1800 K Street, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1.202.775.3270 Fax: 1.202.775.3199 Email: acordesman@gmail.com Web: www.csis.org/burke/reports Afghanistan: Violence, Casualties, and Tactical Progress: 2011 Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy November 10, 2011 www.csis.org
Kinetic Gains and Casualty Estimates New OSD reports claim insurgent momentum reversed. Show continuing tactical gains in the South, uncertain or no progress in the East. ISAF and UN estimates of patterns of violence and casualties differ sharply. ISAF only releases detailed data on threat activities, not ISAF attacks. No data released on increases or decreases in areas of insurgent influence. No detailed analysis of lower levels of insurgent violence and intimidation. ISAF data on insurgent cadre losses do not show losses relative to total strength, or analyze impact on insurgency. Sanctuaries in Pakistan are described as critical limit to ISAF operations but are not analyzed. One outside estimate claims that ISAF raids are key source of civilian casualties, but treats insurgents as civilians. 2 2
ISAF Concept of Operations: 2011 ISAF s spring and summer-fall operations focused on consolidating and expanding the gains made against the insurgency in the winter campaign of 2010-2011. In particular, ANSF-ISAFefforts expanded security in the south through Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, as well as in the east from Kabul into surrounding districts and provinces, including Wardak and Logar Provinces. Further, operations reinforced and expanded security in Kunduz and Baghlan Provinces in the north and Faryab and Baghdis Provinces in the west. Complementing conventional military operations throughout the country, U.S. and ISAF Special Operations Forces maintained a high operational tempo and continued their strategy of counterterrorism network targeting to help expand existing security zones. ISAF s operations during the reporting period were executed within the existing key terrain and area of interest strategic framework. To ensure that limited resources were applied to areas that would realize the greatest advantage and to better prioritize coalition operations, 94 key terrain districts (KTD) and 44 area of interest districts (AOI) were identified in agreement with the Afghan Government. Key terrain is defined as areas the control of which provides a marked advantage to either the Afghan Government or the insurgency. AOI districts, though of secondary importance to KTDs, are areas in which ISAF and the ANSF operate in order to positively shape KTDs to meet operational objectives. Source: DoD/OSD, Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan, pp. 61-62 3
Insurgent Focus Areas (Spring-Summer 2011) The Taliban s spring campaign, Operation al Badr, began on May 1, 2011. The campaign focused on regaining lost safe havens in Helmand and Kandahar; reasserting dominance in Khost, Paktika, and Paktia Provinces; conducting high-profile attacks in Kabul; and expanding the insurgency into Regional Commands West and North. Badr summer fighting campaign faced significant challenges, particularly in the south and Southwest. The combination of their unsuccessful spring campaign and the ongoing success of ANSF-ISAF operations has led to significant discontent within the Taliban-led insurgency. Friction between Pakistan-based senior Taliban leaders and Afghan-based commanders remains and is occasionally highlighted by a disparity between senior Taliban leaders guidance and the Afghanbased commanders willingness or ability to successfully implement the guidance. However, the disconnect between Pakistan-based leadership and Afghan-based commandersmust not be overstated; Afghan-based insurgents have historically operated with a degree of autonomy, which allows them to tailor guidance to their local conditions. For the remainder of 2011, the Taliban-led insurgency s main effort will focus on regaining control of safe havens and population centers in Helmand and Kandahar. Southern Afghanistan remains vital to the insurgency; the Quetta Shura, the Taliban s Pakistan-based leadership council, continues to be dominated by Kandahari leaders, and the nexus between narcoticsrelated financial interests and the insurgency further compound the importance of the region. Beyond southern Afghanistan, Kabul remains a persistent strategic target for highprofile attacks and assassination attempts. The Haqqani Network s main effort will be to re-exert dominance in Khost, Paktika, and Paktia Provinces, while continuing efforts to expand the influence of their network both geographically and across the spectrum of insurgent and terrorist organizations. It will also continue to target Kabul with high-profile attacks in an effort to maintain its influence on the reconciliation process. Insurgent leaders will also continue their attempts to expand the insurgency to Regional Commands West and North; however, these regions will remain supporting efforts to the main focus areas of southern, southwestern, and eastern Afghanistan. Source: DoD/OSD, Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan, pp. 60-61 4
