possible due to the speed of modern computers. Given the above election, then there are two possible uses of the outcome: firstly to elect the most probably candidates (A9 and A11), or secondly, to randomly select between A1 and A11 according to the specified possibilities. Since in this paper we are attempting to reduce the random element, we choose the first option. From the database, 55 cases were selected which correspond reasonably closely to real elections. The results are in the table on page 5. The entry Random gives the number of random choices made with the New Zealand version of Meek which has the first-difference rule. The last three entries are from running the new program. The Probs. column includes the probabilities of election of those candidates who are involved in ties and have nonzero probability of election. 2 Voting matters, Issue 19

The three examples with approximate results from the new program took too long to run to completion. Here, the tabulated results are based upon the first few thousand cases executed. The majority ran very quickly and only those with 10,000 or more passes took longer than a minute or two. The case R038 was exceptional in having probabilities of 29/168, 11/35, 29/60, 431/840, 431/1680, 437/1680 and 1 (and none were repeated). If one was only concerned with the Meek algorithm, then the program could probably be made substantially faster since the ties only arise with an exclusion and Meek is indifferent to the order of the exclusions in the sense that excluding A then B is the same as excluding B then A; this situation will typically be the case when A and B tie on the fewest number of votes. The approach here is a general one that could be applied to any counting rule. It also seemed easier to program the general method presented here. From the 49 cases which were run to completion, all but 7 reported than the random choice had no effect upon the result. Election R102 is typical of the situation in which a large number of random choices are made. In fact, 28 exclusions are made before an election. This implies that for all these initial stages, the votes are integers. Given the small size of the election, ties are very common. Unfortunately, this implies that the number of choices is too large to compute them all. However, experimenting with removing those candidates who are excluded early, gives the result shown in the last column. Followers of the Eurovision Song Contest might like to know that although the official scoring system gave a tie in 1991 between Sweden and France, with Sweden being judged the winner on the basis of having more second (preference) votes, this system gives Sweden a probability of election of 71/288 and hence France the clear winner with a probability of 217/288. According to this system, the UK would have won in 1992 with a probability of 5/6, while the official result declared Ireland as the winner which had a probability of only 1/12. 5 Conclusions It seems that the provision of this program raises more problems than it solves. If one is prepared to ignore the 14% of cases which question the validity of the random choice, then one can continue the current practice with a clear conscience. On the other hand, when a random choice was made in a real election, it would surely be welcome to show that the result was not in question. However, using this program for that purpose might not give a clear answer when only a fraction of all the possibilities could be executed in a reasonable time (as with the three cases in the table). Of course, in those cases, numerous random choices could be tried, but the object here is to avoid such arbitrariness. When a candidate has been subject to a random exclusion in an election, he/she could naturally feel aggrieved. One solution to that would be to undertake a re-count without randomly excluding that candidate. If this were undertaken by computer, the number of recounts would be less than the number of candidates and hence very much less than all possibilities which are considered above. Currently, almost all STV counting rules introduce some rules, like the first-difference rule ([2, 4]) or Borda scores [3], to reduce the need for a random choice to be made. An alternative would be to simplify the counting rules by omitting these provisions, but to use a program like the one presented here to produce a result which is very likely to have no random element. 6 References [1] B. A. Wichmann. A Guide to an STV data base. July 2004. (Available from the author.) [2] R. A. Newland and F. S. Britton. How to conduct an election by the Single Transferable Vote. ERS 3rd Edition. 1997. See http://www. electoral-reform.org.uk/votingsystems/stvrules.htm [3] Earl Kitchener, Tie-Breaking in STV. Voting matters. Issue 11, April 2000. [4] GS1327: General Synod, Single Transferable Vote regulations 1990 and 1998. (Obtainable from Church House Bookshop, Great Smith Street, London SW1P 3BN.) [5] J. C. O Neill: Tie-Breaking with the Single Transferable Vote. Voting matters Issue 18. pp 14-17. 2004. [6] B. A. Wichmann. The computational accuracy using the Meek algorithm. Voting matters Issue 12. pp6-7. November 2000. Voting matters, Issue 19 3

[7] I. D. Hill, B. A. Wichmann and D. R. Woodall. Algorithm 123 Single Transferable Vote by Meek s method. Computer Journal. Vol 30, pp277-281, 1987. Rule Ties Ties Average votes Average votes per case with ties without ties CofE 59 from 299 9.9 102 12900 ERS97 55 from 154 7.1 81 2438 Meek 62 from 587 3.3 12692 44180 Table 1.1: Ties with different election rules 4 Voting matters, Issue 19

ID Votes Candidates Seats Random Choices Passes Probs. M002 131 20 5 1 2 2 1 M112 692 25 6 1 2 2 1 R009 43 14 2 4 1364 264 1/4, 3/4, 1 R012 79 17 2 4 256 48 1 R015 83 19 3 6 32640 3840 1 R017 76 20 2 5 64776 7200 1 R018 104 26 2 11 6 10 6 1? R019 73 17 2 5 3876 672 1 R020 77 21 2 5 42184 4572 5/24, 19/24, 1 R027 44 11 2 4 114 30 1 R028 91 29 2 8 5 10 6 1? R033 115 4 1 1 5 3 1 R038 9 18 3 3 387 115 see text R040 176 17 5 1 2 2 1 R097 45 17 1 6 283742 31190 1 R100 1031 31 10 1 2 2 1 R102 247 49 10 15 34 10 6 1/12, 1/4, 1/6, 2*5/6, 2*11/12, 6*1? S002 16 16 1 1 8 4 2 of 1/2 S003 16 16 1 1 7 5 1 S004 20 20 1 2 12 6 1 S005 18 18 1 1 3 3 1 S006 20 20 1 3 60 18 1 S007 19 19 1 2 46 14 1 S008 19 19 1 3 106 31 1 S009 20 20 1 2 20 10 1 S010 22 22 1 3 448 106 1 S011 21 21 1 4 465 97 1 S012 22 22 1 1 2 2 1 S013 22 22 1 3 3888 624 1 S014 22 22 1 1 176 44 71/288, 217/288 S015 23 23 1 3 646 126 2 of 1/12, 5/6 S016 25 25 4 1 2 2 1 S022 25 25 1 4 1592 329 1 S023 23 23 1 3 288 60 1 S024 17 16 1 2 58 16 1 S025 18 18 1 4 480 96 2 of 1/2 S026 18 18 1 5 39703 6297 1 S027 13 19 1 2 30 12 1 S028 17 18 1 3 229 68 1 S029 18 18 1 2 16 7 1 S030 20 20 1 4 1368 288 1 S031 19 19 1 1 2 2 1 S032 16 19 1 2 16 7 1 S033 22 23 1 2 1132 206 1 S034 25 25 1 4 5774 1072 1 S035 25 25 1 6 70560 10080 1 S036 23 23 1 5 14400 2304 1 S037 24 24 1 2 16 7 1 S038 23 23 1 2 28 10 1 S039 26 26 2 5 17760 2880 1 S047 36 24 1 6 12144 1800 1 S048 24 24 1 6 161280 20160 1 Table 1.2: All results from exhaustive tie-breaking Voting matters, Issue 19 5