Postmaterialism in Times of Crisis

Postmaterialism in Times of Crisis 20 August 2013 Sarah M. Cameron The Australian National University Prepared for the panel S09 P290 Resisting the Markets. Economic Actors and Issues in Global Uprisings from the Middle-East to North-America, European Consortium for Political Research General Conference, Bordeaux, 4-7 September 2013. 1

Abstract Inglehart s research on intergenerational value change suggests that citizens value orientations are influenced by economic conditions, with economic prosperity leading to increases in postmaterialist values, and economic hardship the adoption of materialist values. These value orientations have implications on political behaviour, with postmaterialists generally more likely to protest. The Global Financial Crisis has been the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. This presents an unprecedented opportunity to test Inglehart s theories under the conditions of a major financial crisis. Using data from the World Values Survey from before and after the crisis in 14 democracies, this paper demonstrates that there has been a decrease in postmaterialism across a range of new and established democracies in the years since the crisis. Contrary to Inglehart s study of values during the recessions of the 1970s, the findings do not support the socialisation hypothesis, where only the values of young people are affected by economic decline. Rather there is support for the scarcity hypothesis as post-materialism has declined across a range of age groups and not just affected the young. This paper further finds a drop in political protest in most countries where postmaterialism declined. In the face of a major financial crisis, the relationship between postmaterialism and protest has remained much the same, material insecurity has not driven those with materialist values to the streets in protest, rather, protest has remained the domain of a diminishing number of postmaterialists. 2

Introduction The Global Financial Crisis is widely considered the greatest economic crisis since the great depression of the 1930s. Many countries dipped into recession, or a double-dip recession, and this led to a range of social consequences including rising unemployment, loss of retirement savings, home foreclosures, and the disaffection of youth. The severe impact of this crisis provides an unprecedented opportunity for scholars to re-examine theories which link economic conditions to political values and behaviour. Inglehart s value change thesis argues that citizens value orientations are shaped by economic conditions, and changing value orientations have flow on effects to political behaviour (Inglehart 1971, 1977, 1981, 1997). As economies grew, Inglehart identified a global shift away from materialist values centred around survival, security, and fulfilling basic needs, towards postmaterialist values where material concerns are taken for granted and focus is given to higher-level concerns such as freedom, self-expression, and the quality of life (Abramson and Inglehart 1995, p. 1). The value change thesis argues that economic development is conducive to the spread of postmaterialist values, economic decline the reverse (Inglehart 1981, p. 881). A rise in postmaterialism has been linked to a rise in protest, as postmaterialists tend to have more time and energy available for political action, are more challenging of the status quo, and their concerns tend to be neglected by governments (Inglehart 1981, p. 890). This paper asks what impact the global financial crisis has had on postmaterialist values, and what the implications of this are on political protest. Two of Inglehart s hypotheses are tested regarding impacts on postmaterialist values: firstly, the scarcity hypothesis which suggests that postmaterialism will decline during difficult economic conditions; and secondly, the socialisation hypothesis which suggests that postmaterialism will decline only amongst young people during difficult economic conditions (1981, p. 881). The flow on effects to political protest are also examined with two competing hypotheses. As protest has typically been the domain of postmaterialists, the retreat hypothesis suggests that if under conditions of economic crisis postmaterialism declines, so would protest. Alternatively, the mobilisation hypothesis would suggest that in times of crisis as the needs of materialists are not being met by governments, materialists might be mobilised to participate in protest, increasing the proportion of materialists that protest. 3