Improvements in GIROA Control: June 2010 vs. June 2011 JUNE 2010 JUNE 2011. Source: IJC July 2011. This slide demonstrates clear improvements in overall GIRoA control in Central Helmand River Valley in RC South West, P2K region of RC East ad the Baghlan Kunduz Corridor in RC North. 5
Shortfalls in Civil Servants as a Governance Indicator (Percent Shortfall by Province). 6 As of September 18, 2011, 60% of civil servant positions were fi led in the 14 most insecure provinces, according to USAID. Southern and eastern provinces faced the most difficulties in staffing. This is an improvement from April 2011, when 50% of positions were filled. Lack of security and candidates lack of experience and education continued to pose challenges in filling local positions. To overcome these challenges, USAID supports local and regional recruiters in running job fairs. Training is taking place at provincial-level offices so that new civil servants can be trained promptly in their job roles. In addition, qualification standards are being amended to ensure that more Afghans are able to apply to civil service positions. According to USAID, the implementation by the United States and the Afghan government of the Insecure Provinces Recruitment Strategy helped fill 1,565 tashkil positions from April 1 to September 30, 2011 more than expected. The strategy is intended to boost Afghan government service delivery. Gains were concentrated in provinces that held job fairs. USAID noted that the Afghan government was beginning to implement pay and grading reforms that address the relatively low salaries for some skilled positions. The Civil Service Commission was becoming more responsive to issues associated with the timeliness of salary payments. In addition, to encourage the promotion and retention of women, the commission was planning to establish a professional development center for female civil servants. Source: SIGAR, Report to the US Congress, October 31, 2011, pp. 88-89
Unknown Progress in Security by Area: Internal UN Estimate Lags Back to October 2010. Source: Yarislov Trofimof, UN Maps Out Afghan Security, Wall Street Journal, December 26, 2010 7
Unknown Progress in Security by Area: UN Estimate of January 2010. Source: New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/09/12/world/asia/20100912-afghan-indicators.html 8
UNDOC Warning That Progress in Narcotics Remains Uncertain Source: UNDOC, Afghan Opium Survey, Summary Findings, p. 5. 9
Mission Improbable: ISAF Goals for Stable Areas by March 2012 Before President s July Reduction Announcement Source: ISAF and Center for a New American Security, June 2011 10
ISAF Estimate of Enemy Initiated Attacks: 10/2009-9/2011 (Monthly Year Over Year Change) Although security continues to improve, the insurgency s safe havens in Pakistan, as well as the limited capacity of the Afghan Government, remain the biggest risks to the process of turning security gains into a durable, stable Afghanistan. The insurgency remains resilient, benefitting from safe havens inside Pakistan, with a notable operational capacity, as reflected in isolated high-profile attacks and elevated violence levels in eastern Afghanistan. Nevertheless, sustained progress has provided increased security and stability for the Afghan population and enabled the beginning of transition in July of security responsibilities to Afghan forces in seven areas, comprising 25 percent of the Afghan population. The most significant development during this reporting period is the reduction in year-over-year violence. After five consecutive years where enemy-initiated attacks and overall violence increased sharply each year (e.g., up 94 percent in 2010 over 2009), such attacks began to decrease in May 2011 compared to the previous year and continue to decline Source: DoD/OSD, Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan, pp. 1-2 11
ISAF Estimate of Security Incidents by Regional Command: 10/2009-9/2011 Source: DoD/OSD, Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan, pp. 75-76 As a result of ANSF-ISAF operations, violence in RC-SW continues to decrease, particularly in central Helmand Province, which was the first area to receive surge forces last year. In the districts of Marjeh, Nad Ali, and Garm Ser, violence during the summer fighting season dropped by approximately 70 percent in comparison to the same period last year. Violence in RC-SW during the last three months of the reporting period was 27 percent lower than last year at this time, and continues to drop. Violence levels in RC-S appear to be following a similar pattern to RC- SW, likely reflecting the later flow of surge troops into the region. These trends, however, remain nascent. Violence in RC-E remains 16 percent higher for the summer fighting season compared to 2010, with the most notable changes in the provinces of Ghazni (11 percent increase in violence), Logar (76 percent increase), and Wardak (19 percent increase) due to ongoing clearance operations. The availability of safe havens in Pakistan has enabled this increase in violence, and violence levels are expected to remain high throughout the remainder of 2011. More than 68 percent of nationwide indirect fire attacks are reported in RC-E. 12
