China s Fifth Generation Leadership

1 China s Fifth Generation Leadership Characteristics and Policies BO Zhiyue* The new leadership that will emerge as a result of the 18th National Party Congress will be a mix of several cohorts with the fifth generation leaders in dominance. In the past 66 years, the mode of succession for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) top leadership has evolved from a two-front model to a generation transfer model. 1 When Mao Zedong, one of the founding members of the CCP, was installed as the highest authority in power and ideology at the Seventh Party Congress of the CCP in 1945, the Party was still an opposition party in China. After the CCP established the People s Republic of China in 1949, Mao Zedong introduced a two-front arrangement model for succession. According to the model, Mao Zedong himself would semi-retire to the second front to ponder over major issues while leaving other top leaders such as Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping to stay at the first front to run the day-to-day state affairs. However, the model failed to produce any viable successor. Two of the candidates, Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao, lost their lives in power struggles for succession. When he returned to power in the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping continued Mao s model of twofront arrangement with significant modifications. Instead of one individual at the second front, Deng introduced a whole new institution Central Advisory Commission (CAC) to assist the first front, which composed of top leaders such as the general secretary of the CCP and the premier of the State Council. Deng s variant model, unfortunately, also failed to produce viable candidates. The second front, i.e. the CAC, kept intervening in the state affairs of the first front leaders, resulting in the sacking of two top party leaders, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, in a row. * BO Zhiyue is Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. 1 For a detailed discussion, see Bo Z, China s Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing, Singapore: World Scientific, 2007, pp. 42 49. 7

8 China: Development and Governance In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident, Deng Xiaoping decided to change the mode of succession from the two-front arrangement to a generational transfer model in which political leaders are divided into successive generations. From the First to the Fourth Generation Leadership Until 1989, the concept of generations in the CCP leadership did not exist. The founding fathers of the People s Republic of China had been invariably referred to as the old generation revolutionaries (lao yi dai ge ming jia), but no further delineation was made to differentiate the veteran leaders. The concept of the first generation leadership was posthumously reconstructed by Deng Xiaoping. According to him, the CCP s leaderships from 1921 to 1935 did not count because none of them were mature enough. 2 The first mature CCP leadership started with Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De. 3 Deng also dismissed Mao s successor, Hua Guofeng, as a transitional figure because he did not have his own ideology. He was simply an advocate of Maoism as he adopted a policy of whateverism ( We will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave ). Thus the second generation, according to Deng, refers to the CCP leadership that initiated reform and opening policies, i.e. Deng s generation. Technically, Deng himself belonged to the first generation leadership, but he played a very important role in starting new policies of reform and opening up to the West. Deng s point of retelling the CCP history in terms of generations was meant to introduce a new leadership, the post-tiananmen leadership, which would take over from his generation and move forward. At the 14th National Congress of the CCP in October 1992, Deng not only retained the services of the third generation leadership with Jiang Zemin at the helm but also selected a candidate, Hu Jintao, as the core of the fourth generation leadership. In 10 years, at the 16th National Congress of the CCP held in November 2002, the baton was passed on from the third generation leadership to the fourth generation leadership. Emergence of the Fifth Generation Leadership The first individual to be considered a candidate for the fifth generation leadership was Li Keqiang (born July 1955). At the age of 37 in 1992, he was to succeed Song Defu (born February 1946) as the first secretary of the of the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) at the forthcoming 13th National Congress of the CCYL in 1993. Therefore he was nominated as a candidate for an alternate membership with the 14th Central Committee of the CCP in 1992 when he was still a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CCYL. However, Li failed to obtain a seat partly because deputies in the 14th National Congress of the CCP did not feel the need to elect an alternate member from the CCYL in addition to a full member (Song Defu) from the same institution. 4 At the 15th Party Congress held in September 1997, two candidates emerged. Li Keqiang was elected a full member of the of the CCP as the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CCYL without a glitch. 2 For a complete list of CCP top leaders, see Appendix. 3 Deng X, We Must Form a Promising Collective Leadership that will Carry out Reform (31 May 1989) in Deng X, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1993, pp. 296 301. 4 For details, see Zong H, Disidai (China s New Leaders: The Fourth Generation), Carle Place, NY: Mirror Books, 2002, p. 398.

