IUCN IUCN Water Water Programme Programme NEGOTIATE Toolkit: Case Studies Interlinking of Rivers in India: Dialogue and Negotiations by National Civil Society Committee By Dr Biksham Gujja, World Wide Fund for Nature 1. Background The rapid economic growth during the last decade in China, India, Brazil, and South Africa has major implications for the natural resources around the world. These countries have demonstrated that in a decade it is possible to generate massive wealth, thereby radically improving their position in global financial circles. These countries have a vision for themselves as well as for other developing countries. Not only are they competing with each other in growth and with bigger and larger infrastructure projects, these countries are now contemplating such projects without consulting global financial institutions such as the World Bank as a partner. They no longer need either financial or technical assistance to build such large projects. A decade ago it would not have been possible for India to contemplate such large project without the support of international financing institutes such as World Bank. This situation has changed significantly. The lack of involvement of the World Bank and other financing institutions has significant implications for organizations that wish to influence these projects. Earlier, international organisations would warn or threaten countries with sanctions in order to persuade them to follow the policies they considered necessary for sustainable development for the country and the world. To this end, both national and international NGOs would complain directly to the World Bank or other financial institutions. But now using aid, trade and loans as instruments to cajole and force some of the countries, such as India, to accept the conditions are not even an option. This has posed a formidable challenge to international organisations which are working for the conservation of nature and sustainable development as they can no longer advocate for improved practices via financing institutions. The only option is to work with these countries through dialogues and negotiations within their framework and the creation of credible platforms with civil society and reputed individuals from within the country, who can advocate for change. In the future, international civil society organisations will have to build effective partnerships on equal terms with the institutions and governments in these countries. This global transition is illustrated by two international water infrastructure projects, one each in India and China. A decade ago India was shaken when the World Bank cancelled a $300 million loan for the Narmada dam on the basis of complaints and issues lodged by civil society. India has now almost completed that dam, though some of the earlier issues are still debated. China, perhaps learning from the Narmada project, did not even approach the World Bank for assistance for the Gorges dam which is now completed. Building on this experience, both China and India are now independently undertaking major riverlinking projects. This paper focuses on India s mega Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) Project and the processes used by civil society to influence the project by engaging in direct dialogue. 1
1.1 History of River Interlinking in India River linking has always been in the debate in India, though historically most plans were deemed unfeasible. Sir Arthur Cotton s plan in colonial times to link the southern rivers in 1839 was abandoned as railways took priority. The National Water Grid project by Dr K.L. Rao, an eminent water engineer who later became water resources minister, to link the Ganges and Cauvery with a 2,640 km canal to pump 25-billion cu.m height of 450m to irrigate 4 million ha in the southern states was eventually scrapped as it was very costly and lower cost alternatives were available. A third plan, the Garland canal, was proposed by the retired Captain Dastur. A grandiose project, which though prima facie impractical, persisted in national discussions. So linking rivers at a grand scale to solve India s water problems have been proposed for more than 150 years but were impractical on both technical and financial grounds. Recently these mega projects are again coming into the national agenda, as the cost of these projects and the technology become within the means of the nation. The Central and state governments of India are again contemplating large water infrastructure projects as a part of their solution to the growing water crisis in India the increased water demand from all the sectors. The recent economic growth, largely centred in cities, has added pressure on the government to invest in the agriculture sector. Investing in agriculture means going for large projects. For example, the state of Andhra Pradesh wants to invest about $10 billion in the next decade on water infrastructure projects. That is just one state. ILR needs to be viewed in that context. Though the ILR project has been discussed for over four decades, it never reached the national agenda due to various factors. ILR originated from a simple idea that water can be diverted from surplus rivers to deficit rivers. The government argues that one of the most effective ways to increase irrigation potential to increase food grain production, mitigate floods and droughts, and reduce regional imbalance in the availability of water is the Inter Basin Water Transfer (IBWT) from the surplus rivers to deficit areas. 