Länder Working Party Dealing with radical Islamist prisoners Final report, 18 April 2016
2 Contents I. Introduction (p. 4) II. Identification and monitoring (p. 7) 1. Identification (p. 8) 1.1 Radicalised prisoners (p. 7) 1.2 Vulnerable prisoners (p. 9) 2. Observation (p. 9) 2.1 Radicalised prisoners (p. 9) 2.2 Vulnerable prisoners (p. 10) 3. Gathering and processing information (p. 10) 3.1 Special responsibilities (p. 11) 3.2 Further co-ordination (p. 11) 4. Standard measures in prisons (p. 12) 4.1 Principle (p. 12) 4.2 Outside contacts (p. 12) 4.3 Further measures (p. 13) III. Exchange of information (p. 14) 1. Levels of communication for prison authorities (p. 14) 2. Prison action guidelines (p. 14) 2.1 Dealing with the prisoners concerned (p. 14) 2.2 Handling information gained (p. 15) 3. Exchange of information between the police and judicial authorities (p. 15) IV. Initial and continuing training (p. 18) 1. Initial training (p. 18) 2. Continuing training (p. 20) 2.1 Target group (p. 21) 2.2 Conduct and location (p. 21) 2.3 Official meetings (p. 22) 2.4 Continuing training of contact persons and information providers (p. 22)
3 2.5 Continuing training of trainers and outside professionals (p. 23) V. Spiritual care (p. 24) 1. General/Fundamental (p. 25) 2. Involvement of imams, Muslim associations and Mosque communities (p. 25) 3. Checking and preparing religious carers (p. 26) 4. Provision of religious care (p. 27) 5. Preparation for release (p. 27) VI. Dealing with vulnerable prisoners (p. 28) 1. Concept (p. 28) 2. Dangers facing a vulnerable clientele (p. 28) 3. Attractiveness of extremism from the point of view of those concerned (p. 29) 4. Specific measures with regard to vulnerable prisoners (p. 30) VII. De-radicalisation (p. 31) 1. Concept (p. 31) 2. Radicalisation (p. 31) 3. Number of radicalised prisoners (p. 33) 4. Prevention of further radicalisation (p. 34) 5. Concrete measures (p. 34) 6. Opt-out programmes (p. 36) 7. Assessment of de-radicalisation measures (p. 36) VIII. Recommendations for action (pp. 37-38) Appendix (p. 39)
4 I. Introduction Following the attacks by Islamist terrorists in London, Tunis, Paris and Brussels, few security policy issues have been so much the focus of public debate as Islamist extremists travelling from Western Europe to war and conflict zones. The German authorities are aware of more than 800 German Islamists or Islamists from Germany who have gone to Syria and Iraq to fight on the side of the so-called Islamic State or other terrorist groupings or support them in some other way. In the case of around 130 individuals, there is evidence that they have died in Syria or Iraq. As of 11 April 2016) 1, about a third had returned. Those who have come back are the particular focus of the security authorities' attention and, of course, the attention of the country s prisons if arrested. There are also a rising number of young prisoners who display tendencies towards radicalisation. This radicalisation does not follow a generally similar or standard pattern, but it is clear that certain factors play an important role in this process: social alienation or the feeling of not being integrated into society, identity conflicts, a search for support and meaning and a need for guidance, group-dynamic processes of like-minded people, protest against Western systems and the injustice (supposedly) experienced as a result, as well as provocation. These insecurities, which are in some cases inherent in the personality of these individuals, are taken up in their activities by Islamist or Salafist hate preachers who, on the pretext of bringing about a peaceful and better Islamic world, understand how to use simple, comprehensible language and the new media (internet propaganda, social media) to spread radical ideas as the way to finding a solution. Correctly assessing the potential danger posed by these target groups and countering it if necessary with the necessary preventive measures, as well as identifying 1 Evaluation by the Federal Criminal Police Department (BKA) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV).
