P a g e 1 The Political Economy of Third-Wave Democratization in Africa in West Africa: 1990-2008 A Paper presented at the 21 st World Congress of Political Science July 12-16, 2009 Santiago, Chile By Abdoulaye Saine, Ph.D. Department of Political Science Harrison Hall 221 Miami University Oxford, OH 45056 sainea@muohio.edu Rough draft: please do not quote
P a g e 2 President Obama s election on Tuesday, November 4 th represents major milestones in the history of the United States at several key levels. It is by far the most important presidential election in recent years. Kenyan political analyst captured the moment well when he said: "This is going to be inspirational to young people to stand for justice, to stand for economic progress, and also to appreciate that quality of leadership and to aspire to a different kind of leadership than we have experienced in the past. So this has got inspirational value to the young Kenyans and Africans who want to see quality leadership emerging in the country and elsewhere." This aspiration is particularly relevant for West Africa where both presidential and national assembly elections since the 1990s have had mixed political outcomes- from relative openness to severely constrained electoral processes. According to an Afrobaromiter Survey conducted in 2002-2003, 79 % of Africans prefer to choose their country leaders through regular, open and fair elections, rather than by other means (Diallo, February 2008). This popular demand resonates with West Africa s sixteen countries and 290 million people, 160 of which are Nigerian. The Afrobarometer Survey is also consistent with regional institutions such as the ECOWAS, because in the December 2001 in Dakar, Senegal ECOWAS heads of state adopted the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance that stipulated that: every accession to power must be made through free, fair and transparent elections. In assessing elections and their outcomes, I ask three key questions:
P a g e 3 (1) To what extent is this decree consistent with political practices and outcomes in West Africa s sixteen states? (2) To what extent have elections in this generally unstable region of Africa lived up to citizens expectations? (3) And finally, to what extent have elections since the 1990, and democratization more generally, impacted the economic performance and economic well-being of citizens? In trying to answer these questions a typology of states may be useful: The first category of states fall under (a) Consolidating Democracies, i.e., states that have had at least three presidential and national assembly elections, in which there was an alteration of leadership as was in Senegal and Ghana in 2000. This category include: Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mali, and Senegal. In general, these countries, despite some variations, fulfilled positively questions 1 & 2. The last question regarding economic performance and economic well- being of citizens appears at best, modest. The second category of states, which I dubbed, Liberalizing include: Nigeria, Togo, Guinea Bissau and Guinea (Conakry). Despite the holding of elections in these states performance on the three questions were relatively weak, especially when compared to the first category. Here elections were fraught with innumerable malpractices that included serious rigging and stealing of elections. These elections were also compromised by severely constrained political landscapes that also included the manipulation of the electoral process in an incumbent s favor, as witnessed in Nigeria in 2007. More worrisome, however, is the level of political governmental violence visited on opposition political party leaders and their supporters.
P a g e 4 The third category, which includes Cote d Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, I called the Post-conflict States. In this category, following several years of internal conflict held or are about to hold elections to resolve enduring regional, ethnic and resource-driven conflicts. In this category elections have a putative healing effect and are expected to engendered an environment of peace and reconciliation. Liberia and Sierra Leone in which Sirleaf and Kaba were elected set in motion a process of liberalization and economic recovery. Elections in Authoritarian and Quasi-military states witness a degree of relative political liberalization and some political contestation but under very restrained political and economic circumstances and often overseen by a strongman and a hand-picked electoral body. In this category of states, opposition political parties are weak, and heavily contained, while its leadership suffer violence and intimidation. Relying heavily on the military, these strongmen divert national economic resources to placate the military at the expense of economic performance and well-being of their citizens. These states are also characterized by political instability and economic volatility and are prone to coups and counter-coups. States that fall under this typology are Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger and The Gambia and constitute the fourth category. It should be noted that there is considerable overlap and fluidity in these categories, yet they provide a useful analytical tool to make sense of state-types and their political and economic trajectories.
