School of History The Lester & Sally Entin Faculty of Humanities Tel-Aviv University The United Nations and Peacekeeping in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia, 1988-1995 Thesis submitted for the degree Doctor of Philosophy by Chen Kertcher Written under the supervision of Professor Aron Shai Submitted to the Senate of Tel Aviv University January 2010 i
Chen Kertcher, The United Nations and Peacekeeping in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia, 1988-1995 Email- Kertcherchen@gmail.com Abstract The subject of the study and its goals This study examines the concept of United Nations peacekeeping operations and their execution in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia from 1988 to 1995. The research is anchored primarily in United Nations documents, which were produced following the diplomatic discussions that took place in the organization on the subject of peacekeeping in general and in the cases of Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia in particular. Studies on peacekeeping operations tend to overlook the importance of the diplomatic discussions that occurred and are still occurring at the United Nations. In this study I chose to examine these discussions in order to offer different explanations than the ones that are usually given on the motivation to execute peacekeeping operations, the way they were executed and their outcomes. There is a wide consensus in the peacekeeping operations literature that there were two types of United Nations peacekeeping operations, based on the time of their execution: 'traditional operations' and 'multifunctional operations'. Operations of the 'first generation', sometimes termed 'traditional', were executed during the Cold War, from 1947 to 1987. These operations were limited in their objectives and size. Their main objective was to prevent escalation in inter-state conflicts, through the deployment of peacekeeping forces as a buffer between the belligerent armed forces. During their deployment the United Nations forces investigated and reported breaches of cease-fire agreements. The aim of this technique was to assist ongoing international mediation efforts in order to resolve the conflict. The principles of success of these operations were to gain the support of international and local actors, to be impartial and under no circumstances to use force. In total the United Nations deployed 13 operations during this time period. ii
This mode of action is usually regarded as supporting the ideal of a negative world order as articulated in the United Nations Charter. The Charter focuses on the prevention of wars between states, and not on the initiation of positive actions that can prevent the development of conditions for conflicts. Therefore, some studies consider this technique to be a supporter of 'negative peace'. According to most of the peacekeeping research literature, 'Second generation' operations have been executed since 1988 and they continue to this day. These studies highlight the fact that between 1988 and 1995, the period examined by this work, the Security Council decided on the deployment of 27 new operations, twice the number of operations that were deployed during the Cold War. Furthermore, the number of peacekeepers rose from a low of 15,390 in the end of 1991 to a high of 80,000 in 1994. The cost of the operations rose in parallel, from approximately half a billion dollars in 1991 to 3.5 billion dollars three years later. Another argument found in the academic literature is that Cold War era peacekeeping operations differ from later operations not only in their numbers and size, but also in their objectives, which in the latter included interventions on political, security, economic and social levels during an active conflict inside states. Some researchers have been using terms such as 'multifunctional' operations to define the second generation of peacekeeping operations. They emphasize that these operations are characterized by multiple objectives such as democratization, building new national security institutions, providing humanitarian assistance, and the advancement of human rights. Their main objective is to end intra-state conflicts through these multiple functions. Others prefer to view these operations as advancing 'positive peace', because they regard them as supporting the basic foundations for the maintenance of peace. The United Nations operations in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia were executed in order to achieve multiple negative and positive peace objectives. In this sense they represent the best cases for the examination of the will of the international community to promote negative and positive peace in intra-state conflicts in order to maintain international peace and security. The results of the operations are questioned. Although it is common to claim that the intervention in Cambodia was successful, the intervention in Former Yugoslavia was a partial success and the intervention in Somalia was a failure. In the case of Cambodia, the Security Council decided to terminate the operation in mid iii
