FHSMUN Tampa Bay 3 GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST COMMITTEE THE SITUATION IN COLOMBIA. Authors: Brian D. Sutliff and Chris Gebhardt

FHSMUN Tampa Bay 3 GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST COMMITTEE THE SITUATION IN COLOMBIA Authors: Brian D. Sutliff and Chris Gebhardt Introduction The prevalence and constancy of armed violence in Colombia is its undeniable contemporary tragedy. Torn apart by the ravages of over sixty years of civil war and internal conflicts, Colombia s tragedy has become a critical security issue for the entire Western Hemisphere. As the various actors in this seemingly interminable series of conflicts interact and revise their strategies, they impose considerable burdens on Colombia s neighbors, but most especially on the civilians caught in the middle. The international community, including the UN System, needs to consider the ending of violence and the implementation of comprehensive disarmament and development strategies in Colombia among its immediate and long-term security priorities. Former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) articulated that he believed that the end of armed conflict in Colombia was in sight because of his government s aggressive counterinsurgency policies against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). That proposed end to the armed conflict did not come to pass, however, and with the election of Uribe s successor in 2010, President Juan Manuel Santos began talks with the FARC. 1 In late September 2015, President Santos announced that he and FARC leader Rodrigo Londoño agreed to a 6 month timetable for signing a final peace accord, a subsequent 60-day period for FARC rebels to turn over their weapons, and possible amnesty for most FARC soldiers, although potentially not for leaders such as Londoño. 2 Recent evidence continues to point to a weakening of the FARC s operational capacities, with total FARC combatants estimated at 7,000 -- down considerably from the 20,000 estimated combatants at the opening of the 21 st century. 3 For President Santos, previous Colombian governments have eagerly claimed victory over the FARC and other guerrilla groups in Colombia only to see the guerrillas stage audacious actions and raids. 1 BBC News. Colombia agrees to hold peace talks with Farc rebels. 28 August 2012. 2 William Neuman, Colombia s President Says Peace Talks Overcame Late Surprise New York Times September 25, 2015. 3 International Crisis Group. The Day after Tomorrow: Colombia s FARC and the End of the Conflict. International Crisis Group. 11 December 2014. www.crisisgroup.org/

President Santos position against FARC remains precarious, however, following the January 2011 killing of 460 government soldiers and wounding of over 2,000 more by FARC-EP fighters coupled with an estimated 1,115 FARC-related actions in the first six months of 2011. Nonetheless, some progress between the Colombian government and the FARC has been seen, such as the release in April 2012 of all political hostages being held by FARC and the initiation of peace talks between both sides in 2012 which has led to a FARC-announced unilateral cease-fire that began on 20 July 2015. La Violencia Colombia s centrality in the Western Hemisphere has been a constant over the past 200 years. Colombia occupies a critical geographic location, situated at the northern tip of South America, directly linking the continents of North and South America while also touching both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Colombia s importance for the Western Hemisphere was also solidified through Simon Bolivar s original Gran Colombia, a larger country that once also contained modern Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela. Ecuador and Venezuela broke away from Colombia in the 19th century, and the United States assisted Panama with its independence from Colombia in 1903 by positioning American warships off Colombia s coast while Panamanian rebels staged a brief uprising. Throughout the first 150 years of Colombia s existence as an independent country, the dominant Conservative and Liberal parties contested elections, argued, and engaged in armed conflict against each other. In 1948, after the murder of the leading Liberal candidate for president, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán Ayala (hereafter referred to as Gaitán), Colombia was torn apart by horrific violence as country bore witness to its own version of Cold War antagonisms between the Conservatives (many of whom sought to emulate Francisco Franco, the Fascist leader of Spain), the Liberals, and the small Communist party. The Conservatives, as the dominant political party after the Liberals boycotted the 1950 presidential elections in protest against the concerted wave of violence unleashed in the wake of Gaitán s death, used the security forces to create cadres of assassins, known as pájaros (birds in Spanish), who intimidated and eliminated political opposition in many areas. The Liberals began to retaliate in kind, and by the early 1950 s, La Violencia was in full swing. Journalist and human rights monitor Robin Kirk wrote, the struggle that rapidly consumed Colombia, was personal. Grand political fortunes were at stake, but so too were simmering land disputes, municipal rivalries, indiscretions, ambitions and affairs of the heart 4 As La Violencia engulfed more Colombian communities, it exacerbated the persistent social and economic inequality that has always plagued Colombia. When poor peasants were forced off their lands, wealthy landowners and their political allies used the peasants often-forced exodus to expand their own landholdings. The deepening of these social and economic inequalities were seemingly reinforced by the violence perpetrated by the official security forces as well as their unofficial allies. The peasants and other 4 Robin Kirk, More Terrible Than Death: Violence, Drugs, and America s War in Colombia PublicAffairs New York 2004 p. 25.