5 methods of de-radicalisation and social integration, is a social responsibility (and therefore a strategic task of the prison service). At their spring conference in June 2015, the Justice Ministers of the Länder discussed the current threat posed by Islamist extremism and the challenges that result for the prison service too. They established that numerous steps had already been taken in the Länder to counter effectively the threat by Islamist terrorism. They asked the Prison Oversight Committee to continue to address the question of Dealing with criminal forms of radicalisation and political and religious extremism, in particular to examine the need for new strategies and identify effective ways of handling Islamists/Salafists by focusing on best practice. In order to prepare further discussions, the Prison Oversight Committee requested the building and security consultants of the Länder to produce draft proposals and incorporate in them the recommendations for action drawn up by the joint police and justice task force on co-operation on combating Islamist terrorism. The Länder Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate have sent representatives to the Working Party set up by the building and security consultants for this purpose. As part of the Länder Working Party s work, the existing concepts and recommendations for action in the context of the prison service were considered and assessed. Overall, it can be said that the subject of religiously motivated radicalisation has been addressed in detail. An overlap with Islamist terrorism is unavoidable owing to their close connection, and Islamist radicalisation can be regarded as an interface or precursor for terrorist activities. The Länder Working Party has produced recommendations for action in the areas of identification and observation, exchange of information, initial and in-service training, spiritual welfare, dealing with vulnerable prisoners, and de-radicalisation. It has been guided in this task by the following basic assumptions:
6 1. With regard to the phenomenon of political and religious extremism, the prison service can build on decades of experience in recognising and dealing with problematic groups of prisoners (right-wing extremists, left-wing extremists, members of organised crime groups). 2. One of the core tasks of prison staff is to monitor prisoners and notice any changes in their behaviour. Inmates who draw attention to themselves because of their radicalisation tendencies generally pose a threat to prison security and order. Many different measures can be ordered to stave off the threat. They range from closer observation and the monitoring of visits, telephone calls and correspondence to permanent segregation from fellow inmates. Particular importance attaches to the balance between security measures on the one hand and attempts to exert educational and spiritual influence on the other. When radicalisation processes are detected, an investigation takes place to see whether they constitute a provocation, whether they are based on possible rejection of the system or whether internalisation has taken place. 3. Existing structures for the sharing of information between the police, public prosecutor s offices, the Federal Office for the Defence of the Constitution and the prison service can be built on. 4. In their training, prison officers are taught to deal with criminal forms of radicalisation and political and religious extremism. Continuing training aimed at consolidating the ability of prison officers to act and be able to respond promptly to current developments and information is particularly important. 5. Irrespective of their religious affiliation, all prisoners are entitled to spiritual care from members of their own faith. The task of Muslim chaplains employed in the prison service is to help inmates take a critical look at the ideas of socalled hate preachers who claim to be acting in the name of Islam. This can provide young prisoners in particular with the necessary guidance.
7 6. Co-operation with other federal and Land authorities and the relevant governmental and non-governmental institutions on the development, implementation and evaluation of various programmes and projects (e.g. programmes to help individuals to opt out of Islamism or assist returnees) must be organised and put on a permanent footing. 7. The number of prevention programmes on the subject of Islamist radicalisation is likely to grow. Very few programmes have been meaningfully evaluated and only those whose effectiveness has been demonstrated in scientific studies can be given long-term finance in view of the scarce resources available. II. Identification and monitoring The starting-point of all considerations and measures to deal with Islamist radicalisation in prisons is the recognition of certain phenomena and keeping the risk potential in this connection under observation. Both aspects are linked together as there is not only a danger inherent in radical Islamist views that terrorist aims will be pursued but also that those who hold these views always strive to disseminate them. With individuals living together in a confined space and limited opportunities for their personal development, prisons seem to provide a particularly favourable environment. If monitoring is to be successful, the measures generally available in prisons for maintaining security and order and dealing with inmates need to be consistently applied. 1. Identification 1.1 Radicalised prisoners In order also to deal effectively with the risk of the dissemination of imported radical ideas, it is crucial to identify promptly any prisoners who embraced radical Islamist ideas before they entered the prison. Since the prison authorities usually have no additional sources of information when individuals begin their sentence, the judgment execution documents, or the arrest warrant in the case of remand prisoners, are criti-
8 cally important. A first indication is the offence of which they are charged, which is as a rule membership of a terrorist organisation at home or abroad (sections 129a and 129b of the Criminal Code) or preparation of a serious act of violent subversion (section 89a). With reference to the judgment execution documents, it then has to be examined whether the prisoner has assumed a position of leadership in the terrorist organisation or must be categorised more as a so-called fellow traveller. However, it is also conceivable that the relevant views cannot be inferred from the offence on which the charge is based but only from the charge itself or the additional details contained in the judgment execution documents, which will need to be checked during the admission examination. Prisons are recommended to initially classify all prisoners charged with the offence in question as at least potentially radicalised. Whether individual prisoners must actually be classified as radicalised and could try to enlist fellow inmates will have to be clarified after careful observation of their subsequent behaviour. It is also necessary to turn to more general behavioural observations when existing radical Islamist views cannot be inferred from the judgment execution documents. Since 2004, prisons have been provided with information leaflets and lists of indicators that can be used to check whether inmates should be classified as radicalised. First and foremost of these is the Leaflet for Prison Staff on How to Recognise Islamist and Terrorist Connections, which is regularly updated by the Federal Attorney General attached to the Federal Court of Justice. 2 A handbook on radicalisation and willingness to commit violence produced in 2008 by an EU project team made up of representatives of ministries and security authorities in Austria, France and Germany also contains valuable suggestions in this connection. 3 Additional information can be obtained from other publications produced by the security agencies, such as the reports of the Office for the Defence of the Constitution, as well as other guides. It is also worth recommending guides for prison staff specific to individual regions that 2 Latest update: 18 November 2015 3 However, the handbook needs to be updated.
