Inventory of OECD Integrity and Anti-Corruption Related Data This document was drafted as part of the CleanGovBiz Initiative that brings together all OECD policy communities working on integrity and anti-corruption.
Table of Contents 1. Introduction & Rationale... 2 2. Healthy Systems of Governance... 4 a. Countries where Consultation with Parties Affected by Regulation Is Mandatory... 4 b. Global Trends in Regulatory Policy & Governance... 4 c. Stakeholder Engagement... 6 d. Governance of Regulators... 7 e. Comparison of the Role of the Supreme Audit Institutions in Performance-related Budgeting Systems... 9 3. Effective Prevention... 10 a. OURdata Index of Open, Useful and Reusable Government Data (G7 Open Data Charter)... 10 b. Open Government Data... 10 c. Pre- & Post-Public Employment Regulations and Compensation during Cooling-Off Period... 11 d. Asset Disclosure Regulations for Public Officials... 13 e. Levels of Disclosure of Private Interests and their Public Availability by Country... 14 f. Lobbying Transparency, Rules and Balance Representation... 15 g. Perception of Inappropriate Influence Peddling by Lobbyists... 16 h. Public Availability of Procurement Information at the Central Level of Government... 17 i. Use of E-Procurement... 18 4. Sharp Detection... 20 a. Whistleblower Protection laws... 20 b. Trade Facilitation: Governance and Impartiality... 20 c. Location and Independence of Investigators of Tax Crimes or Evasion... 21 d. Location and Independence of Customs Investigators... 21 5. Robust Prosecution & Recovery... 22 a. Number of Foreign Bribery Cases Concluded per Year... 22 c. Method by which Foreign Bribery Instances were Discovered... 23 d. Sanctions applied in Foreign Bribery Cases... 24 e. Sectors where Foreign Bribery Offenses are Found... 25 f. Recipients of Bribes in Foreign Bribery Cases... 26 g. Sanctions Imposed versus Enrichment from Bribery... 27 h. Purpose of Bribes Paid... 28 i. Assets Frozen and Returned to Foreign Jurisdictions... 28 j. Corruption Risk Management inside Bilateral and Multilateral Development Cooperation Agencies... 29 k. Transparency and Use of Country Systems... 30 1
Aspects of the economic system which are difficult to measure tend to be neglected. Ronald Coase, Nobel Prize in Economics 1. Introduction & Rationale 1. Empirical research over the last decades impressively showed the devastating consequences of corruption on different economic, social and political variables. Even though theoretically this impact of corruption was predictable, the advances made in developing proxies to measure corruption through both perception and victimization indexes allowed to provide evidence, and significantly stimulated deeper research into the determinants and consequences of corruption. 2. Based on these findings, the policy case for strengthening integrity and curbing corruption is straightforward. Our understanding of what works and why, however, is still limited. Policy recommendations are based on good practices, benchmarks and theoretical considerations, but we often lack reliable methods of measuring the impact and therefore the relevance of specific types of measures. As highlighted by Ronald Coase in the quote above, this lack of evidence may endanger the political commitment in the face of ever shifting priorities, but it also limits our ability to learn and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed mitigation measures. 3. Just as corruption and integrity are broad concepts that are daunting to measure because of their complexity, there is also no simple one-size-fits-all solution. Rather, fostering integrity and curbing corruption requires a mixture of policies and measures that together as a framework may produce the desired outcomes. To achieve this, there is a need to collect relevant data and measure in more detail the implications and impact of different policies. Such datasets can then be crossed with other indicators and analysed over time in order to make more confident statements on effective and efficient ways to foster integrity and curb corruption. Also, hard data is often required to make a stronger case for specific policy recommendations. Across the OECD various indicators have the potential to contribute to this and facilitate the work of the Secretariat in its advisory role. 4. This note provides a first step towards an inventory of directly or indirectly relevant indicators used throughout the OECD. As a guide to map this data and assure coherence with OECD policies, we propose to use the CleanGovBiz framework. The table below provides a first overview of indicators that are measuring government efforts to support healthy governance practices, bolster effective prevention, and strengthen detection, prosecution and effective recovery of corruption and proceeds from corruption in OECD countries and across the globe. 