Mesa de Conversaciones: Colombia Peace Talks Dear Delegates, Welcome to the Mesa de Conversaciones: Colombia Peace Talks committee and WMHSMUN XXX! My name is Ani Sinani, and I will be your Director for the weekend. I am a senior at William & Mary studying international relations and finance, and I have been a member of the International Relations Club (IRC), WMHSMUN s umbrella organization, since my freshman year. Throughout my time with the IRC, I have had the great opportunity to serve on past WMHSMUN Secretariats and IRC Executive Boards, and represent William & Mary in dozens of domestic and international Model UN conferences. Outside of the MUN realm, I spend the rest of my time on campus researching for various projects at the Institute for the Theory & Practice of International Relations, searching for time blocs in my schedule to write my honors thesis, drinking too much coffee, and tracking my Fitbit steps (if I can remember to charge it). Now moving on to more substantive matters our committee. We will start on October, 2012, just after the announcement of the General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace between the Colombian government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). All events following this date will be determined by your actions in committee. The committee will be comprised of representatives of the Colombian government, the FARC, and several local civil society members to negotiate the end of the longest-running armed conflict in Colombia through five agenda points: agricultural development policy, political participation, end of the conflict, illicit drugs, and victims. The goal of the committee is to draft a peace agreement addressing all negotiating points by the end of the conference (Yes, this means that we are doing all five topics). Please be mindful that the committee will be run as a Specialized Agency a hybrid between a General Assembly and Crisis Committee. Therefore, you can expect lenient parliamentary procedure and spare crisis updates that you can only respond to as a collective group. Given the structure of this committee, it is imperative that you research and prepare for all the topics on this background guide. Below you can find information on the development of the FARC conflict and issues regarding each agenda points. Howev-
er, I strongly encourage you all to conduct additional research, particularly on potential solutions for each topic as they relate to the interests of your individual positions. WMHSMUN requires that every delegate submits a position paper. Please be mindful that you are required to write a position paper from the point of view of your position assignment on each agenda point.. For more information on what is expected from position papers, there is a link on the WMHSMUN website, under the committees tab. We highly suggest that you use this tool in order to make your position paper as effective as possible! For Specialized Agencies, we highly encourage you to email your position paper to your chair before the first committee session. If this cannot be done for any reason, you may submit a hard copy to your dais at the beginning of the first committee session. I hope that you find this committee to be fun, engaging, and constructive! I wish you all the best of luck with your preparations for the conference, and I hope that you enjoy your time at WMHSMUN XXX. If you have any questions regarding the committee or the conference in general, please feel free to email me at asinani@email.wm.edu. I look forward to seeing you all in November! Ani Sinani Director, Mesa de Conversaciones: Colombia Peace Talks asinani@email.wm.edu
Committee Structure Our committee will start on October, 2012, following the announcement of the General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace between the Colombian government and the FARC. The committee will be set in Havana, Cuba. There will be 5 committee sessions during the conference, and three months passing between each session. The committee will be comprised of thirty delegates, and the breakdown will be the following: 10 delegates will represent the Colombian government, 10 delegates will represent the FARC, and 10 delegates will represent members of civil society organizations. The goal of each delegate is to negotiate the terms of a peace deal based on the interests of the character that they represent. Every delegate will have the same powers in committee, no matter what position they are representing in any of three groups mentioned above. For example, a delegate representing a Colombian Army General and a delegate representing the Colombian Minister of Development will have the same ability to shape debate and draft directives. The only difference between the two is the background knowledge they bring into committee. In this case, the delegate representing the Colombian Army General and the Colombian Minister of Development are expected to focus their research on Colombian military operations and sustainable development policies, respectively. However, both delegates should remain engaged and active on all committee topics, as they are all interconnected. For this reason, it is really important that everyone comes to committee prepared to discuss and propose solutions to all topics. The section below includes the full list of delegates that will be in committee. If you are representing a delegate of the Colombian government or the FARC, feel free to look them up and represent that character to the best of your ability in committee. If you are representing a civil society organization or business entity, feel free to research that organization and represent its interests to the best of your ability in committee. In terms of the committee structure, our committee will run as a Specialized Agency that follows parliamentary procedure and includes spare crisis updates. The first topic we will discuss is agricultural development policy. You can share their stance on the topic and your proposed policies during the speaker s list or moderated caucuses. Following substantial debate, you can collaborate with each other to draft policies that address the topic through directives. Successful directives will include pragmatic and detailed solutions for the topic that are supported by the Colombian government, FARC combatants, and civil society members. A directive needs a simple majority to pass, and only one directive can pass for each topic. For this reason, you are expected to consider all points of