1993, after the United Nations managed an election that resulted in the formation of a new government by the two biggest political parties in Cambodia. In the case of Former Yugoslavia, it was decided in December 1995 to transfer many of the operation s powers to NATO after the belligerent parties in Bosnia signed a peace agreement. In the case of Somalia, it was decided to end the operation in March 1995 although the conflict continued. In 1995 the number and size of peacekeeping operations started to decline until it reach a low of approximately 12,000 soldiers in mid-1999. In June 1999 the tide turned again when the Security Council decided to deploy operations in East- Timor and Kosovo. The numbers and size of peacekeeping operations began to rise after 2001, with most of the new operations deployed in Africa. Because the international political historical context of the early 90's was different than that of the first decade of the 21 st century, operations from this time period are not discussed in this thesis. The change in the objectives, numbers and size of peacekeeping operations after the Cold War raises several questions: to what extent do the three interventions in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia represent a fundamental change in the international politics at the United Nations regarding the management of conflicts after the Cold War? Were these interventions a result of a conceptual change which most member states in the United Nations supported, or perhaps an arbitrary act of a few members in the Security Council? Were the interventions the international response to unusual conflicts, constituting a brief deviation from normal practice, or were they an expression of a new norm in the way the United Nations deals with conflicts? Literature which supports the dichotomy between the two periods, from 1947 to 1987 and from 1988 till today, tends to conclude that a fundamental change has occurred in the way international politics was practiced at the United Nations after the Cold War. According to many studies the end of the Cold War created two major political alliances in the organization. The first alliance represents the developing states and is led by China and Russia; it supports the execution of traditional operations. The second and more dominant alliance represents the Western states, led by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada. This alliance pushed for a change in the concept of traditional peacekeeping operations in order to iv
intervene in intra-state conflicts while promoting democratization, human rights, economic development etc. In this research I demonstrate, using the records of diplomatic discourse at the United Nations, that although there was an attempt to change the concept of peacekeeping operations, it eventually failed. The best explanation for this outcome is that international politics at the United Nations at least as it concerns peacekeeping operations is still conducted according to the principles of each state s realpolitik. The states formed their stance on a case by case basis, while calculating power relations in order to advance their own national interests. Therefore their position on each topic did not necessarily match the declared position of any particular political alliance. Furthermore, many multifunctional operations were still executed in accordance with the traditional concept. The main objective of these operations was international mediation between belligerent sides in order to form sovereign governments and to deploy a 'peacekeeping force' in accordance with the traditional principles of international and local consent, impartiality and the non-use of force. Traditional objectives were preferred over new objectives such as democratization, human rights, and economic development. Methodology and the corpus of sources Since the last decade of the 20 th century, hundreds of books and articles were published on the subject of peacekeeping operations. One major contribution to the field is the publication, since 1993, of an academic journal titled International Peacekeeping which aims to deal with the theory and practice of peacekeeping operations. Research in the field discusses many different issues and raises questions that cannot be reviewed here in detail. It is sufficient to generally categorize it into four clusters: regional studies, functions and objectives studies, international law studies and generational studies. The first cluster, which is the largest in the field, is of regional studies, which sometimes compare different regions. These studies discuss a conflict in a particular region or the decision-making process in a specific state. Many of these studies describe United Nations actions in a specific region in detail, while trying to conclude how the operations contributed to the solution of a conflict. v
The second cluster of studies includes comparative analysis of the operations objectives and their functions in a particular conflict. These studies tend to focus on one objective and compare the methods for its achievement in several operations. Therefore, there are many studies on international mediation, humanitarian assistance and enforcement action. A third cluster of studies on peacekeeping operations is related to international law. These studies usually try to evaluate whether the operations were applied, developed or deployed in accordance with the norms of international law. Therefore, they tend to make comparisons between accepted interpretations of the norms of international law and the practice of the United Nations. For example, they examine cases of massive breaches of human rights and try to evaluate how these breaches and the action of the international community influence the evolution of international law. The last cluster, which I call generational studies, includes studies which try to explain the changes in the concept and practice of peacekeeping from their first use in 1947 to our days. These studies deal with the impact of international politics on the execution of peacekeeping operations in the last six decades, while trying to characterize the uniqueness of each period in the history of United Nations operations. Most of these studies arrive at the same conclusions, positing a dichotomy between traditional operations