internally displaced persons (IDPs) who were forcibly relocated or fled in advance of the encroaching violence eventually created communities from which sprang the most organized and fiercest resistance to La Violencia. Enter Las Guerrillas By 1960, the effects of La Violencia were felt throughout Colombia, particularly in the rural areas. The Liberal party fractured further, with some of the most marginalized members, such as Pedro Marín, later known as Manuel Marulanda Velez or Tirofijo (Sureshot), joining forces with the Communists. By the mid-1960s, Colombia s landscape was being radically reshaped by the conflicts between the security forces and a rapidly expanding cadre of guerrilla groups including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Popular Liberation Army (ELP), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the April 19 Movement (M-19). As these rebel groups survived large-scale government military operations, they began to pose a serious challenge to the Colombian government. By the early 1960s, the FARC and other rebel groups had carved out several independent republics in the poor rural southern provinces of Colombia, and they began to exercise sovereignty in these zones. The government s alliance with the United States only served to alarm many of these groups further at the height of the international Cold War rivalry. The government would gradually adapt its strategy to include relief aid and medical services, modeled along the lines of President Kennedy s Alliance for Progress. Called Plan Lazo, this combination of relief aid and military force was aimed at eliminating the autonomous status of the independent republics. Plan Lazo failed to eliminate the independent republics completely. Marín, or Tirofijo, would later argue that if the government had spent even a fraction of the money it used equipping soldiers to help needy farmers and build roads and schools, it might well have avoided decades of trouble with the FARC. 5 Later Colombian governments, including the successive governments of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) effectively ceded control of large areas of southern Colombia to the FARC in attempts to reduce violence and also induce the guerrillas to negotiate. As these attempts at negotiation failed to produce positive results, the violence between the government and the guerrillas would be augmented by the government s creation of and alliances with new paramilitary organizations, or self-defense groups. Self-Defense Groups That Go On the Offense The extremely close relationships between the Colombian military and the paramilitary organizations, or self-defense groups, have been critical linkages for the economic, military and political elites in Colombia for many years. The infamous pájaros of La Violencia would in time be superseded by the more well-organized and largely selffinanced self-defense groups of the 1980s and 1990s, especially the United Self- Defense Forces (AUC). The influential paramilitary leader, Carlos Castaño, of the AUC presented his armed forces, eventually totaling 32,000, as developing organically in 5 Robin Kirk, More Terrible Than Death 2004 p. 53.