view and negotiate among different groups to reach a consensus. After the first topic agricultural development policy is discussed and a directive is passed, you can choose to set the agenda on the other topics in any order that you prefer. Additionally, you can also expect spare crisis updates in the form of news reports for any topic. You cannot respond to these updates individually, but you may refer to them in your directives. By the end of the conference, after five directives are passed (hopefully!), you will be presented with the five-part peace accord that you drafted and vote on the document as a whole. As you can see, our committee will be very high-paced. For this reason, I expect collaboration and diplomacy from all delegates in the room in order to run a simulation that is fun and engaging! However, if at any point you feel that the committee is moving too fast and you need extra time to work on your directives, please feel free to always let me know and I will do my best to address your concerns Committee Positions Delegates Representing the Government of Colombia 1. Humberto de la Calle, Former Vice-President 2. Sergio Jaramillo, High Commissioner for Peace 3. Frank Pearl, Former Minister of Environment and Sustainable Development 4. Jorge Enrique Mora, Former Army Commander 5. Óscar Naranjo, Former General of the National Police 6. Luis Carlos Villegas, President of the National Business Association of Colombia 7. María Paulina Riveros, Human Rights Director of the Ministry of Interior 8. Eder Alejandro Garcés, Presidential Advisor for Reintegration 9. Gonzalo Restrepo, Plenipotentiary Delegate of Colombia 10. María Ángela Holguín, Minister of Foreign Affair
Delegates Representing the FARC 1. Ivan Marquez, Secretariat Member, Commander of Carribean Block 2. Alexandra Nariño, Negotiator of the FARC 3. Rodrigo Granda, International Spokesman of the FARC 4. Marco León Calarca, Spokesman of the FARC 5. Andrés París, Senior Chief of the Eastern Bloc 6. Pablo Catatumbo, Secretariat Member, Commander of Western Bloc 7. Mauricio Jaramillo, Secretariat Member, Commander of Jose Maria Corboda Bloc 8. Pastor Alape, Secretariat Member, Magdalena Medio Bloc 9. Joaquín Gómez, Secretariat Member, Commander of Southern Bloc 10. Carlos Antonio Lozada, Commander of Antonio Narino Front Delegates Representing Civil Society Organizations and Stakeholders 1. Luz Marina Becerra, Association of Displaced Afro-Colombians (AFRODES) 2. Luis Fernando Arias, Senior Advisor of the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC) 3. Luis Guillermo Guerrero, Director General of the Center for Research and Popular Education (CINEP) 4. Marco Alberto Romero Silva, Director of the Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES) 5. Katherine Ronderos, President of the Women s International League for Peace and Freedom (LIMPAL) 6. Victoria Eugenia Giraldo Villa, Director of Fundacion ESPERANZA 7. Juan de Dios Mosquera, Executive Director of the National Movement for Human Rights of Afro-Colombian Communities (CIMARRON) 8. Elisabeth Ungar Bleier, Executive Director of Transparency for Colombia (TPC) 9. Luis Emil Sanabria, President of the National Network of Initiatives for Peace 1 and Against War (REDEPAZ) 10. Luis Genaro Muñoz, National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia
Establishment Colombia - FARC Conflict Establishment of the FARC The conflict between the Colombian government and the FARC leads back to the 1950s during a period of high political persecution, also known as La Violencia 1. The two prominent political factions of the time liberals and conservatives exacerbated urban tensions for ten consecutive years by using military forces and armed rebellion groups to maintain power. Due the the large number of casualties that resulted from La Violencia, liberals and conservatives agreed to a power-sharing agreement the National Front to end the conflict. 2 Starting in 1958, both parties agreed to alternate four-year presidencies over four election cycles for the next 16 years. The National Front was successful in ending the urban violence, but it concentrated political power in the hands of urban elites for nearly two decades. In turn, this marginalized other political parties, and particularly those living in rural areas lacking access to equal economic opportunities. By 1961, communist supporters and peasants from all over the country gathered in the town of Marquetalia under the leadership of 1 Roman D. Ortiz, Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 25, no. 2 (February 2001): 127-143. 2 Ibid. Manuel Marulanda to live independently from the National Front regime as guerillas. 3 In 1964, the Colombian government stormed the town to attack the socialist guerillas and put an end to the movement in Marquetalia. 4 The operation, however, was unsuccessful because guerillas heard about the incoming forces and fled the town in advance. Following this attack, the leadership of the guerillas reorganized and Manuel Marulanda officially established the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) with the goal of the destruction of the Colombian state and its replacement by a FARC-controlled government. 5 Membership and Organizational Structure For the next 20 years, the FARC concentrated in Colombia s rural areas and quickly increased in size. The organization rose as an insurgency and lasted until the present day thanks to the decentralized and networked organizational structure that its leaders developed. At the top of the administrative chain, the FARC is led by the Secretariat, 3 Carl Meacham, Douglas Farah, and Robert D. Lamb, Colombia: Peace and Stability in the Post- Conflict Era, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2014, https://csis-prod. s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/ files/publication/140304_meacham_colombia_ Web.pdf. 4 Ibid. 5 Bilal Y. Saab and Alexandra W. Taylor, Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of FARC and Paramilitary Groups in Colombia, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32, no. 6 (May 2009): 455-475.