ISAF Estimate of Insurgent Violence 10/2009-9/2011 In Afghanistan, violence and security incidents tend to increase with the spring and summer months and decrease during the fall and winter months. Thus, comparing data season-to-season, as opposed to across continuous periods of time, offers the most accurate basis for sound assessments of violence trends. Security incidents include direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire, and IED events. IED events include IED explosions, IEDs found and cleared, mine explosions, and mines found and cleared. While violence in Afghanistan remains high, 16 of the last 20 weeks in this reporting period witnessed a decrease in nation-wide enemy-initiated attacks when compared to the same period in 2010. Through the end of September, enemy-initiated attacks in Afghanistan were five percent lower than the same period in 2010. Much of the decrease in attacks is due to significantly less direct fire attacks compared to last year, down 40 percent from the same time period last year. Source: DoD/OSD, Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan, p. 73 13
ISAF Estimate of Security Incidents by Key Mode of Attack: 10/2009-9/2011 The high-operational tempo has kept the insurgency off-balance during the fighting season, evidenced by the sharp decrease in complex and coordinated attacks this year compared to 2010. The number of complex and coordinated attacks for the last three months of this reporting period was nearly half of that observed in 2010; complex and coordinated attacks in the summer fighting season of 2011 were only four percent higher than those reported during the same period in 2009. In addition to the ongoing ANSF-ISAF conventional operations, persistent, precise Special Operations Forces strikes have removed a number of mid-level insurgent leaders, which has severely degraded the insurgency s capacity and capability to launch deliberately planned complex and coordinated attacks. The insurgency increased their use of IEDs during the reporting period, as IEDs are an efficient and effective weapon to target ANSF-ISAF operations and to avoid decisive engagement in order to preserve rank-and-file fighters. Year-to-date IED figures for 2011 indicate that IED activity has increased by 22 percent compared to 2010. Despite the increase in IED activity, however, IED strikes increased only five percent during the period of January September when compared to the same period in the previous year. The smaller increase in IED strikes relative to IED activity is attributable to a much greater increase in IEDs found and cleared without explosion; 55 percent of planted IEDs were found and cleared during this year s fighting season, up 10 percent from last year. This improvement is a result of the increase in assistance from the local Afghan population. Tips reported by Afghan civilians have increased nearly three-fold since last year, especially in regions where security gains have been reinforced with effective governance and stabilizing development efforts. The overall improvement of the ANSF, particularly in counter-ied capabilities, has also contributed to the increase in the IED found-and-cleared rate. Source: DoD/OSD, Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan, pp. 76-77 14
Putting Afghan Violence in Perspective: 2006 2010 Iraq vs. Afghanistan: People Killed, Injured, or Kidnapped in Acts of Terrorism, and %of Worldwide Total Source SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, October 30, 2011, p. 58 15
ISAF Estimate of Civilian Casualties 10/2009-9/2011 Prvious trends in civilian casualties continued during this reporting period, with civilians primarily being killed and wounded by insurgent-emplaced IEDs. From January to September 2011, the insurgency caused 80 percent of civilian casualties. Of the year-to-date civilian casualties caused by insurgents, more than 70 percent were caused by IEDs. ISAF-caused civilian casualties from January to September 2011 remain unchanged from the same period in 2010, despite a significant increase in ISAF operations Source: DoD/OSD, Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan, p. 73 16
