Governance Analysis Toolkit for Customs and Border Management

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Governance Analysis Toolkit for Customs and Border Management Economic Commission for Europe Inland Transport Committee Working Party on Customs Questions affecting Transport 126th session Geneva, 28 September 1 October 2010 Michel Zarnowiecki, Amer Z. Durrani and Yusuf Hussain 1

The corruption complex We always talk about tough anti-corruption and zero-tolerance, but what really delivers is good enough governance Anticorruption approaches subjective and appear to retard Trade Facilitation: Corruption measurements difficult; need proxies and even these difficult to monitor and evaluate Often TI CPI and DB plus anecdotes and gut feeling Often overt focus on old fashioned enforcement (e.g., 100 percent inspections) instead of risk management 2

...often addressed in a non-holistic enough view Focus only on transparency, individual integrity and accountability Corruption perceived as something wrong with an agency whereas corruption is a society-wide issue (i.e., the microcosm) Governance is bigger than what we can do Inter-linkages of actions, and between agencies, are not recognized 3

..and often carry an anti-corruption slogan and focus.. Results of which often include: Corruption goes under, fights back harder higher costs to trade and more dangerous corruption Corruption (derivative) focus rather than governance (source) focus 4

..instead of managing governance risks.. Obligation = improve governance to reduce opportunities for corruption [not zero corruption] Managing governance risks = Reducing opportunities for corruption Systemically fixing processes; focus on high impact rather than public appeal (vote bank) Recognizing within and outside agency linkages; apportion responsibility Fiscal versus overall business environment Governance starts from within 5

..which can be assessed through various available approaches.. Many ways to go about this: Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) or Value Chain Analysis (VCA) Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway Commission WCO Integrity Development Guide (IDG) World Bank Guidelines on Governance Accountability Action Plans 6

Starting with vulnerability to corruption assessment as part of the decision tool 1-Vulnerability to Corruption [The RISK ] Probability Impact Monitoring and Evaluation Reassess (redo 1 through 3) Interaction 2 - Governance Complexity Sector [Policy, Institution, Process, HR-A Other Influence Peddlers 3 - Remedial Actions [Managing the RISK ] Priority Process Tools Interaction between processes 7

Measuring vulnerability to corruption (risks), step 1 is process mapping Arrival/ Landing/ Reporting Immediate Customs Control Compliance Checks Detection & Reporting Processing & Adjudication of Valuations Assessment Payment of Duty Exit Transit Warehousing Re-export Post Release Verifications Customs investigations 8

..each process [and thus risk] can be further drilled down.. Process: Arrival/Landing/Reporting (Examples of issues linked to different steps) Who does what? Overlaps, competition, vested interests What is the related risk? Foreign release and entry into country Reach the approved Customs crossing Queue Rent-seeking Border infrastructure Immigration and other controls Transhipment Reporting Driver and passenger checks Additional cargo/vehicle control by specific agencies Weighing (vehicles) Release to proceed inward Isolated or subsequent checks Initiation of transit Clearance Agencies: Customs, Police, Health and SPS... Importers Drivers Political agents Headquarters Foreign agencies Clearing agents Non-reporting Missing cargo or discrepancy Ineffective control Delay Diversion Deliberate avoidance of control Revenue loss Documentation not available 9

..followed by a typical risk assessment of the processes.. Risks in each process step(s)? Impact of each risk? Probability of the risk materializing? 10

Thus these risks have varying intensity or corruption opportunities index (COI) Steps Risks Agencies Impact Probability Risk Level Foreign Release Border Infrastructure Immigration and other controls Driver and Passenger checks Unreported/ Misreporting/ Exiting Cargo Foreign Customs 3 2 6 Ineffective control All Agencies 3 3 9 Identity Checks Insufficient risk management Customs, Border Police, Counter Narcotics, COI 1 1 1 Customs 3 3 9 11

Then combine governance assessment with the decision support tool.. 1-Vulnerability to Corruption [The RISK ] Probability Impact Monitoring and Evaluation Reassess (redo 1 through 3) Interaction 2 - Governance Complexity Sector [Policy, Institution, Process, HR-A Other Influence Peddlers 3 - Remedial Actions [Managing the RISK ] Priority Process Tools Interaction between processes 12

..governance assessment, step 1 = at what level is risk managed.. Human Resource and Administrative Capacity Procedures Institutions Policy 13

...the higher the level, the higher the governance vulnerability index (GVI)... Main steps GVI (corrected by respective weight of families of remedial action) Initial vulnerability index 14

Therefore: governance responsibility index, step 2 = who best manages risk.. At what level can the identified risk be managed? (GVI) Policy Institution Procedures Human Resource and Administrative Capacity Who is involved in each process step(s)? *the Responsibility Index + 15

..higher governance responsibility index; more agencies govern the risk.. 72% is not under direct Customs control 57% 28% 15% Customs Other Agencies Both 16

..and then developing the governance action plan using the decision support tool.. 1-Vulnerability to Corruption [The RISK ] Probability Impact Monitoring and Evaluation Reassess (redo 1 through 3) Interaction 2 - Governance Complexity Sector [Policy, Institution, Process, HR-A Other Influence Peddlers 3 - Remedial Actions [Managing the RISK ] Priority Process Tools Interaction between processes 17