9 both deal with regional phenomena and can give the names of contacts at other security agencies. The criterion for the distribution of the relevant material must always be its clarity and the ability of the staff concerned to understand it. 1.2 Vulnerable prisoners The prisoners at risk are those who may be victims of radicalised inmates wishing to win them over for terrorist purposes or who could become radicalised in some other way, for example through the media available to them, which may be no more that daily news reports. So far, the law enforcement authorities have no indications that the individuals mentioned in the introduction who have travelled to Syria and Iraq became radicalised in prisons. 4 Examples of radicalisation in prisons that has led to terrorist activities have so far only come to the authorities attention from abroad, but all available means must be employed to deal with this risk. Assistance in limiting the group of vulnerable prisoners can in particular be provided by studies on individuals who have returned from the Middle East war zones. According to these studies, young men aged between 18 and 25 who seem to lack direction and are seeking support are especially vulnerable. In particular, many inmates of young offenders institutions can be included in this group, so it is extremely important to monitor their behaviour in prison. However, Muslim prisoners must on no account be placed under blanket suspicion. 2. Observation 2.1 Radicalised prisoners 4 Further details at VII.2.
10 Radicalised prisoners are generally subject to court-ordered restrictions as soon as they begin their sentence, at least as far as their segregation from other individuals charged under sections 89a, 129a or 129b is concerned. In serious cases, it will be necessary to order their segregation from all other inmates, perhaps with permission to contact just a few selected prisoners. The behaviour of radicalised prisoners must be closely monitored and documented. This applies both with regard to accommodation and to taking part in activities in the exercise yard. In the case of an individual exercise hour, it must be ensured that no attempts are made at establishing contacts, for example through a cell window. Special care may be necessary when allocating work or when inmates participate in leisure activities. Cells must be searched regularly and particularly thoroughly, and special attention must be paid to visiting hours and correspondence. The relevant general security measures need to be ordered. 2.2 Vulnerable prisoners It must be concluded that there is an actual danger when prisoners increasingly seek the company of radicalised fellow inmates, for example in the exercise yard, at their place of work or when participating in leisure activities. Alternatively, it may be assumed that there is an actual danger when several prisoners who may be classified as vulnerable according to general criteria split up from other inmates and chiefly maintain contacts in a smaller group. Other clues may be wearing different clothing, changes to hairstyle or beard, distinctly religious/fundamentalist remarks, the use of particular symbols or even simply the more intensive study of specific news reports. Behaviour towards female staff can also be an important indicator. 3. Gathering and processing information The effective and comprehensive gathering and processing of information presupposes clearly defined lines of authority and responsibility that can be recognised in all
11 parts of a prison. In order to achieve this, it is first of all essential to make all staff at least aware that indications of radical thinking, for example in comments made, writings found, symbols employed or changes in behaviour detected, must at any rate be recorded as unusual and passed on. 3.1 Special responsibilities For organisational reasons, however, as well as owing to the degree of knowledge needed, which requires initial and continuing training that is very hard to maintain nationwide, a more precise classification of conspicuous behaviour should be carried out by individuals who are available as contacts to other prison officers and, as the case may be, to informers among the inmates and who persuade staff to be observant. In prisons, this task could be assigned to officers with general security responsibilities, which vary from one Land to another. It may be advisable to make certain staff mainly responsible for carrying out these tasks 5, but officers responsible must in any event be present and easily reachable for all staff to ensure a reliable flow of information. Bearing in mind the need for immediate reactions, it is essential to establish a link to the operational unit responsible for security. For any further questions and in order to for them to act as contacts themselves, these staff must be provided with the necessary contact details of other security authorities. Information must be documented. 3.2 Further co-ordination Recognising situations that are similar from one prison to another, sharing experience and, not least, producing and updating a nationwide picture make it necessary to consolidate in one place the information gained. This can be done by making it 5 Cf. for example the structure monitoring in Baden-Württemberg and Hessen.