P a g e 5 Using Freedom House Rankings as a rough gauge or measure one can get a sense of how democracy has fared in our cases. To be sure these measures are regularly contested because of bias in favor of political rights and civil liberties, while neglecting economic rights; perhaps a Cold-War ideological carry-over. Therefore, while these measures are useful they should be taken with caution because in the end, democracy and its consolidation in this subregion will hinge on tangible and visible welfare benefits to the region's 290 million and growing population. Country PR CL Year Regime-type Benin 2 2 (2006) Free Burkina Faso 5 3 Partly-free Cape Verde 1 1 Free Cote d Ivoire 6 6 Not Free The Gambia 5 4 Partly Free Ghana 1 2 Free Guinea (Conakry) 3 4 Partly Free Guinea Bissau 3 4 Partly Free Liberia 4 4 Partly Free Mali 2 2 Free Mauritania 6 4 Partly Free Niger 3 3 Partly Free Nigeria 4 4 Partly Free Senegal 2 3 Free
P a g e 6 Sierra Leone 4 3 Partly Free Togo 6 5 Not Free USA 1 1 Free United Kingdom 1 1 Free Of this total: 5 are considered free; 9 partly free; and 2, not free. Rankings in 2007 have not changed appreciably. Free Category: Cape Verde (1); Ghana (1.5); Mali (1.5); Senegal (2.5), Benin (2) Partly Free Category: Liberia (3.5); Niger (3.5); Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau Nigeria, The Gambia and Mauritania (4.5) Not Free category: Burkina (4); Guinea (5.5); Togo, (5.5); Patrick McGowan has argued eloquently that the peripheral character of countries in the West Africa sub-region as well as their role as producers of primary products in the international division labor and poor leadership- both civilian and military leaves these countries vulnerable to instability, conflict, in sum a democratic-deficit. In an extension of this argument, I argue further that given West Africa's peripheral status in the global-capitalist economy, and its declining revenue base, it will take committed leadership with sound economic policies to build a democratic political culture and hopefully reverse economic decline, poverty and political instability. Yet, these consequences can be reversed permanently only when the global trade regime adequately and fairly compensates Africans for their labor and lowers trade barriers for Africa's primary and manufactured goods.
P a g e 7 Analysts have generally not looked at the role of the global capitalist system and its direct and indirect effects on democratization nor have they interrogated the ideology and US hegemony as it relates to democracy/ democratization in so-called developing countries. Similarly, there has there been little theorizing on alternative forms of democracy and globalization, especially those that are organically spawned and counter-hegemonic. The laboratory that is Africa today reveals a wide variety of ongoing experiments, some unlikely to succeed. Several African countries still struggle to democratize, with the chances of success seeming more and more remote in other countries. Because of disunity among the opposition, the skills of incumbent leaders and outside support from allies, democracy s travails continue unabated. The stakes are such that old regimes cling to power with unexpected resolve. Regardless of conjecture about an ideal sequence of economic and political liberalization, many African countries face concurrent political and economic reforms. If political liberalization enables a departure from the practices and institutions associated with neo-patrimonial rule, then democratization in African states can also begin to shift the terms of economic governance. The failure of democracy and economic development in Africa is due to a large part to the scramble for wealth by predator elites who have dominated African politics since independence. They see the state as a source of personal wealth accumulation- call it the politics of the belly. There is high premium on the control of the state, which is the biggest and most easily accessible source of wealth accumulation. This includes fostering ethnic sectarianism and political repression. Competition for control of the state whether between the military and civilian classes or among civilian political parties, is invariably ferocious and generates instability.
P a g e 8 Saine has argued in The Paradox of Third-Wave Democratization in Africa that the peripheral character of countries in the West Africa sub-region as well as their role as producers of primary products in the international division labor and poor leadership- both civilian and military leave these countries vulnerable to instability, conflict, in sum a democratic-deficit. In an extension of this argument, we argue further that given West Africa s peripheral status in the global-capitalist economy, and its declining revenue base, it will take committed leadership with sound economic policies to build a democratic political culture to reverse economic decline, poverty and political instability. Another crucial factor in permanently reversing West Africa s perennial state of instability, especially its narco-states will occur only when the global trade regime adequately and fairly compensates Africans for their labor and lowers trade barriers for Africa s primary and manufactured goods. Regrettably, many analysts, mostly students of Comparative Politics have generally not looked at the role of the international capitalist-economy and globalization and their direct and/ or indirect effects on democratization in the periphery. Nor have many American scholars, interrogated or contested the embedded ideology of US economic and political hegemony, as well as foisted neo-liberal policies on states in West Africa and by its IMF and World Bank surrogates. The former is especially pertinent because thousands of miles from the battle fields of Iraq and Afghanistan, another side of America s fight against terrorism is unfolding in West Africa. American Green Berets, according to Eric Schmitt, are training African armies to guard their borders and patrol vast desolate expanses against infiltration of Al Qaeda militants. In five of the cases in this volume (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal) counterterrorism training and funding has intensified. Yet, U.S. efforts at countering the specter of terrorism in West Africa are not limited to military means alone. The War on terror now includes
P a g e 9 instruction for teachers and job training for young Muslim men who could be singled out by militant. Mali, specifically, has had dozens of American and European trainers conducting military exercises to curb the entry of militants who are likely to take refuge in the country s vast Saharan north. In neighboring Mauritania twelve soldiers were killed in September 2008 in an attack that many believe was carried out by Al Qaeda militants. It seems at first glance that the U.S s war on terror could succeed in securing the porous borders of these countries, and in doing so support democratization efforts in the region. Yet, there is a clear potential danger that the military component of U.S. policy could, in fact, threaten the fragile democracies and liberalizing states in the sub-region while simultaneously providing support for the rabidly authoritarian leaders. More importantly, the policy s focus on Islam and Muslims as the problems and hence the targets is for all practical purposes misplaced and dangerous. The sub-region is home to a vastly moderate Sunni Muslim population that form the the majority in eleven states, while the remaining five states (Benin, 15 %, Cape Verde, 16 %, Liberia, 20 %, Ghana, 16 %, and Togo, 10 %) harbor sizeable Muslim minorities. The Muslim majority states (Burkina Faso, 50%, Cote d Ivoire, 60 %, The Gambia, 90 %, Guinea, 85 %, Guinea-Bissau, 45 %, Mali, 90 %, Mauritania, 100%, Niger, 80 %, Nigeria, 50 %, Senegal, 95 %, and Sierra Leone, 60 %) and their populations have historically maintained good relations with the U.S., specifically and the West, generally and a policy that constructs and targets Muslims and Islam as the enemy could backfire and undermine efforts to stem terrorism. U.S. policy should instead give priority to the nonmilitary component while deemphasizing the military rhetoric against Muslims and Islam. This is off putting to moderate Muslims who are the logical allies for the U.S. in the war against terrorism.
