International Political Economy Semester: Spring 2015 Program: International Master s Program in International Studies (IMPIS) Time: Tuesday, 9:10AM~12:00PM Classroom: TBA Number of Credits: 3 Course Type: Core course, required Instructor: Chienwu (Alex) Hsueh 薛健吾 Email: c.hsueh@nccu.edu.tw Office Hour: Tuesday 2:00~4:00PM, by appointment, or walk-in welcome Course Objectives International Political Economy (IPE) studies the political battle between the winners and losers of global economic exchange, addressing how political factors affect economic outcomes and how economic factors influence political outcomes at both the domestic and the international levels of analysis. Two abstract and considerably broader questions typically shape IPE scholarship. First, how exactly does politics shape the decisions that societies make about how to use the resources that are available to them? Second, what are the consequences of these decisions? Therefore, the mainstream IPE examines the interaction between societal interests and political institutions in order to understand how economic and political policies are ultimately made and how these policies may further shape the welfare of both the society and the state. This course is composed of three parts. The first part provides introduction to the basic background knowledge, which contains the scientific research method and the 1
traditional schools of IPE. The second part introduces important topics of IPE research including international trade system, international monetary system, and multinational corporations (MNCs). The last part addresses contemporary IPE issues such as economic development, economic coercion, foreign aid, and globalization. The students are expected to learn to know how to use IPE theories and analytical frameworks to analyze (describe, explain, and forecast) important developments shaping the contemporary world. Course Description This course will be conducted by the way of flipping classroom. The instructor will teach for the first three weeks, and then his role will switch from the class instructor to the class host from the fourth week. Students will be divided into groups and the groups will compete with one another for points given by the instructor based on their performance. The instructor will grade the groups in rank order by how well they answer the questions on the weekly reading assignment and students presentations in the previous week. The group that gets the lowest score will teach the next class using the materials given by the instructor. The group who gets the highest score becomes the overall champion of the week. At the end of the semester, the group who earns the most championships will enjoy the privilege of not taking the final exam and get the full 40% score. There is a caveat that every student in the group has to answer at least one question correctly so that the score of the group can be considered as valid at the end of the game each week. Course Requirements 1. Presentation: 60%. Because there will be 12 sessions with the lowest scoring group in the previous week doing the presentation, each presentation performance counts as 5%. The members of the groups who do not have to make a presentation during the week automatically get the full 5% score. 2. Final Exam: 40%. The members of the group who wins the most championships automatically receives the full 40% score. Note: 2
1. Students who are enrolled in the class but do not show up in the first week are not allowed to take this class. 2. Students who are absent for more than three weeks are failed automatically with no exceptions. You do not have to ask for leave in advance if you plan to be absent. But you are expected to act responsibly toward your fellow group members. 3. The instructor can and is more than happy to fail students who are not hardworking in their studies. 4. The instructor will ask students who come to class late to sing a song at the beginning of next week s class as punishment. If you are frequently tardy, you will have to sing a song in a second language. 5. This class requires you to do lots of group working, so please do not enroll in this class if you do not feel comfortable with it. 6. To make sure the classes will be productive for everyone, please do not enroll in this class if you do not agree to any of the previous rules and requirements. Supplementary Materials Recommended Textbooks (Not required to buy) Robert Gilpin. 2001. Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Joseph M. Grieco and G. John Ikenberry. 2003. State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy. New York, NY: W. W. Norton. Jeffry A. Frieden, David A. Lake, and J. Lawrence Broz, eds. 2009. International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, 5 th edition. New York, NY: W. W. Norton. Thomas Oatley. 2012. International Political Economy, 5 th edition. New York. NY: Routledge. John Ravenhill, ed. 2014. Global Political Economy, 4 th edition. New York. NY: Oxford University Press. 3
