SPEECH/08/399 Olli Rehn EU Commissioner for Enlargement The EU from civilian power to premier league security policy player? Forum of Heads of Mission Helsinki 27. Augustus 2008
Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, It is a pleasure and an honour to be here with you in Helsinki to discuss the European Union's foreign and security policy. When I accepted the invitation in the spring, I had no idea just how topical the subject would be today. In recent weeks the Union's foreign policy has once more been seriously put to the test. Many people have wondered (maybe understandably) whether the EU can become a significant security policy player, at least if viewed in terms of the traditional concept of security applied in power politics. It is true that the EU previously the European Economic Community started life as an explicitly civilian power. And the EU continues to draw most of its influence in world politics from the core social and economic areas of Community competence, such as trade policy, the internal market and environmental and consumer legislation. Elsewhere too the EU has relied primarily on soft power, pursuing its objectives by influence rather than by force. Enlargement policy is the EU's most important soft power tool. The power of attraction exerted by the EU has acted as an incentive for stability and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. This process is now continuing in the Western Balkans and Turkey. All EU countries benefit from having neighbours that are stable democracies and functioning market economies. However, the Union has learnt the hard way that it also needs to develop common foreign and security policy tools. At the start of the 90s when war broke out in Bosnia, the EU had neither the power nor the unity to prevent the ethnic cleansing or exert diplomatic clout. Now our common foreign and security policy is in another league. In recent years the EU has acted as a mediator in conflicts not just in the Balkans, but also in the Middle East, in policy towards Iran and, most recently, in Georgia. This work has been carried out according to the situation by the various institutions in different configurations: often involving the High Representative, Javier Solana, sometimes the Member State holding the presidency or the Commission, sometimes the Troika or a group of Member States. Considerable progress has been made in crisis management too.the EU is currently involved in a total of eleven operations, including in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Africa, the Middle East and Afghanistan. Consolidating the Union's foreign policy requires a combination of soft and hard power. That is to say, in addition to soft power, we should use all the "traditional" foreign policy tools and economic resources. This is what Harvard professor, Joseph Nye calls "smart power". Two practical conclusions can be drawn from this. First, the EU's ability to continue to expand the area of peace and freedom in its vicinity should be fostered through both the enlargement and neighbourhood policies. Second, the Union's foreign policy needs to be more determined and united in order for its impact to be felt. Policy towards Russia has been a cautionary tale, highlighting the need for a united front, if the EU is to have any influence in foreign relations. Even if we don't always speak with a single voice, we nonetheless need a common voice. The Lisbon Treaty would help in this respect, by strengthening decision-making under the Union's foreign policy. The High Representative would be given the tools to conduct the Union's foreign policy (chairing the Foreign Affairs Council, common foreign affairs administration) and the resources to carry it out (vice-presidency of the Commission and the political and economic tools). 2
The Western Balkans have become a test case for the EU's foreign policy. Even without the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has taken up the reins in the Western Balkans. We bear the main responsibility for stabilising Kosovo and the entire region. The EULEX operation in Kosovo, which focuses on strengthening the rule of law, is currently the EU's largest non-military crisis management operation. I nonetheless maintain that if the Lisbon Treaty had been in force, the Union's actions in the negotiations on Kosovo's statehood would have been sturdier and produced a better end-result. When the status quo proved to be unsustainable, our aim was to achieve a decision enabling stability to be maintained in the Western Balkans and democracy and European aspirations to be consolidated in Serbia. We have now achieved this objective, although on occasions only by the skin of our teeth. Having said that, things could have gone even worse. And this is, generally speaking, already quite an achievement in foreign policy. It is fair to say that in the Balkans, if nowhere else, the EU has managed to consolidate peace and strengthen democracy. Ladies and gentlemen, The EU s enlargement policy is an integral part of the Union's foreign policy in fact, it is its most effective single instrument. Enlargement policy also involves a historical process which fundamentally shapes the European security system. I am particularly fond of an aphorism by a