5. The sample provided in the table is not comprehensive, but is intended to provide a starting point for a common effort to identify and facilitate the use of the many methods by which the OECD has already measured relevant inputs and outputs. The objective is therefore to broaden awareness of the integrity and anti-corruption related indicators used across the organisation, with the goal of finding new potential areas for cross-applications to make the most of other existing areas of study or policy. In addition, this could also provide colleagues currently working on integrity and anti-corruption greater possibility of incorporating existing indicators to strengthen their own work. 2
Healthy Systems of Governance 1. Countries where consultation with parties affected by regulation is mandatory 2. Global Trends in Regulatory Policy & Governance 3. Stakeholder Engagement 4. Governance of Regulators 5. Comparison of the Role of the Supreme Audit Institutions in Performance-related Budgeting Systems Effective Prevention Sharp Detection Robust Prosecution & Recovery 1. Index of Open, Useful 1. Whistleblower 1. Number of Foreign and Reusable Protection laws Bribery Cases Government Data (G7 2. Trade Facilitation: Concluded per Year Open Data Charter) Governance and 2. Method by which 2. Open Government Data Impartiality Foreign Bribery 3. Pre- & Post-Public 3. Location and Instances were Employment Independence of Discovered Regulations and Investigators of Tax 3. Sanctions applied in Compensation during Crimes or Evasion Foreign Bribery Cases Cooling-Off Period 4. Location and 4. Sectors where Foreign 4. Asset Disclosure Independence of Bribery Offenses are Regulations for Public Customs Investigators detected Officials 5. Recipients of Bribes in 5. Levels of Disclosure of Foreign Bribery Cases Private Interests and 6. Sanctions Imposed their Public Availability versus Enrichment from by Country Bribery 6. Lobbying 7. Purpose of Bribes Paid Transparency, Rules and 8. Assets Frozen and Balance Representation Returned to Foreign 7. Perception of Jurisdictions Inappropriate Influence Peddling by Lobbyists 8. Public Availability of Procurement Information at the Central Level of Government 9. Use of E-Procurement Moving forward 6. In order to advance in this common challenge of measurement, it is proposed that all Directorates through the CleanGovBiz initiative join efforts to complete the inventory, by: (i) complementing the list of indicators with data considered relevant for measuring integrity and anti-corruption (directly or indirectly); (ii) providing background information on the methodology used for each indicator; and (iii) if possible, sharing a link to the raw data of the indicators. 7. This proposal has been developed to be discussed at the next CleanGovBiz meeting with the aim to get initial feedback on the general idea, the potential use of such a database, and if possible, agree on a common timeframe to complete the inventory. For more information or any questions on the indicators, please contact GOVintegrity@oecd.org. 3
Number of countries 2. Healthy Systems of Governance a. Countries where Consultation with Parties Affected by Regulation is Mandatory The OECD Recommendation on Regulatory Policy and Governance encourages governments to actively engage all relevant stakeholders during the regulation-making process and design in consultation processes to maximise the quality of the information received and its effectiveness. According to the 2015 OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (ireg), a majority of OECD countries engage stakeholders in developing both primary laws and subordinate regulations. Still, challenges remain. Even when stakeholder engagement is mandatory it is not always required that the general public be consulted, as only 14 countries require systematic public consultation on primary laws. Thirteen countries out of thirty-five in the survey reported always or frequently conducting public consultations online with an invitation to comment, and eighteen countries reported using this method only occasionally. Engagement with stakeholders in developing regulatory policy is important in order to maintain transparency and openness in the development of regulations, and prevent policy capture. 