response to the violent excesses and Marxist ideology of the guerrillas. In reality, though, the paramilitaries were never a homogenous organization but rather a marriage of interests between powerful local warlords, drug barons, organized crime, members of local political and economic elites and counter-insurgent groups. 6 The rhetoric of the self-defense groups also consistently conflicted with their own actions in the rural areas of Colombia. The paramilitaries have frequently used drug cultivation and trafficking, donations from wealthy landowners, extortion, smuggling, and other organized criminal activities to finance their growth and activities. 7 The paramilitary groups in Colombia constituted the infamous Sixth Division of the Colombian armed forces because of their extremely close partnerships and working relationships. The Colombian military routinely shared intelligence feeds and information with the paramilitaries, particularly given that many paramilitary commanders and fighters had previously been active members of the Colombian security forces. In a chilling echo of the atrocities in the Darfur region of Sudan, investigators and journalists have documented attacks where the Colombian military began actions and then left the area to allow the paramilitaries to work without any official oversight or obstruction. 8 As the chilling realities of the paramilitaries actions, as well as their continued close relationships with the government and security forces, became common knowledge, especially outside Colombia, the Colombian government began to take steps to curb the worst violence of the paramilitaries. In 2006, the AUC announced that it was voluntarily demobilizing and disarming in return for amnesty from crimes committed over the previous decade. Beyond improving the international image of Colombia s government, certainly in the opinion of its most important security patron, the United States, the Colombian government removed an embarrassing challenge to its own authority. The International Crisis Group (ICG) noted in 2007 that the military power exercised added to the instability of the state to deliver public services in rural areas and allowed the paramilitaries to take de facto control of even legal local economies. 9 While the demilitarization and the demobilization of the AUC is a welcome step towards securing a lasting and just peace in Colombia, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations, along with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and key civil society representatives, have identified a third generation of paramilitaries, including the New Generation Organization (ONG) in Nariño and the Black Eagles in Norte de Santander. 10 Colombia and Terrorism Western media accounts of terrorism overwhelmingly focus on the Middle East and the Muslim World, but Colombia has been cited as an important front for terrorism by the United States and other governments. The FARC and the AUC have both been 6 International Crisis Group (ICG), Colombia s New Armed Groups May 10, 2007 p. 3. 7 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Smoke and Mirrors: Colombia s demobilization of paramilitary groups August 2005 Vol. 17, No. 3 (B). The entire report can be accessed at: http://hrw.org/reports/2005/colombia0805/colombia0805.pdf 8 Bill Weinberg, Colombia s Heart of Darkness in NYC and DC The Nation July 29, 2008. 9 ICG, Colombia s New Armed Groups May 10, 2007 p. 4. 10 ICG, Colombia s New Armed Groups May 10, 2007 p. 2.

labeled terrorist organizations by the US State Department, and the tactics used by the guerrillas, the paramilitaries, and Colombian security forces have frequently targeted civilians and civilian infrastructure, including power stations and oil pipelines. The FARC maintained important links to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) throughout the 1990s and the Basque nationalist group Euzkadi ta Aksaluna (ETA), considered a terrorist group by Spain and was rumored to have trained in Colombia in FARCcontrolled areas. 11 Throughout the 1990s, massacres and reprisal massacres targeted peasants and anyone suspected of having collaborated with the enemy. While the overall level of violence in Colombia is significantly below the levels of the previous two decades, attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure continue, including the FARC assassination of 3 teachers they suspected of being military informants. 12 However, some progress has been seen since the Presidency of Juan Santos, in that FARC attacks have primarily been defensive operations and targeted only government soldiers/forces -- though until 2011, the annual number of FARC attacks. 13 The Reach of Drug Money The unfortunate portrait of Colombia is nearly always one focused on the cultivation, production, and trafficking of illegal drugs, especially cocaine. There is no denying that Colombia is clearly the world s largest producer of cocaine as well as an important producer of heroine and marijuana nor that the sale of illegal drugs brings in tens of billions of dollars annually. Drug money is now so deeply embedded in Colombian society that it is nearly impossible for national politicians to declare that their campaigns have not been financed, at least in part, by drug sales. The guerrillas and the paramilitaries are also so heavily invested in the drug trade that some of the worst atrocities committed by each side have been perpetrated primarily to capture better cocagrowing land. As always, those caught in the middle are the Colombian civilians. Combating the cultivation, production and trafficking of Colombian cocaine has been a priority for successive Colombian and American governments, regardless of political party, but the overall success of the so-called war on drugs has been rather limited. The attempted eradication of coca plants has reduced the total amount of coca grown in Colombia but has also damaged food crops and produced serious environmental consequences. 14 Furthermore, any attempt to stamp out coca production in Colombia will likely lead to increased production in Bolivia and Peru, just as efforts to wipe out Bolivian and Peruvian coca production in the 1980s only spurred Colombia to massively increase its own production. The drug problem and the myriad overlapping and often interrelated security issues in Colombia cannot be addressed by any one country; rather, these problems require comprehensive multilateral and multistakeholder solutions involving 11 BBC News, Colombia used for terrorist training April 24, 2002. 12 Simon Romero, Cocaine Sustains War in Rural Colombia New York Times July 27, 2008. 13 Dickinson, Elizabeth. Rumble in the Jungle Foreign Policy 26 July 2011. 14 The Economist, The unstoppable crop June 19, 2008.