playwright which I heard in London s West End twenty years ago, expressed by an actor playing Ambassador Yuli Kvitsinski, who negotiated in Geneva on middle-range missiles: History is only stretching geography over time. This is what the EU s enlargement policy is largely about European values and political geography that stretches their scope. The EU s relations with its neighbours to the east and south-east are governed by two policies, which have much in common but differ in one fundamental respect. The European Neighbourhood Policy, for which my colleague Ms. Benita Ferrero- Waldner is responsible in the Commission, applies many of the same instruments as enlargement policy but does not include the prospect of EU membership. In the EU s neighbours to the east and south-east there are growing tensions between the European way of life on the one hand and the authoritarian type of government on the other. The European model is based on democracy and the rule of law, whereas in the authoritarian State representation is largely confined to supporters of the government and there is no proper democratic accountability. It usually draws its political support from nationalism. I would like to give a few examples of this. In the parliamentary elections held in Serbia last May, voters had to choose between a European future and an ultra-nationalist past. A majority of the Serbian population voted for the European way of life that is, for greater freedom, a higher standard of living and peaceful relations with their neighbours. The association agreement signed by the EU and Serbia two weeks before the election date was a strong signal to the Serbian people that the country has a European future. A year ago some distinguished or at least frequently cited analysts threw up their hands in despair, claiming that because of Kosovo Serbia had chosen a different path. According to them, the EU would have to accept an isolationist, pro- Russian, anti-eu Serbia. Nothing more could be done in the short term to change its course. 3
Now these assessments have been shown to be wrong at least for the time being. In July, a government committed to EU membership was formed in Serbia under the auspices of the Democratic Party led by President Boris Tadić. A few weeks after this, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, who is held responsible for the massacre in Srebrenica, was arrested. The arrest of Karadžić shows that the Serbian government is determined to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague. They say that the pessimist is never disappointed, but on the other hand the meek shall inherit the earth. Serbia is now firmly on the road towards the EU. This also demonstrates that the EU particularly needs both meekness and determination when backing stability and reforms in the Balkans. In Turkey, a struggle for political hegemony has been waged in the past few years between the hard-line secularists and the Muslim democrats running the government. This is linked to another struggle, that between the established elite and the rising entrepreneurial and middle classes. Turkey managed to avert a particularly serious political crisis at the end of July, when the Constitutional Court rejected the chief prosecutor's request for a ban on the Muslim democratic AK party and for the expulsion from politics of 71 of its members, including Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Gül. Previously it seemed almost certain that the Court would rule in favour of the ban. The Court's position changed partly as a result of the emergence in Turkey of a collective consensus that imposing a ban would have negative consequences. It was no coincidence that the final decision was so finely calibrated and subtle. The fear that Turkey s negotiations for EU membership would be frozen played no small part in the Court's decision. The EU made it clear that it would not turn a blind eye to events in the candidate country Turkey, but that it would react as the situation required. For the negotiating process to proceed without hindrance, the principles of democracy and the rule of law must be applied in accordance with European standards. Although Turkey expended an enormous amount of time and energy on resolving this crisis, 31 July was a good day for Turkey and Europe. Now is the time to revive the reforms aimed at EU membership as indeed the government has done and to break the year-in-year-out cycle of political crises. Turkey s path to EU membership may be long and rocky, but here, if anywhere, it is true that making the trip is at least as important as reaching the destination. Since the Orange Revolution in 2004 Ukraine has implemented a number of democratic reforms, but much remains to be done. It is important that Ukraine should anchor itself permanently to European values. By achieving this, Ukraine can also give a signal to other countries in the region that change is possible. Our cooperation with Ukraine is based on the European Neighbourhood Policy. Discussion about Ukraine's candidate status is not on the agenda at the moment. That said, we should not say "never" to Ukraine; this unnecessary move would amount to both parties shooting themselves in the foot, weakening the EU s influence and slowing down the pace of reform in Ukraine. 4