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2005 2008 & 2009 2014 32 26 25 22 22 Primary laws Subordinate regulations 31 Note: Based on data from 34 countries and the European Commission. Chile, Estonia, Israel and Slovenia were not members of the OECD in 2005 and so were not included in that year s survey. Source: OECD Regulatory Management Systems Indicators Survey 2005 and 2008/09, www.oecd.org/gov/regulatorypolicy/indicators-rms.htm; 2015 OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance, www.oecd.org/gov/regulatorypolicy/measuring-regulatory-performance.htm b. Global Trends in Regulatory Policy & Governance This indicator shows which governments have adopted standard procedures by which laws and regulations are developed which can limit or prevent backroom, opaque development of regulations which may favour specific entities, industries or interest over others. It also shows which countries have a specific minister or high level official accountable for regulatory policy and regulatory reform, and which ones have a formal requirement for conducting RIA and stakeholder engagement to inform the development of new regulations and to conduct ex-post review of regulations. 4
Explicit, published regulatory policy exists Primary laws Subordinate regulations Minister / high level official accountable for promoting regulatory Body responsible for promoting regulatory policy and reporting on regulatory quality Regulatory Impact Assessment Administrative simplification or burden reduction Stakeholder engagement Ex post analysis Legal quality 8.1. The adoption of an explicit whole-of-government policy for regulatory quality, 2014 Standard procedures adopted by which the administration develops Area of responsibility for regulatory oversight body Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States x European Union Total OECD Yes 32 32 33 28 32 26 29 2 8 No 2 1 1 6 2 8 5 6 8 x Not applicable 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 Source: 2015 OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance, www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/measuringregulatory-performance.htm. Number of oversight bodies per country/jurisdiction, 2014 Source: OECD (2015), OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2015 5
c. Stakeholder Engagement Regulatory policy processes should be designed in implemented in the public interest. Stakeholder engagement requirements can help to ensure that those to be affected by regulations have input in their design aids in transparent processes and prevents corrupt results which can favour certain entities or industries. 8.3. Requirements and types of stakeholder engagement, 2014 Requirement to conduct stakeholder engagement Stakeholder engagement to inform officials about the problem and possible solutions Primary Subordinate Consultation on draft regulations/proposed rules Primary Subordinate laws regulations laws regulations Primary laws Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States EU OECD Total For all regulations 21 18 1 2 23 18 For major regulations 4 7 5 3 2 6 For some regulations 6 5 22 21 6 8 Never 2 4 5 8 2 2 Not applicable 1 0 1 0 1 0 Subordinate regulations Source: 2015 OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance, www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/measuringregulatory-performance.htm 6
Government uses interactive websites to consult with stakeholders on: Public consultation conducted over the internet with invitation to comment Plans to regulate Draft regulations Plans to change existing regulations Finalised regulations 8.4. Use of ICTs to consult in different stages of regulation development, 2014 Number of List of countries countries AUS, BEL, CAN, CHL, CZE, DNK, EST, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRC, ISL, IRL, ITA, JPN, KOR, MEX, NDL, NZL, NOR, POL, PRT, SVK, SVN, ESP, SWE, CHE, TUR, GBR, USA, European Union 31 AUS, BEL, CAN, CHL, DNK, EST, FIN, DEU, KOR, MEX, NDL, NZL, NOR, POL, SVK, SVN, CHE, USA, European Union 19 AUS, BEL, CAN, CHL, DNK, EST, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRC, ISL, ITA, JPN, KOR, MEX, NDL, NZL, NOR, POL, SVK, SVN, CHE, GBR, USA 24 AUS, BEL, CAN, CHL, DNK, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRE, ITA, KOR, MEX, NDL, NZL, NOR, POL, PRT, SVK, SVN, CHE, GBR, USA, European Union 23 AUS, BEL, CAN, CHL, DNK, EST, FIN, GRC, JPN, KOR, MEX, NDL, NZL, SVN, USA 15 Source: 2015 OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance, www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/measuringregulatory-performance.htm The Water Governance Initiative has also created an indicator set based