many agencies of the UN System, the OAS, national governments, NGOs, and interested civil society representatives. With the massive expansion of the drug industry came the development of narco violence. The billions of dollars that flowed into Colombia provided the weaponry that dominated the extremely violent rivalry between the Cali and Medellín drug cartels throughout the 1980s. When the US government, under President Ronald Reagan, initiated its War on Drugs, the effects were quickly felt in South America. The US then worked with governments, including Colombia s, to arrange for the arrest and extradition of drug traffickers such as the notorious Pablo Escobar. As the Colombian government sought to extradite more traffickers, Escobar, who was elected to the Colombian Congress as a deputy representative in 1982, and other narcotraffickers had judges and police officers assassinated and Colombia s cities were rocked by deadly bombings. Escobar s control of the Medellín cartel made him one of the richest men in the world by the end of the 1980s, but he was also undoubtedly one of the most violent. According to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), he bombed a passenger plane, as well as Colombia's federal police headquarters, and paid bounties for the murders of policemen and members of rival drug cartels. Estimates are difficult, but it is thought he was responsible for more than 4,000 deaths. 15 Escobar would eventually bargain with the Colombian government to put himself under house arrest, meaning that he would confine himself to his multimillion dollar home and continue to direct the activities of the Medellín cartel until his death in 1993. The Colombian government would eventually stop extraditing drug traffickers to the US and the campaign of assassinations and bombings ceased. These events were of critical importance for Colombia and the US as the Uribe government sought to expand extradition efforts. At the beginning of August 2008, then Colombian President Uribe requested that the US lengthen the minimum prison sentences for convicted extradited drug traffickers. 16 However, it has recently been reported that part of the negotiations between FARC rebels and the Colombian government has resulted in a pledge by current Colombian President Santos to stop the extradition of drug traffickers and drug lords for prosecution. Colombia: World Kidnapping Capital As the various conflicts in Colombia escalated, the guerrillas began exploring other options for financing their operations, including war taxes levied on the economic activities occurring within the independent republics, including narcotics cultivation, production, and trafficking, and kidnapping wealthy people, their children, and foreigners for ransom. The M-19 guerrillas first proved that ransoming wealthy hostages could be a lucrative source of income for the guerrillas in the mid-1970s; by the 1980s, the FARC and ELN would be involved as well and Colombia would in time claim the dubious honor of leading the world in annual kidnappings. These kidnappings would raise the cost of doing business in Colombia for foreign corporations, such as Occidental Petroleum, and would bring in millions of dollars to the guerrillas. These tactics would alienate large swaths of Colombian society against the guerrillas as well as bring them into direct 15 Mike Ceasar, At home on Pablo Escobar s ranch BBC News June 2, 2008. 16 The Washington Post, Uribe to ask US for longer trafficking sentences August 1, 2008.

confrontations at times with wealthy and well-armed drug traffickers who bought huge amounts of land in areas that had traditionally been the domain of the guerrillas. Robin Kirk notes that trouble between the traffickers and the FARC was inevitable. At its core, the FARC remained a movement of peasants and ideological purists who hated everything the traffickers represented but coveted the power of their money. For their part, the traffickers cared nothing about the FARC s decades-old claims against Colombia s elites 17 Kidnapping would also incur the wrath of corporations who would then funnel contributions and even weapons to the paramilitaries fighting the guerrillas; the banana-exporting Chiquita would eventually confess to paying nearly $1.75 million USD to the AUC to protect its workers as well as to channeling large numbers of weapons to the AUC. Chiquita would eventually pay a $25 million USD to the US Justice Department and would sell off its Colombian branch to avoid further penalties. Regional Concerns Colombia s security problems are not strictly internal and therefore require feasible and sustainable international solutions. Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela are the countries most immediately affected by violence and instability in Colombia but the effects can be felt in the United States and Europe as well. The Colombian government infuriated Ecuador in March 2008 by initiating hostilities against guerrillas on Ecuadorean soil; the OAS ruled that the attack was a violation of Ecuadoran sovereignty. In the aftermath of the attack, Ecuador severed diplomatic ties with Colombia; at the beginning of June 2008, Ecuador and Colombia restored low-level diplomatic ties 18 before newly elected Colombian President Juan Santos initiated the full restoration of diplomatic ties in November 2010. 19 The restoration of ties between the two countries has led to a more concerted effort along the Ecuadorian-Colombian border where FARC rebels often cross between the two countries. In recent years, Ecuador has spoken out strongly against the FARC and spoken of a zero tolerance policy regarding the rebel organization, to the point where Ecuadorian security forces have taken action against individuals involved with or suspected of being involved with the FARC. 20 The implicit support for the guerrillas operating along Colombia s borders is essential for the FARC s resilience. Specifically, former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez was an important sponsor of the FARC. After a FARC laptop was recovered early in 2008 detailing links between Chavez and the FARC, Chavez began to distance himself from the FARC. 21 However, President Uribe s posturing led to the 2010 Colombian-Venezuela diplomatic diplomatic crisis, which broke out in July of that year 17 Robin Kirk, More Terrible Than Death p. 109. 18 BBC News, Colombia and Ecuador restore ties June 6, 2008. 19 Sylvestri, Ross. Ecuador s security and Colombia s 50-year-old conflict. Southern Pulse 3 Sept. 2014 20 Ibid. 21 Juan Forero, Chavez, Seeking Colombia Role, Distances Himself from Rebels The Washington Post July 8, 2008.