China s Fifth Generation Leadership 9 However, another young candidate, Xi Jinping (born June 1953), almost failed to enter the 15th of the CCP as an alternate member. A deputy secretary of Fujian province since 1995, Xi s background as a princeling (because his father was Xi Zhongxun) was probably more of a liability at the time. Among the candidates for alternate membership, Xi Jinping was ranked no. 151, one place short of the originally planned number of alternate members. Xi was eventually included as an alternate member of the 15th of the CCP because he was selected as a candidate for the fifth generation leadership. 5 The majority of the fifth generation cohort entered the 16th of the CCP in 2002 as full members, and many entered the 17th Politburo in 2007. Characteristics of the Fifth Generation Leaders Technically speaking, a fifth generation leader is someone who is able to work for another two five-year terms beyond the 18th Party Congress. In other words, this person will have to be 67 or younger in 2017 (i.e. he or she was born in 1950 or later). More precisely, the fifth generation cohort refers to people who were born between 1950 and 1954; the 5.5th generation cohort composes of people who were born between 1955 and 1959; and the sixth generation cohort includes those who were born between 1960 and 1964. However, the new leadership that is expected to be formed by the forthcoming 18th National Congress of the CCP would be a mix of several cohorts who were born in the late 1940s through the 1960s. Using a combination of age 68 and age 65 rules, members of the 17th of the CCP who would stay on in the 18th can be identified. Generally speaking, they are mostly young, well-educated and have extensive management experiences in the central and local governments. The average age of the remaining members of the 17th would be about 58, with the majority in their fifties. The actual average age of the 18th would be lower because there will be younger new entrants. The remaining members of the 17th are highly educated. The majority are graduates despite of the fact that the credibility of their graduate diplomas is questionable. Among them, there are 49 PhD holders (Table 1). They have extensive experiences in their areas of specialty. The current chief provincial leaders, for instance, have managed various provincial units for 12 years on average and many have multiple provincial experiences. Table 1 Education of the Remaining Members of the 17th Education Freq. Percentage High School 1 0.42 Three-Year College 10 4.17 Four-Year College 67 27.92 Graduate Diploma 62 25.83 Masters 51 21.25 Ph.D. 49 20.42 Total 240 100.00 Source: Author s database. 5 Ibid., pp. 398 399.