upon a checklist for stakeholder engagement in water governance. One example of these indicators in on Inclusiveness and equity: Informed and transparent identification and selection of stakeholders to be involved in the engagement process, based on a clear understanding of their roles, responsibilities, interests, motivation and interrelations Broad outreach to inform individuals and organisations about the water policy/project process in order for them to decide whether and/or how they want to be involved Completion of a situation assessment to identify options for engaging under-represented stakeholders and options for funding resource- or otherwise constrained stakeholders Stakeholders motivations and expectations have been clearly identified (e.g. survey, analytical study, report) Early assessment of the concerns and ideas of all stakeholders concerned (e.g. individual interviews with the full range of key stakeholder groups by a neutral entity) Inter-relations/linkages between the stakeholders to be involved have been determined and explained to all those engaged Equitable share of representation among categories of stakeholders involved and workable modalities identified Specific attention is devoted to the stakeholders outside the water sector (e.g. farmers, business, institutional investors, planners, etc.) Broad availability of stakeholders mappings d. Governance of Regulators The independence of regulators, and/or their attachment of ministries or agencies, can affect the perceived legitimacy of the regulations developed, their adjudications, or enforcement actions. This indicator notes where the rulemaking bodies or regulators of government are located within their respective governments. 7
Network Sector 8.9. How is the status of the regulatory agencies best described in network sectors? 2013 Regulator is an independent body with adjudicatory, rule-making or enforcement powers Regulator is a ministerial department or agency Regulator is an independent body with a purely advisory role Electricit y AUS, AUT, BEL, CHL, CZE, DNK, EST, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRC, HUN, IRL, ITA, LUX, MEX, NLD, NZL, NOR, POL, PRT, SVK, SVN, ESP, SWE, CHE, TUR, GBR, ZAF, BGR, HRV, LVA, LTU, MLT, ROM ISL, JPN, KOR, RUS ISR Gas AUS, AUT, BEL, CZE, DNK, EST, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRC, IRL, ISR, ITA, LUX, MEX, NLD, NZL, POL, PRT, SVK, SVN, ESP, SWE, TUR, GBR, IND, ZAF, BGR, HRV, LVA, LTU, MLT, ROM CHL, HUN, JPN, KOR, NOR, BRA, RUS Telecom municati ons AUS, AUT, BEL, CAN, CZE, DNK, EST, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRC, HUN, ISL, IRL, ITA, NLD, NZL, NOR, POL, PRT, SVK, SVN, ESP, SWE, CHE, TUR, GBR, BRA, IND, RUS, ZAF, BGR, HRV, LVA, LTU, MLT, ROM CHL, ISR, KOR, MEX, NOR Rail AUS, AUT, DNK, EST, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRC, HUN, LUX, NDL, NOR, POL, PRT, SVK, ESP, SWE, GBR, LVA, ROM CAN, CZE, ISR, ITA, KOR, MEX, SVN, TUR, BRA, RUS, LTU BEL, CHE, BGR, HRV Air Transpor t AUS, BEL, IRL, ITA, NLD, NZL, NOR, POL, PRT, SWE, GBR, HRV, MLT AUT, CAN, CHL, DNK, EST, FIN, FRA, GRC, HUN, ISR, KOR, MEX, SVN, CHE, BRA, RUS, ZAF, BGR ESP Ports AUS, CAN, ITA, KOR, NDL, ZAF, LTU AUT, CHL, DNK, EST, GRC, ISR, MEX, PRT, SVN, ESP, CHE, TUR, BRA, RUS, BGR, MLT IND, HRV Source: OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) dataset Country 8.10. Use of Tools of Regulatory Quality by Water Regulators, 2014 Requirement to consult with regulated entities before making a regulatory determination Systemati cally Done on an ad hoc basis No Requirement to conduct public consultation before making a regulatory determination Always Done on an ad hoc basis No Economic assessment of the costs and benefits is required to justify a regulatory decision System atically Obligation to conduct expost evaluation of existing regulations Australia Capital territory New South Wales Victoria Western Australia Belgium Flanders Chile Estonia Hungary Ireland Italy Portugal United Kingdom England and Wales Northern Ireland Scotland United States Hawaii Maine Ohio Pennsylvania Tennessee West Virginia In some cases Colombia Latvia Source: OECD (2014), Survey on the Governance of Water regulators No For all regul ations For certai n regul ations Not requir ed 8