when Venezuela broke off diplomatic relations with Colombia and the specter of war rose over the two northern South America nations. As tensions within the region escalated, Colombia s new president, Juan Santos, was sworn in on 7 August 2010, and by 10 August had agreed with Hugo Chavez (with the help of UNASUR and the Ecuadorian government) to restore relations between the two countries via bilateral commissions related to commercial, economic, social investment, infrastructure, and security issues. Several million Colombians have also fled the fighting in their country and immigrated to various Latin American countries, the US, Canada, and Europe, creating important Colombian communities in many international cities. Creating a stable and secure Colombia will allow many of these emigrants, a considerable number of whom are refugees, to return to Colombia and will also allow Colombia and its neighbors critical opportunities to improve their political relationships and cultural and economic ties. The UN System and the OAS in Colombia As the depth of the violence in Colombia disrupts domestic and regional development and security initiatives, the Organization of American States (OAS) has increased its direct involvement to assist in mediating a solution to the violence and insecurity. In February 2004, the OAS established the OAS Peace Support Mission in Colombia (MAPP/OEA) with a mandate to verify initiatives to bring about a ceasefire and end of hostilities, demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration into society of the illegal armed groups that operate in Colombia. 22 The effectiveness of the OAS Peace Support Mission in Colombia (MAPP/OAE) remains widely disputed. The United States government, Colombia s closest ally, has praised the OAS s performance 23 in this regard where human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch (HRW), have criticized the OAS Mission. 24 In recent years, aid for MAPP/OAE has expanded from just OAS countries to include, among others, Germany, which increased its annual contribution following the extension of MAPP/OAE operations through at least 2018. At the announcement, Ambassador Von Goetze stated that it is very obvious that the peace process needs support and the OAS has proven that it can give this support with the full consent of the government but also those on the ground and that peace can only be achieved if justice is guaranteed at the same time. 25 22 Agreement between the Government of Colombia and the General Secretariat of the OAS for Monitoring of the Peace Process in Colombia, signed January 23, 2004, by the Secretary General of the OAS, César Gaviria, and President Álvaro Uribe Vélez. 23 Eric Green, US Department of State, Report Reviews US-Backed Peace Mission in Colombia: US official says peace process in Colombia making progress September 8, 2006. Found at: http://www.america.gov/st/washfileenglish/2006/september/200609081217011xeneerg0.7633478.html 24 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Colombia: Sweden and Netherlands Should Withdraw Support for OAS Mission June 23, 2005. Found at: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/23/colomb11214.htm 25 Organization of American States Germany Announces Contribution to the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia. 24 February 2015.