12 part of the duties of supervisory authority staff already responsible for security issues to write reports. Depending on the extent of the phenomenon, it may be advisable to set up a central information co-ordination office at the supervisory authority 6 or a specialised prison 7. It would be possible to establish a joint forum for sharing information and recognising inter-prison networks. On the specific subject of extremism, this could be done in the context of existing meetings between staff responsible for security issues. 4. Standard measures in prisons Irrespective of longer-term treatment, preventive measures and spiritual care, the set of statutory security instruments must be consistently applied, especially as far as contacts within the prison and with the outside world are concerned. Benchmark rules can if necessary be adopted from existing provisions on dealing with particularly dangerous prisoners. 4.1 Principle In the case of radicalised individuals, especially when it is to be feared they will try to recruit other prisoners, appropriate general and specific security measures must be ordered that enable them to be segregated effectively from fellow inmates both other radicalised prisoners and, at least, those who are actually vulnerable. Security measures must constantly be checked to see if they are up to date. It is essential to hold regular conferences involving all staff who are in close contact with prisoners. 4.2 Outside contacts 6 Cf. Network for De-Radicalisation in Prisons in Hessen or the Central Office for the Co-ordination of Measures against Salafism/Islamism in Bavarian prisons. 7 Cf. Central Information Office in Lower Saxony.
13 Visits to radicalised prisoners must always be monitored by sight and sound. Similarly, correspondence and, if permitted, telephone contacts must also be monitored. If necessary, official assistance must be requested from agents of the police department responsible for state security or the Office for the Defence of the Constitution. 4.3 Further measures In order to ensure their effective segregation from fellow inmates, radicalised prisoners should be accommodated individually in small and easily manageable departments with appropriately trained staff. If attempts are nevertheless made to radicalise fellow prisoners, appropriate measures must be taken, such as accommodating them in other departments or transferring them to another prison. If there is a threat that cannot be avoided in any other way, their temporary or permanent segregation should be considered. If the majority of inmates have been categorised as radicalised, this can also be dealt with by moving some elsewhere. In the case of radicalised prisoners, it appears necessary to carry out more frequent searches of both them and their cells, and perhaps also their places of work. In individual cases, a regular change of cell can be considered. Information obtained about radicalisation potential or even attempts at radicalisation must be taken into consideration in the prison planning process. This applies all the more to examining measures to grant temporary release. Recommendations 1. It is essential to carry out an immediate check of the judgment execution documents on entry into custody to see if they contain any relevant details. If there is any delay in this information coming to light, it is not only possible that dangerous developments have been set in motion but also that the legal justification for precautionary measures has been rendered more difficult owing to the lapse of time.
14 2. An organisational precondition for the effective identification and monitoring of Islamist activities in prisons is the presence of named staff contacts to whom information from both other staff and prisoners (or third parties) can be conveyed with no great expenditure of time and effort. III. Exchange of information 1. Levels of communication for prison authorities Basically, for the prison authorities two different levels need to be taken into account as far as information and communication are concerned: vertical communication occurs within the prison authority itself, while horizontal level communication takes place with other offices and departments. In addition, in the context of the flow of communication a distinction is drawn between the treatment of the prisoners concerned and public security. 2. Prison action guidelines 2.1 Dealing with the prisoners concerned Prisoners who have already drawn attention to themselves in this connection must be monitored particularly closely on a regular basis. This can be achieved by classifying them as security relevant or imposing a security order (monitoring of correspondence and telephone calls, keeping a close eye on contacts with other prisoners, acoustic surveillance, etc). In this way, all staff are aware of what is going on and enter details of their observations into the prisoner administration program. Regular status reports should be produced in the prison staff meetings or departmental meetings, and meetings on individual cases should be held. Reference is made to section II for additional ways of identifying vulnerable prisoners.
15 2.2 Handling information gained This information should be passed to a central co-ordinating body (e.g. head of the security service/head of security and order) in the prison facility in order to consolidate and assess the knowledge gained. This will also ensure there are contact persons responsible for communications between the prison and other authorities. A distinction should be drawn between information that may be purely to do with the prison itself and information that draws attention to a possible (new and perhaps relevant) criminal scenario. In this connection, the normal communication channels must be adhered to (e.g. when examining suitability for temporary release, enquiries to be sent to the authority responsible for monitoring the execution of sentences and to the police, as well as informing them about individual leave granted). In addition, there are special rules to be observed in the case of this group of prisoners. Owing to the considerable public interest that exists in such a matter, these rules include reporting circumstances with a public impact to the supervisory authority and obligations to submit documents to the supervisory authority when granting temporary release. Finally, there are also reporting obligations specific to individual Länder. If there is a suspicion that new offences have been committed, the circumstances must as usual be reported to the public prosecutor s office responsible and to the police. In practice, contacts with the police are often established directly at working level and information is processed by the state security services in the light of the political context. Obtaining the above information must comply with the rules of the relevant Land execution of sentences acts and data protection acts. 3. Exchange of information between the police and judicial authorities
16 At its 121st conference on the island of Rügen from 6 to 8 May 2015, the Prison Oversight Committee adopted under Item 7 Dealing with criminal forms of radicalisation and political and religious extremism in prisons inter alia the following resolution: The Prison Oversight Committee requests that the building and security consultants take account of recommendations for action drawn up by the Joint Police and Justice Task Force for Co-operation on Combating Islamist Terrorism [...] The report by a sub-working party of the aforementioned joint task force for Cooperation on Combating Islamist Terrorism, dated 8 July 2014, stated in paragraph 5 that co-ordination between the prison authorities, the public prosecutor s offices, the police and the courts basically works well. Nonetheless, aspects specific to state security need to be looked at more closely, especially when a remand or convicted prisoner is classified by the police as posing a danger to the public or a person of interest and the classification is not withdrawn during the period on remand or imprisonment. The following recommendations were made: Discreet provision of information to the prison when imprisoning individuals who pose a danger to the public or persons of interest for general offences in order to enable the prison authorities to assess the prisoner in these cases too. Structuring the flow of information between the prison and, as far as possible, the courts, the public prosecutor s offices and the police in order to minimise existing shortcomings in the complaints procedure, insofar as details are not provided orally but, with a time delay, in written form. Passing on all information to be made available on a prisoner to the prison s admissions department In order to ensure during the admission procedure that the right guidance framework is established for the entire custodial period.
