Political Science 200A Week 8 Social Dilemmas
Nicholas [Marquis] de Condorcet (1743 94) Contributions to calculus Political philosophy Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability of Majority Rule (1785) Later political career and death
I. Condorcet s Paradox 1. a.k.a. Voter s Paradox or Cycling in Voting or Social Choice Instability Generalization: Arrow s Impossiblity Theorem 2. Rational Individual: If A > B and B >C, then A>C 3. The Paradox of Majoritarian voting
I. Condorcet s Paradox Player 1: A > B > C Player 2: B > C > A Player 3: C > A > B Player 1 proposes A, Players 1 + 3 prefer A > B Player 2 proposes C, Players 2 + 3 prefer C > A Player 1 proposes B, Players 1 + 2 prefer B > C Player 3 proposes A, Players 1 + 3 prefer A > B but majority is unstable and A > B, B > C, C > A
I. Condorcet s Paradox 4. Instability of majorities increases with [a] Number of players [b] Number of alternatives [c] Distributive policies 5. Implications [a] No unique majority preference [b] Instability cycling of majorities [c] Agenda control may shape outcome [d] Institutions may shape outcomes
Kenneth Arrow (1921 ) Ph.D., Columbia University (Economics) Professor, Chicago, Stanford 1972 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics Currently, Professor Emeritus, Stanford
I. Condorcet s Paradox 6. Arrow s Impossibility Theorem [a] No stability in (and no unique) majorities [b] No voting scheme can guarantee pareto optimal outcome N.B. Pareto optimality: An outcome from which any move to make one player better off will make at least one other worse off That is, there is no alternative to make at least one player better off that leaves everyone else no worse off
Richard McKelvey (1944 2002) Ph.D. Rochester (Political Science) Professor, Rochester, Carnegie Mellon, and Caltech
I. Condorcet s Paradox 7. McKelvey s Chaos Theorem: What determines which majority will prevail? [1] Agenda control [2] Institutions (voting rules)
Mancur Olson (1932 98) Professor of Economics and Political Science, University of Maryland The Logic of Collective Action (1965)
II. Collective Action Problem 1. A Public Good [1] Non excludable Even if you didn t contribute to provision of public good, you get to enjoy it. [2] Non rivalrous (jointness of supply) Your enjoyment of the public good does not diminish other s enjoyment of it. 2. Common examples of public goods Law and order, National security Highways, Lighthouses Clean air, Global climate Social movements (including protest and revolution)
Cooperate Defect Cooperate Defect
Cooperate Defect Cooperate Mutual cooperation Mutual defection Defect
Cooperate Defect Cooperate Mutual cooperation Sucker s payoffs Free rider Mutual defection Defect
II. Collective Action Problem 3. Cooperation in the Prisoner s Dilemma [1] Iteration [2] Strategies to Induce Cooperation Robert Axelrod s Tit for Tat Strategy Punishment for several rounds Examples of Evolutionary Game Theory [3] Group Size [4] Selective Incentives MancurOlson s by product theory of collective action [5] Political Entrepreneurs What is in it for the entrepreneur? [6] Government What is in it for the government?
Garrett Hardin (1915 2003) 1941 Ph.D., Stanford (Microbiology) Professor, UC Santa Barbara 1968 Tragedy of the Commons, Science
II. Collective Action Problem 4. Tragedy of the Commons Property rights and privatization (Demsetz) Right to use a resource Consequences of communal rights Internalizing externalities through private property rights
Elinor Ostrom (1933 ) 1965 Ph.D. Political Science, UCLA Professor (Poli Sci), Indiana University 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics
II. Collective Action Problem 5. How Communities Resolve Common Resource Pool Problems [1] Institutions [2] Coercion [3] Iteration among Small n
III. Coordination Games Thomas Schelling
A Game of Pure Coordination with One Equilibrium
Game of Pure Coordination with Multiple Equilibria
Rendezvous Bar Lone Pine Bar Rendezvous Bar Lone Pine Bar
Rendezvous Bar Lone Pine Bar Battle of the Sexes or Battle of the Two Cultures
IV. Coordination Games Thomas Schelling Focal points (conspicuous or prominent solutions) Suggested by the game or situation Suggested by precedents Suggested by credible commitments Thomas Schelling
Game of Chicken