Supreme Court of the United States

Team: R7 Docket No. 16-01 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States WYATT FORBES, III, V. TEXANSAS, PETITIONER, RESPONDENT. On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Texansas BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT i

TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.iv, v, vi QUESTIONS PRESENTED...vii STATEMENT OF THE CASE.1 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS... 1, 2 PROCEDURAL HISTORY. 2 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.. 3 ARGUMENT. 4 I. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROHIBIT SENTENCING A CHILD TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE.. 4 A. Under This Court s Proportionality Approach, A Sentence Of Life Without Parole For Juvenile Offenders Is Not Cruel And Unusual...5 1. There Is A National Consensus In Support Of The Constitutionality Of Life Without Parole Sentences For Juvenile Offenders 5 2. Independent Judicial Analysis Substantiates The Constitutionality Of Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentences... 7 B. The Court's Originalist Approach Used To Determine What Constitutes Cruel And Unusual Punishment Equally Exemplifies That Life Without Parole Sentences For Juvenile Offenders Is Constitutional...9 C. Life Without Parole Sentences For Juvenile Offenders Does Not Equate To The Death Penalty.10 II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROHIBIT A COURT FROM SENTENCING A JUVENILE OFFENDER TO LIFE WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE FOR A FELONY MURDER CONVICTION...11 A. There Is No Categorical Bar On Life Without Parole Sentences For Juveniles Convicted Of Homicide Offenses. 13 ii

1. The Defendant s Sentence Comports With The Guidelines Mandated By Miller In Order To Sentence A Juvenile Offender To LWOP...14 B. It is Not Cruel and Unusual Punishment To Sentence A Juvenile Offender To LWOP For A Felony Murder Conviction 15 C. The Court Should Allow The States To Continue To Enact Their Own Criminal Justice Systems In Regards To Juvenile Offenders Who Commit Homicide Offenses...17 1. The Court Should Ignore The Decisions Of International Law In Regards To The Sentencing Of Juvenile Offenders 19 CONCLUSION 20 iii

Cases TABLE OF AUTHORITIES United States Supreme Court Cases Page(s) Atkins v. Virginia, 535 U.S. 304 (2002). 4, 6, 7 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993)...17 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)...passim Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).. 11, 13, 18 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) 4, 9, 11, 18 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) 10 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).10 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 544 U.S. 407 (2008)..5, 7, 8, 11 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)... 12 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)..passim New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)...18 Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009)..13 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)..13 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)...6 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) 3, 5 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980)..18 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1988).7, 11, 13 S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012).18 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987)...8, 12, 16, 17 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)..4, 5, 19 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) 4, 11 iv

United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978)..18 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878). 11 United States Court of Appeals Cases U.S. v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2013)..6 US. v. Shill, 740 F.3d 1347 (9th Cir. 2014) 5 State Court Cases State v. Audette, 149 Vt. 218 (1988)...17 Forbes v. Texansas, 123 Texansas 1 (2015) passim State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 2015)...14 United States Constitution U.S. Const. amend. VIII...passim State Statutes Texansas Penal Law 125 (2016).. 16 Texansas Penal Law 160 (2016)..16 Texansas Penal Law 300 (2016).15 Secondary Sources ACLU, Is Life In Prison Without Parole A Better Option Than The Death Penalty? Pro Con (April. 2013).. 11 Brittany Bostic, Reducing Recidivism For Juvenile Offenders, Michigan Youth Violence Prevention Center (March. 2014) 8 David R. Dow, Life Without Parole: A Different Death Penalty, The Nation (Oct. 2012) 10 Joshua Dressler & Stephan P. Garvey, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law 308 (Jesse H. Choper et al. eds., 6 th ed. 2006)..12 Joshua Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, The Sentencing Project (Feb. 2016).........6 v

Nicole D. Porter, The State Of Sentencing 2014: Developments In Policy And Practice, The Sentencing Project (2015)...6 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 1.5(a) (4th ed. 2003)..8 vi