ISAF Civilian Casualties: A Contrary View (Note: Counts Insurgents as Civilians) WASHINGTON, Nov 2, 2011 (IPS) - U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) killed well over 1,500 civilians in night raids in less than 10 months in 2010 and early 2011, analysis of official statistics on the raids released by the U.S.-NATO command reveals. That number would make U.S. night raids by far the largest cause of civilian casualties in the war in Afghanistan. The report by the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan on civilian casualties in 2010 had said the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) by insurgents was the leading cause of civilian deaths, with 904. Except for a relatively few women and children killed by accident, the civilians who died in the raids were all adult males who were counted as insurgents in press releases and official data released by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The data on night raids, which were given to selected news media, cover three distinct 90-day night raid campaigns from May through July 2010, early August to early November, and mid-november to mid- February. The combined totals for the three periods indicate that a minimum of 2,599 rank and file insurgents were killed and an additional 723 "leaders" killed or captured in raids. Assuming conservatively that one-third of the alleged leaders were killed, the total number of alleged insurgents killed in the raids was 2,844. ISAF has leaked a set of statistics on insurgents killed in night raids published in major news outlets covering three 90- day campaigns of night raids. In August 2010, ISAF released figures to the Washington Post showing that 1,031 rank and file insurgents had been killed from May through July. In November 2010 the New York Times reported a total of 968 rank and file insurgents killed in the three months from Aug. 11 through Nov. 11. Reuters reported on Feb. 24, 2011 that 600 people were killed during the 90 days from Nov. 18 to Feb. 18. The figure did not distinguish between rank and file and "leaders". Those three subtotals add up to 2,599 killed from May 2010 to mid-february 2011. The Washington Post and New York Times articles also reported 355 and 368 "leaders" killed or captured during the May-July and August-November periods, totaling 723. An unknown proportion of that total was deliberately assassinated. Nevertheless, it is assumed in estimating the number killed in the raids that the proportion of alleged "leaders" killed to the total killed and captured in the first two campaigns was the same as the proportion of rank and file killed of the total killed and captured: 34 percent of 723, or 245. The sum of the totals of 2,599 alleged insurgents and 245 alleged "leaders" assumed to have been killed in the raids comes to 2,844. The total number or SOF night raids can be estimated from officially leaked subtotals of 3,000 from May through July; 1,572 from Aug. 11 to Nov. 11, and 1,710 from Nov. 18 to Feb. 18. Those subtotals add up to 6,282 night raids for the entire 10 months. SOF night raids during the 10-month period totaled 6,282, according to the same ISAF data. A third crucial statistic, repeated frequently by U.S and NATO officials in 2010 and 2011, is that shots were fired by SOF units in only 20 percent of night raids. A U.S. military source who has been briefed on SOF operation confirmed to IPS what has been generally known among outside observers that anytime shots are fired by SOF troops in a night raid, someone is killed. If shots were fired in 20 percent of the 6,282 raids, it means that 2,844 were killed in 1,256 raids. With very rare exceptions, night raids target only individuals rather than groups. They are carried out at night because they are aimed at catching the individual at home asleep and therefore taken completely by surprise. Therefore, a minimum of 1,588 people (2,844 total killed minus the 1,256 targets in the lethal raids) were killed in the raids even though they weren't targeted. Not every one of the untargeted individuals killed in night raids was a noncombatant civilian. But the socio-cultural and physical setting of the raids guarantees that the percentage of civilians in that total is extremely high. Within the Afghan compounds that are the physical targets of U.S. night raids live extended family households that normally include not only the male head of family and his wife, but his brothers, sons and cousins and their families. In Afghanistan, every adult Pashtun male has a weapon in his home, and is obliged by the ancient code of conduct called "Pashtunwali" to defend his home, his family and his friends against armed intruders. In a typical extended family compound, several males have weapons. As a result, the non-targeted civilians killed in night raids have invariably been either close relatives or neighbours who have come out to assist against an armed assault. SOF commanders and the command and staff of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have essentially denied all civilian deaths in night raids, except for women and children, by counting all adult males killed in raids as insurgents. That ISAF policy has been confirmed to IPS by a U.S. military source briefed on the operational aspects of the raids. But in the Pashtun