I test these hypotheses using data from the World Values Survey. I use data from the two most recent waves of the survey, conducted in 2005-07 and 2010-12 respectively, to provide a comparison in political values and behaviour before and after the global financial crisis. This provides a new contribution to research on value change, as whilst post-materialism has been tested in periods of economic decline such as the recessions of the 1970s (Inglehart 1981), it remains to be tested under conditions of a major economic crisis on the scale we have seen in the years since 2007-08. Further, since the global financial crisis we have seen mass outbreaks of protest such as the Occupy movement and los indignados in Spain, among many others. On this basis it might be reasonable to assume that protest has increased in response to the crisis, this research makes an empirical contribution by testing this assumption. This paper proceeds in five sections. Firstly, I introduce the theoretical framework on postmaterialism and the implications on political protest. Second, I present the methodology used in this paper, including the approach to measurement of post-materialism and political protest. Third, I analyse trends in post-materialism before and after the crisis. Fourth, I analyse trends in political protest, including the relationship between post-materialism and protest, before and after the crisis. I conclude with a discussion on the implications of my findings. Theoretical Framework In the 1970s Inglehart uncovered shifting social values, with trends across a range of advanced democracies indicating a decline in materialist values and an associated rise in postmaterialist values (1977, pp. 262-290). Those with materialist values would be concerned with survival, security, and fulfilling basic needs, meanwhile the growing numbers of postmaterialists would take such needs for granted, and shift their focus to higher-level needs such as self-expression and social justice (Inglehart 1979). Inglehart tested two hypotheses explaining the shift towards postmaterialist values, a scarcity hypothesis and a socialisation hypothesis (1981, p. 881). The former draws upon Maslow s hierarchy of needs, which suggests that humans firstly prioritise survival needs, but once these needs are met focus their attention on higher needs such as self-actualisation (1962). 4

Under the scarcity hypothesis Inglehart expected prolonged periods of high prosperity to encourage the spread of postmaterialist values; economic decline would have the opposite effect (1981, p. 881). The socialisation hypothesis takes this a step further, suggesting these values are not just responsive to current economic conditions, but are formed during the socialisation period of youth, and then remain relatively stable over one s lifetime (Inglehart 1981, p. 881). Those who experienced economic hardship during the socialisation period of youth, would be likely to develop materialist values, while those who grew up without experiencing hardship, would more likely take survival needs for granted, and shift their focus to needs further up the hierarchy, such as social justice, and self-expression (Inglehart 1981, pp. 881-882). Thus, people who were raised during the hardship of World War II were likely to take on materialist values, whereas the baby boomer generation, who grew up in times of unprecedented prosperity, appeared to increasingly be taking on postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1979, p. 311). Inglehart tested these hypotheses in the context of the recession of the 1970s in six West European countries and the United States (1981, pp. 887-890). He found that whilst levels of postmaterialism increased or remained constant in all but one country over the 1970s, levels of postmaterialism significantly dropped in the youngest group over the same period, those aged 15 to 24 in the four surveys undertaken over the 1970s (Inglehart 1981, pp. 887-890). This evidence supported the socialisation hypothesis, but not the scarcity hypothesis, indicating that values formed during a prosperous youth were resilient even to periods of economic decline in adulthood (Inglehart 1981, pp. 887-890). The recession of the 1970s was relatively benign when compared to the global financial crisis that began in 2007-8, widely considered the greatest economic crisis since the great depression of the 1930s. The recent crisis thus provides an unprecedented opportunity to test Inglehart s hypotheses under economic conditions much more severe than those previous periods of decline under which they have been tested. This paper will test the scarcity hypothesis and the socialisation hypothesis under the conditions of the global financial crisis in a range of democratic countries. If the scarcity hypothesis is correct we could expect to see a drop in postmaterialist values after the global financial crisis, across a range of age groups. If the socialisation hypothesis is correct, it would be too soon to see much impact of the crisis on postmaterialist values. In the older age groups, those aged 25 and above, we would expect postmaterialist values to remain constant or continue on an upward trend. Only 5

