Full Report of Research Activities and Results Background The project investigated the post-devolution role of political parties, focussed on the Labour party and (to a lesser extent) the Liberal Democrats, within Scotland and Wales and the new British intergovernmental relations (IGR) system. The key research questions have concerned how changes in the territorial structure of government are related to the spatial structure of political parties and how parties do or do not facilitate IGR. The role of the Labour party is of particular significance as it has been in power in Westminster and in Edinburgh and Cardiff since devolution. The project assumed that, although prior to devolution collective responsibility in the UK cabinet limited Scottish and Welsh policy divergence, post-devolution the Labour party has become the mechanism for coordinating public policy across Britain. Thus the project has asked to what extent have inter-governmental relations become intra-party relations. The need, too, for the Scottish and Welsh parties to respond to their own electoral imperatives and specific circumstances could be expected to generate demands from within those parties for greater formal autonomy from the party centrally. The research set out to contribute to the international literature on the role of political parties and IGR. In most federal systems political parties play a significant role in structuring and managing conflict between the central and provincial levels, sometimes over-riding territorial interests and at others transmitting those interests to the centre. In particular, we sought to test out hypotheses about the structure of the Labour party relating to the contrast between oligarchical and pluralist party models, the dynamics of intra-party centre-periphery relations and central-regional relationships Objectives The original objectives of the research are placed in italics. (1) To test out existing theories of the relationship between devolved or federal governmental structures and party organisation, theories relating to UK government and to devolved or federal structures more generally, and develop these theories as necessary. (a) The literatures on the political parties and on federalism and regionalism acknowledge that a major determinant of the spatial distribution of power in a party is the territorial organisation of the state. The research has built on earlier theoretical work on party structures. We used Eldersveld s (1964) stratarchy thesis as developed in the British case by Gyford and James (1983) in contrast to the theories of McKenzie (1963) as a starting-point but it proved less useful as the research progressed. Other approaches drawn upon include the contrast between oligarchical and pluralist models of party organisation (Minkin 1978, Shaw 1994); and more recent hypotheses relating to central-regional political relationships (such as Carty 2004 and Hopkin 2003). (b) The main theoretical approaches to inter-governmental relations tested out were power-dependence (adopted as the framework for a book edited by Alan Tench under preparation to report the main IGR findings of the ESRC programme) and principalagent theory (e.g. Coglianese and Nicolaidis 2001). The findings of this study point to key weaknesses in hypotheses derived from these approaches: (i) actors are not competing for power or resources in the same sphere (i.e. a zero-sum game), (ii) the power asymmetries in the relationship are so considerable that the extent of interdependence is small and (iii) the affiliations to party rather than territorial identities and interests mean that the parties presently over-ride inter-governmental relations.
(2) To evaluate the role of the parties, especially the Labour party, in shaping and managing the new governmental institutions and acting as channels for conflict resolution, policy and political co-ordination across Britain. The project has been able to reach conclusions over the role of the Labour party (and the Liberal Democrats) as a force in shaping these institutions, limiting conflict and as a mostly informal IGR channel. It has shown how Labour party hegemony across Britain has limited the use and demands placed on the formal IGR systems and how Britainwide the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties have coped with the new political landscape. (3) To investigate the new pressures leading towards more devolved, even federated political parties, particularly towards the emergence of new party policy making structures and capacities in Scotland and Wales, and then consider the implications for these structures at a UK level. The research has identified the pressures on the Scottish and Welsh Labour parties arising from the new party systems in the two nations and how those parties have responded organisationally and in terms of electoral strategy. The changes within the Scottish and Welsh parties have been conceptualised as a transition from a centralised, single elite dominated one-partyist party to a less centralised, party with competing elites or power centres. The strengthened parties in Scotland and Wales have had limited implications for the Britain-wide organisation of the British Labour party as yet no powerful demands for greater intra-party devolution have arisen despite public perceptions of a greater separation, particularly over policy positions. The British Labour party remains a unitary party with few organisational concessions made to the existence of the two devolved administrations. However, our analysis of the dynamics of devolution suggests that, over time, the organisational status quo will not be sustainable. (4) To draw conclusions over how