Political Culture in and Germany Jürgen Maier Bamberger Beiträge zur Politikwissenschaft Forschungsschwerpunkt Politische Einstellungen und Verhalten Nr. II-14, 2003
1. Historical and Political Background 1.1. Political History of the Twentieth Century The German political history of the last one hundred years consists of a wide range of important events. But politics in present Germany and the current standing of Germany in the world can predominantly be traced back to only a handful of these main incidents: First, the German defeat in World War I which lead to the replacement of monarchy by the first democratic system. As one consequence of the lost war, Germany was faced by major economic problems. In combination with an insufficient constitution and lack of democratic political culture, the young democracy could not stand against the Nazi movement and thus was replaced by dictatorship after only 14 years of existence. In 1945, after twelve years of the Third Reich, Germany lost a world war again. But because of the recurring aggression of Germany, the horror of Holocaust and the emerging confrontation between the USA and the USSR, the consequences of this defeat were much harder than in 1918: Germany lost big parts of its territory to Poland, the USSR and France; millions of Germans were expelled from these areas. In addition, Germany was divided into two parts. While the ern part of the country, occupied by the Soviet Union, transformed into the socialist German Democratic Republic (GDR) and thus continued dictatorship under different circumstances, the ern part of Germany established a new democracy and became the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (the most recent analysis of German political history is provided by Kielmansegg 2000). The political systems of and Germany both founded in 1949 were characterized by a number of important keystones (for a short introduction see, e.g., Hesse/Ellwein 1997; Rudzio 2000). First of all, the FRG had a strong commitment to North America, especially the USA, and ern European countries. This commitment was on the one hand covered by the NATO membership. On the other hand, Germany, as one of the co-founders of the EEC (which is now known as European Union), was actively engaged in the process of European integration. But the orientation of Germany towards the ern countries was more than a simple achievement of military security: it was a decision for a specific cultural and economic way of life. In contrast to this, the GDR as a satellite state of the USSR was integrated into the communist defense alliance, the Warsaw Pact. Second, while the German economy followed the concept of the free market with a strong social component, Germany adapted the concept of a planned economy. Third, Germany had always pursued the reunification as a constitutional goal. Of course, for the building of the Berlin Wall, this goal seemed not very realistic until 1989. Thus, German politics faced reality and cooperated with the GDR in order to strengthen the German domestic relationships. Germany tried to become a recognized state and thus had no interest in a reunification. But because of major economic problems, the GDR was forced to cooperate with Germany, too. 1
As a consequence of Gorbatschow politics of Glasnost and Perestrojka, the ties between the Warsaw Pact states were breaking up. In combination with the still noticeable world economic crisis of the 1970s and inflexible political structures of the so called real existing socialism which were not able to react adequately to this crisis, the GDR collapsed in fall of 1989 together with other European communist countries. In the spring of 1990, the first free elections since 1946 were held in the GDR and the Alliance for Germany, an amalgamation of a few political parties led by the CDU, clearly won. This result was not simply an electoral victory of the conservatives and thus a plebiscite for democracy and reunification and against a specific German way but also a decision for a fast reunification process (for an analysis of the 1990 Volkskammer election see, e.g., Jung 1990). After successful negotiations with the four winners of World War II and between the FRG and the GDR about the implementation of a monetary union as well as the adjustment of the economic, social and political systems, the reunification was carried out in October 1990 and was legitimized by the first all-german elections in December 1990. From a legal point of view, the reunification was not a fusion between the two German countries. The GDR became a member of the FRG. Thus, it is not surprising that after October 1990, Germany as a whole looks much more like the former FRG than like the former GDR: Germany is still a member of the NATO and the European Union and therefore has a strong orientation toward ern Europe and North America. The German economy still works after the principles of the free market with a strong social component. Up to the introduction of the EURO, the German currency was the D-Mark. The social system as well as the construction of the administration and the system of jurisdiction remained almost unchanged compared to the German model. 1 Apart from the named policy areas, German structures have also succeeded in almost every other field of society. Maybe the two most important examples are the party system and the system of institutions dealing with the representation of interests. In both cases, German organizations expanded into Germany and integrated existing parties and associations. Integration the other way around, i.e. integration of German organizations into German structures, did not occur. Only few German organizations not unified in this way were able to survive (e.g. the PDS, the successor party of the SED). The transfer of political, social and economic institutions was not only supported by a huge transfer of financial resources but was also accompanied by the transfer of staff. Germans sent to Germany took over leading positions in the economy, in politics and administration. On the contrary, activists of the peaceful revolution usually did not get into higher positions on national, state or local levels due to their lack of competence. To make things worse, in some cases the old 1 The arrangements of the unification process were basically fixed in two contracts: The contract on the currency, the economic and the social union ( Vertrag über die Schaffung einer Währungs-, Wirtschaftsund Sozialunion ) signed in May 1990, and the unification contract ( Einheitsvertrag ) signed in August 1990. 2