17 Advance notification of the criminal prosecution authorities (police/public prosecutor s office) of the actual grant of temporary release to (listed) prisoners with an Islamist background in order not to jeopardise ongoing (police) investigations in the present overall context. Institutionalised holding of case meetings with the involvement of prison representatives, the public prosecutor s office, the police department responsible for state security and, perhaps, Islamic authorities (imams) and Islamic scholars when releases are imminent and when a sentence has been fully served in order to ensure that the security authorities are given early and complete information so that, inter alia, the initiation of appropriate measures can be considered. Ensuring that specific information can be passed on in accordance with the rules applying to classified information (for example in order that the police categorisations as posing a danger to the public or a person of interest are not communicated to the prison authorities in writing and thus find their way into the prisoner s personal file). The Länder Working Party on Dealing with radical Islamist prisoners wishes to make the following comments on these recommendations. The decision to optimise the exchange of data under the existing legal provisions is welcomed. How this is actually to be done will have to be examined by each Land judicial administration in the light of the specific requirements of that particular Land. Special emphasis needs to be placed here on the practical use of the information, so it should only rarely be categorised as classified. Information possessed by the authorities responsible for the defence of the constitution should if possible be prepared in such a way as to make it of practical use. Recommendations
18 1. Relevant information should be consolidated at a central location and coordinated. 2. The exchange of data with criminal prosecution authorities, the police and the Office for the Defence of the Constitution needs to be intensified. IV. Initial and continuing training All staff who are involved in the administration of justice and have contacts with prisoners must undergo initial and continuing training on Dealing with radical Islamist prisoners. The emphasis here must be placed on Recognising radicalisation. The starting-point for all treatment methods aimed at preventing radicalisation or promoting de-radicalisation is the recognition of potential danger as early as possible. The Islamist radicalisation phenomenon is given considerable prominence in the media under the headline Prisons as hotbeds of radicalisation. In fact, attempts at radicalisation have so far only come to light in individual cases. This fact should also be conveyed in initial and continuing training courses to counter any fears participants may have. 1. Initial training A main feature of the prison system is to prevent the formation of subculture structures, whether in the area of organised crime, right-wing extremism or the so-called Germans from Russia. A main focal point in the training of prison staff therefore lies in noting and responding to conspicuous behaviour among prisoners. Prisoners who turn to Islamism or Salafism also behave in a conspicuous way, so staff must be able, or be taught, to recognise where the borderline is between the normal exercise of the Muslim faith and going beyond it to embrace radical Islamist
19 content. 8 Training to deal with the issue of radical Islamist prisoners primarily serves to achieve this objective. Training course content on the subject of Islam and Islamism must be carefully considered in order to avoid giving the impression that Muslims are being placed under general suspicion. The term Islamism has now become established in the sense of Islamist fundamentalism but is linguistically close in meaning to the word Islam. Media headlines can also mislead people into equating Islam with Islamism. This must already be countered during the period of initial training because Islamist fundamentalism is a distortion of Islam, which starts from the premise that there are many possible religious convictions: There is no compulsion in religion. A training course should in particular serve the purpose of explaining the correlations between Islam and Islamism, and especially the differences between the two terms. It must be clear to every member of staff that Islamist-Salafist aspirations constitute an abuse of Islam for political ends. The aim of a training course is also to recognise the importance of employing sensitive language. There is Islam and there is Islam and there are Muslims and there are Muslims, and there is a need to draw distinctions in the light of the many different branches of the faith. Staff should already be given at an early point in their career in the administration of justice a set of tools enabling them to counter the Salafists black-and-white images ( believers vs non-believers or Heaven vs. Hell ). On no account may Salafists be allowed to hold the sole power to define matters relating to the Islamic faith. The diverse nature of Islam means that the transition from a deep religious conviction to Islamism can in fact be a subtle one, so it is all the more important to keep a close 8 See also Draft of an EU guideline of 23.09.2015, para. 28 p. 1