QUESTIONS PRESENTED I. Whether the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on a juvenile violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. II. Whether such sentence violates the Eighth Amendment when it is imposed on a juvenile offender for a homicide offense that does not require the prosecution to prove that the juvenile intended to kill the victim. vii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS The petitioner, Wyatt Trey Forbes III, is a 14-year old juvenile offender who comes from an affluent family. Forbes v. Texansas, 123 Texansas 1. His family owns an oil refinery and resides in the wealthy Texansas suburb of Eagle Heights. Id at 3. His grandfather is Wyatt Forbes Sr., a three-term congressman. Id at 3. Despite his comfortable upbringing, the petitioner is no stranger to law enforcement. Id. Prior to this case, the petitioner has experienced multiple run-ins with law enforcement. Id. The petitioner had been arrested multiple times for both disorderly conduct and shoplifting. Id. However, due to his youth and his family s influence, he was released to his parents custody on both occasions and was never formally charged with these crimes. Id. On the afternoon of October 1, 2014, the petitioner met up with his friends at a local park. Id. While at the park, the petitioner and his friends ingested synthetic cathinone, otherwise known as bath salts. Id. Petitioner had stolen these bath salts from a local convenience store. Id. Petitioner then left his group of friends, hoping to steal more bath salts from the same convenience store. Id. Before entering the store, petitioner disguised himself by pulling the hood of his sweatshirt over his head, while carrying several items in his backpack that could be used as dangerous weapons, including a large screwdriver and a Japanese martial art instrument known as nunchuks. Id at 3-4. Petitioner had used the screwdriver to pry open the vending machines at his school and had been trying to learn how to use the nunchucks. Id. at 3-4. Despite petitioner s attempts at disguise, the store clerk recognized him and chased him away from the store, as the clerk was well aware of the petitioner s penchant for shoplifting. Id at 4. The petitioner then remained in the general vicinity of the convenience store, hiding in a nearby alley. Id at 4. 1

At 8:30 P.M., Pamela Taylor drove her car into the parking lot of the convenience store. Id at 4. Pamela ran into the store to purchase diapers for her six-month old daughter Madison. Id. Pamela left the vehicle s engine running so as not to disturb Madison, who slept soundly in her car seat. Id at 4. Petitioner, who had witnessed Pamela enter the parking lot, then jumped into Pamela s vehicle and sped away, with Madison still sleeping in her car seat. Id. The police were alerted, and eventually found the petitioner driving north on Main Street, a busy commercial street in the town. Id. When the police turned on their sirens to instruct the defendant to pull over, the defendant led the police into a high-speed chase, reaching a speed of 120 miles per hour. Id. While driving at this high rate of speed, the defendant lost control of the vehicle and struck an oncoming car. Id. The vehicle rolled over several times. Id. The defendant was ejected from the vehicle, and suffered a broken collarbone. Id. Madison Taylor, Pamela s six-month old daughter, died as a result of her injuries. Id. PROCEDURAL HISTORY The defendant was arrested and charged with first-degree robbery, first degree kidnapping and murder in the second degree, pursuant to Texansas s felony murder statute. Id. at 4-5. In response to the immense public outcry over the crime, the defendant was tried as an adult in Texansas state court, and was convicted after a jury trial. Id. at 4-5. At the defendant s sentencing hearing, the court heard testimony from psychiatrists, psychologists, and school officials regarding the circumstances of the defendant s youth. Id. at 5. The State also presented victim impact testimony from the parents of Madison Taylor. Id. After the hearing, the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id. The defendant then appealed this decision, claiming that the sentence was facially invalid. Id. The Appellate Court denied his appeal. Id. This court then granted certiorari. Id. 2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT I. The Supreme Court of Texansas correctly held that the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution does not prohibit life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders. After reviewing prior precedent, the Texansas Supreme Court correctly noted that life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders is not a method of punishment that should be deemed cruel and unusual. Additionally, the Eighth Amendment should not bar this form of sentencing, as it is constitutional under this Court's proportionality approach. Pursuant to this Court's holding in Graham v. Florida, life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders is a proportional punishment because (1) objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice support a national consensus in favor of this practice; and (2) an independent judicial review supports its constitutionality. Lastly, a life without parole sentence is not analogous to sentencing the juvenile to death, and thus this form of punishment cannot be held unconstitutional under Roper v. Simmons. II. The Supreme Court of Texansas correctly held that the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution permits life without parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders, irrespective of whether the prosecutor must prove intent. Pursuant to this court s holding in Miller v. Alabama, a court may impose a life without parole sentence for a juvenile offender, as long as an individual determination has been made as to the defendant's culpability. Furthermore, a juvenile offender who commits felony murder possesses the requisite mens rea to be sentenced to life without parole due to the underlying predicate offense. Because this practice comports with current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence coupled with the fact that criminal sentencing is primarily within the province of state regulation, this court should affirm the Texansas Supreme court on this issue. 3