..by combining corruption risks and governance vulnerability and responsibility.. Importance GVI GRI Ease Priority COI Policy Responsible Entity(ies) f{gvi, GRI} f{ease, Importance} Institution Procedure HR-A 18

..targeting most important & easiest to implement governance reforms.. High Importance = Corruption Opportunity Reduction Importance is the weight of the cumulated risks Low Ease is the product of weight of categories of action by the number of Difficult agencies involved Ease of Implementation = Easier to tackle 19Governance Issue Easy 19

The strategic path To find the best way down the mountain and around the hills... 20

..and then developing the governance action plan using the decision support tool.. 1-Vulnerability to Corruption [The RISK ] Probability Impact Monitoring and Evaluation Reassess (redo 1 through 3) Interaction 2 - Governance Complexity Sector [Policy, Institution, Process, HR-A Other Influence Peddlers 3 - Remedial Actions [Managing the RISK ] Priority Process Tools Interaction between processes 21

As reforms are implemented the GAAP tool also becomes the M&E tool by plugging in GAC variables improvement for example GVI should decrease over time depending on the success of implementing remedial measures Main steps Components GVI Policy Institution Procedure HR Capacity Total Arrival/ Landing/ Reporting 60 45 24 4 111 Immediate Customs control 12 20 14 6 38 Compliance Checks 20 15 16 6 49 Detection and reporting 15 25 4 2 17 Processing and adjudication of violations 18 30 0 0 14 Assessment 8 18 0 0 7 Payment of duty 12 6 2 0 20 Exit 4 3 6 1 14 Transit 20 45 4 0 18 Warehousing 8 9 4 0 17 Re-export 6 3 0 0 7 Post release verifications 22 0 9 12 29 Customs investigations 30 18 6 3 20 595 Initial GVI I n i t i a l GVI 595 22

solving 50% of policy issues should bring a reduction of 20% in GVI ( and a commensurate decrease in overall organizational COI) Before 60 50 40 30 20 10 After 0 60 50 40 30 20 G V I I m p rove m0 e n t 10 20% (595 - > 4 7 7 ) 23

further solving arrival/landing/reporting issues should improve GVI cumulatively to 37% Simulation table Policy Institution Procedure HR Capacity Total Arrival/ Landing/ Reporting 0 0 0 0 111 Immediate Customs control 6 20 14 6 38 Compliance Checks 10 15 16 6 49 Detection and reporting 7 25 4 2 17 Processing and adjudication of violations 9 30 0 0 14 Assessment 4 18 0 0 7 Payment of duty 6 6 2 0 20 Exit 2 3 6 1 14 Transit 10 45 4 0 18 Warehousing 4 9 4 0 17 Re-export 3 3 0 0 7 Post release verifications 11 0 9 12 29 Im provem ent Customs investigations 15 18 6 3 20 374 37% C u m u l a t i ve GVI I m p rove m e n t 37% (595 - > 4 7 7 - > 3 7 4 ) Dealing with transit from an institutional only perspective brings an improvement of 45 %. C u m u l a t i ve GVI I m p rove m e n t 45% 24

Country Example: Afghanistan Customs Department GAT applied to prepare Governance Accountability Action Plan for Afghan Customs in 2009

Societal acceptance of high levels of corruption makes the State s job of good governance difficult Opium almost all of the world s opium currently coming from Afghanistan Government s writ not entirely established and over reliance on external assistance Dysfunctional Governance Post Conflict Societal Vulnerabilities Unique social support systems; dependence on extended family networks Some level of corruption momentarily tolerated otherwise goes underground or results in strong political opposition to good governance measures a parallel familial economic unit a government with a stronger writ?! 26

Corruption impacts the state fiscally, commercially and socially! Grand or Criminal Fiscal and Security Patronage Collusion Rent Seeking TYPES OF CORRUPTION Business Environment and Economic Growth 27

Tackle overall governance not just corruption; GOA s risk appetite realistic Afghan Society Afghan Government Afghan Customs Department Customs Reform Project Governance Assessment Governance Action Plan Monitoring and Evaluation anti-corruption is a result, not an initiative! 28