At the same time, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) continues to call upon the Colombian government as well as the guerrillas and the paramilitaries to protect the lives of human rights investigators as well as trade unionists, both of whom are still frequent targets of violence and assassination attempts. 26 The UN s human rights presence in Colombia stretches back to 1996 when the Office in Colombia of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) began its mission to monitor the human rights situation in Colombia and to work with the government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to implement the recommendations of the Office s annual reports. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) also works extensively in Colombia and throughout the region to assist Colombian refugees in Ecuador. The UNHCR also launched a new internet campaign, in conjunction with 10 partner organizations, called Corre por la vida, Running for life, to provide greater assistance and relief to Colombian internally displaced persons (IDPs). 27 Land mines An unfortunate shared characteristic of many developing world conflicts is the widespread use of land mines, and Colombia is no exception. In a country that has seen 10,900 recorded deaths and injuries due to land mines since 1990 28, the highest rate in the world 29, it is disturbing that so few of the armed groups admit to using land mines. 30 The Colombian government is a party to the Ottawa Treaty banning the use of land mines and must officially refrain from using land mines, but the military s close connection to rightwing paramilitaries that refuse to disclose whether or not they use land mines impedes the government s efforts to completely disassociate itself from land mines. The FARC admit to laying land mines in Colombia but none of the other guerrilla groups claim to use these weapons. Colombia has the third greatest number of land mines deployed of any country in the world, behind only Cambodia and Afghanistan, and yet most of the likely parties to use them deny any purchases or deployment of these munitions. The United Nations Children s Fund (UNICEF) has implemented classes to teach rural children about the dangers posed by land mines and unexploded ordinances (UXOs) but the government, armed groups, international community, NGOs, and related civil society representatives need to increase their efforts to remove land mines throughout Colombia. Child Soldiers in Colombia The various disturbing components of the Colombian conflict are like the layers of an onion; as another layer is peeled away, another deeper, and likely related, problem 26 UN News Centre, Colombia: UN experts call for ending violence against human rights defenders April 30, 2008. Found at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsid=26515&cr=colombia&cr1= 27 UN News Centre, New UN Running for Life campaign spotlights plight of Colombia s displaced July 25, 2008. Found at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsid=27487&cr=columbia&cr1= 28 The Halo Trust. Colombia. Found at: http://www.halotrust.org/where-we-work/colombia 29 United Nations Children s Fund (UNICEF), Deadly landmines threaten the lives and well-being of rural children in rural Colombia April 4, 2007. Found at: http://www.unicef.org/protection/colombia_39301.html 30 Vinicius Souza and Maria Eugênia Sá, In Colombia, Land Mines Claim Three Victims a Day Folha de Sao Paulo February 22, 2006.

is exposed. While the pernicious and debilitating impacts of child soldiers are most frequently associated with conflicts in sub-saharan Africa, they surface with disturbing regularity in Colombia, too. UNICEF estimates there are at least 6,000-7,000 child soldiers in Colombia, working with urban-based militias, guerrillas, and the paramilitaries. 31 These estimates may in fact be rather conservative; other estimates place the number of child soldiers in Colombia between 15,000-20,000. These children typically come from poor, marginalized communities. Some are abducted and forcibly recruited while others join the militias, guerrillas, and paramilitaries because of recruitment bonuses and access to economic opportunities and resources that would frequently be unavailable to them otherwise. A critical element of children ripe for recruitment is the hundreds of thousands of IDPs under the age of 18. Cornell University researchers Charles Geisler and Niousha Roshani note that Whether during war or peace, there actually appears to be a strong relationship between the risk of recruitment during displacement and the risk of displacement as an outcome of recruitment. 32 UNICEF and many local and international NGOs are striving to provide vulnerable children and IDPs with needed supplies and services but all of the armed parties, including the Colombian government, must immediately stop recruiting child soldiers, demobilize current child soldiers, and cooperate with these organizations to end this shameful and utterly destructive practice. While the UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict has concluded that the Colombian government has made important progress in prohibiting the use of child soldiers in intelligence operations, the Secretary-General s Special Representative (SRSG) has expressed serious concerns that the Colombian government and the other parties involved have not adequately addressed the needs of both active and demobilized child soldiers. While recent developments certainly point toward a positive change in attitude toward the cessation of recruitment efforts for child soldiers, the issue of their demobilization and how to treat and re-integrate those children into Colombian society remains pressing. Plan Colombia During the 1990s, the US government began devoting greater attention to the violence in Colombia, linking this violence to the US-led war on drugs. In 2000, the Clinton Administration and the US Congress approved a 3-year $1.3 billion USD aid package through which the US would begin assisting Colombia militarily. Plan Colombia, as the aid package came to be known, was reauthorized and expanded by President Bush in 2003. As of 2013, total Plan Colombia aid since 2000 totals over $8 billion USD. 33 Plan Colombia has also included extensive fumigation efforts aimed at eradicating coca cultivation but these efforts have also destroyed traditional agricultural production in certain areas of Colombia. 34 While Presidents Bush and Uribe cited Plan 31 UNICEF, Colombia: Background. Found at: http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/colombia_2660.html 32 Charles Geisler and Niousha Roshani, The Role of Young IDP s as Soldiers Colombia Journal June 17, 2006. Found at: http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia240.htm 33 Sales, Marcus. Plan Colombia: A success? Colombia Politics 14 May 2013. 34 BBC News, Colombian governors decry coca fumigation efforts March 13, 2001.

