GOVERNMENT 426 CONFLICT & COOPERATION IN WORLD POLITICS Spring 1996 Tuesday 2:15-4:05 p.m. Healy 106 Professor Joseph Lepgold Professor George Shambaugh ICC 665 ICC 674A phone: 687-5635 phone: 687-2979 office hrs: MTW 4:15-5:00 p.m. office hrs: TR 11:40-12:30 email: jlepgold@guvax email: shambaug@gunet How difficult is cooperation in world politics? Cooperation -- which is often understood to mean policy coordination to achieve jointly preferable objectives -- is often more common than pessimistic Realists expect, but often more difficult than optimistic Liberals expect. What explains why stable patterns of agreements and collaboration are achieved in some areas, while in others it is difficult for states to work together? This course addresses these questions through a combination of theoretical arguments and substantive case studies. Class time will be divided among lectures and extensive discussions. Efforts will be made to incorporate insights from the political economy, security, and the general international relations literatures. REQUIRED BOOKS AND OTHER READINGS Benjamin Miller, When Opponents Cooperate (Michigan, 1995) Kenneth Oye, ed. Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, 1986) Arthur Stein, Why Nations Cooperate (Cornell, 1990) Janice Stein and Louis Pauly, eds., Choosing to Cooperate (Johns Hopkins, 1993) Steve Weber, Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control (Princeton, 1991) Other readings have been placed on reserve at Lauinger, and are designated in the course outline by *. REQUIREMENTS AND GRADING You will be asked to write 3 papers of not more than 7 double-spaced pages each, which will each count for 30% of your grade. Papers will be due March 6, April 10, and May 1. Class participation will count for the remaining 10% of your grade. Course grades will be determined jointly by both professors. Feel free to see either or both of us about any issue of concern.
2 TOPICS AND SCHEDULE Overview (January 16) 1. The Conflict-Cooperation Spectrum (January 23) Stein, Why Nations Cooperate, chapter 1 *Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," International Organization Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984) 2. Relative Gains, Realism, and Cooperation (January 30) *Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978) *Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994) *John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95) *Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991) 3. Strategic Interaction Approaches (I): Strategic Interaction and the Use of Game Theory (February 6) Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy," in Oye, ed. Snidal, "The Game Theory of International Politics," in Oye, ed. Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy," in Oye, ed. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate, chapters 2, 4-7 4. Strategic Interaction Approaches (II): Two-Level Games and Reciprocity (February 13) *Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," International Organization Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988) *Robert O. Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," International Organization Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1986) *Beth V. Yarbrough and Robert M. Yarbrough, "Reciprocity, Bilateralism, and Economic 'Hostages': Self-Enforcing Agreements in International Trade," International Studies Quarterly Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 1986)
3 *Russell Leng, "Reciprocating Influence Strategies in Interstate Crisis Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1993) 5. Strategic Interaction Approaches (III): Discussion of Cases (February 20) Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert," in Oye, ed. Stephen Van Evera, "Why Cooperation Failed in 1914," in Oye, ed. George W. Downs, et al., "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Oye, ed. John Conybeare, "Trade Wars," in Oye, ed. Charles Lipson, "Bankers Dilemmas," in Oye, ed. *Howard P. Lehman and Jennifer L. McCoy, "The Dynamics of the Two-Level Bargaining Game," World Politics Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992) 6. Psychological Approaches (I): Arguments (February 27) Stein, Why Nations Cooperate, chapter 3 *Richard K. Herrmann and Michael P. Fischerkeller, "Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive-Strategic Research After the Cold War," International Organization Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995) Janice Gross Stein, "International Cooperation and Loss Avoidance," in Stein and Pauly, eds., Choosing to Cooperate Timothy J. McKeown, "Decision Processes and Cooperation in Foreign Policy," in Stein and Pauly, eds., Choosing to Cooperate 7. Psychological Approaches (II): Discussion of Cases (March 5) Michael Mastanduno, "Framing the Japan Problem," in Stein and Pauly, eds. Choosing to Cooperate Deborah Spar, "Co-developing the FSX Fighter," in Stein and Pauly, eds. Choosing to Cooperate Louis Pauly, "The Political Foundations of Multilateral Economic Surveillance," in Stein and Pauly, eds.,choosing to Cooperate David A. Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint," in Stein and Pauly, eds., Choosing to Cooperate