1 The IBWT is also proposed to manage water crisis due to large variations 2 of utilisable water on per-capita and per ha of cultivable area of individual river basins. 1.2 The Development of the Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) Project The Government of India created a National Water Development Agency (NWDA) in 1982 whose objective was to explore, among others, the creation of storages and interbasin transfers from surplus river basins to deficit basins. Added to this is the political argument that integrating rivers contributes to national integration. Thus, interlinking rivers serves both technical and political purposes. After examining possibilities for IBWT, the NWDA observed that work of interlinking of river basins does not involve technological problems of a radically different nature, which can be done within the capability of Indian engineering. To support the latter, the NWDA drew inspiration from India s experience of designing and constructing projects of unprecedented magnitude. The major purpose behind interlinking rivers is to provide 173 billion cu.m of additional water to irrigate about 37 million ha. After establishing certain basic criteria, the NWDA conducted water 1 http://nwda.gov.in/index2.asp?sublinkid=46&langid=1, Website of NWDA, the government site with information on the ILR project. 2 For Sabarmati river basin the per-capita utilisable water is about 182 cu.m where as it is 2,500 cu.m and 3,082 for Mahanadi and Narmada respectively, in Integrated water resource development: a plan for action, Government of India, Sept.1999. 2
balance studies of 137 river basins/sub-basins and 71 diversion points and prepared prefeasibility reports for 31 links--14 Himalayan rivers and 17 peninsula rivers. These reports are the foundation for the ILR Project. 1.3 ILR on the National Agenda ILR, both as concept and project, became a national agenda in a peculiar way. Based on a writ petition filed in September 2002, the Supreme Court of India, considering that as public interest, directed the government to start interlinking rivers and complete it by 2016. Ever since the Court has been monitoring the project s progress. It should be noted that for such a project, which has serious implications for ecosystems and people, and at an estimated cost of around $135 billion, the only project documents for this project are the pre-feasibility reports prepared by NWDA and feasibility reports for only two river links. The ILR is expected to have major implications for people, forests, and wetlands. Critics argue that large numbers of people will be displaced, pollution will spread and many protected areas will be adversely affected. The food security of the country, critics argue, can be alternately met by improving water productivity, through schemes like rainwater harvesting. Many civil society organisations have raised doubts about the ILR in terms of social, economic and ecological costs. There was an urgency to establish an informed dialogue to openly debate the costs and benefits of this mega project. 2. Process to Establish the National Civil Society Committee The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) was instrumental in establishing the National Civil Society Committee (NCSC) that was to serve as a platform for discussion on the ILR. A dialogue was organised by various groups supported by WWF in February 2003 in Delhi to discuss how to set up the NCSC. The meeting was attended by government officials including the then members of the government appointed task force to formulate the ILR project,, political leaders, media and others. The deliberations were intense and emotional. During that meeting it was decided, by the participants, that eminent persons representing different views on the ILR Project would be brought together to form the NCSC. A small working group was established to take this idea forward, and after much deliberation, a list of individuals whom all would accept was drawn up and requested to join. The process to select the members of the NCSC took much longer than anticipated: the discussions were very sensitive, and time consuming, as there were no precedents to follow. The National Civil Society Committee was expected to: Generate public debate on the ILR; Facilitate and improve information sharing between civil society and government in general and the government task force responsible for ILR planning; Make available past knowledge and experience, and generate new knowledge about the project through independent studies. The committee was launched on 20th October 2003, eight months after the first dialogue meeting. A small secretariat and modest funding was provided primarily by WWF for effective 3
functioning. The committee comprised 13 members, most of them well known and respected in India: Medha Patkar, Prof. Kanchan Chopra, A.K. Mohile, Dr S.R. Hashim, etc., with Professor Y.K. Alagh as chairman and Dr Ashok Khosla as the executive chairman. It is important to mention here that the members of the committee were intentionally selected for their diversity of views on the ILR. For example some committee members were known to be supportive of large dams in the interest of the nation. Other members were known to oppose dams and had been lead actors in long running people s movements on issues such as the Narmada dam. Therefore the committee was not established of like-minded members with an aim to either oppose or promote the ILR. It was felt that unless the committee included members representing all perspectives, it would not be able to advise the government or inform the nation in a credible way. This is quite a new way of working