intergovernmental relations could be structured across the UK in future, both formally and informally, especially in the light of the possible further regionalisation of England. The findings underscore how the dominance of the Labour party at both levels of government (plus a favourable public expenditure regime) has been crucial in creating what are largely harmonious relationships across Britain with very few instances of tension. If different political parties came to power at the two levels, then, relationships could become less harmonious, especially if a party came to power in Westminster committed to reducing public expenditure and a greater element of user-pays into public services. Under these circumstances, serious questions must be raised over how robust the existing machinery for resolving inter-governmental conflicts would prove. In some of our publications we have raised the issue of whether there should be UK-wide national policy frameworks within which significant policy changes could be negotiated. This issue raises further questions if English regional devolution takes place given the greater likelihood of Conservative control over regionally devolved bodies. Future questions of Labour party governance also arise in particular how sustainable is the combination of a unitary party with even a semi-federalised governmental system? International comparisons indicate that sub-nation state political party branches, in federal or regionalised countries, are very seldom as dependent for their finances and official appointments on the central or federal party as are the Scottish and Welsh parties. Although presently demands for greater branch autonomy are muted, as the devolved arrangements settle down the Labour party may find that it has
to accommodate such demands, especially as English regionalism could also add to these pressures. As yet interviews conducted with Labour party figures in North East England indicate that such demands are some way off and are seen as hypothetical. Methods The research methods used were documentary analysis, interviews and participant observation (mainly attending Labour party conferences and other meetings). Documentary analysis involved newspaper reports, Assembly minutes and reports, and internal party papers; and the quarterly annual monitoring reports coordinated by the Constitution Unit. Over 80 interviews were held with Labour and Liberal Democrat party officials, AMs, MSPs, MPs and political advisers. Access was good on the whole with no problems in interviewing Welsh ministers, backbench MPs MSPs & AMs, Labour party and Liberal Democrat officials in Scotland, Wales and London. We experienced difficulties in arranging interviews with Labour and Liberal Democrat Scottish ministers in the autumn of 2003 and some difficulties in interviewing UK cabinet ministers, even two ex-ministers (Stephen Byers and Alan Milburn) declined an invitation. However, we were able to talk informally to two ministers (one of Cabinet standing) and interview Estelle Morris (interviewed between ministerial postings). These difficulties, in part at least, reflected a sense among those approached that Scottish and Welsh devolution had little relevance to them, for example Estelle Morris began her interview by wondering what she could contribute to the project (but them talked for over an hour on the issue!). Laffin and Thomas also devoted significant time to an overlapping project on the Future Options for the Assembly with another Glamorgan colleague, Dr Ian Thomas. This project made a useful contribution to the party project by providing an analysis of the policy intentions (both achieved and frustrated by various factors) of the present Assembly government, thus providing a wealth of specific policy material for the party project. The project also enabled us to draw on our longstanding links with Assembly civil servants who have often filled us in on the background to IGR policy negotiations. It is worth noting that civil service interviews can be very valuable in a study such as this, despite its focus on political parties, and also that those interviews are most productive where there is a pre-existing relationship of trust. Results These five points seek to answer the research questions posed in the original proposal (pp. 18-19). 1. The Labour party organisationally remains a unitary party despite governmental devolution. The territorial devolution of state power has not led to a formal devolution of power within the Labour party. Post-devolution the Scottish and Welsh Labour parties still have the same status as the English regional branches within the national party, both are dependent on London financially and for personnel appointments. An important question posed in the original proposal was whether the retention of unitary national party structures compromised semi-federalisation or devolution. A unitary party machine is likely to form an extra-governmental means for federal control of devolved governments: any powerful party organisational and moral pressures on devolved branches of the dominant party to adhere to national party policies are likely to compromise the aims of devolution. Yet, ultimately to succeed politically in the devolved territories the parties have to compete in subnational party systems, drive policy