ARGUMENT I. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROHIBIT SENTENCING A CHILD TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE. The Eighth Amendment states, excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. This latter portion of the amendment, known as the cruel and unusual punishments clause, has served as a check on federal and state government disciplinary power. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) ( [W]hile the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards. ). The Eighth Amendment officially applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). This court has articulated two strands of reasoning as to what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The first interpretation of this clause focuses on the proportionality between the punishment and the crime committed. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) ( [T]he Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments is the precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense ); see Atkins v. Virginia, 535 U.S. 304, 311 (2002). The second strand of reasoning distilled from this language is that the clause precludes any method of punishment that was considered cruel and unusual at the time the amendment was ratified. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976 (1991) ( [T]he [Eighth Amendment] disables the Legislature from authorizing particular forms or modes of punishment specifically, cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or customarily employed. ). Thus, the text and original meaning surrounding the passage of the amendment are the principal focus in this context. Id. at 965. Under both of these approaches, the 4

imposition of a sentence of LWOP for juvenile offenders is permitted under the Eighth Amendment. A. Under This Court's Proportionality Approach, A Sentence Of Life Without Parole For Juvenile Offenders Is Not Cruel And Unusual. This Court has interpreted the cruel and unusual punishment clause in part by examining the proportionality between the offense committed and punishment imposed. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010) ( [T]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment. ). In this context, proportionality is shaped by the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 101; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005). This Court has engaged in a two-step analysis to determine whether a punishment, specifically a categorical rule of punishment, is proportional to a certain offense. Graham, 560 U.S. at 59. First, the Court considered objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice to determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue. Id. As for the second prong of the two-step analysis, the Court then conducted an independent determination as to whether the punishment in question violated the Constitution. Id.; see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 544 U.S. 407, 461 (2008). Under this two-step approach, the imposition of LWOP for juvenile offenders is proportional and thus constitutional under the Eighth Amendment. 1. There Is A National Consensus In Support Of The Constitutionality Of LWOP Sentences For Juvenile Offenders. The first step in determining whether a punishment is proportional to a certain offense, is by considering objective indicia of society s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice to determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue. United States v. Shill, 740 F.3d 1347, 1350 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 147 (2014) 5

( [W]hen identifying the types of crimes or types of offenders for which a sentence is categorically disproportionate, we must first consider objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice to determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue. ); see also United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204, 213 (2d Cir. 2013). In the context of LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders, there is clear national consensus in support of this form of punishment. Despite this Court s recent decisions regarding juvenile punishment, an overwhelming majority of 34 states still permit the imposition of LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders. Joshua Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, The Sentencing Project (Feb. 2016), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_juvenile_life_without_parole.pdf; see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 ( The clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures ) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)). Although many state legislatures have reformed various aspects of the juvenile penal system, the imposition of LWOP on juveniles is still permitted in 34 states. See Nicole D. Porter, The State Of Sentencing 2014: Developments In Policy And Practice, The Sentencing Project (2015), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/sen_state_of_sentencing_2014.pdf; see also Rover, supra at 3. For example, a number of states have passed legislation, which enables their courts to focus on treatment rather than punishment for low-risk youths in need of care. Id. at 5. There are also a large number of states that are seeking to expand community-based alternatives as opposed to detention, in hopes of redirecting resources to practices proven to reduce recidivism. Id. at 13. Despite these reforms, 34 states still permit the imposition of LWOP on juvenile offenders. Therefore, while reform has been robust, a national consensus still supports 6