e. Comparison of the Role of the Supreme Audit Institutions in Performance-related Budgeting Systems The role of SAIs can be key in preventing and detecting corruption through the various types of audits, including performance audits which can aid in preventing excessive, unnecessary or poorly planned government expenditures/investments. Audit financial information of public bodies Conduct performance audits or VFM audits Audit the achievement of performance objectives Assess the quality of performance information Assess the quality of the programme logic models being used Assess the performance budgeting system and may recommend reforms Australia Austria Belgium Czech Republic Chile Estonia Finland France Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Korea Mexico New Zealand Norway Poland Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland The Netherlands Turkey United Kingdom USA Always 20 6 5 3 4 2 Sometimes 2 7 5 3 6 8 Often 4 9 5 11 4 4 Seldom 0 1 4 2 3 4 Never 0 3 7 7 9 8 Total 26 26 26 26 26 26 Source: OECD (2014) Mini-Survey on Supreme Audit Institutions and Performance-related Budgeting. 9
3. Effective Prevention a. OURdata Index of Open, Useful and Reusable Government Data (G7 Open Data Charter) A clear example of how inclusiveness could be strengthened through proactive access to information stems from open government data (OGD) that provides new opportunities to empower a new generation of citizens, businesses and civil society organisations through the reuse of these data and increased transparency. Open, transparent data is necessary for effective independent oversight by citizens and watchdog organisations, and helps prevent corrupt practices and acts. Figure 1.7. OURdata Index: Open, Useful, Reusable Government Data, 2014 Total score OECD 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 No national OGD portal 0 Source: 2014 OECD Survey on Open Government Data b. Open Government Data The public sector produces and collects a wealth of data in its day-to-day activities. By making these data available, easily accessible and re-usable by citizens and businesses, governments can improve accountability and transparency, create new business opportunities and better inform both citizen engagement and their own decision-making. 10
10.7. Central/federal government support to open government data, 2014 Strategy/Infrastructure Consultations Data re-use support and promotion Data accessibility on the national portal Single Central/federal OGD strategy Existence of a national OGD portal Regular consultation of users needs for data release Organization of co-creation type events (e.g. hackathons) Training for civil servants to build capacities for data analysis and reuse Data released in CSV format (machine readable) Systematic provision of metadata Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary........ Ireland.... Italy Japan Korea Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain Sweden.... Switzerland Turkey x x x x United Kingdom United States.... User feedbac k section Possibility to receive notification when datasets are added Total OECD 25 29 24 20 22 11 Colombia Latvia x x x x Yes Often/Generally.. Missing data No Sometimes x Not applicable Never Source: OECD (2014), Survey on Open Government Data c. Pre- & Post-Public Employment Regulations and Compensation during Cooling-Off Period A survey of regulation of post-public employment for civil servants/elected officials. Important implications regarding conflicts of interest in public service, and post-employment lobbying. 11
7.1. Post-Public Employment: Compensation during the cooling-off period, 2014 President Prime Minister or Members of Political advisors/ Senior civil Civil Minister Cabinet/Office appointees servants Servants Australia x Austria Belgium X Canada X Chile X Czech Republic Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan X Korea Mexico x Netherlands X New Zealand X Norway X Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain X Sweden X Switzerland X Turkey United Kingdom X United States X OECD total Yes 2 3 3 2 2 2 No 4 9 11 10 18 15 no cooling-off period 15 17 18 20 12 15 Brazil x Colombia x Latvia Russia Source: OECD (2014), Survey on Managing Conflict of Interest in the Executive Branch and Whistleblower Protection, OECD, Paris. 12