zones of Afghanistan, contacts with Taliban commanders and other Taliban figures are nearly universal, according to Michael Semple, former deputy EU representative in Afghanistan and a leading specialist on the Afghan insurgency. In addition, SOF commanders have begun consciously targeting individuals who were not believed to be insurgents but who were believed to have provided moral or material support, or to have intelligence information about them. That targeting shift, acknowledged by military officials to the authors of a recent study by the Open Society Foundations and The Liaison Office, was reflected in an 82-percent increase in the number of people seized in raids and detained briefly during the August- November campaign, compared with the May-July campaign. Those detainees were also counted as insurgents in the data released to the news media, despite the fact that up to 90 percent of them were released as civilians within days or months, as IPS reported last June. Some of those targeted civilians were killed in raids when they appeared to challenge the SOF intruders, adding to the 1,588 non- targeted individuals killed in the raids. However, estimating the additional toll of civilians is impossible. 17 Source: Excerpted from ISAF Data Show Night Raids Killed over 1,500 Afghan Civilians Analysis by Gareth Porter*
UN Estimate of Security Incidents: 2003 to 3/2011 Source: UNDOC, Afghan Opium Survey, Summary Findings, p. 25. 18
UNAMA Estimate of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan (First Six Months of Year) Air strikes remained the leading cause of Afghan civilian deaths caused by Pro-Government Forces; all aerial attacks25 in Afghanistan are carried out by ISAF. In the first six months of 2011, 79 civilian deaths were attributed to air strikes, a 14 percent increase compared to the first half of 2010. This increase is associated with a greater number of civilian deaths resulting from aerial attacks by Apache helicopters. For all of 2010, 33 percent of civilian deaths from air strikes were attributed to aerial attacks by Apache helicopters (56 of a total 171 deaths). In the first half of 2011, civilian deaths attributed to aerial attacks by Apache helicopters were already at 56 percent of the total number of civilian deaths from air strikes for this period (44 of a total 79 deaths). Civilian casualties from ground combat and armed clashes increased over the first six months of 2011. Ground combat resulted in 304 civilian deaths and 354 injuries, a 36 percent increase in deaths and an eight percent increase in total civilian casualties from ground combat compared to the same period in 2010. UNAMA documented 188 civilian deaths from ground combat by AGEs, 66 to PGF and 50 civilian deaths from crossfire. Two percent of all civilian casualties occurred as a result of night raids, down slightly from the first half of 2010.27 UNAMA documented 30 civilian deaths and 14 injuries during night raid operations. However, resentment regarding these raids grew among the Afghan population. Violent demonstrations sometimes followed night raids and led to deaths and injuries of civilians, as when police opened fire on protestors in Nangarhar province, Kandahar city and Taloqan city after night raids caused civilian casualties. Source: UNMA, http://unama.unmissions.org/default.aspx?tabid=4652, p. 3. 19
UNAMA Estimate of Civilian Deaths and Injuries in Afghanistan (First Six Months of Year) Air strikes remained the leading cause of Afghan civilian deaths caused by Pro-Government Forces; all aerial attacks25 in Afghanistan are carried out by ISAF. In the first six months of 2011, 79 civilian deaths were attributed to air strikes, a 14 percent increase compared to the first half of 2010. This increase is associated with a greater number of civilian deaths resulting from aerial attacks by Apache helicopters. For all of 2010, 33 percent of civilian deaths from air strikes were attributed to aerial attacks by Apache helicopters (56 of a total 171 deaths). In the first half of 2011, civilian deaths attributed to aerial attacks by Apache helicopters were already at 56 percent of the total number of civilian deaths from air strikes for this period (44 of a total 79 deaths). Civilian casualties from ground combat and armed clashes increased over the first six months of 2011. Ground combat resulted in 304 civilian deaths and 354 injuries, a 36 percent increase in deaths and an eight percent increase in total civilian casualties from ground combat compared to the same period in 2010. UNAMA documented 188 civilian deaths from ground combat by AGEs, 66 to PGF and 50 civilian deaths from crossfire. Two percent of all civilian casualties occurred as a result of night raids, down slightly from the first half of 2010.27 UNAMA documented 30 civilian deaths and 14 injuries during night raid operations. However, resentment regarding these raids grew among the Afghan population. Violent demonstrations sometimes followed night raids and led to deaths and injuries of civilians, as when police opened fire on protestors in Nangarhar province, Kandahar city and Taloqan city after night raids caused civilian casualties. Source: UNMA, http://unama.unmissions.org/default.aspx?tabid=4652, p. 3. 20