LWOP for these particular criminals. 2. Independent Judicial Analysis Substantiates The Constitutionality of Juvenile LWOP Sentences. Community consensus, while entitled to great weight, is not itself determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. Graham, 560 U.S. at 67. Rather, in conformity with constitutional design, the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains with the judiciary. Id. Specifically, judges must consider the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question. Id; see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983). Additionally, the Court must also consider whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317. A consideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue along with the severity of the punishment in question supports the constitutionality of this sentence. The common rhetoric that jurists use to support juvenile sentencing reforms is that as compared to adults, these individuals have a lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68. Additionally, these same proponents argue that juveniles are more vulnerable and susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures. Id. While these arguments may be valid in the context of non-homicide crimes, this court has admitted, there is a line between homicide and other serious violent offenses against the individual. Kennedy, 544 U.S. at 449. This is because life is over for the victim of the murderer, whereas even for a very serious non-homicide crime, life is not over and normally is not beyond repair. Id. at 68. From this, it is clear that although juveniles have a diminished sense of culpability in some settings, it would be inherently wrong to hold that LWOP sentences for such individuals is always unconstitutional. There are situations where this form of sentencing is warranted, and we cannot grant juveniles a complete shield to punishment due to a lacking of maturity. 7

The penological justifications for the sentencing practice, namely retribution, deterrence and incapacitation also support its constitutionality. Id. For instance, at the heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 149. Additionally, retribution is grounded on the fact that defendants are expected to give up something to pay for the offenses they commit. See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 442 (the goal of retribution is [S]eeing that the offender is repaid for the hurt he caused ). Accordingly, LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders are necessary when certain crimes are committed. Society must be reminded that although the death penalty may not imposed on juvenile offenders, see Roper, 543 U.S. at 575, this form of punishment will be imposed when a particularly heinous crime is committed, or, as is the case here, when an innocent victim s life has been taken. Additionally, the justification of deterrence also supports this type of sentence. Under this justification, the punishment of a criminal for a crime committed deters others from committing that same crime lest they suffer the same fate. Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 1.5(a) at 27 (4th ed. 2003). This court has noted that while juveniles possess certain characteristics rendering them less capable than adults, juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence. Id. at 571. However, if courts are disabled from sentencing juveniles to LWOP, these offenders will have much more confidence in committing particularly heinous crimes. It doesn t take a criminal to understand that when penalties are relaxed, unlawful behavior ensues. Lastly, the goal of incapacitation supports the constitutionality of this sentence. The rationale of incapacitation provides that society may protect itself from dangerous persons with prior criminal conduct by isolating them from other members of society. LaFave, supra at 27. Although there is no national recidivism rate for juveniles (because juvenile justice systems vary 8

across states), the juvenile recidivism rates of several states display that this is a serious problem. Brittany Bostic, Reducing Recidivism For Juvenile Offenders, Michigan Youth Violence Prevention Center (March. 2014), http://yvpc.sph.umich.edu/exploring-rehabilitation-programsjuvenile-criminal-offenders/. Populous states like New York, Florida and Virginia recorded that 55% of juvenile offenders were rearrested within 12 months of being released from prison. Id. Additionally, in states such as Florida, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Virginia and Georgia, 33% of juveniles were actually reconvicted and sent back to jail. By forbidding the imposition of LWOP, this Court will effectively be striking a blow to society s right to protect itself from criminal actors. B. The Court's Originalist Approach Used To Determine What Constitutes Cruel and Unusual Punishment Equally Exemplifies That LWOP Sentences For Juvenile Homicide Offenders Is Constitutional. The second approach for determining what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to the Eighth Amendment is by consulting the text and original meaning of the amendment at the time of its ratification. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 976. In Harmelin, the petitioner claimed his sentence of LWOP was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment because it was grossly disproportionate to his offense, the distribution of narcotics. Id. at 960. Writing for the majority, justice Scalia disagreed, citing the amendment's text and original meaning. Id. Beginning with the text, the justice noted that while the amendment received little attention during the proposal and adoption of the Federal Bill of Rights, the view at its inception was that, the cruel and unusual punishments clause was directed at prohibiting certain methods of punishment. Id at 958 (emphasis added). In order to shed more light on what methods he was referring to, justice Scalia provided a number of examples of punishment in concluding that a 9