an elite group of seven who direct the group s strategic plans and give out orders to subordinate units. 6 When planning attacks, the Secretariat disseminates instructions to leaders of blocs strategic units placed throughout the country with specific political and military responsibilities working independently of each other. 7 Each bloc has at least five basic units also known as fronts comprised of companies and squads. 8 Figure 1: Map of FARC Blocs Source: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army While complicated, this decentralized, hierarchical structure has ensured the FARC s resistance for over half a century. 6 John A. Gentry and David E. Spencer, Colombia s FARC: A Portrait of Insurgent Intelligence, Intelligence and National Security, 25, no. 4 (August 2010): 453-478. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. In terms of membership, the majority of FARC supporters are predominantly peasants with low levels of education who joined the insurgency because they offered higher wages and more reliable employment than the Colombian government. 9 As new recruits, they are required to regularly read socialist propaganda in order to become well-educated people. 10 Through these means, the FARC indirectly controls everyone within the organization as the propaganda increasingly becomes second nature for all. However, the FARC also infamously uses coercion and intimidation to retain its members after they join its ranks. Narcotics, Finances, and Internal Displacement As the FARC s scope expanded in the 1970s, the organization needed monetary resources to fund its political and military activities. In this case, the FARC took advantage of the booming drug market in the 1970s and used its decentralized structure to take risks and infiltrate itself in local cartel affairs. At first, the FARC partnered with several illicit organizations and only gathered revenue from them through a protection 9 Bilal Y. Saab and Alexandra W. Taylor, Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of FARC and Paramilitary Groups in Colombia, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32, no. 6 (May 2009): 455-475. 10 Paul S. Nader, Former Members Perspectives are Key to Impacting the FARC, Journal of Strategic Security, 6, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 73-83.
tax on drug production, the gramaje. 11 In this partnership, peasants in FARC-controlled territories grew coca leaves and sold them to narco-traffickers, which then processed them into cocaine to export it to international markets. 12 This arrangement did not last too long, as narco-traffickers were only interested in maximizing their profits and began harassing local peasants to lower the prices of coca leaves. Since then, the FARC and local narco-traffickers have constantly competed for the control of arable coca fields. The FARC further exploited the market environment by increasing its involvement from taxation of coca leaves to the management of cocaine laboratories. 13 This strategy brought large revenues to the FARC who was making anywhere between $500-800 million annually by the early 2000. 14 Half of these profits came from the narcotics trade, and the other half was generated through extortion and high-profile kidnappings. 15 The newfound competition and the increasing international demand for narcotics sparked a reverse migration cycle in Colombia where people started mov- 11 Thomas R. Cook, The Financial Arm of the FARC: A Threat Finance Perspective, Journal of Strategic Security, 4, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 19-36. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Elizabeth Gonzalez and Pablo Medina Uribe, Explainer: The FARC and Colombia s 50-Year Civil Conflict, Americas Society / Council of the Americas, October, 2014, http://www.as-coa.org/ articles/explainer-farc-and-colombias-50-yearcivil-conflict. 15 Ibid. ing out of the urban areas into rural ones to gain revenue from coca production. Figure 2: Colombian Soldier overlooking an illegal coca plantation Source: Raul Arboleda, AFP, Getty However, that cycle is miniscule compared to the 4.5 million people that were internally displaced through coercion by guerilla forces from rural areas to urban ones. 16 Despite initial benefits, the FARC s involvement with narco-trafficking organizations contradicted its commitment to social justice and ultimately hurt its reputation in the long run. 17 By the 21st century, the mission of the organization became ambiguous to the Colombian government and the international community and even FARC members allegedly felt that their social grievances were overshadowed by the lucrative drug partnerships. 18 16 Carl Meacham, Douglas Farah, and Robert D. Lamb, Colombia: Peace and Stability in the Post- Conflict Era, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2014, https://csis-prod. s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/ files/publication/140304_meacham_colombia_ Web.pdf. 17 Chris Lee, The FARC and the Colombia Left: Time for a Political Solution, Latin American Perspectives, 39, no. 1 (Jan 2012): 28-42. 18 Ibid.