Recommended Journals (you can download the articles for free through NCCU s ip) International Organization Review of International Political Economy Review of International Organizations World Politics New Political Economy Journal of Political Economy The Journal of Economic History Journal of International Economics International Studies Quarterly International Studies Review Comparative Political Studies Journal of Conflict Resolution Journal of Peace Research Conflict Management and Peace Science International Interactions International Security Security Studies Defense and Peace Economics American Political Science Review American Review of Political Science Annual Review of Political Science 4
Foreign Policy Foreign Affairs International Affairs The Economist http://www.economist.com/ The International Interest http://intlinterest.com/ The National Interest http://nationalinterest.org/ 5
Class Schedule (The class schedule is subject to change according to students performance and interest or the instructor s schedule.) Part I: Basic Background Knowledge Week 1: (2/23) Introduction Week 2: (3/1) Scientific Research Method Week 3: (3/8) What Makes the World Tick Part II: Important IPE Topics Week 4: (3/15) Why Hegemony is Important Week 5: (3/22) Why International Regime is Important: Function and Institution Week 6: (3/29) Why International Regime is Important: Complying and Pathology Week 7: (4/5) Compensatory Day-Off, No Class Week 8: (4/12) What are the Determinants of States Trade Policy? (Part I) Week 9: (4/19) Midterm Exam Week (for Flexible Use) Week 10: (4/26) What are the Determinants of States Trade Policy? (Part II) Week 11: (5/3) What are the Determinants of States Trade Policy? (Part III) Week 12: (5/10) What are the Determinants of States Financial Policy? Part III: Contemporary IPE Issues Week 13: (5/17) How Major Powers Win the Wars against Other Major Powers Week 14: (5/24) Is Economic Coercion a Useful Tool? Week 15: (5/31) Is Foreign Aid a Useful Tool? Week 16: (6/7) What is Globalization? Week 17: (6/14) Why are There Contentment and Discontentment with Globalization? Week 18: (6/21) Final Exam 6
Part I: Basic Background Knowledge Week 1: (2/23) Introduction (No classwork.) Week 2: (3/1) Scientific Research Method Topic: Scientific Research Method None Recommended papers: William H. Riker, The Future of a Science of Politics, American Behavioral Scientist 21, no. 1 (September 1, 1977): 11 38. Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, International Organization and the Study of World Politics, International Organization 52, no. 4 (October 1, 1998): 645 85. Jeffrey Frieden and Lisa L. Martin, International Political Economy: Global and Domestic Interactions, in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds. Political Science: State of the Discipline (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company), pp: 118-146. David A. Lake, Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review, Review of International Organizations 4, no. 3 (September, 2009): 219-244. Thomas Oatley, The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy, International Organization 65, no. 2 (Spring, 2011): 311-341. Week 3: (3/8) What Makes the World Tick Topic: Internationalization and Domestic Politics 7
Robert Gilpin, Three Models of the Future, International Organization 29, no. 1 (1975): 37 60. Peter J. Katzenstein, International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States, International Organization 30, no. 1 (1976): 1 45. Peter Alexis Gourevitch, International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 8, no. 2 (1977): 281 313. Peter Gourevitch, The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics, International Organization 32, no. 4 (October 1, 1978): 881 912. Daniel W. Drezner, Globalization and Policy Convergence, International Studies Review 3, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 53 78. Part II: Important IPE Topics Week 4: (3/15) Why Hegemony is Important Topic: Public Goods and the Evolution of the World Trade System Stephen D. Krasner, State Power and the Structure of International Trade, World Politics 28, no. 3 (1976): 317 47. John A. C. Conybeare, Public Goods, Prisoners Dilemmas and the International Political Economy, International Studies Quarterly 28, no. 1 (March 1, 1984): 5 22. Duncan Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, International Organization 39, no. 4 (1985): 579 614. Scott C. James and David A. Lake, The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain s Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846, International Organization 43, no. 01 (December 1989): 1 29. 8