LWOP was not a method of punishment in the Amendment s purview. Id. at 981 ( [M]aiming, mutilating and scourging to death, are wholly alien to the spirit of our humane general constitution ) (quoting B. Oliver, The Rights of An American Citizen 186 (1832)); see Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002). With that being said, the text and original meaning of the Eighth Amendment permits the imposition of a LWOP sentence for juvenile offenders. Such a sentence is not transformed into a torturous punishment just because it pertains to a younger class of criminals. The cruel and unusual punishments clause is focused on methods of punishment that are particularly inhumane and barbarous, reminiscent of sentences imposed by the Star Chamber Court of England. See In re Kemmler 136 U.S. 436 (1890). That is certainly not what is occurring in this context. Juvenile defendants are not tortured through this form of punishment, and all constitutional limitations are absolutely abided by. Overall, when looking through a historical prism in determining whether the Eighth Amendment bars life without parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders, the answer is in the negative. C. LWOP Sentences For Juvenile Offenders Does Not Equate To The Death Penalty. This court has previously held that execution of individuals who were under 18 years of age at time of their capital crimes is prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575. While some argue that a life without parole sentence is indistinguishable from the death penalty, David R. Dow, Life Without Parole: A Different Death Penalty, The Nation (Oct. 2012) ( Life without parole denies the possibility of redemption every bit as much as strapping a murderer to the gurney and filling him with poison ), the two methods of punishment are extremely different. 10

Besides the fact that in the context of LWOP, the defendant continues to live, there are other stark differences between the two forms of punishment. For instance, the American Civil Liberties Union has pointed out that the death penalty costs more, delivers less, and puts innocent lives at risk. ACLU, Is Life In Prison Without Parole A Better Option Than The Death Penalty? Pro Con (April. 2013) http://deathpenalty.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionid=001017. Additionally, the organization has noted that LWOP sentences provide justice to survivors of murder victims and allow more resources to be invested into solving other murders and preventing violence. Id. This court has even conceded that a death sentence is unique in its severity and irrevocability, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Overall, these two forms of sentencing are distinct and independent from one another, and it would be incorrect to group them together for purposes of determining constitutionality. II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROHIBIT A COURT FROM SENTENCING A JUVENILE OFFENDER TO LWOP FOR A FELONY MURDER CONVICTION. The Eighth Amendment has long provided the citizens of this country resolute protection from inhumane punishments and criminal sentences, particularly when the facts and circumstances deem a sentence disproportionate. See, e.g., Solem 463 U.S. at 290; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373-78 (1910); see also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2040 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment); Harmelin 501 U.S. at 996-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). While this court has held that certain punishments are prohibited under the Eighth Amendment (Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878)) (drawing and quartering, public dissection, and disembowelment were cruel and unusual forms of punishment under the Eighth Amendment), LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders have never been deemed to be 11