that were executed until 1987 and multifunctional operations that were executed since 1988. The main explanation put forth for the change is the end of Cold War. However, these studies do not give enough attention to the discussions in the United Nations bodies on the concept and practice of peacekeeping operations. Regional studies tend to emphasize the importance of the interventions that they review, and this is done without providing the proper context of the discussions that were carried out in the UN on the operations. This results in studies that tend to neglect the wider historical context of the operation that they review. Studies that compare specific objectives between different operations tend to emphasize the importance and role of a specific function in the operation beyond the original intentions of the United Nations personnel, the persons which were responsible for the planning and the execution of the operations. International law studies tend to give greater weight to the development of international law at the expense of the practice, which is in essence a political activity in the United Nations. Finally, generational studies which strive to review the historical change in the vi
concept and practice of peacekeeping operations hardly analyze the discussions at the United Nations. In this study I challenge the accepted notion in the field of peacekeeping operations that operations executed by the United Nations until 1987 and those executed by it since 1988 differ significantly. As far as I know, there is no research on the discourse that took place at the United Nations from 1988 to 1995 on the concept of peacekeeping, or a comparison between these discussions and the execution of the major operations at the time, in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia. As I demonstrate in the study, the examination of these discussions draws a different picture from the one that is usually depicted. Diplomatic discourse at the United Nations took place in the three central bodies of the United Nations the Security Council, The General Assembly and the Secretariat. In the Security Council there were discussions on the concept of the operations and their execution in different conflict areas in the world. During discussions that took place at the General Assembly, many states representatives expressed their government s views and positions on the concept and practice of the operations. The main body in the General Assembly which was responsible for developing the concept of peacekeeping was the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations. The Secretariat took an active part in all of the discussions that took place in the Security Council and the General Assembly. The protocols of hundreds of these discussions help to trace the formal and unique positions on the concept of the operations and their practice in every case. The use of United Nations sources reveals the arguments and justifications which diplomats and Secretariat personnel raised on each issue. Meticulous reading of these sources allows the researcher to map the different alliances that were formed on each subject and action. In addition to the corpus of United Nations primary sources, containing thousands of pages, the study is based on other sources such as diplomatic correspondence which includes official governmental exchange of letters, professional reports to the organization on the concept and practice of different operations, and published official literature such as the United Nations periodicals and yearbooks. A different corpus of sources is the official documents of states which had specificinfluence on a particular peacekeeping operation, such as the Australian Government s recommendations to solve the Cambodian conflict. vii
To support these primary sources, I used books and articles written by professionals which took part in the debate on the operations. Finally, because the focus of this research is on the history of the United Nations peacekeeping operations and not on the history of a particular region, I used secondary literature written by regional experts concerning the events in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia and on the foreign policy of several prominent states which influenced the operations. The Chapters of the Dissertation Chapter 1 offers a brief review of United Nations peacekeeping operations from 1947 to 2010. The chapter reviews the main conceptual differences between 'first generation' and 'second generation' peacekeeping operations, as they are usually represented by studies in the field. The chapter discusses the main explanations given in the field for the change that occurred in the international politics at the United Nations that enabled the use of multifunctional peacekeeping operations from 1988. It addresses the principal differences which are argued to exist between the objectives and principles of success for the operations in the two time periods, and reviews the central arguments on the practices of management and organization of the operations. Chapter 2 examines the guiding principles of international politics regarding the objectives of the United Nations and its peacekeeping operations. The first part of the chapter describes the objectives of the UN and its work principles. In this part I focus on a distinction between the negative objectives of the organization and its positive objectives. The negative objective, which is its primary one, is to maintain a world order based on sovereign states that do not use war as a mean to resolve their conflicts. The positive objectives are the advancement of human rights, economic development etc., which are sometime mentioned as the minor objectives of the organization. The second part of the chapter examines the work of the central United Nations bodies in which the main discussions on peacekeeping operations are being made. The three bodies in review are the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretariat, and they are responsible for the formulation of the concept of peacekeeping and the execution of operations. The main focus of the chapter will be viii