P a g e 10 What the vast majority-muslim states counter strongly is the presumption that Islam and Democracy are inherently irreconcilable, in part, because Islam lacks the principle that separates the domains of Mosque and State. In all the Muslim-majority states, except for Mauritania, perhaps, secularism rather than theocracy is more deeply entrenched. African cultural as well as historical sensibilities have spawned an Islam that is tolerant and one that is distinct, as it betrays high levels of syncretism and tolerance. Thus, the problems may lie, not so much with Islam or Muslims, per se, but on the ways in which they are constructed. If this perverse construction of Islam and Muslims are not corrected, the U.S. stands to gain little in its growing effort to root out terrorism in the sub-region. Thus, it is not Islam but culture and the ways in which this cultural prism is mediated. The issue of culture brings up another important concern as it relates to liberalization and democratization in West-Africa. This issue has to do with the little theorizing on alternative forms of democracy and globalization, especially those that are organically spawned and counter-hegemonic. Democracy in each of the sixteen countries that comprise the sub-region will invariably reflect domestic influences but not necessarily at the expense of external inputs. The task at hand is to craft democratic institutions that citizens deem legitimate and can relate to and help support. These issues deserve considerably more academic attention than they currently receive. What emerged clearly from these studies, whether it is because of the nature of the West African state, the unfair international economic environment, and other internal factors, it remains true that democracy, even where it has become a reality, has yet to alter fundamentally the lives of Africans. This must be one of democracy s litmus tests in West Africa because to insist on deepening democracy against a backdrop of growing poverty and a global trade regime that is
P a g e 11 inimical to the principles of free and fair trade is to reduce most of the states in the sub-region to perpetual instability and ill-liberalism. The prospects that the changes on the continent will lead to sustainable and reasonably fair and enduring multiparty democracies are thus far discouraging. Most new democracies seem only concerned with the mere holding of elections. Empowering Africans to participate in democratic government will require that some economic and social transformations be put in place. Beyond a system in which opposition parties are allowed to form and peacefully contest elections, multiparty democracy in West Africa should tackle economic disparities. The generally dismal record of democracy in many African countries is reason to dismiss its sustainability in West Africa, however, alongside these cases many encouraging ones offer us hope for democracy to deepen in years to come. The struggle will almost certainly be fitful, sometimes violent and many are likely to be tempted, as in several Latin America countries, to trade in democratic principles and rights for authoritarian regimes that putatively offer citizens the goodies. Democracy is the only game in town and it may have also won the intellectual debate, yet the task at hand is to strengthen a democratic ethos to bear tangible and visible economic fruits for all. What this suggests is that elections, specifically, and liberalization/ democratization, generally must be analyzed within the context of economic and political globalization, and whose interests it ultimately serves. Finally, while President-elect Obama s recent historic victory is a victory for ethic groups and nationalities in the US and elsewhere, and promises to improve US relations with allies, and possibly Africa- high expectations must be tempered, as US hegemonic interests could run counter to genuine political and economic democracy in Africa. Yet, what his election potentially illustrates is how good leadership and an effective political and macroeconomic framework predicated on home-grown democracy and provision of basic-needs for the bulk of
P a g e 12 the population may offers the best alternatives to externally-driven neo-liberal and governance policies in Africa. In the end, Obama s election to the highest and most powerful job in the US, and possibly the world sends a strong message to dictators the world-over, and those in West Africa, specifically, that impunity, gross human rights violations and the lack of accountability to their citizens may soon represent a thing of the past.