in the youngest group surveyed (those aged 17-24) we might expect to see a drop in postmaterialist values compared to the same age group of the previous survey. The effects of the financial crisis would then become more visible in future surveys when the children of the crisis period come into adulthood where we would expect that a greater proportion would develop materialist values, than previous generations who were raised in times of prosperity. Changes in citizens value orientations have implications for political behaviour. Literature on postmaterialism has long linked this change in values, to a change in political behaviour particularly, participation in political protest (Inglehart 1971, Inglehart 1977, Barnes and Kaase 1979, Klingemann 1979). Inglehart s original study connected the 1968 May Revolt in France to the emergence of postmaterialist values (1971, pp. 992-993). More generally, the protest movements of the 60s and 70s were seen as a form of political expression for the growing number of postmaterialists (Inglehart 1977, pp. 262-290). Inglehart provides three reasons for the relationship between postmaterialism and protest (1981, p. 890). Firstly, Materialists tend to be preoccupied with satisfying immediate physiological needs; Post- Materialists feel relatively secure about them and have a greater amount of psychic energy to invest in more remote concerns such as politics (1981, p. 890). Second, as the concerns of government have typically been materialist, postmaterialists are more likely to be dissatisfied by government and thus seek to participate in political action which challenges the status quo (1981, p. 890). Finally, the things threatened by more disruptive forms of protest, both security, and physical property, are valued less by postmaterialists (1981, p. 890) This relationship between postmaterialism and protest is also worth re-examining in the context of a major financial crisis, on a scale not seen since the 1930s. If levels of postmaterialism have been affected by the global financial crisis, as might be expected from the theory, this would presumably have flow on effects to protest activity. If we assume that there will be a drop in postmaterialism, consistent with either the scarcity hypothesis (across all age groups), or the socialisation hypothesis (amongst the youngest age group only), we can construct two main hypotheses for the flow on effects to political protest. The retreat hypothesis suggests that post-materialism will remain similarly correlated with protest activity after the crisis, therefore we could expect to see a drop in protest activity to accompany the drop in postmaterialist values. As more people adopt materialist value orientations, they prioritise matters of survival and security and have less psychic energy 6

available to devote to political activities such as protest (Inglehart 1979, p. 345). Thus it remains the diminishing numbers of postmaterialists that are more likely to protest, and as their numbers diminish so does participation in protest. If the scarcity hypothesis is correct, we could expect this shift to take place across the population. If the socialisation hypothesis is correct, we would only see this trend emerge amongst young people. In contrast, the mobilisation hypothesis suggests that the growing numbers of materialists would become more likely to protest following the financial crisis, and protest becomes more widespread as a result. One of the reasons Inglehart gives for the relationship between postmaterialism and protest, is that governments have tended to prioritise materialist concerns meaning materialists concerns are more often addressed by government (1979, p. 345). It was therefore postmaterialists that needed to go outside of conventional modes of participation to have a voice (1979, p. 345). Under the conditions of a major economic crisis resulting in unemployment, home foreclosures, and a loss of economic security it can be said that materialists concerns are not being met by governments. In these circumstances it is foreseeable that materialists may be more likely to go outside of the electoral process to express their discontent. Previous research shows protest activity to be strongly correlated with postmaterialism (Inglehart 1997, pp. 312-315), but if materialists increasingly turn to protest we could expect this relationship to weaken. Further, we might see a rise in protest activity as numbers of dissatisfied materialists increase in response to conditions such as unemployment and loss of financial security. Whether this trend occurs across the population, or just amongst young people would depend upon whether the scarcity or socialisation hypothesis is validated. = = = Table 1 goes about here = = = Data and measurement This paper will test the outlined hypotheses by measuring trends in post-materialism and political protest using data from the World Values Survey. Waves of the World Values Survey were conducted both before and after the crisis, with the two most recent waves being conducted in 2005-07 and 2010-12 respectively. This paper incorporates in the analysis every democratic country which was included in the surveys both before and after the crisis, this includes: Australia, Chile, Cyprus, South Korea, Japan, Ghana, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, 7