relevant to the specific circumstances of the territory, provide policy platforms for their ministers, platforms which are not simply derivative of national party platforms. Despite being the party of devolution, the Labour party itself has not embraced devolution in formal, constitutional terms. Centrally the party s response to devolution has been ad hoc and piecemeal. The research does not support the sweeping controlfreak thesis advanced by thesis advanced by some commentators on central-periphery relations in the Labour party, particularly in the early days of devolution. Yet neither is there much evidence of a strategic, post-devolution rethinking of the party s institutional machinery. Only during 2003 did the NEC begin formally to incorporate some limited report back from Scotland and Wales. It has not gone further in taking on issues of territorial management, but has remained dominated by issues of party management, finance, campaigning and party-unions relations. It has long ceased to be recognised as the pivotal institution it once was during earlier Labour governments. It has not been involved in any of the inter-governmental relations issues between London and Edinburgh or Cardiff, let alone become an instrument for exercising party discipline over the Scottish and Welsh parties. Rather the NEC has become primarily a negotiating platform between the trade unions and government, with the constituency representatives acting, to some extent at least, as outsiders in the negotiation of issues on their own executive body. In contrast, the National Policy Forums are organised on a territorial basis. Most notably, devolved policy has in practice been completely farmed out to the Scottish and Welsh Policy Forums and their relevant national conferences. Thus the policy forums reflect, what seems to be at least, a tacit acknowledgement of the policy logic of Scottish and Welsh governmental devolution. The party elites, at both levels of government, are able to and do ignore the deliberations of the NPF and the Welsh and Scottish Policy Forums, much as they were the old policy-making system through party conference. The forums are restricted to overall policy direction, but the handling of dayto-day policy in government is the preserve of ministers. Moreover, many recent New Labour ideas and initiatives like foundation hospitals and higher education top-up fees have their origins outside the policy forums. Our findings do not substantiate the claim that candidate and leadership selection in Scotland and Wales has been under tight central party control. Our findings indicate that these selection processes should be understood in the context of an evolving Scottish and Welsh politics rather than that of an assumed over-weaning centre. In Scotland, for example, we have solid evidence that Donald Dewar played a key role in the initial candidate selection process, working more or less in conjuncture with the party centre. The two subsequent leadership contests took place with no direct attempts from those at the centre to shape the outcome. Similarly, in Wales the leadership selection contest was engineered by a tacit alliance between members of the Welsh Executive and the centre. The subsequent leadership contests, in both Scotland and Wales, took place with no direct attempts from those at the centre to shape the outcome. We would add that the case of Ken Livingstone is a contrasting not a similar case, as much more is at stake for the centre in London electorally and psychologically than in Scotland or Wales. Why has a very centralist government (which continues to control tightly local government in England) apparently interfered so seldom in the devolved administrations? Firstly, the asymmetrical nature of the present UK devolution settlement means that Scotland and Wales are marginal from the viewpoint of central strategists within the party they represent less than 15 per cent of the UK population and contain few marginal constituencies for whom middle England remains the major electoral challenge. Secondly, at least in some policy areas, those at the centre have
recognised advantages in distancing themselves from the actions of the devolved administrations (a good example is over the perceived difficulties of the health service in Wales). Thirdly, the Scottish and Welsh administrations have not strayed far from central Labour party policy. However, in one instance of serious policy divergence, over the Scottish Executive s implementation of universal free personal care for the elderly, our research has unearthed intense criticism (in private and in press briefings) from Westminster partly over the then First Minister, Henry McLeish, failure to consult the centre. Some commentators have argued that there is a significant ideological, right-left difference between Blairite and the Scottish/Welsh Labour ruling elites, illustrated by the latter s rejection of market-driven solutions (such as foundation hospitals) and stress on issues of social justice and equality. Our view is that the Scottish and Welsh Labour elites policy or ideological position is best understood within the political and public policy ecology of their two nations. Firstly, inter-party competitive electoral pressures pull Welsh and Scottish Labour to the left rather than to the right (as in England), in both nations the main electoral threat is from the nationalist parties who occupy very similar social democratic ground to that of Labour. Secondly, the two nations historical legacy has left them dominated by public sector institutions. Consequently, the dominant policy bias has been towards direct public service provision rather than towards policies to marketise the public sector. At the same time producer interests, especially in the professions, play a very significant role in policy making not least as there are fewer countervailing organised interests and thinktanks in Edinburgh and Cardiff compared to London. In contrast, the UK central government has challenged producerist interests and promoted market-based policies; notably, many Welsh MPs were critical of what they saw as the excessive influence of producerist interests over the Assembly. 