David A. Lake, Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?, International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 4 (1993): 459 89. Week 5: (3/22) Why International Regime is Important: Function and Institution Topic: Prisoners Dilemma and International Trade Cooperation [Book] Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 1984; 2005). Chapter 3, 4, 5, 6. Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 1 24. John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, International Security 19, no. 3 (December 1, 1994): 5 49. Week 6: (3/29) Why International Regime is Important: Complying and Pathology Topic: Why States Cooperate to Supply Global Public Goods Ronald B. Mitchell, Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance, International Organization 48, no. 3 (July 1, 1994): 425 58. Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations, International Organization 53, no. 4 (October 1, 1999): 699 732. Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney, Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform, International Organization 57, no. 02 (March 2003): 241 76. Xinyuan Dai, Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism, International Organization 59, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 363 98. David H. Bearce and Stacy Bondanella, Intergovernmental Organizations, 9
Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence, International Organization 61, no. 4 (October 1, 2007): 703 33. Week 7: (4/5) Compensatory Day-Off, No Class (No classwork.) Week 8: (4/12) What are the Determinants of States Trade Policy? (Part I) Topic: A Society-Centered Approach to Trade Politics John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, International Organization 36, no. 2 (April 1, 1982): 379 415. Michael J. Hiscox, Class versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade, International Organization 55, no. 1 (2001): 1 46. Jude C. Hays, Sean D. Ehrlich, and Clint Peinhardt, Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis, International Organization 59, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 473 94. Sean D. Ehrlich, Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies, International Organization 61, no. 3 (July 1, 2007): 571 605. Benjamin O. Fordham and Katja B. Kleinberg, How Can Economic Interests Influence Support for Free Trade?, International Organization 66, no. 02 (April 2012): 311 28. Week 9: (4/19) Midterm Exam Week (for Flexible Use) (No classwork.) 10
Week 10: (4/26) What are the Determinants of States Trade Policy? (Part II) Topic: A State-Centered Approach to Trade Politics Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, International Organization 42, no. 3 (July 1, 1988): 427 60. Judith Goldstein and Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, International Organization 54, no. 3 (July 1, 2000): 603 32. Helen V. Milner and Keiko Kubota, Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries, International Organization 59, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 107 43. Daniel Yuichi Kono, Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. American Political Science Review 100(3) (August 2006): 369 84. Wen-Chin Wu, When Do Dictators Decide to Liberalize Trade Regimes? Inequality and Trade Openness in Authoritarian Countries, International Studies Quarterly 59, no. 4 (December 1, 2015): 790 801. Week 11: (5/3) What are the Determinants of States Trade Policy? (Part III) Topic: International Integration and Regionalism Anne O. Krueger, Are Preferential Trading Arrangements Trade-Liberalizing or Protectionist?, The Journal of Economic Perspectives 13, no. 4 (1999): 105 24. Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, The New Wave of Regionalism, International Organization 53, no. 3 (July 1, 1999): 589 627. Edward D. Mansfield and Eric Reinhardt, Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements, International Organization 57, no. 4 (October 1, 2003): 829 62. [Book] Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, Votes, Vetoes, and the Political 11
Economy of International Trade Agreements (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012). Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. Week 12: (5/10) What Are the Determinants of States Financial Policy? Topic: A Society-Centered Approach to Monetary and Exchange-Rate Policies Jeffry A. Frieden, Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance, International Organization 45, no. 4 (1991): 425 51. Benjamin J. Cohen, The Triad and the Unholy Trinity: Lessons for the Pacific Region, in Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict?, 1993, 133 58. David M. Andrews, Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of International Monetary Relations, International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 2 (1994): 193 218. William Bernhard and David Leblang, Democratic Institutions and Exchange-Rate Commitments, International Organization 53, no. 1 (January 1, 1999): 71 97. Jeffry A. Frieden, Globalization and Exchange Rate Policy, in The Future of Globalization: Explorations in Light of Recent Turbulence, 2007, 344 57. Part III: Contemporary IPE Issues Week 14: (5/17) How Major Powers Win the Wars against Other Major Powers Topic: A State-Centered Approach to Monetary and Exchange-Rate Policies Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, The 12