Romania, Spain, Sweden, the United States and Uruguay. This includes both new and established democracies, and countries affected by the global financial crisis to varying degrees, classified by whether or not experienced one or more recessions, as shown in Table 2. = = = Table 2 goes about here = = = Inglehart and others have measured postmaterialist values using a battery of questions which have been included in surveys since the 1970s, including each wave of the World Values Survey since 1981. Initially, postmaterialist values were measured using a four-item index. Respondents were asked to pick their top priority, and next most important item from the following list: A. Maintaining order in the nation B. Giving people more say in important government decisions C. Fighting rising prices D. Protecting freedom of speech (Inglehart 1977, pp. 40-41) Those who chose A and C were said to be materialists, those who chose B and D were said to be postmaterialists, other combinations were considered to have mixed values (Abramson and Inglehart 1995, pp. 9-10). Recognising that such a short list might have problems of validity, particulary fighting rising prices was sensitive to inflation, Inglehart later introduced a further eight items to strengthen validity (Inglehart 1977, pp. 39-41). Thus, to measure post-materialist values either the fouritem or twelve-item index can be used, of which the twelve-item index can be considered stronger on validity. However, use of the twelve-item index can be problematic as the percentage of pure materialists and postmaterialists generated is much smaller than if using the four-item index, creating analytical issues due to the relative size of standard errors. For this reason, this paper uses the four-item index. The bivariate correlation for the four and twelve item indicies is.716 for the 2005 wave of World Values Survey data used here,.705 for the 2010 wave (Pearson s r). The two indices are therefore highly correlated. Much of the 8

analyses for this paper were tested using both indices, using one or the other would not have impacted upon the conclusions. The measurement of postmaterialist values has been extensively criticised, and rigorously defended by Inglehart and colleagues (see for instance: Clarke and Dutt 1991, Bean and Papadakis 1994, Abramson, Ellis et al. 1997, Davis and Davenport 1999, Inglehart and Abramson 1999, Moors and Vermunt 2007, Tranter and Western 2010). The purpose of this paper is not to weigh in on these debates; accepting Inglehart s thesis of intergenerational value change, it seeks to retest this theory in the context of a major economic crisis on a scale not seen since measurement of the postmaterialist phenomenon commenced. To measure political protest, I use the questions asked in both waves of the World Values Survey. The survey asks: I m going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it: signing a petition joining in boycotts attending peaceful demonstrations (World Values Survey 2011) This captures both protest activism, measured by have done responses, as well as protest potential, measured by might do responses (Norris, Walgrave et al. 2005, p. 195). Factor analysis reveals that responses to these three items are highly intercorrelated, meaning they can be combined into a single scale of protest. I construct this scale by adding up values across each of the items, with have done responses scored as 1, might do responses as 0.5, and would never do responses as 0. This results in an overall scale of protest ranging from 0 to 3, where 3 indicates the highest level of protest activism. 9

Trends in Postmaterialism Inglehart s work over the past several decades has demonstrated growing trends towards postmaterialist values across a range of different national contexts. In his 1997 study, he highlighted that most countries under study showed a shift towards postmaterialist values most of the time (Inglehart and Abramson 1999, p. 326). Following confirmatory tests by scholars in a range of national contexts (see for instance Scarbrough 1995, pp.156-157, van Deth and Scarbrough 1995), Inglehart has stressed that there is no longer a debate about whether this shift in values is actually taking place (1999, p. 326). This paper, using new data following the global financial crisis, highlights the partial reversal of this shift in many countries since the Global Financial Crisis. In contrast to earlier trends, more recent data for the period 2005 to 2010 shows a significant decline in postmaterialist values in six of the 14 countries under study, with the countries experiencing a decline outnumbering those showing the usual trend towards postmaterialist values, as shown in Table 3. There is a drop in postmaterialist values across a range of different geographical and cultural contexts, in advanced democracies including New Zealand and the United States, in addition to more recent democracies including Peru, Cyprus, Uruguay and Ghana. In several of the advanced democracies, specifically Australia, Spain and Japan there is no significant change in the proportion of postmaterialists. Five of the 14 countries demonstrate a shift towards postmaterialist values. With the exception of Sweden, where the smallest change was observed, these countries share two features in common. Firstly, they are all recent democracies, including the only former communist states in the study, Romania and Poland, South Korea which democratised in 1988, and Chile, which transitioned to democracy in 1990. Secondly, the countries in which post-materialism increased all did so from an exceptionally low starting point. = = = Table 3 goes about here = = = These trends can be explained through two competing forces. On the one hand long-term trends of economic and social development are generating a long-term shift towards postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1997). Meanwhile the global financial crisis and the recessions which it has caused represent a counter force depressing postmaterialist values. We can interpret the trends in postmaterialist values across countries over 2005-10 as a reflection of these competing forces. In newer democracies processes of societal development, linked to economic development, are taking place at a much faster rate 10