2. Both the Welsh and Scottish Labour parties enjoy more extensive policy development freedom than originally anticipated and there is little evidence of strong pressures within the two parties for greater formal autonomy. The policy development process in the two Labour Party branches, leading to the manifestos for the 2003 Elections, proceeded with no direct interference (as far as we have been able to ascertain) from the Party centrally. Similarly, central interest in candidate selection this time round has been low, but most seats already have incumbents. These points question any simple centralist, control-freak, thesis understanding of central-regional relationships within the Party. Although the British Labour party itself remains undevolved, both Scottish and Welsh Labour parties have undergone significant organisational and cultural change. They have moved from being traditional, centralised parties with a single hierarchical organisation focused on a dominant centre, an elitist or one-partyist party (McAllister 1981), to pluralist parties with less hierarchical organisations and competing centres of power. Devolution could have just embedded traditional style political elites in Scotland and Wales. However, the proportional representation electoral system has ensured that Labour would not become the perpetual government of Scotland and Wales. Secondly, centrally-driven organisational changes (unrelated to devolution) within the party have had a significant impact in reducing the influence of activists vis-à-vis ordinary party members. Not least this has widened the recruitment pool for candidates and contributed (especially with twinning) to the forcing of a generational shift in Scottish and Welsh politicians, resulting in a Parliament and Assembly with gender-balanced, relatively youthful Labour groups of members less dependent on party patronage and with professional political outlooks.
These reformed Scottish and Welsh parties are characterised by more pluralist power configurations compared with their traditional elitist configurations. Yet strong pressures have not arisen within the Scottish and Welsh parties for a federalisation of the British Labour party. The current Scottish and Welsh leaderships are not inconvenienced by the existing structures, hence the absence of political pressure to loosen the ties with the British party. In any case, they are absorbed in the challenges of government involved in bedding in devolution. The Scottish and Welsh Labour elites, too, retain a strong sense of common party identity across their respective borders with their English comrades which has not, at least as yet, been undermined by nationalist attachments. The Scottish and Welsh parties, too, have acquired new institutions creating a pluralist spread of rights and responsibilities. But formal pluralism has coincided with ministerial dominion in policy-making. In neither Cardiff nor Edinburgh have Labour ministers encountered major problems in securing acceptance of their policy agenda within their parties, with the noteworthy exception of PFI in Scotland where concessions have been made to the unions over employment rights. The unions are also more important actors in Scottish and Welsh Labour than in national Labour and both administrations have proved more willing to accommodate union pressure than their national counterpart. The Parliamentary and Assembly control over policy reflects a high degree of elite consensus over major policy issues in all the key institutions of their parties and the absence of the conflicts which have, in the past at the British level, characterised relations between (Westminster) parliamentarians and the wider party. In any case the left-right cleavage has declined in importance, especially in Scotland where that cleavage long defined the internal politics of the party. Similarly the constituency parties have largely ceased to be vehicles for ideological struggle, though this may well reflect the serious diminution of grassroots activism characteristic of the party across Britain. The Assembly and Parliament are also characterised by more relaxed and more consensual systems of party discipline compared with Westminster. Party discipline in these two, small, legislatures rests as much on personal contact than as on formal systems. Finally, the Welsh and Scottish Parliamentary Labour Parties have faced difficulties in defining a post-devolution role for themselves: are they there to scrutinise their respective devolved administrations or are they there to lobby for (what they see as) Welsh or Scottish interests? In both cases sustainable working relationship have yet to be created between the territorial PLPs and the respective Labour groups in the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly. This has been most apparent in Wales where Labour MPs have been openly critical of Assembly performance in such areas as health policy and support for PFI initiatives. Our research found that relations between the two tend to be poor, marred by competition over political coverage and by resentment amongst MPs over lost status and influence. So far, Labour has signally failed to establish adequate consultative mechanisms or to establish machinery where Scottish and Welsh interests which might be adversely affected by Westminster legislative proposals can be taken into account before those proposals take definitive form, a notable instance was the Higher Education White Paper about which the devolved administrations were only belatedly informed. 3. The importance of the Liberal Democrats in the two coalitions in driving policy divergence. The Liberal Democratic party is of particular interest because it has played an important policy role as a member of the coalition in Scotland (both after 1999 and 2003 elections) and Wales (until 2003), and because, in contrast to the Labour party, it has a federal constitution. As a condition of coalition the party has been able to achieve important