AUS AUT BEL CAN CHL CZE EST FIN FRA DEU GRC HUN ISL IRL ISR ITA JPN KOR MEX NLD NZL NOR POL PRT SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TUR GBR USA OECD BRA COL LVA RUS Low level High level 7.2. Restrictions on Pre-Public Employment, 2014 On private sector employees or lobbyists: 12.5% No restrictions: 59.4% Israel On both private sector employees or lobbyists and government suppliers: 21.9% On government suppliers: 6.3% Source: OECD, (2014), Survey on Managing Conflict of Interest in the Executive Branch and Whistleblower Protection, OECD, Paris. d. Asset Disclosure Regulations for Public Officials Asset disclosures aid in transparency and preventing public officials from making decisions based on personal interests (conflicts of interest). This indicator shows in which countries executive, legislative and judicial officials are required to disclose personal assets. 7.3. Level of disclosure and public availability of private interests across branches of government, 2014 100 Executive Branch Legislative Branch Judicial Branch "at risk" areas 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Source: OECD (2014), Survey on Managing Conflict of Interest in the Executive Branch and Whistleblower Protection, OECD, Paris. Source: OECD (2014), Survey on Managing Conflict of Interest in the Executive Branch and Whistleblower Protection, OECD, Paris 13
AUS AUT BEL CAN CHL CZE EST FIN FRA DEU GRC HUN ISL IRL ISR ITA JPN KOR MEX NLD NZL NOR POL PRT SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TUR GBR USA OECD BRA COL LVA RUS Low level High level 7.4. Level of disclosure and public availability of private interests by the level of public officials in the executive branch, 2014 7.4. Level of disclosure and public availability of private interests by the level of public officials in the executive branch, 2014 100 Top decision makers Political Advisors / Appointees Senior Civil Servants Civil Servants 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Source: OECD (2014), Survey on Managing Conflict of Interest in the Executive Branch and Whistleblower Protection, OECD, Paris. Source: OECD (2014), Survey on Managing Conflict of Interest in the Executive Branch and Whistleblower Protection, OECD, Paris. e. Levels of Disclosure of Private Interests and their Public Availability by Country This indicator shows in selected countries the level of disclosure of private interests by officials in different branches of government in OECD countries. Disclosure of private interests is key to preventing conflicts of interest and self-interested policymaking. Making this information publicly available assists citizens and watchdog organisations in holding public officials accountable. Source: OECD 2012 Survey on Managing Conflict of Interest 14
f. Lobbying Transparency, Rules and Balance Representation This indicator shows which OECD countries have regulations on lobbying activities in place, as well as rules regarding the presence of lobbyists and corporate executives on expert or advisory groups. 7.5. Introduction of lobbying regulation, 1940-14) 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 DEU 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010-2014 AUS CAN POL HUN ISR FRA MEX SVN AUT ITA NLD CHL GBR Source: OECD (2014), Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3: Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD, Paris. 15
7.6. Rules on the balanced representation of interests in advisory groups, 2013 Is there an obligation to have a balanced composition of advisory/expert groups? Are lobbyists allowed to sit in advisory/expert groups in personal capacity? Are corporate executives allowed to sit in advisory/expert groups in personal capacity? Austria X O O Belgium O X O Canada X O O Chile X O O Estonia O O O Finland X O O France X O O Germany X O O Hungary X X O Ireland X O O Italy X O O Korea O X O Luxembourg X O O Mexico X O O Netherlands X O O New Zealand X X X Norway X O O Poland X O O Portugal X O O Slovenia X O O Spain X X X Sweden X O O Switzerland O O O United Kingdom X O O United States O O O OECD Total Yes O 5 20 23 No X 20 5 2 Brazil X O O Source: OECD (2013), Survey on Lobbying Rules and Guidelines g. Perception of Inappropriate Influence Peddling by Lobbyists This indicator shows how legislators and lobbyists perceive the problem of influence peddling by lobbyists through gift-giving. This indicator can indicate how much of a problem special interests and lobbyists actions are in legislating and policy-making. 16
h. Public Availability of Procurement Information at the Central Level of Government This indicator shows which countries make certain public procurement information public available, which can ensure a level playing field in procurement, and undermine tailored tenders or other noncompetitive acts to favour certain contractors or parties. 17
i. Use of E-Procurement The use of digital technology in the public sector is a driver of efficiency and supports the effectiveness of policies by enabling more open, transparent, innovative, participatory and trustworthy government. 18