(Abramson and Inglehart 1995, p. 130), meaning, in some countries, the impacts of the crisis are not enough to counter these trends. Meanwhile in the advanced democracies processes of societal development are much slower, and thus people s values are more sensitive to period effects as brought about through the global financial crisis. Australia and New Zealand can be compared as countries similar in many respects, though Australia did not fall into recession following the GFC whereas New Zealand has experienced a double-dip recession. In New Zealand there was a 16% shift away from postmaterialist values towards materialist values after the GFC, whereas in Australia there was no significant change in the proportion of postmaterialists. = = = Figure 1 goes about here = = = The analysis so far has looked at trends in postmaterialist values across the population over the 2005 to 2010 period, and has found a significant drop in postmaterialism in around half of the countries under study. To test the scarcity and socialisation hypotheses, we need to look at these trends by age group. The socialisation hypothesis would suggest that we would see a drop in postmaterialist values amongst the youngest group surveyed (those aged 17 to 24), whereas the scarcity hypothesis would suggest that we would see a drop across the population irrespective of age. We know from the above analysis that in some countries post-materialism increased while in others it decreased over the 2005 to 2010 period. To find out more about the pattern in values in those countries where post-materialism decreased over the 2005 to 2010 period, I now conduct an analysis of the pooled trends data by age group, excluding Romania, Poland, Chile, and South Korea. The reason for excluding these countries is that these are outlier countries where there was a large increase in post-materialism. Further, they all experienced an increase in postmaterialist values across all (or almost all) age groups. Including these countries would not help explain the pattern of a decrease in postmaterialism by age group, for those countries where post-materialism declined. The results of the pooled analysis are presented in table 4 below. Here we see a significant decline in postmaterialism in three of the age groups, 17 to 24, 35 to 44, and 45 to 54, and in the total sample. In no age group is there a significant increase in post-materialism. Whilst we still do not see a drop in postmaterialism in every age group, this analysis lends more support to the scarcity hypothesis, as whilst post-materialism has dropped amongst the youngest group here, it has also dropped significantly in a number of other age groups. 11

= = = Table 4 goes about here = = = These hypotheses were tested in advanced democracies previously under conditions of economic decline in the 1970s, with this analysis lending support to the socialisation hypothesis (Inglehart 1981). Testing these hypotheses under the much more extreme economic conditions of the global financial crisis, and in a wider range of countries, lends support to the scarcity hypothesis, not the socialisation hypothesis, as in countries where postmaterialism declined, it did so across a range of age-groups, not just the young. This suggests a severe financial crisis is enough to have a dent in the value orientations even of older cohorts socialised during times of prosperity. Whether these value orientations will continue over time, or whether it is a temporary response to conditions of crisis, will only become clear through analysis of future survey data. Further, as the children of the global financial crisis years come into adulthood, it will be worth re-testing the socialisation hypothesis, to assess whether their value orientations are significantly lower than that of previous generations. Trends in political protest The next stage of this analysis looks at trends in political protest, to proceed an investigation of the relationship between postmaterialism and protest. In the years since the financial crisis, we might expect that there has been an increase in political protest. In Spain the 15-M movement los indignados brought over 100,000 indignant Spaniards to the plazas of Madrid, Barcelona and elsewhere (Charnock, Purcell et al. 2011). The Occupy movement, in 2011 took hold of Zuccotti Park in New York, and subsequently spread to over 900 other cities around the world (Addley 2011). Further, we ve seen mass protests on the streets of Cyprus, and a range of other countries, following financial turmoil. It seems viable to expect that in the wake of a major financial crisis, with subsequent impacts including widespread unemployment and home foreclosures, people will express their dissatisfaction through protest. Cross-national survey data reveals a different story. We see a significant drop in political protest across a sweep of countries including Ghana, Japan, Peru, Spain, Sweden, and the United States, as shown in Table 5. Meanwhile, we see a significant increase in protest only 12