on how international politics affects the work of these bodies, with a special emphasis on peacekeeping operations. The study of international politics at the United Nations allows us to recognize the main actors, their motives and the arguments that were raised during the discussions on changing the concept of the operations, which also had organizational and management implications. At the end of the chapter I formulate a list of questions that this study attempts to answer regarding international politics at the United Nations and its influence on the concept and practice of the operations. Chapters 3 to 5 analyze the diplomatic discourse inside the United Nations on the concept of peacekeeping. Chapter 3 examines international politics at the United Nations from 1988 to 1991 (when the USSR dissolved), and challenges the accepted premises concerning the change in the objectives and principles of success to peacekeeping operations at the time. The chapter is divided into three parts: the influence of the process ending the Cold War on the work of the organizations; the discussions on the concept of peacekeeping at the United Nations and the objectives that were given to five new peacekeeping operations from 1988 to 1990. The chapter proves that during these years the main protagonists for change in the concept and use of peacekeeping operations were veteran peacekeeping supporters such as Nordic states, Canada and USSR and its allies in the organization and not the Western powers and their traditional allies as studies claim. Furthermore, the chapter will show that the five new operations that the UN launched from 1988 to 1990 had almost no new objectives and they were executed according to the traditional principles. It also demonstrates that the 'first Gulf War' in the years 1990-1991 was not a peacekeeping operation. Finally, the chapter shows that until mid-1991 no new concept for peacekeeping operations was formulated at the United Nations, in contrast to what is usually argued in the research literature. Chapter 4 analyzes the diplomatic discussions at the Security Council, the General Assembly and the UN Secretariat on the objectives and principles of success of the operations from January 1992 to 1995. This chapter examines to what extent the discussions reflect a support by member states of the concept of the operations. The analysis of UN discourse is divided into two parts which reflect two phases in the discussion: the first part concerns the period between 1991 and mid-1993. During this time period, it was proposed to change the objectives and principles of success of the operations. The main basis for the discussions in the early 90's was the special report ix
by the Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace, of June 1992. Most member states supported the innovative ideas that were included in the report and called for the deployment of multifunctional peacekeeping operations to civil wars around the globe. However, the international support for this development did not create a new concept for peacekeeping. Instead, it raised many new questions pertaining to its feasibility many of which remained unanswered: for example, in what conditions should these units use force or what is the relationship between development projects and peacekeeping. In the second phase of the discussions, from mid-1993 to 1995, the support of the international community for the development of a new concept dwindled. This shift was a result of several factors: most questions regarding the new concept remained unanswered; the number of operations and demands rose rapidly; and the Permanent Five in the Security Council remained the main force in the interpretation of the new concept. Therefore, most member states declared their resolve to stick with the traditional objectives and principles of success of the operations due to the political nature of these new multifunctional operations which could be used as an efficient tool for intervention in the hands of the Permanent Five in the Security Council. Chapter 5 complements the discussion on the objectives and principles of success of the operations. The chapter examines to what extent states modified the management process and the organization of the operations so that they fulfilled the new demands of the multifunctional operations, which now tried at least in principle to advance the objectives of positive and negative peace. In this chapter I demonstrate how unique alliances were created, which tried to advance the specific interests of the alliance s member states in every subject, managerial or organizational alike: the authority of the Security Council to define the operations objectives; the question of improving Secretariat capacity to manage the operations; and questions of troops and logistical support as well as coping with the financial difficulties of the organization. Concerning the decision making process, the revival in the work of the Security Council work after the Cold War gave birth not to stability but rather to a harsh debate which is still ongoing between the Permanent Five, who wish to maintain their privileges, and the majority of UN member states Westerners and developing alike who want a change in the composition, authorities and decision making processes of the Council. x
