Mens Rea case law problem Hyam v DPP (1975) HL D sought to frighten an occupant of a house by pouring petrol though the letterbox and then igniting it, resulting in the death of two occupants by asphyxia. Held: Intention is to be distinguished from desire and foresight of probable. Lord Hailsham LC: [A] man may desire to blow up an aircraft in flight in order to obtain insurance moneys. But if any passengers are killed he is guilty of murder, as their death will be a moral certainty if he carries out his intention. Therefore, intention is established where the defendant knows that there is a serious risk that death or grievous bodily harm will ensue from his acts, and commits those acts deliberately and without lawful excuse... It does not matter in those circumstances whether the defendant desires those to ensue or not, and in none of these cases does it matter that the act and the intention were aimed at a potential victim other than the one who succumbed. A man may do an act with a number of intentions. If he does it deliberately and intentionally, knowing when he does it that it is highly probable that grievous bodily harm will result... [then] whatever other intentions he may have had as well, he at least intended grievous bodily harm. Guilty Moloney, R v (1985) HL D and V (D s stepfather of whom D was very fond) had a contest as to loading and firing a shotgun. D a serving soldier shot V without aiming. V taunted D to fire the gun. Incident occurred during a late night of drinking. Held: Lord Bridge: foresight of, as an element bearing on the issue of intention in murder, or indeed any other crime of specific intent, belongs, not to the substantive law, but to the law of evidence... In the rare cases in which it is necessary for the judge to direct a jury by reference to foresight of, I do not believe it is necessary for the judge to do more than invite the jury to consider two questions. First, was death or really serious injury in a murder case (or whatever relevant consequence must be proved to have been intended in any other case) a natural consequence of the defendant s voluntary act? Secondly, did the defendant foresee that consequence as being a natural consequence of his act? The jury should then be told that if they answer yes to both questions it is a proper inference for them to draw that he intended that consequence. D was not guilty of murder The Law Bank 1
Hancock and Shankland, R v (1986) HL In the midst of a miner s strike in which they were participating, H and S pushed a concrete block and post from a bridge over the road along which V was driving M; the latter was killed in the collision. Held: Lord Scarman: The issue of probability regarding death or serious injury is critical to determining intention, yet Moloney omitted any reference in its guidelines to this issue. [T] herefore, the Moloney guidelines as they stand are unsafe and misleading. They require a reference to probability. They also require an explanation that the greater the probability of a consequence the more likely it is that the consequence was foreseen and that if that consequence was foreseen the greater the probability is that that consequence was also intended. H and S were not guilty of murder. Nedrick, R v (1986) CA D poured paraffin through the letterbox of a house and set it alight, resulting in the death of a child. Held: Per Lord Lane CJ: Where the charge is murder and in the rare cases where the simple direction [on intent] is not enough, the jury should be directed that they were not entitled to infer the necessary intention unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant s actions and that the defendant realised that such was the case. Where a man realises that it is for all practical purposes inevitable that his actions will result in death or serious harm, the inference may be irresistible that he intended that result, however little he may have desired or wished it to happen. The decision is one for the jury, to be reached on consideration of all the evidence. D was guilty of manslaughter, not murder. The Law Bank 2
Woollin, R v [1998] HL D lost his temper with his three-month-old son and threw the child onto a hard surface, causing head injuries from which the child died. Held: The jury, should be directed that they are entitled to find the necessary intention if they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty - barring some unforeseen intervention - as a result of the defendant s actions, and that the defendant realised such was the case, but should be reminded that the decision is one for them on a consideration of all the evidence. Murder is a crime of specific intent. If for any reason (including self-induced intoxication) the killer does not form the necessary intent, he cannot be convicted of murder Not guilty of murder, guilty manslaughter. Use these pieces of case law to fill in the gaps in the oblique intent exercise on the next page The Law Bank 3
Nedrick [1986] Hancock and Shankland [1986] Greater degree of greater degree of [1985] Hyam [1975] High degree of [1999] (HL) Virtual certain Test Woolin (CA) More than a slight of harm Test Arguably creates unacceptable overlap with Recklessness Virtually certain Probability Probability Moloney Woolin Natural Foresight Widens Narrows Risk Consequences The Law Bank 4
Nedrick [1986] Virtually certain Hancock and Shankland [1986] Greater degree of probability greater degree of foresight Maloney [1985] Natural Hyam [1975] High degree of probability Woollin [1999] (HL) Virtual certain Test narrows Woolin (CA) More than a slight risk of harm Test widens Arguably creates unacceptable overlap with recklessness The Law Bank 5