cruel and unusual under the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, even when a juvenile is convicted without the prosecutor needing to prove intent. In recent years, this court has addressed the issue of juvenile sentencing on several occasions. See Roper, 43 U.S. at 575 (juvenile offenders may not be sentenced to the death penalty); Graham 560 U.S. at 74 (juvenile offenders may not be sentenced to LWOP for nonhomicide offenses); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012) (juvenile offenders may not be sentenced to LWOP based off of a mandatory sentencing scheme). While these decisions place constitutional ceilings on the type of punishment imposed on a juvenile offender, none of these holdings categorically ban the use of LWOP for juveniles convicted of homicide offenses, which include non-intent homicide offenses such as felony murder. Additionally, this Court does not require judges to impose the least severe punishment available, but rather any punishment that is not deemed cruel and unusual. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. In Miller, this court analyzed its prior holding in Tison to determine whether a juvenile offender could be sentenced to the harshest of punishments for a felony murder charge. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2476. Offenders that commit felonies that result in the deaths of others can be shown to possess the requisite culpability to be sentenced to LWOP. Tison, 481 U.S. at 158. Further, this Court has never invalidated a life sentence for felony murder on the sole basis that the intent to murder is not inherent in the charge of felony murder. States are permitted to enact felony murder statutes and sentence defendants accordingly. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978). The felony murder doctrine, developed through common law and embodied in statutes across the country, provides that where a death occurs in the commission of or as a consequence of the commission of another felony, the felonious intent inherent in the underlying felony is transferred to provide the intent to kill that is required to distinguish the death as a 12

murder. Joshua Dressler & Stephan P. Garvey, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law 308 (Jesse H. Choper et al. eds., 6 th ed. 2006). Additionally, this Court should not forbid states from enacting and administering their own criminal justice systems. See Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 168 (2009) (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977) ( [A]dministration of a discrete criminal justice system is among the basic sovereign prerogatives States retain. ). Traditionally, the Court has deferred the role of crime and punishment to state legislatures. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176. The court should not diverge from this long-standing precedent and should continue to allow states to dictate their own penological goals in regards to juvenile offenders. A. There Is No Categorical Bar On The Imposition Of LWOP Sentences For Juveniles Convicted Of Homicide Offenses. The Eighth Amendment s cruel and unusual punishment clause prohibits barbaric punishments and sentences grossly disproportionate to the crime committed. Solem, 463 U.S. 277 at 305. In light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, the defendant s sentence is not cruel and unusual under the meaning of the Eighth Amendment because he has been convicted of a homicide offense. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. In addition, a court is not precluded from sentencing a juvenile offender convicted of a homicide offense to LWOP as long as certain requirements are met; i.e., that the determination is made after a sentencing hearing allowing for the review of testimony concerning mitigating factors of youth and other circumstances surrounding the case. Id. There is a clear-cut difference between those crimes that result in the death of another human being and those that do not. Graham, 560 U.S. at 69 ( In terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, non-homicide crimes cannot be compared to murder in their severity and irrevocability. ). This method of punishment for a homicide offense is not 13

cruel and unusual because society is entitled to impose severe sanctions on an offender to express its condemnation of the crime and to seek restoration of the moral imbalance caused by the offense. Id. at 71. The only instance in which the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing a juvenile offender convicted of a homicide offense to LWOP is when the offender is sentenced pursuant to a mandatory sentencing scheme. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. This court has not placed a categorical ban on this sentence, and therefore the imposition of LWOP is permissible in the present case. The defendant s conduct of leading a high-speed chase in a stolen vehicle while under the influence of bath salts directly led to the death of six-month old Madison Taylor. Forbes, 123 Texansas at 3. The defendant was convicted in a jury trial, and was sentenced to LWOP after the judge heard testimony from both the State and the defendant. Id. at 5. Therefore, because this Court has never imposed a categorical bar on LWOP, the imposition of LWOP for homicide offenses not requiring the prosecution to prove intent does violate the Eighth Amendment. 1. The Defendant s Sentence Comports With The Guidelines Mandated By Miller In Order To Sentence A Juvenile Offender To LWOP. This court s holding in Miller stipulates that in order for a judge to sentence a juvenile to LWOP, the judge must determine that the juvenile is irreparably corrupt and incapable of rehabilitation. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 573). While the imposition of a LWOP sentence on a juvenile is rare, a court is not precluded from making the judgment that the juvenile offender in question is the rare offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption. Miller, 132 S. Ct at 2469; see State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 555-556 (2015). Prior to sentencing a juvenile, the court imposing the sentence must take into account a myriad of factors before imposing a punishment, such as the offender s youth and attendant characteristics. Miller, 14