Political Participation and Negotiation Attempts On the political front, the FARC made its first attempt to enter Colombia s government through legitimate means after President Betancur reached out to the groups to pursue peace negotiations in 1982. By 1984, both parties agreed to a bilateral ceasefire which would last for the next three years. 19 In the meanwhile, the FARC took advantage of its position and founded a political wing, Unión Patriótica (UP), in 1985 to prepare for the upcoming elections the following year. 20 The UP ran on a platform of improving health care and education resources for the poor, and nationalizing service sectors of the government and was relatively successful by winning 14 congressional seats, 14 provisional deputies, 23 mayoral offices, and 351 city council seats. 21 However, this success was short-lived. In 1987, the FARC broke off its ceasefire with the government as right-wing paramilitary forces incited political forces and launched several attacks on FARC strongholds. 22 Overall, more than 2000 19 June S. Beittel, Peace Talks in Colombia, Congressional Research Service, March 2015, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/r42982.pdf. 20 Ibid. 21 Elizabeth Gonzalez and Pablo Medina Uribe, Explainer: The FARC and Colombia s 50-Year Civil Conflict, Americas Society / Council of the Americas, October, 2014, http://www.as-coa.org/ articles/explainer-farc-and-colombias-50-yearcivil-conflict, and Jim Rochlin, Plan Colombia and the Revolution in Military Affairs: The Demise of the FARC, Review of International Studies, 37, no. 2 (2011): 715-740. 22 Chris Lee, The FARC and the Colombia members of the UP were murdered in the late 1980s, and by the early 1990s, the FARC left the political sphere convinced that there was no room for leftist groups in the Colombian political landscape. 23 In the 1990s, the FARC expanded its operations and grew militarily. Nevertheless, it entered negotiations with the Colombian government once again during President Pastrana s tenure. In light of the large casualties of former UP members in the 1980s, the insurgency asked that the negotiations be held in demilitarized zones in Colombia to ensure the safety of FARC combatants. 24 Once Pastrana granted their request, the FARC leadership went back on its word and used the demilitarized zones to regroup militarily, launch violent attacks, grow coca on a large scale, and hold hostages. 25 In turn, this generated great revenue for the organization, but these developments almost made Colombia a failed state. 26 Left: Time for a Political Solution, Latin American Perspectives, 39, no. 1 (Jan 2012): 28-42. 23 Ibid. 24 June S. Beittel, Peace Talks in Colombia, Congressional Research Service, March 2015, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/r42982.pdf. 25 Ibid. 26 Colombia: Peace at Last?. International Crisis Group. September 2012. http://www. crisisgroup.org/~/media/files/latin-america/ colombia/045-colombia-peace-at-last.