GDR elites were able to stay or get back quickly into leading positions. They used their power to provide jobs for former members of the SED and the state security service ( Stasi ). As a consequence of this system of roped parties, new elites were kept away from power, too. It is easy to imagine that the colonialization (Dümcke/Vilmar 1995) of the GDR as some critics call the farreaching institutional and personnel transfer to Germany had and still has an impact on attitudes of Germans toward the German unification, their retrospective views on the GDR, and their political behavior. 2 1.2. Recent Executive Turnovers and Legislative Records The first all-german federal election ended as the surprising results of the local, state and national elections in the GDR in 1990 had indicated: the governing coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP, conducted by chancellor Helmut Kohl since 1982, clearly won the elections (for results see table 1). The SPD was heavily defeated and achieved the worst result since 1957. Die Grünen in Germany failed to cross the Five per cent-hurdle 3, while the alliance of Die Grünen and Bündnis 90 in Germany with clearly more than 5 per cent received parliamentary seats. 4 The PDS passed this criterion in Germany, too (for a detailed analysis of the 1990 election see, e.g., Gibowski/Kaase 1991; Klingemann/Kaase 1994). - table 1 about here - Four years later, CDU/CSU and FDP won the national election for the fourth time in a row. But in contrast to 1990, the coalition was only a little ahead of the opposing parties SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and PDS. The individual results of each party show that CDU/CSU sustained minor losses, while the FDP suffered heavy losses. The SPD had somewhat improved its 1990 result. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen clearly crossed the Five per cent-hurdle. The PDS did not pass this criterion but received parliamentary seats by winning four constituencies. The most astonishing result of the 1994 election was the - differences. CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen received much better results in the old Bundesländer. In contrast, the PDS won almost all votes in the five German new Bundesländer (for a detailed analysis of the 1994 election see, e.g., Jung/Roth 1994; Kaase/Klingemann 1998). 2 3 4 The data analyses in the following chapters have to take this into account. Consequently, the analyses will be almost always split into and Germany. According to German electoral law, parties with less than five per cent of the casted and valid so-called second votes do not receive parliamentary seats. The only exception which breaks this rule would be to win three constituencies (for the German electoral system see, e.g., Nohlen 2000). Due to the judgement of the Federal Constitutional Court, for the first all-german election Germany was split into two independent election areas following the borders of the former FRG and GDR. 3
In 1998, the Germans wrote election history. For the very first time, the incumbent chancellor was defeated by his challenger: after 16 years, Helmut Kohl had to leave office; a coalition of SPD and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen represented the federal government. The CDU/CSU lost more than six per centage points and achieved the worst result since 1949. The SPD on the other hand improved slightly and for the second time after 1972 became the strongest party. While the FDP which had to leave government after 29 years and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen came to somewhat weaker results than in 1994, the PDS crossed the Five per cent-hurdle for the first time and thus had no longer to rely on winning at least three constituencies. Finally, the sharp differences between the electoral successes of the parties in and Germany as observed in 1994 increased in 1998 (for a detailed analysis of the 1998 election see, e.g., Klingemann/Kaase 2001). In 2002, SPD and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen were able to defend a small majority. While the SPD lost somewhat more than two per centage points, the CDU/CSU, the FDP and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen improved their 1998 result. The PDS also lost votes and failed to cross the Five per cent-hurdle. Because they won only two constituencies, the post communists therefore are only represented with two seats in the actual German Bundestag. While the strong - differences between the electoral successes of the CDU/CSU, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and the PDS occur again, the SPD and the FDP were able to receive in both parts of the country about the same portions of votes. In the case of the social democrats, it is interesting to note that for the very first time their German result was somewhat better than the German result. Between 1990 and 1998 1.072 legislative records passed the national parliament, the Bundestag (see Schindler 1999a, 1999b). 5 About 70 per cent of these records were introduced by the government, about 20 per cent were suggested by the parliament, and about five per cent of the initiatives were taken by the Bundesrat, the second parliamentary chamber representing the 16 German states. 6 Between 1990 and 1994, 27 per cent of the legislative records forced by the government fell into the resorts Economy and Finances, followed by legislative records introduced by the Ministry of Law (15 per cent), legislative records out of the policy complex work and social affairs, youth, family, education and research (14 per cent), legislative records suggested by the Ministry of Mail and Transportation, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Environmental Affairs and Agriculture (eleven per cent each) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (nine per cent). 7 Of course, most of the passed records (about 75 to 90 per cent) were only of secondary importance. Only about five per cent of the records were essential records, another 10 to 20 per cent could be described as important. In addition to this, one fifth of all passed records dealing with the different questions of interior politics were adjustments to European standards as required by the European Union. 5 6 7 In addition, between 1990 and 1998 ten records to change or extend the constitution were formulated. All other legislative records were joint initiatives of at least two of these institutions. In addition, each one per cent of the legislative records introduced by the government cover questions of national defense as well as building and construction. 4