in Chile, Poland, and Romania. These three countries are all new democracies which started from an exceptionally low score on protest (all below a mean score of 1), suggesting this increase may be due to general processes of societal development which leads to a greater acceptance of political protest as a legitimate form of political action (Norris 2002, pp.191-192), rather than the effects of the financial crisis. The drop in the mean score on the protest scale across a wide-range of countries, across four continents, lends support for the retreat hypothesis, where people are retreating from political action in the face of material struggle, rather than the mobilisation hypothesis, which would have seen citizens responding to economic decline with heightened participation to express their dissatisfaction. This finding fits well with existing theory, which suggests that when people are preoccupied with material concerns, they will have less time and energy available for political activities, particularly protest which tends to require more time, initiative, and resources than voting (Inglehart 1981, p. 890, McAllister 1992, p. 63). There seems to be a relationship between protest and the degree to which countries were affected by the crisis. Of the six countries which experienced a significant drop in political protest, five of them experienced at least one recession between 2005 and 2010. Only one, Ghana, did not experience recession and still faced a drop in political protest. = = = Table 5 goes about here = = = = = = Figure 2 goes about here = = = Now turning to look at the relationship between the change in postmaterialist values and change in protest participation over the 2005-2010 period, we see a clear relationship between values on these variables. As shown in Figure 3, most countries cluster together in the quadrant which indicates both a decline in postmaterialism and a decline in protest. This includes countries as diverse as New Zealand, the United States, Peru, Ghana, Uruguay and Cyprus. Poland, Romania, and Chile fall into the opposite cluster, where both postmaterialism and protest have increased. Again we see here a trend with a subset of newer democracies, Chile, South Korea, and the post-communist countries Poland and Romania, falling into an outlying cluster where trends on both dimensions have increased (aside from South Korea where protest levels remained stable). These are the trends that would be 13

expected under normal circumstances. Meanwhile most other countries, both established and new democracies experienced a decline on both dimensions. Distinguishing the countries which fell into recession with the global financial crisis does not reveal a clear pattern. = = = Figure 3 goes about here = = = A bivariate correlation between scores on the protest scale and the postmaterialism index before and after the crisis reveals the coefficient remains approximately the same, at.228 before the crisis, and.238 after the crisis (Pearson s r), suggesting that postmaterialism and protest are strongly correlated both before and after the crisis. Given some degree of sampling error, we can infer that this relationship remains much the same. Thus a rise in materialism has not led a greater proportion of materialists to participate in protest. A regression analysis of the predictors of protest provides more information as to the impact of postmaterialism and other predictor variables on protest. By comparing regression coefficients from before and after the global financial crisis it can be assessed whether the crisis has changed the nature of who protests. Table 6 shows that the impact of postmaterialism on protest remains similar before and after the crisis (B=.563 before, B=.598 after). This further supports the retreat hypothesis; whilst the proportion of materialists is on the increase in many countries, these materialists are not turning to protest to express dissatisfaction regarding government failure to fulfil material concerns. It remains primarily the domain of a diminishing number of postmaterialists to take part in protest. The data does not support the mobilisation hypothesis which would have seen the coefficient for postmaterialism decrease, as more materialists turn to protest to voice their dissatisfaction. The regression model also reveals a slight decrease in the coefficient for employed citizens to participate in protest, and a slight increase in unemployed likely reflecting the changing demographics of the population after the global financial crisis. The results further suggest that education is a stronger predictor of protest following the crisis. = = = Table 6 goes about here = = = 14