Plan Colombia and Uribe s Strategy In 2000, the United States intervened in the region and launched Plan Colombia, a large aid package designed to combat the drug trade and bring peace to the country. 27 About 80% of the funding that Colombia received through this aid package was directed towards military affairs and used to train the country s military and security forces to defeat the FARC and other paramilitary organizations. 28 As a result, the negotiations attempted during Pastrana s administration were abandoned. In 2002, once President Uribe came to office, the Colombian government launched a fully offensive campaign against the FARC known as Democratic Security Policies (DSP). Before 2002, Pastrana s reforms and Plan Colombia upgraded the country s military equipment and increased security forces by 60% to 132,000. 29 During his tenure, Uribe further expanded the Colombian military to 283,000 members and the national police to 159,000. 30 This increase in security forces proved successful for the Colombian government and by 2010, over 27 U.S. Policy in Colombia, Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/ourwork/countries/americas/colombia/us-policyin-colombia. 28 Ibid. 29 Colombia: Peace at Last?. International Crisis Group. September 2012. http://www. crisisgroup.org/~/media/files/latin-america/ colombia/045-colombia-peace-at-last. 30 Ibid. 12,000 FARC members were killed, over 12,000 were captured, and over 17,000 were demobilized, leaving about 9,000 active members. 31 Due to the success of the DSP, the FARC s ability to launch attacks at similar rates weakened and they have increasingly reduced urban attacks and opted back to rural areas to re-strategize and secure their illicit operations. Santos Administration and Pathway for Peace Although the DSP was successful in reducing the FARC s capabilities in the 21st century, the insurgency remained as a prominent actor in Colombian affairs. Thousands of people in rural areas continue to live in fear, lack significant economic opportunities, and are stuck in the cycle of the illicit drug trade. In 2010, President Santos, Uribe s former Minister of Defense, recognized these problems and began crafting progressive legislation to address them. In 2011, his administration passed the Victims and Land Restitution Law which offered monetary reparations and land restitution to 4 5 million victims from the FARC conflict and internally displaced people. 32 Most notably, in 2012, Colombia s Congress passed the Framework Law for Peace, a constitutional amend- 31 Colombia: Peace at Last?. International Crisis Group. September 2012. http://www.crisisgroup. org/~/media/files/latin-america/colombia/045- colombia-peace-at-last. 32 June S. Beittel, Peace Talks in Colombia, Congressional Research Service, March 2015, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/r42982.pdf.
ment providing the legal framework for peace negotiations with any leftist guerrilla group. 33 This amendment paved the way for the secret exploratory talks in the first half of 2012 between the Colombian government and the FARC. Figure 3: Delegations of the Colombian government and FARC in Havsna, Cuba Source: El Nuevo Heraldo On September 4th, 2012, the Colombian and FARC leadership confirmed the exploratory talks and published the General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace, formally launching the Mesa de Conversaciones (Table of Talks) and peace talks under the Santos administration. 2012 Peace Talks Once the Table of Talks was established, representatives from the Colombian government and the FARC drew upon lessons learned from past failed negotiations. Both parties agreed to hold the talks in Norway and Cuba, neutral countries with no vested interests in 33 Graciela Rodriguez-Ferrand, Colombia: Congress Approves Framework Law for Peace, Library of Congress, June, 2012, http://www. loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/colombiacongress-approves-framework-law-for-peace/. the conflict where both delegations felt safe to continue negotiations. Additionally, both the Colombian government and the FARC agreed that there would be no bilateral ceasefire until a final accord is compromised. On this principle, all parties agreed that during the ongoing negotiations, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. Following these ground rules, the Table of Talks set the agenda to the five points listed below. Point I: Agricultural Development Policy Agricultural development is at the root of this half-decade long conflict. FARC rebels have continuously fought for the access and use of land, infrastructural and social development, and food security. On this point, the general agreement lists that both delegations to the peace talks will address the following issues: Access and use of land. Wastelands/ unproductive land. Formalization of property. Agricultural frontier and protection of reservation zones. Development programs with territorial focus. Infrastructure and land improvement. Social development: health, education, housing, eradication of poverty. Stimulus for agricultural production and for solidarity economy and cooperatives. Technical assistance. Subsidies. Credit. Generation of income. Marketing. Formalization of employment. Food security system. 34 34 General Agreement for the Termination
1. What policies can the government institute to reduce economic inequality to constituents living in rural areas? What opportunities can we promote that will yield pragmatic results? Questions to Consider: 2. How can both parties foster agricultural development in areas that lack the infrastructure to access markets? How can we connect urban communities with rural ones? 3. Is it possible for farmers to grow crops that will ensure their families are have both economic and food security? If so, does one take precedence over the other? 4. What rights do internally displaced people have over their land possessions? How can we ensure their property is fairly restored? 5. What role should the national government play in assisting with sustainable development in rural communities? Should that responsibility fall under local governments? of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace, International Crisis Group, September 2012, http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/ peacemaker.un.org/files/co_120826_general%20 Agreement%20for%20the%20Termination%20 of%20the%20conflict.pdf. Point II: Political Participation Political participation can transform demobilized combatants into a legitimized force with access to public office. The last time the FARC entered the Colombian political area was in the 1980s through the UP. Despite winning a few local seats, the party disbanded shortly after the 1986 elections once paramilitary and cartel forces attacked UP members, resulting in over 2000 deaths. The current peace talks provide the FARC with a unique opportunity to re-enter the political sphere in decades, but there is a lot at stake. On this point, the general agreement lists that both delegations to the peace talks will address the following issues: Rights and guarantees for exercising political opposition in general and for the new movements that emerge after signature of the Final Agreement. Media access. Democratic mechanisms for citizen participation, including direct participation, on different levels and on diverse issues. Effective measures to promote greater participation of all sectors in national, regional and local politics, including the most vulnerable population, under conditions of equality and with security guarantees. 35 35 Ibid.