9.7. Functionalities provided in e-procurement systems Announcing tenders Electronic submission of bids (excluding by e-mails) e-tendering Notification of award Electronic submission of invoices (excluding by e-mails) Ex-post contract management Mandatory and provided Not mandatory but provided Not provided AUS, AUT, BEL, CAN, CHL, DNK, EST, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRC, HUN, IRL, ITA, KOR, LUX, MEX, NLD, NZL, NOR, POL, PRT, SVK, SVN, ESP, SWE, CHE, TUR, GBR, USA ISL, JPN BEL, CHL, EST, FRA, GRC, ITA, MEX, PRT, USA BEL, CAN, CHL, EST, GRC, IRL, ITA, MEX, CHE, USA AUS, AUT, DNK, FIN, DEU, IRL, JPN, KOR, LUX, NLD, NZL, NOR, SVK, SVN, ESP, SWE, TUR, GBR AUT, DNK, FIN, FRA, DEU, JPN, KOR, NLD, NZL, NOR, PRT, SVK, SVN, ESP, SWE, TUR, GBR AUS, AUT, BEL, CAN, CHL, DNK, EST, FIN, DEU, GRC, HUN, IRL, KOR, MEX, NLD, NZL, NOR, POL, PRT, SVK, SVN, ESP, SWE, CHE, TUR, USA FRA, ITA, JPN, GBR ISL, LUX AUT, DNK, FIN, ITA, NLD, ESP, SVN, SWE, CHE, USA CHE, TUR, USA FRA, DEU, ISL, JPN, KOR, NZL, NOR, GBR DNK, FIN, DEU, ITA, JPN, KOR, NZL, NOR, SVN, SWE CAN, HUN, ISL, POL, CHE AUS, HUN, ISL, LUX, POL AUS, BEL, CAN, CHL, EST, GRC, HUN, IRL, LUX, MEX, POL, PRT, SVK, TUR AUS, AUT, BEL, CAN, CHL, EST, FRA, GRC, HUN, ISL, IRL, LUX, MEX, NLD, POL, PRT, SVK, ESP, GBR Source: OECD (2014) Survey on Public Procurement 9.8. Main challenges to the use of e-procurement systems Low knowled ge/ ICT skills Low knowledge of the economic opportunities raised by this tool Low innovativ e organizat ional culture Difficulties to understand or apply the procedure Difficulties in the use of functionalities Do not know Australia x Austria x x x x x Belgium x Canada x Chile Denmark Estonia x Finland France Germany x Greece x Hungary x Iceland x x x x x Ireland Italy x Japan x Korea x Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands x New Zealand x Norway x Poland x Portugal x Slovak Republic x Slovenia x Spain x Sweden Switzerland Turkey x United Kingdom x United States OECD total Procuring entities 14 11 13 x x 9 Potential bidders/suppliers 14 12 10 13 13 7 Not a major challenge 8 11 10 12 12 x Brazil x Colombia x Russia x Source: OECD (2014) Survey on Public Procurement 19
4. Sharp Detection a. Whistleblower Protection laws This indicator tracks the presence of legal protections for whistleblowers in OECD countries, as well as the scope of those laws in terms of types of employees are protected (permanent, temporary, volunteers, etc.). 7.7. Legal Protection of Whistleblowers in OECD Member Countries 2014 No protection : 13% Protection through dedicated law : 41% Protection through provisions in other law(s) : 47% Source: OECD (2014), Survey on Managing Conflict of Interest in the Executive Branch and Whistleblower Protection b. Trade Facilitation: Governance and Impartiality The OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators include a rating of Governance and Impartiality, which rank the country s customs functions and structures, accountability and ethics policies. Strong customs systems can effective prevent the corruption of national and international trade policies, and ensure fair and effective application of rules and regulations to all citizens and businesses. Source: OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators, available at www.oecd.org/tad/facilitation/indicators.htm 20
c. Location and Independence of Investigators of Tax Crimes or Evasion Conducting investigations into tax evasion, fraud or other crimes requires specialised training, resources, and independence to support effective investigations in the interest of the public. This indicator provides a comparison of where the responsibility for conducting these investigations lies in key countries in the world. Source: OECC (2013) Effective Inter-Agency Co-operation in Fighting Tax Crimes and other Financial Crimes, 2 nd Edition. d. Location and Independence of Customs Investigators Similar to tax investigations, customs investigations also require special training, resources and expertise. This indicator shows where the responsibility for customs investigations lies in several key countries. 21
Source: OECC (2013) Effective Inter-Agency Co-operation in Fighting Tax Crimes and other Financial Crimes, 2 nd Edition. 5. Robust Prosecution & Recovery a. Number of Foreign Bribery Cases Concluded per Year The Number of cases concluded can indicate the effectiveness of prosecution efforts and resources being dedicated to these prosecutions. 22