On the question of improving Secretariat capacity to manage multifunctional operations, The Secretariat was the first to acknowledge its shortcomings. However most of its requests for raising more personnel and upgrading its command and control abilities were rebuffed by most member states who underscored the need of the Secretariat to work more efficiently. The contribution of troops was another issue which the international community failed to address properly. Many studies emphasize the increase in the number of states that were willing to send troops to the operations. However, peacekeeping operations still had to contend with severe shortcomings in manpower and logistics, and the training of many UN civil and military personnel in the field was poor. For example, while the number of peacekeeping personnel sharply increased to more than 60,000 in late 1993, the actual number needed was close to 100,000. The final issue that the chapter examines is the finance of the operations. States were more concerned with increasing the compensation they received for every soldier participating in the operation than with the proper funding of the operations. The most conspicuous state in this regard was the United States, which unpaid arrears threatened to bring the organization to the verge of financial collapse. The last three chapters in the study, chapters 6, 7, 8 examine the changes in the execution of peacekeeping operations from 1988 to 1995 through the discussion of United Nations interventions in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia. Each chapter examines the interventions in a specific region. The first part of every chapter discusses the historical context of the intervention. The second part reviews the objectives and principles of success that were adopted by the Security Council. In these parts I examine a number of questions: What were the most influential states in the process of defining the objectives and the principles of the operation? Were they influenced by the discussion of the concept of the operations that took place at the time? Were they the same states that called for the adoption of a new concept? The chapter then proceeds to discuss the main aspects of the interventions: political, security and economic-humanitarian. In each aspect I examine the level of contribution and interest of United Nations member states in the advancement of positive and negative peace, and the impact of their actions in the field. The last part of each chapter reviews the managerial and organizational aspects of the operations, which include the level of cooperation with Security Council resolutions, the capacity xi
of the Secretariat to run the operations, and the contribution of member states to the operations. The discussion in chapters 6, 7, and 8 reveals that international politics at the United Nations, in regard to each of the conflicts, had unique characteristics which do not necessarily correlate with the efforts by certain alliances in the organization to agree on a new concept for peacekeeping operations. Highly significant was the limited willingness of the two main superpowers, the United States and the USSR (later Russia) to intervene unilaterally, and the increase in the influence of the UN Secretary-General and regional organizations. Furthermore, the chapters conclude that in most cases, the United Nations continued to work according to the peacekeeping operations Cold War principles of success, when it strived to achieve mainly traditional objectives that characterized the first generation of peacekeeping rather than the second generation. In some cases, when the organization tried to achieve its new objectives, the attempts unintentionally crippled the ability to achieve the traditional objective an end to the conflict. Chapter 6 analyzes the UN intervention in the conflict in Cambodia from 1991 to 1993. The conclusions are that the operation was not the result of a new concept for peacekeeping, but a unique international support for an Australian government initiative. Furthermore, positive peace objectives were given, but only the minimal option from every level of intervention received support. One of the most conspicuous examples was in regard to the question of the administration of Cambodia during an interim period, which then morphed into a reporting mechanism on the work of Cambodians, rather than an international administration of Cambodia. During this course of action, almost all member states supported the management of the operation according to traditional lines. The Permanent Five played a negligible part in the intervention. However, France and China supported it politically and militarily. The Secretariat personnel who managed the operation tried to act with the consent of the international and local actors. The states in the region, and especially ASEAN, played an important role in supporting the operation politically and militarily while emphasizing that negative peace is the main objective of the operation. This was done by putting a special emphasis on the formation of a new government for Cambodia while disregarding other important issues such as the advancement of human rights, demobilization of armed forces, and the like. Except for Australia, most Western veteran contributors to peacekeeping operations xii