Questions to Consider: 1. Should demobilized FARC members have the right to exercise political opposition? 2. What roles should the government play in guaranteeing the safety of political candidates? 3. How can ethnic and racial minorities gain political representation in local and central government, particularly in areas affected by conflict and violence? 4. What will the landscape of political contests look like in a post-accord Colombia? Should there be restrictions on campaign finances? What role should media play in the portrayal of candidates pasts? 5. How can we promote a participatory democracy and engage all stakeholders in the political process? Point III: End of the Conflict As one of the most sensitive agenda points, the end of the conflict focuses on the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of FARC members. Every previous unilateral and bilateral ceasefire between the Colombian government and the FARC has failed, largely due to insecurities from paramilitary groups and a lack of consensus within both actors. In the past, DDR has been used in U.N. peacekeeping operations for several decades and has become an integral part of post-conflict peace consolidation. 36 However, in this case, the terms of post-conflict reconstruction and the end of the conflict are determined by local actors themselves, without interference from any third party, such as a multilateral organization. Given these circumstances, the general agreement lists that both delegations to the peace talks will address the following issues: Bilateral and definitive ceasefire and end of hostilities. Handover of weapons. Reintegration of FARC- EP into civilian life, economically, socially and politically, in accordance with their interests. 36 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, United Nations Peacekeeping, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ ddr.shtml.
The National Government will coordinate re- vising the situation of persons detained, charged or convicted for belonging to or collaborating with FARC-EP. In parallel, the National Government will intensify the combat to finish off criminal organizations and their support networks, including the fight against corruption and impunity, in particular against any organization responsible for homicides and massacres or that targets human rights defenders, social movements or political movements. The National Government will revise and make the reforms and institutional adjustments necessary to address the challenges of constructing peace. Security guarantees. Under the provisions of Point 5 (Victims) of this agreement, the phenomenon of paramilitarism, among others, will be clarified. 37 37 General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace, International Crisis Group, September 2012, http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/ peacemaker.un.org/files/co_120826_general%20 Agreement%20for%20the%20Termination%20 of%20the%20conflict.pdf. Questions to Consider: 1. How can the Colombian government facilitate the proper demobilization of FARC forces? Who will be responsible for tracking the inventory of decommissioned weapons? Where will these weapons be stored? How can we assure that all weapons are turned in? 2. How can we guarantee the safety of demobilized FARC guerillas, particularly from paramilitary groups shortly after the demobilization process? Should the government play a role? 3. Should the FARC have to share intelligence collected on operations of paramilitary forces and drug cartels with the Colombian government? If so, how? 4. What will happen to the FARC s funds? Should the insurgent group allow the Colombian government to decide what to do with it or should it retain it for its political operations? 5. How can the government facilitate an easy integration of demobilized FARC guerillas into society? Does it have a responsibility to assist these individuals in finding housing and employment and gaining skills that contribute to society?
Point IV: Illicit Drugs Illicit drugs are not only an issue that have plagued the Colombian state for over half a century, but also a fundamental problem for peasant guerillas who joined the ranks of the FARC. Determined to eradicate cocaine production, the international community has launched several campaigns targeting zones that produce coca leaves through aerial fumigation and alternative crop development programs. On one hand, it is difficult to assess the direct effect of aerial fumigation in Colombia as there are multiple factors that may vary the growth in coca leaf production. On the other hand, alternative crop development programs require time to yield results and peasants face pressure from local cartels and even FARC guerillas to revert back to coca production. Nevertheless, illicit drugs are a topic that the Colombian government and the FARC want to address, and the general agreement lists that both delegations to the peace talks will discuss the following issues: Illicit-crop substitution programs. Integral development plans with participation of communities in the design, execution and evaluation of substitution programs and environmental recovery of the areas affected by these crops. Consumption prevention and public health programs. Solution to the phenomenon of narcotics production and commercialization. 38 Questions to Consider: 1. What is the primary approach that both parties should take to eradicate coca leaf production and cocaine manufacturing? 2. Are illicit drugs a national security concern or a public health concern? Why? Who should be responsible for eradicating the manufacturing of narcotics? 3. How can we identify the value-chain of drug trafficking? 4. What will happen to the coca fields under FARC control? Will those farmers we persecuted? If so, how? If not, what programs will ensure that they have the resources to support themselves without falling back in the coca-growth production cycle? 5. What strategy should the government implement to ensure that paramilitary criminal organizations do not fill the gap that the FARC will leave on coca producing areas in a post-accord scenario? 38 Ibid.