132 S. Ct at 2468. Once a court has considered these factors, it may then decide whether or not the offender is irreparably corrupt, and then whether or not to sentence the juvenile to LWOP. In the present case, the defendant was convicted of the murder of a six-month old child. Forbes, 123 Texansas at 4. His actions directly led to the death of that child and he was acting alone at the time of accident. At his sentencing hearing the judge heard testimony regarding the extenuating circumstances of the defendant s youth, including testimony from psychiatrists, psychologists, and school officials, as well as victim impact testimony. Id. at 5. It is important to recognize that the defendant s case represents the rare instance in which LWOP should actually be imposed on a juvenile defendant. The majority of juvenile offenders who are subjected to the possibility of LWOP are found to come from broken homes and rough upbringings. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. In contrast, the defendant comes from an extremely wealthy and affluent family, where he has likely been afforded opportunities in life not available to the majority of juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP. See Forbes, 123 Texansas at 4. Despite enjoying this privilege, the defendant had been in trouble with law enforcement on several occasions, and each time, he was given a second chance and not charged. Id. at 3. The court in the present case followed all these guidelines before sentencing the petitioner to LWOP. Even though the judge could have given him a lesser sentence, he decided to impose the harshest sentence possible, which he had the right to do. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. ( We do not foreclose a sentencer s ability to make that judgment in a homicide case. ); see also Texansas Penal Law 300 (2016). The court in this case followed the principles established in Miller and decided that the defendant was irreparably corrupt and deserving of LWOP. B. It is Not Cruel and Unusual Punishment To Sentence A Juvenile Offender To LWOP For A Felony Murder Conviction. A juvenile offender who commits felony murder possesses the required culpability to be 15

sentenced to LWOP because inherent in any felonious activity is the foreseeability of death. Graham, 560 U.S. at 69. A juvenile offender who has been convicted of a felony murder charge can be sentenced to LWOP if the offender was a major participant in the felony committed and showed a reckless indifference to human life. Tison, 481 U.S. at 158. Those whose felonious actions lead to the death of another do not have a diminished moral culpability because the felony murder rules in this country function on a theory of transferred intent. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2476 (Bryer, J., and Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) ( this rule has been based on the idea of Transferred Intent ; the defendant s intent to commit the felony satisfies the intent required for murder ). This Court has never held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the sentencing of LWOP on juveniles convicted of certain types of homicide offenses. This Court s decisions in Graham and Miller do not single out specific types of homicides in terms of LWOP sentencing for juveniles. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 ( Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime. ). To require a decreased punishment for a person convicted of felony murder would constitute a fundamental misunderstanding of the felony murder rule. In Texansas, a person is guilty of felony murder when they commit or attempt to commit robbery, burglary, or kidnapping, and in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he causes the death of a person other than one of the participants. Texansas Penal Law 125 (2016). In the present case, the defendant was convicted of firstdegree robbery because he forcibly stole Pamela Taylor s automobile while in possession of a dangerous weapon, a pair of nunchucks. Forbes, 123 Texansas at 4. The defendant committed first-degree kidnapping under the meaning given to it by Texansas Penal Law 160 when he abducted Madison Taylor, thereby causing her death. Under the laws of Texansas, the defendant 16