10 China: Development and Governance Possible Lineup of the New Politburo Standing Committee If the age limit is still a qualifying requirement as per the two previous Party Congresses, that is, those who are 68 or older will have to retire, out of the current 25 Politburo members, 11 would stay on, including two Politburo standing members and nine Politburo members (Table 2). Among them, seven would be able to work for another five-year term (the 4.5th generation cohort); two for another two five-year terms (the fifth generation cohort); and two for another three five-year terms (the 5.5th generation cohort). If the Politburo Standing Committee of the 18th membership number is to remain at nine members, there would be some competition among the remaining members of the current Politburo. In addition to Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, the new Politburo Standing Committee members might be selected from this group: Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yandong (female), Liu Yunshan, Wang Qishan, and Li Yuanchao. The underdogs are Zhang Dejiang, Zhang Gaoli and Wang Yang. A native of Shaoxing, Zhejiang, Yu Zhengsheng is a descendent of an elite family in China. 6 The history of his clan reflects the evolution of China in the past 160 years, and he is closely connected to both Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi, two of the most important political figures in contemporary China. Yu s father, Yu Qiwei (alias Huang Jing), had been married to Li Yunhe (alias Jiang Qing), 7 who later became the fourth wife of Mao Zedong. Yu s great uncle (son of the brother of his great grandfather), Yu Dawei (1897 1993), was Jiang Jieshi s confidant. A non-kmt member and non-military professional, Yu Dawei served as Jiang s Defence Minister for a decade. 8 Yu Zhengsheng is also very close to Deng Pufang, son of Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader of China from 1978 to 1997. Yu Zhengsheng and Deng Pufang worked together for a year in the 1980s. A two-term Politburo member, Yu is likely to move up at the forthcoming 18th Party Congress. He is a strong candidate for the position of the National People s Congress Standing Committee chairman. Table 2 The 17th Politburo Members Who Would Stay On Name Year of Birth Cohort The 17th Politburo Prospect Yu Zhengsheng 1945 4.5 Member Promotion Liu Yandong (f.) 1945 4.5 Member Promotion Zhang Dejiang 1946 4.5 Member Stay Zhang Gaoli 1946 4.5 Member Stay Liu Yunshan 1947 4.5 Member Promotion Wang Qishan 1948 4.5 Member Promotion Li Yuanchao 1950 5 Member Promotion Xi Jinping 1953 5 Standing Member Stay Wang Yang 1955 5.5 Member Stay Li Keqiang 1955 5.5 Standing Member Stay Source: <http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/> (accessed 5 July 2012). 6 For details, see Gao Y, Yu Zhengsheng he Ta de Jiazu (Yu Zhengsheng and his Clan), Carle Place, NY: Mirror Books, 2009. 7 Ibid., pp. 55 102. 8 Ibid., pp. 37 54.

China s Fifth Generation Leadership 11 Similarly, Liu Yunshan is also a two-term Politburo member as well as a two-term Secretariat member. He is likely to replace Li Changchun as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee in charge of propaganda. Wang Qishan would move up as the executive vice premier and concurrent member of the Politburo Standing Committee, and Zhang Gaoli is a strong candidate for the position of the secretary of the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission (CDIC). Wang Qishan has been a capable vice premier and Zhang Gaoli has performed well as party secretary of Tianjin. Zhang Dejiang and Liu Yandong are both strong candidates for the position of chairmanship of the Chinese National People s Political Consultative Conference (CNPPCC). Zhang Dejiang has extensive central and local experiences. He has served as party secretary in Jilin, Zhejiang and Guangdong. He is the vice premier of the State Council, and starting in March 2012, Zhang is also concurrent party secretary of Chongqing. However, Liu Yandong possesses unique resources as a candidate for the CNPPCC position. She is the only female member of the Politburo and has extensive connections with both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao; she has vast experiences in the united front affairs. Liu Yandong s father, Liu Ruilong (1910 1988), was one of the two people who introduced Jiang Shangqing (1911 1939), Jiang Zemin s uncle, into the Chinese Communist Youth in 1927. Liu Yandong graduated from the same university, Qinghua University, as Hu Jintao and worked with Hu Jintao in the Secretariat of the of the Chinese Communist Youth League in the 1980s. She was deputy director of the United Front Department of the CCP Central Committee from 1991 to 2002 and its director from 2002 to 2007. She was also concurrent vice chairman of the CNPPCC from 2003 to 2008. Li Yuanchao, currently a Politburo member, a Secretariat member and the Central Organisation Department director, is likely to replace Xi Jinping as vice president of China. He would be in a position to become president in case Xi Jinping ceases to function in that capacity for whatever reasons. Wang Yang is likely to be transferred to Beijing after the 18th National Congress of the CCP but not very likely to be promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee. He is a strong candidate for a vice premiership but not likely to become the executive vice premier. Nevertheless, in the event that the age limit is revised downward by one year at the 18th Party Congress, Yu Zhengsheng and Liu Yandong would have to exit and a somewhat different line-up would include some younger candidates in the Politburo Standing Committee, including Wang Yang and Hu Chunhua, party secretary of Inner Mongolia. A frontrunner of the sixth generation leadership, Hu would undergo a training period for the top job in the Party if he enters the Politburo Standing Committee in 2012. Policy Orientations of the New Leadership As the fundamental orientation for the next five years has been set in the 12th Five-Year Programme, the top priority of the new leadership is not to introduce new radical policies. Their main focus, as Xi Jinping alluded in his speech at the Central Party School on 1 March 2011, would be on implementation. Implementation, Xi said, is an extremely important link in exercising leadership and a fundamental requirement of the Party s ideological line and mass line. Therefore, it is unlikely that this new leadership would introduce major political reform measures within its first five years in office. This is because the basic ideological line of the CCP is to refrain from carrying out any political reforms. 9 9 For a methodic analysis of the debate on political reforms among the current top leadership, see Bo Z, What is Next for China s Political Reforms? Different Views at the Top, EAI Background Brief, no. 624, Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore.