4 Louise Richardson, "Avoiding and Incurring Losses," in Stein and Pauly, eds., Choosing to Cooperate Paper Topic 1 Your first paper is Due on March 6 at 5:00 p.m. in Professor Lepgold's mailbox. The strategic interaction approach to understanding international cooperation, especially when combined with the substantive assumptions about actors' utilities made by Realists, produces implicit assumptions about actors' abilities to calculate their objectives and strategies. Are these assumptions about political leaders' abilities to reason "realistic," given our understanding of cognitive processes? Given your answer to this question, what are the implications for the prospects for conflict or cooperation? Your paper should address the following issues: (a) What assumptions do Realists make about actors' abilities to calculate their utilities and strategies in a situation where cooperation is possible but not guaranteed? (b) In your judgement, are these assumptions "realistic"? How so or not? And what difference does your answer make? (c) Use a case (one we have covered or one you know from some other source) to illustrate your argument. March 12 -- No Class (Spring Break) 8. Institutional Approaches (I): Regimes and Multilateralism (March 19) *Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987) *Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," in Friederich Kratochwil and Edward Mansfield, eds., International Organization: A Reader *Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as an Intervening Variable," in Kratochwil and Mansfield, eds., International Organization *John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in Kratochwil and Mansfield, eds., International Organization *Friederich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State," in Kratochwil and Mansfield, eds., International Organization
9. Institutional Approaches (II): International Relations as an Institutionally Modified Anarchy (March 26) 5 *Ernst Haas, "Collective Conflict Management: Evidence for a New World Order," in Kratochwil and Mansfield, eds., International Organization *Inis Claude, "Collective Legitimization as Political Function of the United Nations," in Kratochwil and Mansfield, eds., International Organization *Roger Coate and Donald Puchala, "Global Policies and the United Nations System: A Current Assessment," in Kratochwil and Mansfield, eds., International Organization *Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough, "International Institutions and the New Economics of Organization," in Kratochwil and Mansfield, eds., International Organization 10. Knowledge and Expertise Based Approaches (I): Arguments (April 2) *Ernst Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," International Organization Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992) *Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International Organization Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992) *Emmanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," International Organization Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992) *Peter M. Haas and Ernst B. Haas, "Learning to Learn: Improving International Governance," Global Governance Vol. 1 (1995) 10. Knowledge and Expertise Based Approaches (II): Discussion of Cases (April 9) *Emmanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," International Organization Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992) *M. J. Peterson, Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management of Whaling," International Organization Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992) *G. John Ikenberry, "A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo- American Postwar Settlement," International Organization Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992)
6 Paper Topic 2 Your second paper is due April 10 at 5:00 p.m. in Professor Shambaugh's mailbox. Rationalists and what Keohane calls "reflectivists" have very different conceptions of the role and impact of international institutions in managing conflict and facilitating cooperation. Yet both see "knowledge" or professional expertise as potentially important in shaping the way issues and options for action are defined. Choose a contemporary international policy issue (not one we have read about) and assess whether or how knowledge or expertise mattered in producing agreement to act together. Your paper should address the following issues: (a) Can knowledge or expertise make it easier for international institutions to manage conflict or promote cooperation in your case? If so, how? (b) Does your case support rationalist or reflectivist assumptions? Why? 11. Cooperation on Security Issues (I): Great Power Relationships (April 16) Benjamin Miller, When Opponents Cooperate (entire) 12. Cooperation on Security Issues (II): Arms Control (April 23) Steve Weber, Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control (entire) 13. What Forms Do Agreements Take? (April 30) *Charles Lipson, "Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?," International Organization Vol. 45, No. 4 (Autumn 1991) *Anthony Aust, "The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments," International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 35 (October 1986) Paper Topic 3 Your third paper is due May 1 at 5:00 p.m. in Professor Shambaugh's box. (Both professors will grade a portion of these papers.) Partly as a response to the Bosnian peacekeeping mission, NATO's relationship with Russia is being redefined as a mix of cooperative and conflictual elements. If you were a policy advisor to President Clinton, how would you advise him to try to structure this relationship for the foreseeable future? Specifically, what elements of the NATO- Russia relationship should be formally structured, and which elements should be
7 structured informally? What is the reasoning behind your recommendations? Refer explicitly to Lipson, Aust, and our discussion of these works. Your paper should address the following issues: (a) What specific substantive issues are likely to arise in the NATO-Russian relationship for the foreseeable future? (b) What are the benefits and limitations to structuring each of these problem areas formally as opposed to informally? (c) What are the benefits and limitations to the United States of the alternative approaches?