was properly convicted. Under the guidelines set forth by this Court s holding in Tison, the defendant satisfies the first prong of being a major participant in the felony. He was the only participant in the felony, in that he chose to steal a car with Madison Taylor in it, and then drove that car at incredibly high speeds while attempting to flee from the police. Forbes, 123 Texansas at 5. In addition, his actions fit the second guideline set forth in Tison, which mandates that the offender show a reckless indifference to human life. Tison, 481 U.S. at 152. The defendant ingested a dangerous substance that he knew could cause him to act recklessly. Forbes, 123 Texansas at 3. Despite this knowledge, the defendant committed the theft of the vehicle and led police on a high-speed chase while an innocent baby was sleeping in the backseat. Id. at 4. His actions clearly constituted a conscious disregard for the value of human life. It should be noted that kidnapping in and of itself is a general intent crime. State v. Audette, 149 Vt. 218, 543 A.2d 1315 (1988). Crimes of general intent do not require that the defendant have a specific mens rea when committing the offense. Dressler at 158. The court in the present case followed these standards, which this court has recognized as fitting within the meaning of Miller and therefore should not be considered cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the court should hold that it is not cruel and unusual for the petitioner to be sentenced to LWOP even though the prosecution did not have to prove intent. C. The Court Should Allow The States To Continue To Enact Their Own Criminal Justice Systems In Regards To Juvenile Offenders Who Commit Homicide Offenses. The Court should respect the sovereignty of the states and continue to allow the states to enact their own criminal justice schemes in regards to juvenile offenders. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) ( States possess the primary authority for defining and enforcing criminal law within their borders. ). State legislatures and Courts are the most 17

equipped to determine the methods of punishment best suited to reduce the amount of criminal activity within their borders. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978) ( [S]tate and federal government each have the power, inherent in any sovereign, independently to determine what shall be an offense against its authority and to punish such offenses ). To thrust a specific and constrained sentencing scheme for juvenile offenders on the states would represent an overreaching of this Court into an area that is traditionally reserved for the discretion of the states. See Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 at 176. A state s ability to sentence its own citizens should be inclusive of all those who violate their own state laws, whether they are over the age of 18 years old or below it. State courts are not required to turn over the administration of their own criminal justice systems to the auspices of nine justices in Washington. See S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2361 (2012) ( The administration of a discrete criminal justice system is among the states most basic sovereign prerogatives. ); see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980) ( [F]or crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, that is, as punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a [state] penitentiary, the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative. ). To do so would frustrate each state s sovereign power to punish those who commit offenses within their borders, as well as trample upon the liberties of individuals that the sovereignty was meant to protect. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992). The states themselves are best suited to decide whether or not they wish to subject juvenile offenders to LWOP for homicide offenses because they are more in tune with the needs of their own criminal justice systems and understand which deterrents are the strongest. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 71 ( Criminal punishment can have different goals, and choosing among 18

them is within the legislature s discretion. ) (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999). Conversely, those states that currently do not impose this type of sentencing for juvenile homicide offenders may decide that the imposition of LWOP is necessary as a deterrent to curb certain criminal activity. This judicial overreach has the potential to invalidate well-settled criminal justice systems in states across the country. By deeming a sentencing scheme in compliance with the Constitution and recent Supreme Court jurisprudence unconstitutional, this court will effectively be drafting its own criminal legislation. The State of Texansas followed the guidelines set forth in Miller before sentencing the petitioner to LWOP. Forbes, 123 Texansas at 5. To punish the State for complying with this Court s own guidelines by taking away its ability to punish its own citizens could potentially create a dangerous precedent in the area of state sovereignty. Criminal justice affects every type of citizen within a state s confines. Even though juveniles do not posses the mental ability and culpability of adults (See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464), the results of their crimes are very much the same. Therefore, this Court should continue to allow the states to enact and proscribe their own systems of criminal justice in regards to juvenile offenders. 1. The Court Should Ignore The Decisions Of International Law In Regards To The Sentencing Of Juvenile Offenders. This court should refrain from applying international law to the issue at hand. The societal goals and social mores of the international community are not wholly reflective of those in our nation, and should not be relied upon in making judgments concerning the citizens of the United States. The meaning that cruel and unusual punishment has under the Eighth Amendment must be drawn from our own standards of decency, and not those of other nations. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. The penal goals of a foreign nation are not necessarily analogous with our own, and do 19

not always reflect the evolving standards of decency within our own borders. Therefore, this court should not allow the decisions of foreign countries to influence its decision in regards to the sentencing of juvenile offenders. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texansas should be affirmed. 20