20 eye on prisoners behaviour. Information leaflets can provide help in correctly identifying faith-related changes in that behaviour. 9 Prison-specific matters with an Islamic dimension must be given particular prominence in staff training, especially rules on diet and dress. In this connection, there are many different opinions within the broad spectrum of the interpretation of Islam, and religious or Islamic scholars must be involved in the development of teaching content. In accordance with its importance, the subject of Islam must at least be integrated into the training for both the General Prison Service and the Senior Prison and Administration Service. In addition to recognising the beginnings of radicalisation, the question of notifying suspicious facts also has to be addressed in training courses. Every member of staff with contacts with prisoners must know along what channels important information can be transmitted promptly and comprehensively. This corresponds to the prison authorities duty to ensure efficient reporting channels and regular opportunities for experience sharing. With regard to the subject of de-escalation, trainees also have to be shown how to avoid conflicts with prisoners of other faiths. In this connection, it is particularly necessary to teach Islamic rules of behaviour. In order to optimise the training, accompanying scientific research can be carried out. 2. Continuing training Continuing training courses should focus on specific distinguishing features of possible Islamist radicalisation. 9 For more details, see II.1.
21 In all other respects the content of the training remains the same. 2.1 Target group Continuing training courses should primarily target those members of the prison staff who have daily contacts with inmates as this is the only to guarantee that any risk potential is recognised early on. Staff who have already undergone continuing training must see themselves as multipliers since not all prison staff can be brought up to the same level of training in the short term. It is therefore recommended that training be initially given to staff with a particular aptitude for acting as multipliers. The training also involves teaching participants to be particularly sensitive in handling relevant information, which also includes passing all relevant information on to the prison section responsible for the subject concerned, for example the head of the security service or the head of security and order. 2.2 Conduct and location Continuing training courses can be run by outside experts or the prison s own specially trained staff. Staff particularly well-trained in the subject concerned should also be available to provide information on it. 10 When employing outside teachers, the possibility of utilising the expertise of the police department responsible for state security and the Office for the Defence of the Constitution should in particular suggest itself as these authorities are likely to have the best intelligence on local developments with regard to Islamism and Salafism. 10 Further details at II.3.1.
22 In-house courses have the advantage that the prison s internal structures are tested and can if necessary be optimised. They also reach a large number of staff. Measures involving several prisons are also conceivable and promote the exchange of information between prisons outside their daily routine operation. The content of training courses should if possible be co-ordinated with the authorities responsible for the defence of the constitution in order to be able to provide an up-todate overview at any one time. In order to ensure that a continuing training course is based on a practical approach, connections need to be pointed out with everyday life in prisons, where questions are increasingly asked on such matters as whether Islam itself requires long breaks to be granted for prayers (even during working time or lesson times) or only special meat to be served. These questions will need to be answered by consulting experts, such as religious or Islamic scholars. 2.3 Official meetings Official meetings with prison managements and heads of security and order services or specialised services are also appropriate forums for looking into the subject of dealing with Islamist prisoners. Here, too, the aim should be a sharing of best practice. The same applies to other national and regional networks, for example prevention networks, interministerial working parties or national bodies like the Prison Oversight Committee or the Conference of Building and Security Consultants. The optimisation of continuing training is also a suitable subject for accompanying scientific research. 2.4 Continuing training of contact persons and information providers
23 In order to be able to answer specific enquiries on distinguishing Islam from Islamism/Salafism as quickly and as expertly as possible, those staff responsible for receiving and processing information need to be given the relevant training. As it is not possible to give all staff members comprehensive initial and continuing training, it is recommended that, at least in the larger prisons, these individuals be appointed as outwardly recognisable contacts on extremism, who can be approached on a wide range of questions. Both staff and prisoners can turn to them with information and queries. Supra-local training courses held up to now have shown that there is a huge demand for information on the extent to which Islamic principles impact the daily prison routine. Specialists employed within a prison should be given intensive continuing training. 2.5 Continuing training of trainers and outside professionals If special internal programmes have been developed for dealing with radicalised prisoners, trainers need to be given the relevant continuing training. That training can tie in with the standards developed up to now (anti-violence training, etc). When working with outsiders, a contribution should be made to their continuing training. In particular, they should given insights into the prison s daily routine in order to create optimum conditions for targeted measures for dealing with inmates. Section V. discusses the initial and continuing training of imams. Recommendations: 1. The subject of distinguishing Islam from Islamism/Salafism and its importance for daily prison practice must be firmly integrated into the initial and continuing training of both the General Prison Service and the Senior Prison and Administration Service.