UNAMA Estimate of Civilian Deaths by Tactic (First Six Months of Year) The mounting toll of civilian casualties in the first six months of 2011 represents a deepening entrenchment of violence in the everyday lives of Afghans.28 With responsibility for security transitioning from international military forces to Afghan forces in several parts of the country in July, violence rose as Anti-Government Elements sought to demonstrate that Afghan security forces could not manage security on their own. Combined with the efforts of various armed groups to undermine peace and reconciliation, the rising tide of violence and bloodshed in the first half of 2011 brought injury and death to Afghan civilians at levels without recorded precedent in the current armed conflict. In addition to changes in tactics, new locations were targeted by Anti-Government Elements in the first half of 2011. UNAMA documented the first confirmed cases of attacks against two hospitals, which are in principle protected places under international humanitarian law. The Taliban claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on a military hospital in Kabul on May 21 that killed six students from the medical faculty and wounded 23 others. UNAMA documented a second attack on a hospital on June 25, when a suicide attacker detonated explosives at a civilian hospital in Azra district, Logar province, killing 20 including 13 children lined up to receive vaccinations and injuring 43, many of whom were women and children. UNAMA documented tactics used by the Taliban to coerce civilians to support them. For example, in addition to the fear created through IED attacks, targeted killings and other deliberate attacks against civilians, the Taliban continued to use intimidation tactics such as night letters, verbal threats, abduction and illegal check points to force communities to support them. In May, threats against civilians associated with the Government of Afghanistan surfaced in Logar, Nuristan, Kunar, Nangarhar, Sari Pul, and Ghor provinces, with reports of Taliban carrying out abductions, restricting freedom of movement and sending night letters warning civilians to resign from their jobs. UNAMA notes that while Taliban messaging about reducing civilian casualties improved in the first half of 2011, as seen in several statements released by the Taliban in April and May, a corresponding improvement in compliance with international humanitarian law and an actual reduction in civilian casualties from improved targeting practices did not occur.29 The Taliban continued to deliberately target and kill civilians, and Anti-Government Elements used a large and increasing number of indiscriminate weapons, in particular pressure plate IEDs. These IEDs that function like anti-personnel landmines cannot discriminate between a military and a civilian target and are therefore illegal weapons. Source: UNMA, http://unama.unmissions.org/default.aspx?tabid=4652, pp. 4-5 21
UNAMA Estimate of Civilian Deaths from Anti-Government Elements (First Six Months of Year) The first half of 2011 was marked by another increase in civilian casualties caused by Anti-Government Elements. Between 1 January and 30 June 2011, 2,927 civilian casualties were attributed to anti-government elements, with 1,167 civilian deaths and 1,760 injuries. This represents an increase of 21 percent in civilian deaths and injuries attributed to antigovernment elements from the same period in 2010. Deaths linked to anti-government elements rose to 80 percent of all civilian deaths, compared with 72 percent for the same period in 2010. The main causes were an increase in civilian deaths from suicide attacks and ground combat, a continued campaign of targeted killings and increased use of improvised explosive device attacks. IEDs were the single largest killer of civilians in the first half of 2011, killing 444 civilians and comprising 30 percent of all civilian deaths in Afghanistan and 38 percent of all civilian deaths attributed to the anti-government elements. They caused 1,254 civilian casualties including 444 deaths and 810 injuries. This is a 21 percent increase in total civilian deaths and injuries from improvised explosive devices compared to the same period in 2010. IEDs were often placed where civilians are likely to be harmed by them; along busy roads and in commercial areas like bazaars. This affects not only civilian lives but civilian livelihoods, killing and injuring civilians, potentially removing an earner from a family, affecting freedom of movement due to fear of IEDs, and destroying business property and goods. The widespread use of these indiscriminate weapons by anti-government elements in such obviously civilian areas demonstrates an unwillingness to distinguish between civilians and military targets. Insurgents continued to carry out suicide attacks in populated areas. Suicide attacks saw the largest percentage increase in civilian casualties over last year s numbers at this time, with a 52 percent increase in civilian deaths compared to 2010. Suicide attacks caused 19 percent of all civilian deaths and 26 percent of civilian injuries. Suicide attacks caused 831 civilian casualties comprising 276 deaths and 555 injuries. This is a 28 percent increase in total civilian deaths and injuries from suicide attacks compared to the same period in 2010. Source: UNMA, http://unama.unmissions.org/default.aspx?tabid=4652, pp. 10-15 22