Colombia aid as highly effective and influential in improving the security situation in Colombia, extrajudicial killings by the official Colombian security forces rose in 2007, according to Amnesty International s latest report. 35 Those extrajudicial killings continued to rise through 2011 before a more amiable relationship between the Colombian government and the FARC began to form under President Juan Santos. Nonetheless, the plan has lead to a greater sense of relations between the United States and Colombia, with the June 2013 announcement from Colombian President Santos that Colombia had initiated the first steps to potentially join the NATO military alliance. In fact, by mid-2014, NATO Deputy Secretary General, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, reiterated NATO s willingness to further assist Colombia in the potential areas of ammunition safety and military training courses, while noting that any further, long-term alliance would be built over time. 36 Nonetheless, the willingness of the Colombian Government to join outside organizations whose desires include a commitment to peaceful solutions above military actions -- though not excluding military actions -- points to significant progress from the south American nation in its steps toward commitment to not only international peace initiatives but to domestic peace initiatives as well. Developments under President Uribe President Alvaro Uribe s government sensed that the FARC was more vulnerable than it had been in previous years for several reasons. With the deaths of leaders such as Raul Reyes and Marín, the FARC lost some of its most experienced commanders. Furthermore, the Colombian military s successes not only harassed the guerrillas but they also disrupted the ability of the FARC to communicate and coordinate activities. Millions of Colombians marched in demonstrations and protests during the final years of the Uribe government, calling for an end to kidnapping and violence, with the most visible expressions of anger directed towards the guerrillas. Since popular support is critical to the success of any guerrilla movement, the FARC became concerned by the widespread condemnation of their tactics by many segments of the Colombian population. President Uribe s confidence was tempered, however, at the beginning of July 2008 when Colombian soldiers rescued 15 hostages, including 2002 presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and 3 US Department of Defense contractors. While the initial media reports were predictably glowing with praise for the Colombian government and military, the government later admitted that one of its soldiers wore the insignia of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on his uniform; according to many international legal jurists and scholars, this very well may have constituted a war crime 37, though nothing to date has came of this misuse of the emblem. The Colombian government claims that this was a mistake made by a nervous soldier. 35 Amnesty International (AI), Amnesty International Report 2008: State of the World s Human Rights Found at: http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/regions/americas/colombia 36 NATO. NATO and Colombia discuss future of cooperation. 19 March 2014. 37 The New York Times, Colombian Soldier Wore Red Cross Logo in Hostage Rescue July 17, 2008.