24 2. Contacts on extremism must be given intensive continuing training. V. Spiritual care 1. General/Fundamental Muslims are the third largest faith community in Germany after the Evangelical and Catholic Christians. In the EU member states, there is a basic right to unhindered religious worship, and Islam as a religion must be treated equally to other faiths. The Prison Acts of the Länder and the Federation (e.g., sections 53 and 54 of the Federal Prison Act) contain fundamental provisions on religious worship that naturally also apply to prisoners of the Muslim faith. They too are entitled to religious care by in the words of the prison acts spiritual advisers of their faith community (section 53(1) of the Federal Prison Act). However, fundamental differences become apparent here: the Arabic and Turkish languages do not contain the concept of spiritual (pastoral) care, so it is not really possible to speak of Muslim spiritual care. Rather than through theologically trained individuals, traditional Islamic spiritual care mostly takes place in a noninstitutionalised environment within the family with no reference to a professional. The Koran provides practical guidelines for living and dying. Accordingly, few trained Islamic theologians can be found. Owing to the structure of Islam, the search for cooperation partners for the administration of justice also proves problematic: there are not only the Sunni and Shiite denominations but within them many very different groupings, which reflect the diversity of the Muslim faith and Muslim life with its manifold regional and ethnic identities. The four largest umbrella organisations and several small organisations in Germany represent only a minority of the Muslims living here. According to constitutional law and prison legislation, imprisoned Muslims must be given help to contact spiritual or religious carers from their faith community and may
25 as a rule also hold individual conversations with them. They also have the right to take part in religious events of the Muslim community, such as Friday prayers. Religious needs are already taken into account with the prison food, in order to enable Muslim inmates to observe the dietary rules of their own faith community. All this helps to avoid discriminatory disadvantages, which can lead to radicalisation. 2. Involvement of imams, Muslim associations and Mosque communities Imams and religious carers thus provide an opportunity for prevention and deradicalisation when they hold in-depth discussions on and question the radical views of extremist inmates and, through religious conviction, exert their influence on radical attitudes. It must, of course, be ensured that imams themselves do not hold extremist views. They must confront sympathisers and vulnerable inmates with fundamental questions in individual and group discussions (at least the latter to be held in German): what potential for violence is inherent in religion? What about the relationship between religion and politics? How literally is the Koran to be understood? Moderate answers must be developed both with and for inmates through a nuanced interpretation of the Koran, a discussion about Islamic law, the Prophet and the history of ideas within Islam. The aim is to counter Salafist arguments that glorify violence. Religious instruction and religious worship then make an important contribution to staving off specific dangers. The conveying of religious values by trained and reliable imams contributes to social reintegration when prisoners not only increase their knowledge of the Koran but also enhance their own personality. Islamism is often not only an extreme form of religious practice but also a movement of sections of the population who either perceive themselves or actually are socially disadvantaged and uneducated. A strengthened personality, on the other hand, will find it easier to refuse to go along with polarising agitation by extremists who advocate violence. Imams can be located through regional Muslim communities or if available a Muslim umbrella organisation. Co-operation with Muslim communities or local Muslim representatives makes it easier for imams to be accepted among prison inmates. The Centres for Islamic Theology, which are located in Frankfurt (Giessen), Mün-
26 ster/osnabrück, Erlangen-Nuremberg, Karlsruhe and Tübingen and have been sponsored by the Federal Ministry for Justice Education and Research since 2011, could also be helpful in this connection. They hold training courses for religious educators, and accompanying scientific research could also be established there. With the help of a network of trained bi- or multilingual imams and Muslim religious carers, needs-based spiritual care can be provided for prisoners through their faith community. To this end, co-operation agreements on selection and initial and continuing training could be entered into between the judicial authorities and umbrella organisations. Prison administrations should make agreement on an appointment dependent on whether the person concerned takes part in an introduction to prison practice of which the scope and content are modelled on the introduction for full-time spiritual advisers. If the prison administration thinks the conduct of spiritual advisers or their assistants poses a threat to prison security, it should try to reach an amicable solution with those concerned. Co-operation agreements of this type have been reached in individual Länder. 11 3. Checking and preparing religious carers Imams and religious carers are permitted to speak to prisoners unsupervised, so it might be advisable before they begin their work to have checks on them carried out with the participation of police officers and/or agents of the Office for the Defence of the Constitution in accordance with the legal provisions specific to the Land concerned. When offering to hold discussions and speak to potentially vulnerable inmates, imams and religious carers should work closely with the prison responsible. In partic- 11 See appendix.