Some of the records and changes of the constitution that passed the legislative institutions since 1990 covered highly controversial questions. On the wide field of interior politics these questions were, e.g., the move of the capitol from Bonn to Berlin, how to handle crime against citizens accepted and forced by the government of the GDR (e.g. the Stasi issue), how to reform the social security system, how to control immigration, and how to use environmental resources. In the field of economy, a lot of the records tried to fight the rising unemployment and to give the reconstruction of Germany a significant impetus. In addition, to reduce the federal debts and to approximate a balanced budget were important topics of legislative records during the last decade. Of course, attempts to reform the tax system were always strongly connected to these topics. Important records concerning the field of foreign affairs focused on the future of the Bundeswehr, the question under which conditions out-of-area missions of the military would be acceptable, and the achievement of a further integration of Europe (e.g. the introduction of the single European market, the replacement of the national currency by the EURO or the enlargement of the European Union). 1.3. Economic Profiles After World War II, Germany was militarily defeated, politically broken and divided into two occupation zones. The Germans had lost their national self-assurance; and with the foundation of the two German countries they finally lost every national symbol to identify with. In this situation, the rapid development of the destroyed economy was of great importance for Germany. Even if initially facilitated by financial support of the ern allies, the economic miracle was something the Germans could be proud of. In addition, the prospering economy stabilized the new political system. But the first postwar economic crisis at the end of the 1960s and the electoral success of the right wing NPD raised the question whether the FRG was only a fine weather democracy. While the right wing party disappeared, the economic problems remained: the oil shock of the early 1970s made clear that in addition to the high dependency of the German economy on export trade the supply of energy also depended on other countries. In the late 1970s, unemployment became a major problem. Up to now, unemployment has more or less increased continuously. In 1997, the number of people without work crossed the limit of three million (see figure 1). - figure 1 about here - One important factor causing these economic problems is the change of the socio-economic structures in Germany as it appears in other modern economies, too. While industrialization in the 19 th century replaced agrarian structures, today the industrial society is challenged by a postindustrial society characterized by a high level of service orientation. According to these general shifts in the 5
economic structure of modern societies, in contemporary ern Germany the primary sector has almost disappeared (see figure 2). The secondary sector was growing until the 1970s but declined during the following decades. At the expense of the first two sectors, the tertiary sector is still growing today. - figure 2 about here - This process also works in the new Bundesländer. But because the GDR failed to adapt its economy from industrial to postindustrial standards (the socio-economic structure of the GDR in 1990 was like the socio-economic structure of the FRG in 1965, see Geißler 1992: 117), this process is much more painful: as a consequence of the attempts to restructure the German economy, its competitiveness decreased due to low levels of productivity and exploding wages. Additionally, because of the breakdown of the European markets the traditional European trading partners disappeared. Both developments taken together, it is not surprising that high unemployment was the result. In the first year after reunification, about one million unemployed persons were registered (see figure 1). During the following years, this number has further increased. Even if the situation in Germany is not as bad as in other European countries 8, thinking, e.g., of the famous metaphor of the blooming landscapes used by ex-chancellor Kohl, the current situation differs significantly from the expectations of how the economy was supposed to develop during the last decade. This discrepancy, of course, has a major impact on the attitudes of Germans towards the German political system, its main actors, and its central institutions. 1.4. Political Culture as Stylized in the Literature The German political culture has significantly shifted since 1945. In the early years of the FRG, Almond/Verba (1965) still drew a skeptical picture. In their study of political culture in five nations, they noticed a passive subject orientation for Germany in 1959 (Almond/Verba 1965: 362) which was predominantly characterized by a lack of commitment to the political system that is relatively independent of system output (Almond/Verba 1965: 364). Almond/Verba (1965: 364) missed the underlying set of political attitudes that would regulate the operation of these [formal political] institutions [of democracy] in a democratic direction. In addition, they feared that the stability of the system may be in doubt if the level of output becomes less satisfactory (Almond/Verba 1965: 364). And indeed: up to the mid 1960s, only about one third of the Germans showed interest in politics. Participation beside elections, e.g. engagement in the work of political parties, was very 8 This is, of course, at least partly a result of the massive transfer of financial ressources from to Germany. Only between mid 1990 and 1994, the financial transfers to Germany covered in total more than 800 billion deutschmarks. About 75 per cent of this sum were provided by public budgets (see Klinger 1995: 179). 6