UNAMA Estimate of Targeted Killings by Anti-Government Elements (First Six Months of Year) Targeted killings (or assassinations) and attempted killings remained steady over last year s numbers at the same time. They caused 233 civilian casualties including 190 deaths and 43 injuries. This is a five percent increase in total civilian deaths from targeted killings compared to the same period in 2010 when anti-government elements assassinated 181 civilians. Anti-government elements engaged in a systematic and widespread campaign of intimidation by carrying out targeted killings against those civilians perceived to support the Afghan government or international military forces. Off-duty police, members of peace councils, tribal elders, and fighters trying to reintegrate into Afghan society were some of the groups and individuals singled out in targeted killings. Anti-government elements also targeted high-level political and police officials including members of provincial councils, chiefs of police, governors and other high-level political figures. UNAMA highlights the vulnerability of former combatants who have joined the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP). For example, anti-government elements shot and killed eight recently reintegrated men in two separate incidents in the northeast region in May. Targeted killings affect Afghan society and violate human rights in ways that go far beyond the deaths of those targeted. These killings violate the right to life and deter civilians from exercising their basic human rights to security, freedom of expression and rights to political participation, and the right to work and to education. This suppression of rights has severe political, economic and social consequences as it impedes governance and development, and hinders the process of transition. Source: UNMA, http://unama.unmissions.org/default.aspx?tabid=4652, pp. 10-15 23
UNAMA Estimate of Civilian Deaths and Injuries from Pro- Government Forces (First Six Months of Year) Between 1 January and 30 June 2011, 345 civilian casualties were attributed to Pro-Government Forces, including 207 civilian deaths and 138 injuries. This represents an 11 percent decrease in overall civilian deaths and injuries attributed to Pro-Government Forces compared to the same period in 2010. Deaths by pro-government forces were down nine percent and injuries decreased 13 percent compared to the first half 2010. Airstrikes killed more civilians than in 2010, reversing the previous year s downward trend. Ground combat, including armed clashes continued to kill civilians. Escalation of Force (EOF) continued to raise concerns in the south with ISAF and countrywide with the ANP. Civilian casualties from night raids remained low, although they sometimes led to violent demonstrations, furthered civilian harm and remained intensely disliked by the Afghan population. Source: UNMA, http://unama.unmissions.org/default.aspx?tabid=4652, pp. 19-22 24
UNAMA Estimate of Civilian Casualties from Air Strikes (First Six Months of Year) Airstrikes killed more civilians than in 2010, reversing the previous year s downward trend. Ground combat, including armed clashes continued to kill civilians. Escalation of Force (EOF) continued to raise concerns in the south with ISAF and countrywide with the ANP. Civilian casualties from night raids remained low, although they sometimes led to violent demonstrations, furthered civilian harm and remained intensely disliked by the Afghan population. Two types of air strikes are used in Afghanistan, Close Air Support (CAS) and Close Combat Attack (CCA).52 Civilian casualties from Close Air Support (CAS), fixed-wing aircraft, have decreased over the last three years even though the number of CAS air strikes has increased. In the first six months of 2011, ISAF released 2170 weapons from CAS, a 51 percent increase over 2010 when 1440 weapon releases occurred from CAS in the first six months.53 35 civilians were killed and 20 wounded by ISAF fixed-wing aircraft during CAS missions in the first six months of 2011. Although CAS has improved, mistakes continued to claim the lives of Afghans civilians. Source: UNMA, http://unama.unmissions.org/default.aspx?tabid=4652, pp. 23-24 25