Journal of Economic History 49, no. 04 (December 1989): 803 32. Nathan Sussman and Yishay Yafeh, Institutions, Reforms, and Country Risk: Lessons from Japanese Government Debt in the Meiji Era, The Journal of Economic History 60, no. 02 (June 2000): 442 67. David Stasavage, Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 18, no. 1 (April 1, 2002): 155 86. Quan Li, Democracy, Autocracy, and Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investment, Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 8 (August 1, 2009): 1098 1127. Daniel W. Drezner, Bad Debts: Assessing China s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics, International Security 34, no. 2 (2009): 7 45. Week 15: (5/24) Is Economic Coercion a Useful Tool? Topic: The Political Economy of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) R. Harrison Wagner, Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence, International Organization 42, no. 3 (July 1, 1988): 461 83 Robert Mark Spaulding, German Trade Policy in Eastern Europe, 1890-1990: Preconditions for Applying International Trade Leverage, International Organization 45, no. 3 (July 1, 1991): 343 68. [Book] Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Chapter 1. Daniel W. Drezner, The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion, International Organization 57, no. 3 (July 1, 2003): 643 59. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Alexander H. Montgomery, Power or Plenty: How Do International Trade Institutions Affect Economic Sanctions?, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 213 42. 13
Week 16: (5/31) Is Foreign Aid a Useful Tool? Topic: Resource Curse Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?, Journal of Economic Growth 5, no. 1 (2000): 33 63. Michael D. McGinnis, Policy Substitutability in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: A Model of Individual Choice and International Response, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 1 (February 1, 2000): 62 89. Randall W. Stone, The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa, The American Political Science Review 98, no. 4 (November 1, 2004): 577 91. David H. Bearce and Daniel C. Tirone, Foreign Aid Effectiveness and the Strategic Goals of Donor Governments, The Journal of Politics 72, no. 03 (July 2010): 837 51, Sarah Blodgett Bermeo, Foreign Aid and Regime Change: A Role for Donor Intent, World Development, Expanding Our Understanding of Aid with a New Generation in Development Finance Information, 39, no. 11 (November 2011): 2021 31. Week 13: (6/7) What is Globalization? Topic: Financial Crises Geoffrey Garrett, Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?, International Organization 52, no. 4 (October 1, 1998): 787 824. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Globalization: What s New? What s Not? (And So What?), Foreign Policy, no. 118 (2000): 104 19. Moisés Naím, The Five Wars of Globalization, Foreign Policy, no. 134 (2003): 28 37. Nancy Brune and Geoffrey Garrett, The Globalization Rorschach Test: International Economic Integration, Inequality, and the Role of Government, Annual Review of Political Science 8, no. 1 (2005): 399 423 14
Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett, Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism, International Organization 60, no. 4 (2006): 781 810. Week 17: (6/14) Why are There Contentment and Discontentment with Globalization? Topic: International and Global Governance Papers for Discussion (pick up to five): Robert O. Keohane, Governance in a Partially Globalized World Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 2000, The American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (March 1, 2001): 1 13. Helen V. Milner, Globalization, Development, and International Institutions: Normative and Positive Perspectives, Perspectives on Politics null, no. 04 (December 2005): 833 54. Erik Wibbels, Dependency Revisited: International Markets, Business Cycles, and Social Spending in the Developing World, International Organization 60, no. 02 (April 2006): 433 68. Mark M. Gray, Miki Caul Kittilson, and Wayne Sandholtz, Women and Globalization: A Study of 180 Countries, 1975 2000, International Organization 60, no. 02 (April 2006): 293 333. Dani Rodrik, How to Save Globalization from Its Cheerleaders?, The Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy 1, no. 2 (Fall, 2007): 1 33. Lloyd Gruber, Globalisation with Growth and Equity: Can We Really Have It All?, Third World Quarterly 32, no. 4 (May 1, 2011): 629 52. Daniel W. Drezner, The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked, An IIGG Working Paper, Council on Foreign Relations Press (2012). Week 18: (6/21) Final Exam (No classwork.) 15