NEW LANDSCAPE IN THE BRAZILIAN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

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New landscape in the brazilian antitrust enforcement ISSN 1900-6381 159 NEW LANDSCAPE IN THE BRAZILIAN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT leopoldo pagotto* Abstract main fronts affected by the new Brazilian Antitrust Law: (i) the administrative structure of the Brazilian Antitrust Authorities; (ii) the new premerger control review; and (iii) the investigation of anticompetitive conducts. Key words: Brazil, cade, Reform in the Antitrust Law, Institutional design, Merger Controls, Cartels. * MSc in Regulation, the London School of Economics and Political Science. Master and PhD in Economic Law, Law School of the University of São Paulo, Partner of Zingales & Pagotto Advogados (zisp Law).

160 leopoldo pagotto resumen en las tres áreas que se afectan por la nueva ley de competencia de Brasil: (i) la estructura administrativa de las autoridades de competencia de Brasil, (ii) el nuevo control previo de las integraciones empresariales y (iii) la investigación de conductas anticompetitivas. Palabras clave: Brasil, CADE, Reforma de la ley de competencia, Diseño institucional, Control de las integraciones empresariales, Carteles. After more than 7 years under analysis, on the 1 st December 2011, the new Brazilian Antitrust Law (Law # 12.529) was pu- Antitrust Law (Law # 8.884), leading to major changes in the Brazilian antitrust Antitrust Law entered into force on the 29 th May 2012. In order to give an overview of the main changes in the antitrust three main fronts affected by the new Antitrust Law: (i) the administrative structure of the Brazilian Antitrust Authorities; (ii) the merger control review; and (iii) the investigation of anticompetitive conducts. administrative rationalization of the brazilian antitrust authorities Under the old Antitrust Law, there were three agencies responsible for the antitrust

New landscape in the brazilian antitrust enforcement 161 a. the Secretariat of Economic Surveillance (Secretaria de Acompanhamento Econômico - seae) of the Ministry of Finance; b. the Secretariat of Economic Law (Secretaria de Direito Econômico - sde) of the Ministry of Justice; and c. the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica - cade) of the Ministry of Justice. - perform successive tasks in the antitrust investigation, which of- even the government. It came as no surprise that the oecd concluded in its 2010 Peer Review that: subject to no formal deadline by which its decision must be made. Also, because the merging parties are permitted to consummate their transaction before the review is completed (absent a preliminary order, discussed below), they lack incentive to speed the process. Antitrust Law addresses these concerns and reorga- - Antitrust Authorities will consist of just two agencies (the cade and the seae), but the procedures and decision-making related to antitrust investigations and merger control review will be concentrated only by the cade. sde was merged into the cade, consolidating the roles of investigation and decision-making of the Antitrust Authori- cade, which was been Super-cade due to the great deal of power recently acquired, continues to be subject to judicial review but

162 leopoldo pagotto cade consists of the following departments: a. The Administrative Tribunal It will be composed by a president and six commissioners, who will serve a single successi- on complex merger cases which were challenged by the Di- also responsible for decisions if one of the commissioners di- about antitrust violations. b. The Directorate General: with a two-year term, extendable for another term, the Di- antitrust violations; (ii) to clear simple merger or those which are not requested by any of the commissioners; and (iii) to render cleared with conditions in cases which will be ultimately de- c. The Department of Economic Studies: Headed by cade Chief Economist, it will be responsible for issuing non-binding economic opinions and drafting economic studies to subsidy the antitrust policy. seae will have an even minor role when it comes to antitrust cade may inform the seae about the commencement of an investigation and the seae may or may not issue an opinion according to its evaluation about the importance of the case. On the other hand, the seae will play a strong role in the competition advocacy. It may voice its opinion on normative

New landscape in the brazilian antitrust enforcement 163 industries and suggest to the responsible regulatory agency the adoption of the appropriate legal measures, whenever any anti- of the Super-cade. merger review control: clearance as a condition to close the deal Brazilian antitrust policy regards the merger review control. Under the old Antitrust was one of the few jurisdictions to have an ex post assessment system for the merger review. Under this system, the parties to clear informational asymmetry against the cade the implementation of the transaction was not conditioned to the antitrust clearance, the parties could take measures to undermine the effectiveness of cade anticompetitive deal.

164 leopoldo pagotto Antitrust Law establishes a mandatory pre-merger require the previous approval by the cade. It also provides for two - - mechanism ). Under the new Antitrust Law, for a transaction to be referable to the cade - - meet two minimum turnovers simultaneously: R$ 750 million and R$ the turnover of the groups is those of the acquirer, seller or target. fact that there is no de minimis criterion to be met. In other words, as long as there are some sales made by the target company or antitrust to a global transaction and after reviewing the turnover test in Brazilian Antitrust Law sets out statutory time periods for the review of the transactions, establishing a maximum

New landscape in the brazilian antitrust enforcement 165 90 days under certain circumstances. However, the new Antitrust Law lacks a rule to determine what happens if the cade does not comply with the new time period: as a matter of fact, one of the presidential vetoes to the bill excluded the automatic clearance if the cade takes longer than established in the law. After three months under the new regime, the average time for any transaction to be cleared was below 20 days. a New breath for the anti-cartel enforcement? Most of the rules on abuse of dominance position did not change, but there are some intriguing pieces of news in the anti-cartel whether the changes will lead to a tougher or laxer enforcement. antitrust violation, they may range from 0.1% to 20% of the turnover of the company, group or con- the investigation in the business activity of the market involved applicable to individuals may range from 1% to 20% of that imposed on the company. centages applicable for companies and individuals have been reduced in relation to the old Antitrust Law. However, it is still calculated based on the turnover of the company in the business activity of the market under investigation, which may even in- the business activity of the market under investigation, which seems to be something different of the traditional idea of relevant market. As the cade has been vehemently arguing that such a change will not adversely impact on the level of the antitrust

166 leopoldo pagotto cade issued siness activity of the market under investigation whether this will mean an increase or a decrease in the level of enforcement, only a real case will allow to conclude. Other controversial issue refers to the negotiation of leniency agreements with the Super cade which seems to have become more feasible. Contrarily to old Antitrust Law, now the ring leader in the cartel may apply for leniency and may be granted with full immunity, if the cade has no prior knowledge of the antitrust violation. antitrust policy got bigger in the criminal sphere. As regards the prosecution of individuals, the new Antitrust Law changes the criminal legislation and it increases the increases the likelihood that cartelists will have to serve some time, even though jail terms will still depend on the circumstances. Such an amendment to the Criminal Code will prevent violators from applying for a conditional suspension of the criminal sentence - under the old Antitrust Law, the imprisonment could be