low. Moreover, the affective distance to politics and its main actors was quite in the tradition of the German empire and the Weimar Republic where politics meant continual disputes and violence still big. To make things worse, up to the end of the 1950s only a minority felt that things were going best for Germany with the present democratic system. However, the majority was in favor of the authoritarian and totalitarian political systems of the past (for a compilation of public opinion polls about politics and other topics of the early years of the FRG see Noelle/Neumann 1981; Noelle-Neumann 1981; Merritt/Merritt 1970, 1980). In the late 1960s, the German political culture changed significantly. Stimulated by the student unrests of 1968, a broad public discussion about the democratic deficits and the authoritarian structure of the German society took place. Encouraged by the shift of cognitive resources due to the expansion of education, these disturbances lead to a higher political involvement: the interest in politics as well as the discussion about politics increased. In addition, the Germans now made use of institutionalized forms of participation more frequently, i.e. participation in elections, participation in political parties and engagement in political interest groups. Finally, unconventional forms of participation, e.g. demonstrations and the amalgamation of citizens in initiative groups, became very popular. Especially citizens who received their political socialization after World War II showed a high level of acceptance of democratic values, structures, and processes (Conradt 1980). But the older generations had developed a positive attitude toward diffuse aspects of the political system during the three past decades, too. Conradt (1980) explained the attitude change of these age cohorts as a consequence of the convincing performance of the political system. Thus, Conradt (1986: 80-81) concluded for the early 1980s that Bonn, in contrast to Weimar, is not a Republic without republicans. Since then, Germany has been regarded as an established democracy (Edinger 1970) especially if compared to other European countries (see, e.g., Gabriel 1992). With the German reunification, about 17 million Germans relatively inexperienced in questions of democracy joined the FRG. In addition, after 40 years of GDR dictatorship and twelve years of Nazi dictatorship it was not clear which set of political attitudes toward the new political system the Germans would have. The first studies to answer this question concentrated on attitudes towards democracy. They showed that already in 1990 there was a surprisingly high level of support for democracy as a model of political order (see, e.g. Gabriel 2000: 45). But in contrast to this, the current condition of democracy was and still is an object of criticism. Survey data usually show that more than 50 per cent of the Germans are permanently not satisfied with the way democracy works (see, e.g., Maier 2000: 167). Thus, Gabriel (2000: 46) concludes that criticizing the German model of democracy is a solid part of the political culture in Germany. While the reasons for the early attachment of Germans to the principles of democracy are still not identified (Dalton 1994; Rohrschneider 1999), the reasons for the big distance to the German democracy is seen as a result of the persisting impact of a different political socialization (le 1994) as 7
well as the result of a disappointing economic performance and the resulting differences of individual circumstances (see, e.g., Neller 2000; Walz/Brunner 1997). As a consequence of the dissatisfaction with democracy, the political institutions and the main political actors of the collapsed GDR are highly esteemed and receive some sort of nostalgia. Thus, about 70 to 80 per cent of the Germans think that socialism is a good idea that has only poorly been carried out up to now. In addition, about 40 per cent say that the GDR had more good than bad sides to it (see, e.g., Neller 2000). Even if the differences in other fields of political culture are of gradual rather than categorical nature and continuously vanishing (see, e.g. Juhász 2000; for a comprehensive overview of German political culture after reunification see, e.g., Falter/Gabriel/Rattinger 2000), major differences in the party system remained: while the FDP and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen are almost nonexistent in the new Bundesländer, the PDS is successful only in Germany and has a significant impact there on politics at all levels of the political system. Since it seems that these differences will last for the next decades, the assertion of a particular German identity is very plausible (see, e.g., Pollack/Pickel 1998; for criticism on this point of view see, e.g., Veen 1997). 2. Political Culture 2.1. Identities The affective ties citizens have to their own country are one important aspect of national political culture. Most of the Germans have a strong affinity to their country (for recent analyses of this topic see, e.g., le 1992, 1998): 76 per cent of the Germans think of themselves as German, three per cent are affiliated to another nationality, and 21 per cent do not think of themselves in this way. In Germany, 86 per cent describe themselves as Germans, one per cent has another nationality, and 13 per cent do not use such categories. 71 per cent () respectively 75 per cent () out of the group who think of themselves as German describe this feeling as important. This feeling has somewhat increased during the last decade. In contrast to this, other social or regional contexts like neighborhood (: 16 per cent, : 17 per cent), region (: 15 per cent, : 13 per cent), other ethnic groups (one per cent in as well as in Germany) or religion (: nine per cent, : four per cent) are almost irrelevant for the self identification of Germans. An exception is of course the identification with Europe (for a comparative analysis of European identity see Duchnese/Frognier 1995): 54 per cent in the and 51 per cent in the think of themselves as European, three () respectively one per cent () have another supranational identity, and 43 () respectively 48 per cent cannot classify themselves in these categories. In 8