Ukraine may be the next focus of political pressure for Russia, whose doctrine of "the near abroad" harks back to the sphere of interest policy of the past. This is why it is important, for the sake of stability, that the EU should deliver a clear political signal that Ukraine's rapprochement towards the EU is possible, provided that Ukraine continues its determined work for reforms promoting European values. This calls for the unity of Ukraine's government and continuous joint endeavours. Talks on a new EU-Ukraine agreement began in February. The intention is to bring matters to a conclusion some time next year. A new agreement will give greater breadth and depth to EU-Ukraine relations through increased dialogue on foreign and security policy and enhanced cooperation in areas such as justice and home affairs, energy, transport and the environment. For Ukraine this will be a further step towards the European way of life. Ladies and gentlemen, The Georgian crisis occurring in the middle of Europe s summer break required immediate action from the EU. I was serving as the on-call Commissioner in Brussels during the week of the conflict and can attest to how quickly the EU pulled together. It was up to Europe to conduct active arbitration; this began as soon as the war broke out, as did humanitarian aid. Foreign ministers Bernard Kouchner and Alexander Stubb received deserved praise for their action. The crisis is, of course, far from being over. Foreign minister Stubb's speech has staked out the future ground to be covered. The Georgian conflict has brought with it a strong reminder of the EU s current major foreign policy challenge: relations with Russia. There are two sides to the relationship between the EU and Russia. The EU is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law, while today s Russia combines features of authoritarian rule with hard-line capitalism. There is greater prosperity and stability, but civil liberties have taken a step backwards. Having said that, the EU and Russia are united by their far-reaching economic interdependence. There were high hopes for President Medvedev following his statements emphasising the rule of law and economic reform and the smooth progress of the EU-Russia summit. The war in Georgia changed (or perhaps clarified) this image. It left nobody in any doubt that Medvedev is implementing Putin-style foreign policy to the letter. The war saw instances of provocation and wrong moves were made. It must still be recognised, however, that Russia used its military might against a sovereign neighbour State and threatened its democratic government. Russia could not bear the idea of NATO expanding into its southern neighbourhood and so deliberately created tensions in the region. Concerns have already been voiced about a new Cold War. I am not convinced that this parallel is correct. Rather than the sustainable balance of the Cold War, Russia seems to be longing for the multi-polar power politics of the 19 th century. Here we have a clash of two different security concepts since the European Union is relying on Community-based security. It had been widely assumed that Russia had become a European state in the sense that it would emphasise political cooperation rather than military power when it came to conflict resolution. As things stand, this assumption now has to be abandoned. 5
The Kremlin seems to consider that the loss of international standing is not important as long as Russians are kept happy and its immediate neighbours remain scared. I am not sure that the Kremlin is on the right track here. Russia may gain some tactical victories, but power politics alone are hardly sufficient for a superpower strategy. At the very least, it will not improve Russia's standing as an international player and it will also have negative consequences for the economy, such as the rapid reduction of the country s foreign exchange reserves we saw last week. The West will have to reassess how to treat Russia in the future. The EU will do that in its summit next Monday. In any case, it seems clear that we cannot continue as if nothing has happened. Ladies and gentlemen, As Finns, we know how important Russia is for Europe and vice versa. We also know that neither confrontation nor wishful thinking is the way forward with Russia. Unfortunately, in recent weeks the room for realistic policy options between these two extremes has become increasingly cramped. It is clear that prolonged confrontation would only mean losses both to Europe and Russia. Whether or not this will be the outcome will largely depend on Russia's actions. The EU has been open to a sustainable partnership with Russia but how can it be in partnership to a country which is prepared to use military power against its democratic neighbours? No sensible European would want a new Cold War. I do not want to put my trust in containment policy, but rather in realism and reciprocity. In the coming weeks, relations with Russia will put the EU's common foreign policy seriously to the test. Whether the EU passes or fails this test, it will be reflected in the EU's activities and very being for years, maybe even for decades to come. Getting through this test is what we need to hope for and, moreover, work for. 6