Conclusion: Scarcity and Retreat Inglehart s thesis of an intergenerational shift towards Postmaterialist values has been tested across a broad spectrum of different countries over several decades (Abramson and Inglehart 1995, Inglehart 1997). It has also been tested in the context of minor economic downturns, such as the recessions of the 1970s (Inglehart 1981). It remained to be tested in the context of a major economic crisis on the scale that we have seen since the global financial crisis that began in 2007-08. This paper has examined trends in Postmaterialism and protest activity in 14 countries, before and after the global financial crisis, using data from the 2005 and 2010 waves of the World Values Survey. Whilst the shift towards Postmaterialist values continued in a few countries, specifically in a few third wave democracies all of which had a very low starting point on the Postmaterialism scale, many more countries, including most of the advanced democracies in the study along with some newer democracies, experienced a significant drop in Postmaterialism over the 2005-2010 period. This marks a significant change given that over the past forty years or so Postmaterialist values have typically been rising. To uncover the processes resulting in this downward shift, this paper tested two of Inglehart s hypotheses which seek to explain how people s value orientations might respond to an economic downturn. The first of these is the scarcity hypothesis which would indicate that in times of economic downturn people s values will shift in the materialist direction. The second possible explanation is the socialisation hypothesis which suggests that value orientations are formed during the socialisation period of youth, so in the context of economic crisis only the values of young people would shift in a materialist direction. Earlier work by Inglehart in the context of the 1970s downturn found support for the socialisation hypothesis (19811981). In the context of a more extreme financial crisis, I find support for the scarcity hypothesis as postmaterialism declined across a range of age-groups, not just amongst young people. Existing research shows a strong relationship between Postmaterialism and political protest. This paper tested this relationship under the conditions of a major economic crisis. Would the growing numbers of materialists express their dissatisfaction over economic conditions through protest, or would it remain a diminishing group of postmaterialists that participate in protest? 15

The data revealed a significant drop in political protest following the global financial crisis in around half countries under study, with three outliers following the opposite trend again, newer democracies with a low starting point on the protest scale. Whilst we have seen a number of movements burst onto the streets, such as los indignados in Spain, and the Occupy movement which began in the US and then spread around the world, trends across the population suggest that generally speaking people protest less after the global financial crisis. It would appear that as people s material circumstances decline, a focus on survival and security has left less time and energy for political activism. An examination of the relationship between the shift in postmaterialism and the shift in protest uncovered a strong positive correlation between the two. In most countries, where postmaterialism declined, so did protest, in the few cases where postmaterialism increased, so did protest. Similarly, multivariate regression results show that the coefficient for postmaterialism as a predictor of protest remains constant over the time period. This paints a scenario where both postmaterialism and protest have declined, however protest is still the domain of postmaterialists, much as it was before the crisis. Following socio-demographic changes after the crisis, unemployment marginally increased as a predictor of protest. Whilst the global financial crisis has facilitated a shift towards materialist value orientations, materialists are no more likely to protest than they were before the crisis. The response of publics in many countries has been to retreat from the political process, rather than increase engagement in response to declining economic security. 16

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TABLE 1 Summary of Hypotheses Trends in postmaterialism Scarcity hypothesis Implications on political protest Retreat hypothesis Drop in postmaterialist values across the population following the global financial crisis. Relationship between postmaterialism and protest remains. Therefore associated drop in protest. Mobilization hypothesis Relationship between materialism and protest strengthens, potentially leading to increased protest. Socialisation hypothesis Retreat hypothesis Drop in postmaterialist values only amongst young people following the global financial crisis. Relationship between postmaterialism and protest remains, therefore associated drop in protest amongst young people. Mobilization hypothesis Relationship between between materialism and protest strengthens, therefore more materialist young people protest. 19

TABLE 2 Countries Classified by Degree of Global Financial Crisis Impact No recession Recession Double-dip recession Australia South Korea Poland Uruguay Ghana United States Chile Peru Spain Japan New Zealand Sweden Cyprus Romania Source: OECD Statistics Note: Recession defined as two or more consecutive quarters of negative growth. 20