Point V: Victims Over the past 50 years, the conflict between the Colombian government and the FARC has resulted in over 5.5 million victims between government forces, FARC guerillas, and members of paramilitary organizations. 39 Of these 5.5 million, over 4 million people were internally displaced, over 200,000 were killed, thousands more were victims of forced disappearances, forceful recruitment of minors, sexual violence, and femicide. 40 As a result, our conversation on victims will be focused on transitional justice and emphasize compensation, human rights, and the revelation of the truth. In the past, transitional justice has been applied through retributive justice advocating for the persecution of perpetrators and restorative justice advocating for reconciliation and alternative sentences. Most recently, however, experts have advocated for a hybrid approach between the retributive and restorative models, calling it transformative justice. 41 Nevertheless, in each of these cases, the international community has played a significant oversight role. However, it will not do so in Colombia because the structure of the peace talks only allows third 39 Colombia, International Center for Transitional Justice, https://www.ictj.org/ourwork/regions-and-countries/colombia. 40 Ibid. 41 Catherine Turner, Deconstructing Transitional Justice, Law and Critique, 24, no. 2 (15 March 2013): 193-209. parties to serve as guarantors and accompaniers during the negotiations. 42 Given these circumstances, the general agreement lists that both delegations to the peace talks will address the following issues with respect to victims: Human rights of the victims. Truth. 43 1. Is retributive or restorative justice more suitable for Colombia? Should we opt for a hybrid approach and advocate for transformative justice? If so, how? 2. Who should be held accountable for the human rights violations committed in the past 50 years? What sentences should high-ranked FARC officials receive? What about lowerranked guerillas? What about those arguing that they were acting out on fear? Questions to Consider: 3. Should the Colombian government establish a truth-seeking mechanism to assist with healing, reconciliation, and post-conflict reconstruction? If so, should perpetrators be sentenced if they confess to their crimes? Should the remain anonymous? 42 General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace, International Crisis Group, September 2012, http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/ peacemaker.un.org/files/co_120826_general%20 Agreement%20for%20the%20Termination%20 of%20the%20conflict.pdf. 43 Ibid.
4. What compensations should Association victims of Southeast. Point III Asian - Acuerdo Nations sobre //WMHSMUN cese al fuego 30 and their families receive? Who will y de hostilidades bilateral y definitivo y pay for these reparations? 5. What role can civil society organizations and other stakeholders play in assisting demobilized FARC guerillas reintegrate back into society? How tools, mechanisms, institutions, and policies are needed to promote reconciliation among communities? Final Remarks When researching policy proposals for the five agenda points of the peace talks, I recommend that you seek sources from several think tanks who have conducted extensive research on the issue. These include the Inter-American Dialogue, the Washington Office on Latin America, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Brookings Institution, the Wilson Center, the United States Institute of Peace, the International Crisis Group, etc. Additionally, please be mindful that four years have passed since the formal commencement of the real peace negotiations and that the Colombian government and the FARC have reached an agreement on all agenda points. Here are the original agreements in Spanish on each agenda point:. Point I: Hacia un nuevo campo colom biano: Reforma rural integral. Point II: Participación política: Apertura democrática para construir la paz dejación de las armas entre el Gobierno Nacional y las Farc-EP and Acuerdo sobre garantías de seguridad. Point IV - Solución al problema de las drogas ilícitas. Point V - Acuerdo sobre las Víctimas del Conflicto You are more than welcome to read the original agreements or summarized versions in English, but please come to committee with your own creative proposals on each topic. Since these agreements were reached after 2012, you cannot cite them as sources in your position papers. Best of luck with your preparations for committee, and feel free to email me if you have any questions! I look forward to your discussion and proposals in November!