b. Length of Time between Last Criminal Act and Sanction The amount of time it takes to detect and prosecute/sanction a criminal act can also indicate the effectiveness of investigation/detection procedures (or the complexity of cases in some instances). c. Method by which Foreign Bribery Instances were Discovered The way by which cases are brought to the attention of authorities can demonstrate how effective prevention and detection mechanisms are, and where additional resources, training or better policymaking could complement existing anti-corruption frameworks. 23
d. Sanctions Applied in Foreign Bribery Cases The types of sanctions available/applied in foreign bribery cases can indicate how seriously countries prosecute, or who will be held liable. 24
e. Sectors where Foreign Bribery Offenses are Found The business sectors where most foreign bribery offenses are discovered or prosecuted can indicate that there are more opportunities/demand for corruption behaviour or acts in these areas, and policies can be adjusted accordingly to compensate. 25
f. Recipients of Bribes in Foreign Bribery Cases The common recipients of foreign bribes can suggest the need for additional oversight, training, asset disclosure or audit measures for certain government services or agencies. This can aid in more effective policy making to address the different risks among these entities. 26
g. Sanctions Imposed versus Enrichment from Bribery This indicator can demonstrate where sanctions may need to be increased in order to effectively dissuade corrupt behaviour, as some sanctioned offenses may still allow the corrupt official to have made a profit after paying fines. 27
h. Purpose of Bribes Paid The reasons for which bribes are paid can also indicate weaknesses in government agencies, overregulation leading to excessive administrative burdens to conduct business, or other problems. i. Assets Frozen and Returned to Foreign Jurisdictions This indicator shows the amount of assets frozen and assets returned to foreign jurisdictions in the prosecution of corruption and recovery of proceeds from these acts. This indicator can show how effectively MLA requests are being taken by other countries, as well as how they are executed in returning assets. 28
Source: StAR Initiative (2014) Few and Far: The Hard Facts on Stolen Asset Recovery Gray, Larissa, Kjetil Hansen, Pranvera Recica-Kirkbride, and Linnea Mills. 2014. Few and Far: The Hard Facts on Stolen Asset Recovery. DOI: 10.1596/978-1-4648-0274-4.Washington, DC: World Bank and OECD. j. Corruption Risk Management inside Bilateral and Multilateral Development Cooperation Agencies Several indicators where constructed to analyse the policies and mechanisms development cooperation agencies have in place to manage risks of corruption involving aid funds. The indicators show the degree to which bilateral and multilateral development agencies have policies such as: o Codes of conduct o Anti-corruption advisory services to support staff o Training and awareness raising for staff on anti-corruption policies o Corruption reporting/whistleblowing mechanism o Procurement integrity systems o Auditing and investigation o Sanctions and information sharing on sanctioned counterparts o Risk analysis o Risk management/mitigation o Policies for responding jointly with other donors in cases of corruption arising involving international aid Source: Hart, Elizabeth. 2015. Building Donors Integrity Systems: Background Study on Development Practice, Paris, OECD Publishing. 29
k. Transparency and Use of Country Systems The monitoring framework of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation was established in 2012 to support international accountability for making progress in the implementation of the Busan commitments for more effective development co-operation. The framework consists of a set of ten indicators that measure progress in improving the effectiveness of development co-operation in specific areas, such as the transparency and predictability of aid, gender equality and the contribution of the private sector to development. The monitoring applies to all countries members of the GPEDC, including non-oecd member states. Two indicators are relevant as they can contribute to anticorruption efforts: o Transparency: information on development cooperation is publicly available. This measures the state of implementation of the common standard on disclosure of information for co-operation providers; o Effective institutions: developing countries systems are strengthened and used. This measures the quality of developing countries Public Financial Management (PFM) systems. Source: GPEDC. No date. The Monitoring Framework for the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation http://effectivecooperation.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/gpedc-monitoring-framework-10-indicators.pdf 30