parts of its policy agenda in Scotland and Wales such as student maintenance grants, free prescriptions and free social care for the elderly, some of which have been a source of tension with central government. The electoral systems in Wales and Scotland have given them an entry to government, while the party s growing electoral strength is actually in England (especially in local government). The party is federal in theory but the reality often reflects an asymmetrical practice. Those in the Scottish and Welsh parties have raised questions about a federal constitution which still permits confusion between the English and the federal party not least over the jurisdiction of the national conference. Moreover, the Liberal Democrats in both coalitions have pursued very similar policies, notably the Welsh Partnership Agreement was modelled on the Scottish Partnership Agreement. There are also indications of de facto English domination, especially from a Welsh point of view, given the limited capacity of the Scottish and Welsh branches to develop their own policy and consequent reliance on Liberal Democrat headquarters and the de facto English domination of federal policy making bodies such as Conference and the Federal Policy Committee. 4. The Labour party is much less important as an active IGR channel than we had anticipated in the original proposal. Our findings confirmed our original assumption that the formal IGR mechanisms (the Joint Ministerial Committee and concordats) are of limited significance but neither have we found formal organisational Labour party channels to be of significance. However the norms of party solidarity (common Labour party membership and identity) were stressed by actors at both levels. These norms clearly did ease relationships between ministers at the two levels of government and encouraged cooperative behaviour, not least in the run-up to the 2001 General Election and the 2003 Scottish and Welsh elections. We also explored the changing role of the territorial secretary of state as party fixer or broker between the party regionally and centrally. We found that this role had diminished, even before central government made it a part-time role, as devolution settled down and Scottish and Welsh ministers developed their own direct links with their Westminster counterparts (but in Wales the Welsh Secretary retains an important role in negotiating legislative time for Welsh primary legislation). However, (at least in Wales) ministers and civil servants reported that the frequency of contact at ministerial level was significantly lower than they had anticipated, although the extent and frequency of contact varied (e.g. agricultural ministers met formally every quarter, whereas education ministers met on an less frequent, more ad hoc basis). The main reason for this limited contact is that both sides did not see the need for extensive contact ministers in the two devolved administrations found themselves absorbed by issues of service delivery rather than new legislation. Our forthcoming book chapter on IGR explores some of the theoretical ideas on IGR such as power dependence mentioned above. In particular we point to how the very asymmetrical relationships, in which the strong centre dominates leaving Scotland and Wales (particularly given its limited powers) as petitioners rather than equal partners; how the centre and periphery are competing for power or resources in the same sphere (i.e. contemporary UK IGR do not resemble a zero-sum game) and the continuing uncertainties surrounding the extent of the zone of toleration at the centre of what divergence they are willing to tolerate in Scotland and Wales; and the Scottish and Welsh political elites over-riding affiliations are to political party identity rather than territorial identities and interests, and how they expect to adhere to national party policy and to sort out their differences with the centre through party channels
However centre-periphery relations might be reshaped if Labour were to be in government in Cardiff and Edinburgh with all the advantages that access to governmental resources and prestige affords but in opposition in London. In future, especially if a right wing Conservative party won power in Westminster, this left-right difference between the two nations and England is likely to be much more significant and may be reinforced by nationalism (especially if the centre is seen to impose unpopular policies on the two nations). Equally, the potential exists for the two Labour party branches especially the Scottish to adopt a more left-inclined political trajectory than in England, because the gravitational pull of party competition is much more to the left, the more proportional electoral system values all votes more or less equally rather than privileging the floater and both share a more deeply rooted social democratic tradition and interests than England. Hence it may well be that in the future the Labour party s own constitutional and political settlement will come under increasing strain. This is a major area for future research. 