contributed minimally. Their former dominance in the percentage of contributions to peacekeeping operations during the Cold War was replaced by the sharp rise in the contribution made by developing states such as Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. Chapter 7, demonstrates how the influence of the peacekeeping discourse on the reaction of the international community to conflicts can be seen in the UN Intervention in Former Yugoslavia. The main protagonists for the interventions were regional powers such as France, United Kingdom and Germany. However their main interest was to use the international support for what seemed at the time to be a new tool for resolving intra-state conflicts, in order to contain the conflict at minimal costs to them while continuing with regional cooperation and integration towards the creation of the European Union. Therefore, the main objective of the operation was the deconstruction of Former Yugoslavia according to the internal borders of the Republics and not according to the ethnic divisions which positive peace ideas might have demanded. Other objectives such as international civil administration or enforcing respect for human rights were rejected. Instead, minimal actions were taken, for example the responsibility of the UN for the administration of "Protected Areas" in Croatia or a series of Security Council resolutions which called for the international prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of International Humanitarian law. During most of the intervention, the operations in former Yugoslavia were managed according to traditional principles of success. The use of force against Serb targets near the end of the intervention was an exception and not the rule. In contrast to Cambodia, there were sharp divisions among the members of the international community and in general they formed three groups. In the Permanent Five, the United Kingdom and France were the main supporters of the operations politically, materially and in contribution of troops. Their actions gained much support from Western states that contributed in the past to peacekeeping operations. The second group was led by the United States who was a negligible player in UN efforts until late in the intervention. Throughout most of the period, the United States operated according to its own interests even when its actions sabotaged the efforts of its Western allies. United States policy that called for an international enforcement action against the Serbs gained the support of most member states and especially the Islamic members of the UN. China was against the operation, because it deviated from the traditional concept without establishing a clear new concept. The Russian xiii
representatives, who backed the intervention at first, changed their views during 1993 and supported arguments similar to those of the Chinese. The Secretariat personnel who managed the operations were under continuous pressures from the three political groups but emphasized traditional principles of success such as the importance of abstaining from using force and of impartiality. Developing states hardly contributed troops to the conflict. Chapter 8 examines the most ambitious UN intervention of the early 90's, in terms of its objectives, in Somalia. The lack of international interests by major powers in Somalia aided the Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in his efforts to transform a traditional operation that was executed in the country during most of 1992 to a multifunctional operation during late 1992 and early 1993. In his view this operation was supposed to be a model for future multifunctional operations. However, Boutros- Ghali did not receive the manpower and material support that was needed in order to implement the ambitious objectives. The United States representatives wanted to provide humanitarian assistance to starving Somalis in the south and central parts of the country for a limited time period, and did not take interest in many positive peace objectives such as the reconstruction of civilian police and enhancing the capacity of local administrations. In early 1993, Bourtos-Ghali's position became dominant and a multifunctional operation was launched. The Secretariat personnel tried to advance positive peace objectives such as the construction of local and regional administrations, supervising the country s economic reconstruction and reconstructing the civil judicial system. However, all these efforts failed when they lacked international political and material support. Furthermore, the ambitious humanitarian aid operation backfired when it became an economic resource which local armed militias fought for. The adoption of negative and positive objectives for the operation in Somalia during 1993 also forced the Secretariat personnel to erode traditional principles of success to peacekeeping operations. In its attempt to implement a new concept for peacekeeping operations the Secretariat was not sensitive to the wishes of the member states which were not ready to send sufficient support for the implementation of positive peace objectives or the forces to enforce such actions against local factions. Furthermore, Secretariat personnel were biased when they intervened in the local politics of the Somali factions. They rejected the northern Somalis declaration of xiv
independence, and preferred to recognize local leaders who supported the UN intervention. They had also labeled the most powerful faction in centre and south Somalia, the USC/SNA, an obstruction to their work. This tension between the UN and the USC/SNA developed into a direct war between the two from June to October 1993. The campaign in Mogadishu, dubbed sometime as 'Crossing the Mogadishu Line', revealed that the international community was not ready to implement a new concept for peacekeeping, especially when it required sending troops to fight. Throughout 1994 and until the official termination of the operation in March 1995, the UN operation in Somalia returned to operate according to traditional objectives and principles. xv