combination with the nationality question, we can define four types of identity: People who belong only to a special nation ( nationalists ), people who also have an affiliation to Europe or another larger cultural context ( mixed identity ), people who see themselves only as European or have another supranational identity ( supranationalists ), and people who cannot identify themselves with one of these groups ( no identity ). As follows from table 2, 35 per cent can be described as nationalists, 45 per cent have a national identity as well as an identification with a larger cultural context, twelve per cent have a supranational identity and nine per cent do not have an identity at all. While the slight difference between and Germany is statistically insignificant, strong relationships between identity and age respectively education occur. Older cohorts and persons with a low level of education think of themselves more often as nationalist but less often as supranationalists than younger Germans and well-educated persons. In addition, young and welleducated people have much more problems to define their point of view in such categories. - table 2 about here - It is not surprising that there are also strong associations between identity and party attachment. This association basically reflects the position of the German political parties of the left-right continuum. On the one hand, persons attached to conservative or right wing parties define themselves more often as nationalist than followers of all other parties, but do only seldom think of themselves as supranationalists. On the other hand, supporters of left parties tend above average to be supranationalists while the levels of nationalist views are low. Followers of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and the PDS also have the biggest problems to think in these categories. It is also interesting to note that three out of four supporters of the liberal party (FDP) have a mixed identity. The strongest association can be observed between identity and national pride. Proud people define themselves a lot more often as nationalists and less often as supranationlists than less proud persons. In addition, the latter have much more problems to classify themselves in the named categories. The most constitutive element of being German is the ability to speak the German language: 94 per cent in and in Germany describe this as an extremely or somewhat important feature. German citizenship is the second most important criterion (: 82 per cent, : 85 per cent). While these aspects do not significantly differ in both parts of the country, Germans do much more often agree to the statement than Germans that to feel German (: 66 per cent, : 76 per cent) as well as to have been born German (: 59 per cent, : 68 per cent) is indispensable for being German. The most unimportant aspect for being German is to be a Christian. Of course, the attitudes of the much more denominational engaged Germans significantly differ from Germans in this point (: 42 per cent, : 28 per cent). - figure 3 about here - 9
These five characteristics of being German are strongly correlated to each other (mean correlation, :.44, :.38) and describe one common dimension. 9 Thus, for explaining these attitudes it seems to be justifiable to combine the five items into a single index. 10 The regression analysis (see table 3) reveals that in Germany national pride is the strongest predictor for the elements described as indispensable for being German. Of course, persons with a pronounced level of national pride count much more of these characteristics to a German identity as less proud persons would do. In addition, older, less educated and conservative people care more about these elements. Gender does not have any influence. Very similar effects can be observed in Germany. The only exception is that education has no significant impact of its own on the dependent variable. - table 3 about here - If national pride is one of the most important variables influencing attitudes toward national identity, it is interesting to analyze how national pride is divided among people and which factors are able to explain the different pride levels. As shown in figure 4, 59 per cent of the Germans are very or somewhat proud to be German. While this feeling is slightly but not statistically significant stronger in the part of the country (63 per cent vs. 58 per cent), significant relationships occur for all other variables: males are more proud of their country than females, national pride increases with age and decreases with education. Moreover, supporters of right wing and conservative parties are much more proud to be German than followers of the liberal party or of the parties on the left side of the political spectrum. - figure 4 about here - The most important reason why the Germans are proud of their country are economic achievements, followed by the social welfare system, the way democracy works, and the political influence of Germany on the world (see figure 5). Finally, Germans are proud of their armed forces, though this reason was only mentioned by a minority of interviewees. In Germany, the situation is somewhat different. On the one hand, the acceptance of these statements is always and with exception of economic achievements statistically significantly lower than in the ern part of the country. While the economy is the most important reason for Germans, too, to be proud of Germany, the political influence of Germany on the world follows on the second rank. But 9 This is supported by the results of dimensional analysis. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach s alpha) for this dimension shows values of.79 in the and.73 in the. 10 The index is computed by summing up the values of all single statements and dividing the result by five. The index takes values from 0 ( not important at all ) to 3 (extremely important ). Before summing up the single items, missing values were set to 0. 10