5. Lateral liaison and contact through party channels between Scotland and Wales was very limited. The research set out to establish the level and quality of lateral contacts between Scottish and Welsh politicians. For the Labour party our findings confirm our original hypothesis that the severe asymmetries in UK devolution and geographical differences, between Scotland and Wales, would limit the significance of lateral relationships: contact at ministerial level is limited and almost non-existent at the lateral level (as opposed to the vertical level) of Labour party organisation. The IGR contacts which do exist are organised on the basis of administrative, rather than party political, engagement. In contrast, this hypothesis does not hold up in the case of the Liberal Democrats. There has been considerable lateral contact between the Welsh and the Scottish parties, especially over the conditions for coalition. The reasons for this contact are the very limited resources for policy development available to the Liberal Democrats in Scotland and (especially) Wales and the recognition within a party, which has been out of power for almost eighty years, of the need to maximise the opportunities presented by devolution. Activities Laffin gave evidence, by invitation, to the Richard Commission which is reviewing the powers and electoral basis of the National Assembly for Wales. He also presented a paper to the ESRC-Commission Seminar in Aberyswyth, October 2002. Laffin, Alys Thomas submitted a research report to the Commission in February 2003, published as Future Options: An Assessment of the Powers of the National Assembly for Wales (Glamorgan Policy Centre, March 2003 ISBN 1-840540-88-5). Copies of this report were sent to all AMs, most Welsh MPs, the Welsh Secretary, and the Assembly Permanent Secretary and other senior civil servants. Outputs The project has generated two published or about to be published articles in referred journals, six conference papers, two book chapters, four contributions to the Welsh Annual Monitoring Reports and four contributions to non-referred journals (Planet and Agenda). The key academic findings from the project will be contained in the following four main, comparative papers (drafts of the first two are attached to this report) (three papers will be submitted to major journals over the next few months): Devolution and Party Organisation in Britain: How Devolution has changed the Scottish and Welsh
Labour Parties, British Devolution and the Labour Party: How a Unitary Party Adapts to Devolution, The Political Parties and Inter-governmental Relations (a book chapter) and (provisional title) The British Liberal Democrats and Devolution: A Force for Policy Convergence? Impacts The main example is Laffin s involvement with the Richard Commission mentioned above. However a range of actors, including party officials in Scotland and Wales, MPs, MSPs, and AMs have shown interest in the research and have been or will be shortly circulated with copies of relevant papers. Given the early stage of devolution and the still fluid nature of the relations between the party at the centre and the periphery we anticipate that our findings will have some influence on future organisational change. Future Research Priorities 1. The Liberal Democrats have been little studied but they have come to play an important role in Scottish and Welsh politics, and in English local government. There is scope for work on how they develop policy (paradoxically, the party does not seem to have an ideology yet as this research indicates there are considerable programmatic commonalities across the British party) and the nature of the party organisation. 2. The Conservative party was not included in this study as it was, and still is, very unlikely to achieve power in Scotland or Wales in the foreseeable future. The party in Scotland and Wales is debating the need to distinguish itself from English Conservatives (who lean significantly to the right of Scottish and Welsh politics) if they are to compete effectively with the other parties in those two nations. Consequently, research on these issues could shed light on how a territorial reorganisation of government can produce significant changes in the spatial organisation of political parties. 3. The future of the Labour party. Inevitably our study is limited to the early years of devolution and, as we point out, some of the reasons for good intra-party relationships will evaporate over time and we might expect more powerful pressures for greater intraparty devolution to emerge. We would therefore emphasise the importance of further research in the future. Bibliography Carty, R. K., Parties as Franchise Systems: The Stratarchical Organizational Imperative Party Politics 10 (1) 2004. Coglianese, C. and K Nicolaidis, Securing Subsidiarity, in K. Nicolaides and R. Howse, The Federal Vision (OUP: Oxford). Eldersveld, S. (1964) Political Parties: A Behavioural Analysis (Rand McNally and Co.: Chicago). Gyford, J. and M. James (1983) National Parties and Local Politics (George Allen & Unwin: London). Hopkin, J. (2003), Political Decentralization, Electoral Change Party Organizational Adaptation, European Urban and Regional Studies, 10, 3, pp. 227-237.
McAllister, I.(1981), The Labour Party in Wales: The Dynamics of One-Partyism, Llafur: The Journal of Welsh Labour History Vol. 3, no. 2, Spring. McKenzie, R (1963), British Political Parties: the Distribution of Power within the Conservative and Labour Parties (Heinemann: London). Minkin, L. (1978), The Labour Party Conference (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Shaw, E. (1988), Discipline and Discord in the Labour Party (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Shaw, E. 2002, New Labour - New Democratic Centralism? West European Politics Vol. 25 No. 3.