TABLE 3 Change in Postmaterialist Values 2005-2010 2005 2010 Change Sig New Zealand 11-5 -16 ** Peru -5-18 -12 ** Cyprus -21-31 -10 ** Uruguay 8 2-6 ** Ghana -27-31 -5 ** United States -2-5 -3 ** Australia 9 8-2 Spain -24-24 0 Japan -16-16 0 Sweden 20 24 +4 * Poland -24-17 +7 ** Chile -16-5 +11 ** South Korea -52-37 +15 ** Romania -43-23 +20 ** Source: 2005 and 2010 World Values Surveys. Note: Uses 4-item index of Postmaterialism measuring percent Postmaterialist minus percent Materialist. *Statstically significant change at p<0.05 **Statistically significant change at p<0.01 21

TABLE 4 Percent Postmaterialist by Age Group 2005-2010 Age at time of survey 2005 2010 Change Sig 17-24 17.3% 13.6% -3.7% ** 25-34 14.5% 14.9% 0.4% 35-44 17.2% 14.2% -3.0% ** 45-54 18.7% 13.7% -5.0% ** 55-64 18.9% 17.0% -1.9% 65+ 14.4% 15.7% 1.3% Total 16.8% 14.9% -1.9% ** Source: 2005 and 2010 World Values Surveys. Note: Uses 4-item index of postmaterialism with pooled data from Australia, Cyprus, Ghana, Japan, New Zealand, Peru, Spain, Sweden, USA and Uruguay. Excludes countries with high increases in postmaterialist values (Chile, South Korea, Poland and Romania) in order to see trends by age group in the remaining countries. **Statistically significant change at p<0.01 22

TABLE 5 Trends in Political Protest 2005-2010 (Mean Protest Scale) 2005 2010 Change Sig Australia 1.74 1.74 0.00 Chile 0.67 0.82 0.15 ** Cyprus 1.15 1.10-0.05 Ghana 0.71 0.49-0.22 ** Japan 1.30 0.99-0.31 ** South Korea 1.24 1.24 0.00 New Zealand 1.85 1.81-0.04 Peru 1.05 0.87-0.18 ** Poland 0.80 1.02 0.22 ** Romania 0.47 0.66 0.18 ** Spain 1.25 1.13-0.12 ** Sweden 1.96 1.79-0.17 ** United States 1.74 1.64-0.11 ** Uruguay 0.78 0.73-0.06 Source: 2005 and 2010 World Values Surveys. Note: Scale of protest constructed by coding responses to questions regarding participation in petitions, boycotts and peaceful demonstrations. Scale is on a range of 0-3 with higher levels indicating greater protest activism/potential. Scale captures both protest activism and protest potential across the three items, coding responses have done = 1; might do = 0.5; and would never do = 0. **Statistically significant change at p<0.01 23

TABLE 6 Predicting Political Protest 2005-2010 2005 2010 B Std. Error B Std. Error (Constant).694**.030.472**.027 Employed.204**.017.156**.015 Unemployed -.057.032.056*.028 Education.395**.020.503**.016 Gender -.097**.015 -.036**.013 Age.002**.000.005**.000 Postmaterialism.563**.023.598**.021 Source: 2005 and 2010 World Values Surveys. Note: Uses 4-item index of Postmaterialism. Gender coded as Female = 1. *Statistically significant at p<0.05 **Statistically significant at p<0.01 24

FIGURE 1 Change in Postmaterialist Values 2005-2010 (Percent postmaterialist minus percent materialist) Source: 2005 and 2010 World Values Surveys. Note: Figure uses 4-item index of postmaterialism. 25

FIGURE 2 Change in Protest 2005-2010 Source: 2005 and 2010 World Values Surveys. Note: Scale of protest constructed by coding responses to questions regarding participation in petitions, boycotts and peaceful demonstrations. Scale is on a range of 0-3 with higher levels indicating greater protest activism/potential. Scale captures both protest activism and protest potential across the three items, coding responses have done = 1; might do = 0.5; and would never do = 0. 26

FIGURE 3 Change in Protest by Change in Postmaterialism 2005-2010 Source: 2005 and 2010 World Values Surveys. Note: Figure uses 4-item index of postmaterialism and scale of protest as outlined in Figure 2. 27