like the third (social welfare system), fourth (the way democracy works) and fifth reason (armed forces), political influence is only mentioned by less than 50 per cent of the Germans as a source of national pride. - figure 5 about here - As the regression analysis in table 4 shows, some sources of national pride are significant predictors for the affinity of Germans to their nation: the most important variable of these sources is the perception of the role of the armed forces, followed by the influence of Germany on world politics and economic achievements of Germany. However, attitudes toward the performance of democracy as well as orientations toward the social welfare system are without any significant impact on national pride. While the influence of gender and age is also insignificant, there are significant coefficients for education and ideological orientation. They indicate that less educated people and persons who perceive themselves as conservatives have higher levels of national pride. - table 4 about here - In Germany, the situation is once again somewhat different: the only sources for national pride able to explain the orientation of Germans towards their country are their attitudes toward economic achievements and the social welfare system. While the former has the strongest impact on national pride and as in the ern part of the country positively correlated with the dependent variable, for the latter a negative sign is estimated surprisingly. In addition, gender and education have a significant impact on national pride, i.e. males and less educated people are more proud of Germany than females and well educated people. 2.2. Trust/Distrust Trust in institutions is a second important aspect of national political culture. The trust Germans have in their institutions is marked by four characteristics (see figure 6): first, there is a huge difference between the institution seen as most trustworthy the police (: 65 per cent, : 48 per cent) and the institution seen as less trustworthy the political parties (: 17 per cent, : 13 per cent). 11 Second, in Germany, for only three out of the sixteen institutions mentioned here the net trust, i.e. the difference between the proportion of people who have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in a specific institution and the proportion of people who have not much or 11 Of course, some of the actors mentioned here (i.e. business and main political leaders) do not fit into the classical understanding of institutions. Nevertheless, some research about trust in institutions includes these actors (see, e.g., Listhaug/Wiberg 1995, Rose 1984). According to these studies, they will also be included in the following analysis. 11
no confidence at all, is positive. In the new Länder, those who do not have trust in institutions always outweigh those who do. Third, in Germany, the trust levels are almost always lower than in the. The only exceptions from this are the World Trade Organization and the mass media; but these - differences are not statistically significant. Fourth, while political core institutions, i.e. the parliament (: 7 th place, : 15 th place), the government ( and : 11 th place), and the political parties (corresponding the 16 th and last place in and Germany), take their places at the end of this list, semi- (e.g. military or police) or unpolitical institutions (e.g., business or civil service) as well as international actors (e.g. NATO or United Nations) usually receive much more support. - figure 6 about here - These results are not an exception from the rule but a finding reproduced repeatedly (see, e.g., Gabriel 1993; for comparative results see, e.g. Listhaug/Wiberg 1995). Furthermore, longitudinal analyses covering the 1990s indicate a sharp decline of trust in almost every institution. Of course, the existence of distrust in institutions does not always have to be seen as critical for the legitimacy of a political system. From a normative point of view, the lack of confidence can also be seen as functional in the sense that a distrust forces the political system to act responsibly (for a summary of the different positions see Wright 1976, 1981). Thus, contemporary scholars argue that both trust and distrust are necessary to make a democracy work well (see, e.g., Sniderman 1981). Though there are no absolute standards to judge whether a given level of distrust is still functional or already dysfunctional, the structure of the above-mentioned trend decreasing levels of confidence is alarming. While the erosion of trust in the 1980s was predominantly observed for institutions located at the periphery of the political system, at the beginning of the 1990s the political core institutions were affected, too (see, e.g., Gabriel 1993). As discussed above, our data indicate that things got worse during the last decade. The lack of confidence in institutions and especially political core institutions is part of a broader trend of a declining satisfaction with politics; a phenomenon which is discussed as Politikverdrossenheit in Germany. 12 The sources of dissatisfaction can be categorized into two groups (see Maier 2000): on the one hand, there are structural factors explaining dissatisfaction with politics. In this group, the demographic replacement of society, the expansion of education, the change of social norms and values, the decline of partisanship or the changing political environment, e.g. the changing role of the mass media, have to be mentioned. On the other hand, there are rational factors referring to the deficits of politics in solving the most important problems, the lack of political performance, the insufficient representation of the voter by political parties, and, last but not least, the self-presentation of politicians (e.g. the subjectively increasing amount of so called political 12 Of course, this trend is not restricted to Germany; almost every ern democracy is facing it. 12
scandals). Surprisingly, empirical results show that the first group of variables explains dissatisfaction with politics much better than the latter. This indicates that dissatisfaction with politics seems to be a structural problem rather than a temporary reaction on insufficient output of the political system. Before addressing the question whether distrust in institutions has to be traced back to societal change and its consequences, too, we will first have to analyze along which dimensions confidence in institutions is structured. Even though the levels of trust respectively distrust are very different in and Germany, the attitude structure regarding confidence in institutions is pretty similar in both parts of the country (see table 5). Four meaningful factors occur in both and Germany: the first factor can be labeled as a factor assembling different political core institutions, i.e. the government, the parliament, the political authorities, the political parties, and the jurisdiction. 