Customs preventive Customs investigations Post clearance On-line checks Other checks and audit Total effect Policy Institution Procedure HR Capacity Customs NC This leads to a direct linkage of the corruption risk mapping to governance assessment Issues/ Risks Agencies Impact Probability Risk Level Mitigating action Recommendation(s) To ensure compliance throughout the Customs teritory Customs would need powers of control, search and arrest akin to Police powers, including the use of weapons; and adequate cross-border computerized data exchange this would require a change in the interpretation of the Constitution, some chan Unreported/Misreporting/ Exiting Cargo 3 2 6.0 Powers of enforcemenborder line control 1 4 2 1 0 Rules of business 24/7 presence 1 1 Border patrol 1 1 Inland checks 1 1 1 1 E-link 1 1 1 4 1 2 2 3 12 0.0 33.3% 8.3% 16.7% 16.7% 25.0% Identity check Customs, Border Police, Specialized 1 1 1.0 Powers of enforcemencross border coordination between 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 Rules of business Border line control 1 1 1 24/7 presence 1 1 1 Border patrol 1 1 1 Inland checks 30 1 1 1 1 E-link 25 1 1 20 6 2 0 5 5 18 0.0 15 33.3% 11.1% 0.0% 27.8% 27.8% Insufficient risk management Customs 3 3 9.0 Powers of enforcemenborder line control10 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 Rules of business E-link 5 1 Risk management 0 1 1 3 0 0 2 1 6 0.0 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 16.7% Delay Police agencies, Customs 1 3 3.0 Powers of enforcemeninter-agency coordination 1 1 4 3 0 1 Risk management 1 1 1 Rules of business Performance measurement 1 1 1 3 1 0 2 2 8 0.0 37.5% 12.5% 0.0% 25.0% 25.0% 9/29/2010 29 25-30 20-25

..and showed why despite a large focus on capacity building governance reform has not moved in Afghanistan! Post release verifications HR Capacity Policy 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Arrival landing and reporting Institution Procedure Arrival/ Landing/ Reporting Immediate Customs control Compliance Checks Detection and reporting Processing and adjudication of violations Assessment Payment of duty Exit Transit 30

But it helped in assessing what reforms are within the controls of Afghan Customs. Customs Procedures Customs Influence Non- Customs Corruption Opportunities/ Risks Governance Risk attributed to Both Policy Institution Processes HR-A Compliance Check Arrival-Landing- Reporting Customs Control (Immediate) 9 3 2 67 5 4 7 5 4 8 2 50 6 6 7 1 6 2 1 35 3 2 5 4 Payment 5 2 2 33 5 2 3 0 Enforcement Transit 3 3 3 27 3 3 0 3 3 3 2 24 2 2 3 0 Warehousing 3 3 3 24 1 3 2 0 Release 3 1 1 21 1 1 3 1 Irregularities Post Clearance Activity Re-export 5 2 2 19 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 8 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 31

.only a quarter of what needs to be done high interference 32

...but, interference not proportional to importance of particular Customs reform; there is a chance! Results in terms of ease of implementation of significant reforms

thematic reform actions cross the various processes to help targeting and bring about efficiencies. SUMMARY OF PREVENTIVE MEASURES Measures Occurrences Computer checks 40 14% Management 25 9% Audits 22 8% E-link 14 5% Inland checks 13 5% Performance measurement 13 5% Cross border coordination between neighbouring Customs 11 4% Inter-agency coordination 10 4% Legislation 10 4% Risk management 9 3% Total 59% Other Measures 114 41% Total 281 100% 34

Topic/ Process Step Complian ce Checks Detection and Reporting. Based on this agree with the ACD/MOF/GOA on the various policy, institutional and procedural reform Type of Risk/ Risk Vulnerability to Corruption Level priorities. During document controls Customs officers misuse their discretionary powers Insufficient coordination between various agencies present at the border cause delay, opportunities for rent seeking Goods are undervalued Incorrect tariff regime is applied Importers are subject to an excessive rate of control Exemptions are issued by directive During physical control goods may be subject to pilferage, inadequately or excessively examined or control affected in return for a bribe Levels of penalties are inadequate to have deterrent effect Irregularities are not reported Distinction between minor and severe irregularities is not made Customs abuses their (averag e) 72/11 6.55 21/3 7 Mitigating Action Agency Priorities Ease& Importan ce Policy level: Other agencies delegate power to Customs to ensure compliance (e.g. MoA, MoPH) Amending and clarifying rules of business and penal legislation for Customs to have power to prosecute/ punish deliberate, repeated and serious violations in terms Institutional and Procedural level: Establishing and refining internal Customs procedures to ensure adequate checks and balances, proper reporting, measurement and mechanisms for management feedback Ensuring that clearance operations are well coordinated with other agencies Computerising valuation process/ introduce ASYCUDA valuation module of declaring, describing and evaluating imports Introducing special statute for Customs (see below) Institutional and Procedural level: Establishing and refining internal Customs procedures to ensure adequate checks and balances, proper reporting, measurement and mechanisms for management feedback Ensuring that clearance operations are well coordinated with other agencies Computerising valuation process/ introduce ASYCUDA valuation module Human Resource level: Training Customs officers in valuation Policy level: Enhancing legislation to increase penalties and strengthen enforcement capacity of Customs Introducing special statute for Customs (see below) Human Resource level: Training Customs officers in valuation Institutional and Procedural level: Introducing computerised reporting ACD MoF, MoA, MoPH, MoC, MoI, standards authorities IARCSC MoLSA ACD ACD ACD ACD ACD ACD HIGH/ IMMEDIA TE Ease 5 Import. 72 MEDIUM Ease 6 Import. 21

The conclusion Do a self assessment built into the model Benchmark it: What is really wrong with us, come up with an integrity action plan A year after repeat steps one and two Introduce an enhanced integrity action plan This tool does all three steps in a Cartesian manner 36