Ultimately, nothing to date has transpired from this misuse of the ICRC; but perhaps most importantly, the issue was not repeated during the remainder of Uribe s presidency and no reports have surfaced of such an event occurring under the presidency of Uribe s successor, Juan Santos. Nevertheless, while Uribe pronounced his great abilities against the FARC, his militaristic tactics did little to stem the growing tide of violence -- though he was able to secure, with the help of internationally negotiated deals, the release of several high-ranking and high-profile prisoners from FARC custody. This, however, did not obscure the fact that during his presidency, over 60 of Uribe s political allies in the Colombian Congress, including his cousin Mario Uribe, were arrested and/or imprisoned due to their close connections to the paramilitaries. 38 Recent Developments: Following a failed attempt to persuade the constitutional court of Colombia to allow him to run for a third term in office 39, President Uribe handed over control of Colombia s government to newly elected President Juan Manuel Santos on 7 August 2010. Within two years of taking the presidency, President Santos announced a significant departure from the policies of his immediate predecessor in dealing with the FARC. Santos announced that instead of pursuing military operations against the FARC movement, he would instead explore the possibility of peace talks to end the conflict and bring stability back to Colombia 40. Immediately decried by his predecessor, former President Uribe, as seeking peace at any cost in contrast to military action, President Santos made the case that he had learned from mistakes of the previous administration that pursued nothing but militaristic options against the FARC. 41 Importantly, President Santos pledged that Colombian military operations throughout the country would continue while the peace talks occurred. In the back-and-forth negotiations that have followed since, significant progress has been made toward the brokering of a lasting, long-term peace between the FARC rebels and the Colombian government. While the negotiations have overall than positive, they have not been without their setbacks, such as the 2013 lifting of a non-permanent cease-fire which resulted in the deaths of at least seven government soldiers. 42 Despite the setbacks, by May 2013 both sides announced that some of the most contentious issues have been resolved, marking the first time that the Columbian government and FARC had reached an agreement on a substantive issue in over 30 years of negotiation attempts. 43 In the year that followed, and agreement was reached between both sides regarding the participation of political opposition and regarding work against drug trafficking. Furthermore, in early 2015, FARC announced that they would no longer 38 Jeremy McDermott, Colombia confronts its bloody past BBC News August 2, 2008. 39 Markey, Patrick, Colombia s Uribe blocked from re-election. Reuters 26 February 2010. 40 Aljazeera Colombia seeking peace with FARC rebels. 29 Aug. 2012 41 Murphy, Helen and Luis James Acosta. Colombian government seeking peace with FARC rebels. Reuters. 28 Aug. 2012 42 The Associated Press Colombia: Solders ide in Rebel Fight. The New York Times 12 February 2013 43 Aljazeera Deal reached on land reform in Colombia. 27 May 2013.

recruit child soldiers. 44 All of this culminated in what is widely considered to be an unprecedented announcement by FARC itself of a unilateral cease fire which began on 20 July 2015 following years of talks involving not just politicians from the two sides and international negotiators but also spiritual leaders as well. As discussed earlier, the late September 2015 announcement of a spring 2016 timetable for negotiating an end to the conflict is a critical and potentially definitive step towards peace. Peace in Colombia: An Achievable Goal Achieving peace in Colombia while not easy, now sappers to be more achievable than ever; 65+ years of war have left deep and lasting animosities and grievances throughout Colombia. While these tensions are palpable, it is also clear that the overwhelming majority of Colombians (including the FARC) wish to end these fratricidal conflicts and focus on economic and human development initiatives and the President Santos -- who narrowly won reelection in 2014 -- has contributed greatly to the increased peace between both sides. Regardless, it is essential that all armed groups commit themselves to a sustained peace with continuing negotiations designed to bring a comprehensive, long-term solution. Short-term gains are certainly important in stemming the tide of violence that just a few years ago seemed insurmountable. However, shortterm solutions often face unseen obstacles that can fracture a fragile peace. Colombia and the international community may also wish to examine the peace and reconciliation commissions that countries such as Chile, Guatemala and South Africa have instituted to investigate the human rights situation. Furthermore, the Colombian government, in concert with the international community, needs to inculcate a profound respect for human rights throughout its security forces and system of justice in order to regain the trust of millions of Colombian citizens. Clearing Colombia of land mines and unexploded ordinances (UXOs) is a critical step in creating a stable environment for economic, human, and social development and the UN System and the international community need to assist Colombia in mine clearance. Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of guerrillas, paramilitaries, and child soldiers must be included in any comprehensive settlement to the violence plaguing Colombia. Assisting IDPs and refugees to return to their communities and to implement sustainable economic, human, and political development initiatives is another related element to any long-term comprehensive solution. Guiding Questions How does the security situation in Colombia affect your country? How can the UN System, the OAS, and neighboring countries assist Colombia in resolving the violent conflicts currently occurring? How might the international community bolster already existing initiatives aimed at providing assistance and relief of Colombian IDP s and refugees? 44 Anastasia Moloney, Ex-child soldiers in Colombia face their tormentors. The Christian Science Monitor 23 February 2015.

What new steps need to be taken to induce the FARC and other guerrillas to negotiate with the Colombian government? How might efforts to demobilize and disarm former AUC and other paramilitary fighters be strengthened and accelerated? How can the UN System assist the Colombian government in more effectively integrating fundamental respect for human rights into the security forces and the system of justice?