13 The second factor is an international institution factor and includes the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the European Union, the NATO, and the World Bank. The third factor combines unpolitical institutions like the national and the international big business and the mass media. 14 Finally, the fourth factor is characterized by executive institutions like the police, the civil service and the military. Because the behavior of these institutions depends at least partly on instructions from the government, these institutions can be labeled as semi political institutions. 15 - table 5 about here - Using this information to compute four indices representing each factor, 16 we can finally get a very general idea of how trust in institutions is divided among people (see again figure 6): in Germany, the institutions regarded as most trustworthy are semi political institutions (mean trust: 47 per cent), followed by international institutions (41 per cent). Unpolitical institutions and political core institutions share the last place (each 27 per cent). In Germany, the first place is taken by international institutions (35 per cent), just followed by semi political institutions (34 per cent), unpolitical institutions (21 per cent), and political core institutions (18 per cent). Next, we will use these indices as dependent variables to find out how to explain the attitudes toward the different types of institutions. As table 6 shows, the explanatory power of the specified models is weak except for political core institutions. The general finding in three out of four models 13 In contrast to Germany, the attitude structure in the five new Länder is somewhat more complex. Thus, the civil service loads on this factor, too. 14 In Germany, the World Trade Organization, the NATO and the World Bank show weak loadings on this factor, too. 15 Once again, the Germans show a slightly more complex attitude structure than the Germans because law and courts as well as the NATO are loading on this factor, too. 16 The indices were created by summing up all factors loading on a common factor. To ensure that the results were comparable between and Germany, the minor deviations of the German factor structure were ignored and brought into line with the German result. 13
is that the most important predictor for trust in institutions is satisfaction with national politics. In contrast to this, factors referring to the German social structure (age, education, left-right placement, attachment to the established political actors) are almost weaker, occur rather unsystematically (which does not mean that the observed relationships are implausible) or as in the case of education are absolutely unimportant. Attachment to the established political parties CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP is the only continuously significant structural variable. Of course, these findings contradict the research results on Politikverdrossenheit. While the latter findings suggest that the legitimacy crisis of the German democracy is inevitable, i.e. cannot or can only partially be influenced by the quality of political performance, the results found here on trust in institutions indicate that the low levels of confidence as shown in figure 6 are a consequence of dissatisfaction with national politics. Thus, politics seems to matter. - table 6 about here - 2.3. Satisfaction/Anxiety The last traditional aspect of political culture analyzed in the context of this paper is the question of satisfaction. Analytically, this aspect can be divided into life satisfaction on the one hand and political satisfaction on the other hand. Let us first focus on life satisfaction (for a comparative analysis see, e.g., Weller 1996). The Germans are predominantly satisfied with their life: 46 per cent in Germany and 63 per cent in Germany declare that they are satisfied; only 16 () respectively nine per cent () of the Germans are not satisfied with their life. Thus, the difference between satisfied and dissatisfied people is significantly higher in Germany (31 per cent in the versus 53 per cent in the ; see figure 7). - figure 7 about here - The lack of life satisfaction should be directly connected to the perception of problems concerning the personal situation (for an analysis of satisfaction in different areas of life see, e.g., Glatzer 1984). Corresponding to the high level of life satisfaction, the perception of such problems is rather seldom (see figure 8). In Germany the current international situation is the aspect most worried about (21 per cent), followed by health (19 per cent), the job situation (16 per cent), family life (13 per cent), the country and the neighborhood (eleven respectively seven per cent). Germans worry most about their job situation (36 per cent), followed by the international situation (29 per cent), health (26 per cent), the country (18 per cent), family life (14 per cent) and the neighborhood (ten per cent). In general, every problem listed here is mentioned more often in than in 14
Germany. Additionally, the differences between both parts of the country are statistically insignificant only for family life and neighborhood. - figure 8 about here - The perception of problems listed above has a noteworthy causal impact on life satisfaction (see table 7). In both parts of the country the job situation is the most reliable predictor for being (dis)satisfied with life as a whole. While in Germany the job situation is the only significant determinant of life satisfaction, life satisfaction in Germany also depends on family life and the country s well being. Surprisingly, perceived problems in the latter field significantly increase life satisfaction. Finally, the level of education also has an impact on the life satisfaction of Germans. The estimated sign indicates that higher educated people are much more satisfied than persons with a lower level of education. - table 7 about here - In sharp contrast to life satisfaction, Germans are predominantly dissatisfied with politics (see figure 7): in Germany only 21 per cent of the people are satisfied with politics; 32 per cent are not satisfied. The situation is even worse in Germany. Only eleven per cent declare to be content; 50 per cent are discontent. It is very interesting to note that life satisfaction and satisfaction with politics is only weakly connected in Germany (r=.16, p<0.001) while this relationship is very strong in Germany (r=.45, p<0.001). One reason for the much stronger politicization of personal problems in Germany is of course the close relationship between life satisfaction and the personal job situation that can easily be seen as a result of political decisions. But another important reason to explain the strong correlation between life satisfaction and satisfaction with politics is the still effective tradition of general responsibility of the state as practiced in the former GDR. If we take a closer look on the political problems perceived by the citizens, Germans worry most about the level of unemployment and the level of crime (both 50 per cent), followed by political corruption and environment protection (both 39 per cent; see figure 9). Ethnic conflicts (33 per cent), immigration (31 per cent), human rights problems (25 per cent), religious conflicts, and public administration (both 19 per cent) are following. At the end of the list, other economic problems besides unemployment appear (14 per cent). In Germany the ranking of the problems is very similar to Germany (rank correlation: 0.82, p<0.01). But while in the new Bundesländer almost every problem is mentioned more often than in the, only in the case of unemployment (76 per cent), crime (69 per cent), immigration, and economy (41 and 30 per cent), the difference is statistically significant. 15
- figure 9 about here - The perception of problems should be reflected in the evaluation of government performance. As figure 10 shows, this is indeed a connection: Government approval is typically high in those policy fields where the level of perceived problems is low, and vice versa. Thus, Germans are satisfied with the work of SPD and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen regarding the economy, human rights problems, religious conflicts or environment conditions. They are disappointed, however, of government performance concerning political corruption, crime or unemployment. This relationship between perceived problems and government evaluation is very strong in Germany (rank correlation: -.75, p<0.05) and somewhat lower in Germany (rank correlation: -.50, not significant). - figure 10 about here - Even if the perception of problems as well as the evaluation of government performance is very similar in and in Germany, the factors explaining satisfaction with politics differ strongly (see table 8). In Germany perceived political problems have a minor influence on political satisfaction only the perceived lack of quality in public administration has a significant impact. Much more important than the perceived problems is the evaluation of the work of SPD and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. In this context, their performance in fighting unemployment is in an exposed position. In addition, the evaluation of the government s work in economy, political corruption, human rights problems and immigration show significant effects. A significant relationship appears for life satisfaction as well as for identification with one of the governing parties. Socio-demographic variables do not have any significant influence. - table 8 about here - In Germany the explanation for satisfaction with politics is somewhat less complex. The strongest determinant is life satisfaction, followed by identification with SPD or Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. Similar to Germany, the perceived ineffectiveness of public services has a significant influence. Finally, older people are significantly more satisfied with politics than younger citizens. All other factors specified in this model, especially all government performance indicators, have no significant impact. 16
3. Political Tenets and Actions 3.1. Political Tenets The political space in Germany is traditionally structured by two major political cleavages (see Lipset/Rokkan 1967): first, the socio-economic cleavage representing the conflict between owners and workers (see, e.g., Pappi 1990). Second, the religious cleavage representing the conflict between state and church (see, e.g., Schmitt 1984, 1989). After World War II the content of the religious cleavage changed significantly and represents now the conflict between religion and laicism (see, e.g., Pappi 1985). The socio-economic cleavage can be measured by the left-right continuum where left indicates a workers position and right indicates the owners position. The distribution of self-classification on the left-right continuum shows that Germans tend somewhat more to the left (see figure 11). 17 The mean on this Ten-point scale is 5.2 for Germany and 4.9 for Germany (p>0,05). A closer look on the distributions of the left-right self classification in and Germany shows a strong similarity to normal distribution: in both parts of the country, the majority is located in the middle of the scale; only a few people take extreme left or extreme right positions. - figure 11 about here - Ideological orientation usually differs by age and education (see table 9). First, the portion of voters who locate themselves on the left-right continuum increases with age (not in Germany) and education. Second, Germans older than 60 years describe themselves significantly more often as conservative than their younger fellow citizens. In contrast to this, in Germany the oldest age cohort locates itself most left on the left-right dimension. In both parts of the country these results may predominantly be caused by generation effects. While in Germany the younger generations carry more postmaterialist values corresponding with a left ideological orientation, the left values of Germany s older generations are a product of a still effective binding to the old political system which provided them with a much higher social and economic status than the reunified Germany. In both parts of the country, left ideology is more common among groups of higher educated people; lower education corresponds with conservative views of the world. In Germany this difference in ideological self-location is even statistically significant. - table 9 about here - 17 Thinking in terms of left and right is very familiar to Germans. Only ten per cent in Germany and 13 per cent in Germany are not able to locate themselves on this scale (for the meaning of left and right in Germany see, e.g., Gibwoski 1977; for the change of this meaning see, e.g., Jagodzinski/Kühnel 1994, 1998). 17