12 China: Development and Governance It is also unlikely for the new leadership to conduct any substantial economic reforms. The major concerns of the current leadership are no longer quantitative growth. They want to change the mode of growth from one that is focussed on GDP alone to one that is more balanced, more sustainable and more environment-friendly. The top priority of the new leadership would be on social reforms. With more than 85,000 cases of mass incidents every year since 2005, China has been facing many social issues. It will be a great challenge to come up with a new social management system to handle these social issues. Externally, the new leaders would also try to maintain good relations with the United States and Europe as well as its neighbouring countries such as Japan, the two Koreas, and members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Instead of an assertive China, the new leaders will try their utmost to restore the image of China as a peaceful, rising major power that is still willing to operate within the confines of the current international order as a responsible stakeholder. Appendix: Top Leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (1921 ) Name Election Title From To Chen Duxiu First Congress Secretary of the Central Bureau 7/1921 7/1922 Chen Duxiu Second Congress Chairman of the Central Executive 7/1922 6/1923 Committee Chen Duxiu Third Congress Chairman of the Central Bureau 6/1923 1/1925 Chen Duxiu Fourth Congress General Secretary of the Central 1/1925 5/1927 Executive Committee Chen Duxiu Fifth Congress General Secretary 5/1927 7/1928 Xiang Zhongfa Sixth Congress Party Chairman 7/1928 1/1931 Xiang Zhongfa Fourth Plenum of the Sixth General Secretary 1/1931 1/1934 Bo Gu Fifth Plenum of the Sixth General Secretary 1/1934 1/1935 Zhang Wentian A Politburo meeting General Secretary 1/1935 3/1943 Mao Zedong A Politburo meeting Chairman of the Politburo and Secretariat 3/1943 4/1945 Mao Zedong Seventh Plenum of the Sixth Chairman of the 4/1945 6/1945 Mao Zedong Seventh Congress Chairman of the 6/1945 9/1956 Mao Zedong Eighth Congress Chairman of the 9/1956 4/1969 Mao Zedong Ninth Congress Chairman of the 4/1969 8/1973 Mao Zedong 10th Congress Chairman of the 8/1973 9/1976 Hua Guofeng Third Plenum of the 10th Chairman of the 10/1976 8/1977 Hua Guofeng 11th Congress Chairman of the 8/1977 6/1981 Hu Yaobang Sixth Plenum of the 11th Chairman of the 6/1981 9/1982 Hu Yaobang 12th Congress General Secretary 9/1982 1/1987 Zhao Ziyang Seventh Plenum of the 12th Acting General Secretary 1/1987 11/1987 (Continued)

China s Fifth Generation Leadership 13 (Continued ) Zhao Ziyang Thirteenth Congress General Secretary 11/1987 6/1989 Jiang Zemin Fourth Plenum of the 13th General Secretary 6/1989 10/1992 Jiang Zemin 14th Congress General Secretary 10/1992 9/1997 Jiang Zemin 15th Congress General Secretary 9/1997 11/2002 Hu Jintao 16th Congress General Secretary 11/2002 10/2007 Hu Jintao 17th Congress General Secretary 10/2007 Source: <http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/21/content_698625.htm> (accessed 27 June 2012).