in civil society. Normally committees are formed by people who oppose such projects in order to be critical. There are such initiatives on ILR as well. The NCSC was particularly established to promote dialogue. Its balanced membership gave it legitimacy, which enabled it to influence the government on the project, for example to convince them to share more information with civil society. The committee has successfully raised public debate on the ILR. It met 14 times, published reports and books, deliberated on key concerns, commissioned studies and invited experts to clarify several issues. Some milestones achieved are: Detailed analysis of the first ILR link, the Ken-Betwa link, has provided a critique of this link, and also set the basis on which other links should be viewed; A detailed deposition for the parliamentary committee examining the ILR. Although the information is confidential, the parliamentary committee expressed some areas of concern upon reading the deposition and called for further detailed analysis by the government; National and local dialogues organised and newspaper articles written to raise public debate on ILR; Revisited existing guidelines on irrigation projects and revised them in the context of present realities; Raised fundamental assumptions on ILR the concepts of surplus and water productivity, the demand, side management, etc. weighing all options before moving ahead; The rivers of the Himalayan region, which involve international issues, hadn t been given priority. Raising issues has now led to a critical examination of the implications of the Himalayan component; Each link in ILR is now being examined on its own merit rather than as a part of the mega project; and A film on ILR was recently completed for the public and policy makers. 3. Lessons learned Organisations working for sustainable development in general and the conservation of biodiversity and natural resources in particular have to rethink their strategy on how to influence development interventions in rapidly developing countries which have clearly demonstrated that they no longer need any kind of assistance from multilateral and bi-lateral institutions. Many large infrastructure projects, which were either on hold or unfeasible because of financial reasons, are now being discussed and have become symbols of national 4
aspirations. Dialogues on these projects with national experts are the only option to convince governments of the need for changes to protect the environment and secure livelihoods; Establishing and supporting dialogues with nationally eminent people who express both pros and cons has proven effective for such negotiations. The committee has earned credibility by maintaining objectivity and focusing on the benefit and costs of ILR; The NCSC, through constant and persistent dialogue with the government at various levels has been successful in convincing the government to rethink its approach to ILR. The independent and credible analysis of one link of the ILR has effectively raised serious issues for the entire project and has convinced the government that this project needs a careful and thorough analysis before the work begins, and in particular on the Himalayan component; They have also made the process more open and transparent by persuading government to release key technical documents for public scrutiny; The NCSC has demonstrated a new method of working. People with different viewpoints can engage and contribute to the process of building more sustainable water resources management. 3.1 Shortcomings Direct dialogue with Government takes longer than expected, and so results can be delayed; It was difficult and often time consuming to reach a consensus within the NCSC amongst different people expressing different opinions; In a country like India, civil society committees are still viewed by the government with certain degree of scepticism; Often civil society groups are expected to automatically oppose such mega projects. When the National Civil Society Committee did not take any open stand on the ILR, it therefore created some confusion. Groups which are traditionally involved in directly confronting mega projects may view such committees as being too soft and compromising. 3.2 Conclusion In the future, governments from major developing countries will become more assertive in launching their pet mega projects. Many of these projects have been conceptualised when sustainable development did not exist as a concept. Dialogue and negotiations with these countries may be the only options for national and international civil society organisations to influence these projects to become more environmentally sound and socially equitable. Future negotiations will have to be based on specific cases with specific solutions. The general stance that dams are bad, diversions will not solve problems, rainwater harvesting is the only solution and ecosystems provide stability to the poor might be correct but will not necessarily dissuade governments from undertaking such large projects. Each project needs to be treated as casespecific, with credible civil society groups comprising people who are also passionately supportive of the project. Such diverse groups, that are beyond the operative control of any one agenda, will have to engage in dialogue with government institutions with an open mind: the dialogues may not guarantee every success but it is the best option in dealing with national governments to effect significant change. For further information: Dr Biksham Gujja, bgujja@wwfint.org. IUCN Water Programme 5 IUCN Water Programme