27 ular, they must be prepared to discuss Islamist/Salafist theses. To accomplish this task, they should possess the necessary religious and personal qualifications (theological expertise, previous experience, reliability, motivation) as well as a knowledge of both German and other languages depending on the prison s requirements. They should be prepared for this task in an induction course run, for example, by Muslim associations and regularly be given the opportunity to hold personal discussions. 4. Provision of religious care This can consist of open discussions and, as and when required, individual discussions with Muslim prisoners, especially on the inmate s life history and intercultural experience (culture of origin, Western culture); compatibility of traditional and modern values; orientation in a pluralistic society; support with the development of prosocial future prospects Religious help and care should if possible be provided in the national language in order to be able to recognise extremist ideas. During Friday prayers, at least the sermon should be in German. Carers should if possible look after inmates throughout their time in prison. 5. Preparation for release Religious care and support should mainly be given when preparing inmates for release and providing aftercare. If a moderate religious community is available in the case of releases that can be planned, contacts should be established in good time (e.g. through the prison s social services department). Recommendations
28 1. In order to support the prison service in the selection and initial and continuing training of imams and religious carers, it would seem helpful to enter into cooperation agreements with Muslim associations, institutions or individuals. 2. Muslim prison chaplains should be involved in the implementation of prevention and de-radicalisation measures. VI. Dealing with vulnerable prisoners 1. Concept It is not possible to produce a standard profile for those individuals who have been or could be radicalised as far as supporting violence and participation in acts of terror are concerned, but prisoners can be regarded as vulnerable if they are receptive to extremist influences owing to their lack of experience with prisoner subcultures and/or their own instability and a lack of direction. They are often particularly vulnerable when given the prospect of being able to enhance their status and gain membership of an ideological community by belonging to a group or as a result of their relationship with individual inmates. 2. Dangers facing a vulnerable clientele Life in a prison with inmates unavoidably close to one another involves the risk of infection with radicalism. Especially in prison, radical Islamists encounter a vulnerable clientele. This applies particularly to young offenders institutions. Vulnerability to radicalisation of whatever kind is frequently the result of a lifechanging event and individual problems and difficulties faced by the individual concerned. In particular, those inmates whose criminal background is the result of a lack of direction are often open to systems of belief and value that act as ideological mainstays and provide perceived support in such life situations.
29 The cause of, and trigger for, vulnerability to extremist ideas can in particular be: personal instability lack of or weak paternal authority experience of personal discrimination experience of personal failure social isolation familiarity with, and acceptance of, violence subcultural/criminal environment identification with a (supposedly) oppressed group (victim mentality) identity crisis after experiencing severe losses contacts with individuals with religious convictions lack of religious knowledge It is not possible to draw a clear distinction between vulnerable and non-vulnerable individuals, but it must be assumed that their vulnerability increases the more the above factors are present. It must always be borne in mind that prisons contain many (predominantly young) people to whom these factors apply. It must be made clear that not only Muslims are vulnerable. Members of other religions or non-religious individuals can also become radicalised, but Muslim socialisation can prepare the ideological ground for Islamist radicalisation. 3. Attractiveness of extremism from the point of view of those concerned Radical messages can be attractive for prisoners because they reduce social complexity to a simplistic black and white picture. Inmates also often have a strong desire to belong to something big and for once in their lives be on what they assume is the winning side. Furthermore, these individuals can compensate for their own insecurities by adopting extremist religious principles and finding ways of blaming others for their own shortcomings. Finally, Islamism (similar to religious sects or other ex-
30 tremist groups) is extremely attractive for young people in particular because it seems to offer answers to problems of growing up: giving meaning to life, simple world view, structure, clear rules, answers to all questions feeling of their own importance by belonging to a selected group, power, disparagement of others (ideology of superiority) thirst for adventure; an exotic world in which one can prove oneself opposition against the supposedly contradictory and complicated adult world that they feel unable to cope with and perceive as hypocritical and dishonest 4. Specific measures with regard to vulnerable prisoners The prison service is obliged to offer inmates realistic hope for the future, and they must be constantly approached in person. The following measures should be mentioned in this connection: Assignment to a specific inmate of a prison officer, if possible long-term, from the cell-block service, the specialised service or the prison industry service so that he/she can try to converse with the inmate on a regular basis Strengthening of contacts with suitable individuals outside the prison in whom the inmate can confide; perhaps provision of voluntary carers Involvement in communal activities (school/training/work, sport, leisure groups, living units) to avoid isolation Discussions with people who can give dispassionate information on the Islamic religion (perhaps also information on the experiences of returnees from Syria) Discussion groups in the light of a recent event, for example after bomb attacks Making access to propaganda material more difficult (perhaps bans on receiving visits, stopping letters)