Through: Mr. Rohit Sharma with Mr. Amarjeet Singh, Advocates

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI SUBJECT : INDIAN PENAL CODE CRL.M.C. 1096/2011 & Crl.M.A. Nos. 2903-2904/2012, 2906-2907/2012 Date of Decision: 29th November, 2012 JASBIR KAUR & ORS.... Petitioners Through: Mr. Rohit Sharma with Mr. Amarjeet Singh, Advocates versus STATE & ANR.... Respondent Through: Ms. Jasbir Kaur, APP for State with SI Madhurendra Kumar, DIU/SD Mr. N. Hariharan with Mr. Vaibhav Sharma and Mr. Saurabh Soni, Advocates for respondent No. 2 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN J U D G M E N T MANMOHAN, J (ORAL): 1. Present petition has been filed seeking quashing of FIR No. 184/2010 registered with Police Station Mehrauli, Delhi by respondent No.2 under Sections 406/498A/376/420/506/120B IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 2. A perusal of the cause list reveals that upon a petition being filed by three other co-accused for quashing of the same FIR being Crl.M.C. No. 864/201, another learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed the said petition vide order dated 08th August, 2011. The said order is reproduced hereinbelow:- Learned APP, on instruction from the Investigating Officer SI Kiran Sood, P.S. DIU, South District submits that on completion of investigation

of FIR No. 184/2010, P.S. Mehrauli, which is sought to be quashed, a charge sheet has been filed against the petitioners No. 1 & 2 and the petitioner No. 3 has not been named as an accused in the charge sheet. He further submits that learned Magistrate has already taken cognizance of the petitioners No. 1 & 2. Since the offences complained of in the FIR are triable in accordance with warrant trial procedure, the petitioners No. 1 & 2 obviously, would get an opportunity of being heard on the point of charge under Section 239 CrPC. As the equally efficacious remedy is available to the petitioners, I am not inclined to invoke inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC, particularly when, the entire charge sheet is available to the learned Trial Judge, who will have advantage of going through the entire evidence before coming to a conclusion. Petition is accordingly dismissed. I am sure that all the pleas on facts and law taken up by the petitioners No. 1 & 2 shall be considered and decided on merits by the learned Magistrate while deciding the issue on the point of charge. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in the present case Delhi Police has no territorial jurisdiction to register, investigate or proceed with the aforesaid FIR as all the allegations pertain to the period when respondent No. 2-complainant and petitioners were abroad. He further submits that in the event, the petitioners are relegated to the remedy of Section 239 Cr.P.C. then it would amount to the petitioners being forced to invoke Cr.P.C., which according to him is inapplicable. 4. On the other hand, Mr. N. Hariharan, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2-complainant states that Delhi Police has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain, investigate and proceed with the aforesaid FIR as consequence of the criminal acts committed by the petitioners have ensued within the territorial jurisdiction of Delhi. In this connection, he has drawn this Court s attention to the averments in the FIR as well as Sections 178 (b) and (c), 179 and 181(4) Cr.P.C. The said Sections are reproduced hereinbelow: 178. Place of inquiry or trial.-- xxx xxx xxx (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or (c)where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or

179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues.-when an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. 181. Place of trial in case of certain offences.- xxx xxx xxx 4) Any offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained, or was required to be returned or accounted for, by the accused person. 5. In rejoinder, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the Supreme Court in Fatma Bibi Ahmed Patel v. State of Gujarat and Another (2008) 6 SCC 789 quashed the FIR lodged in India on the ground that the accused was not a citizen of India. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:- 14. There are materials before us to show that the appellant is a citizen of Mauritius. She has been visiting India on visas issued by India. She, thus, indisputably is not a citizen of India. She might have been staying in India with her relatives as has been contended by the complainant, but it has not been denied and disputed that she is not a citizen of India. If she is not a citizen of India having regard to the provisions contained in Section 4 of the Penal Code and Section 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the order taking cognizance must be held to be illegal. 15. In terms of Section 4 of the Penal Code, the Indian courts will have jurisdiction to try an accused only if the accused is a citizen of India even if the offence was committed outside India or by any person on any ship or aircraft registered in India wherever it may be. Neither of the aforementioned contingencies is attracted in the instant case. Section 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure also deals with offences committed outside India. Clause (a) brings within its sweep a citizen of India, whether on the high seas or elsewhere, or by a person, although not citizen of India when the offence is committed on any ship or aircraft registered in India. 16. In view of the fact that the offence is said to have been committed in Kuwait, the provisions of the Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be said to have any application.

6. He also relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia & Others v. State of Punjab & Others (2009) 7 SCC 712 wherein it has been held as under:- 32. Furthermore, the larger part of offence, if any, has been committed only in Canada. Why the father of Respondent 3 had to come from Canada to Jalandhar to lodge an FIR is difficult to comprehend. Respondent 3 and the first informant do not say that the inquiry report submitted by the Superintendent of Police on the representation made by Appellant 2 was incorrect. It has also not been stated that as to on what material, the chargesheet had been submitted. We, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, have absolutely no doubt in our mind that the allegations contained in the FIR had been made with an ulterior motive to harass the appellants. Continuance of the criminal proceeding against them would, therefore, amount to abuse of process of the court. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the paper book, it transpires that the petitioners have not joined the investigation in spite of service of notices upon them by the Police in India. In the anticipatory bail application filed by the petitioners, the Additional Sessions Judge had initially granted them protection subject to their joining the investigation. This was despite the fact that FFRO had informed the Court that the petitioners had not departed from India when they came in the month of June, 2010. The initial order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge is reproduced hereinbelow: 25.04.2011 The Bail matters have been assigned to the undersigned as Ms. Renu Bhatnagar, Ld. ASJ is on leave today. Present: Sh. S.K. Kain, Addl. PP for the State. Sh. S. Azad, Counsel for the applicant/accused. Sh. Saurab Soni for complainant. IO/SI Kiran Sood. This is the bail application on behalf of Jasbir Kaur, Baldev Singh, Kanwar Veer Singh and Amrit Kaur in case FIR No. 184/10 U/s 406/498A P.S. Mehrauli. According to the counsel, if the allegations mentioned in the FIR has been taken as it is, then also no offence is committed in the territory of India. There is a serious irregularity in registering the FIR in India. Moreover, he has also referred the order passed by Delhi High Court in respect of the bail application of co-accused. He further submits that the

applicants are settled in America. On the other hand, counsel for the State has opposed the prayer and submitted that applicants have not joined the investigation even when they were in India. FRRO has been placed where it has been mentioned that the applicant had not departed from India when they come in June. This has been refuted by the counsel for the applicant and submitted that the applicant had returned to America in July 2010. IO has also submitted that the applicants who are settled in India even had not joined the investigation inspite of service of notice u/s 16 Cr.P.C. Because the order of anticipatory bail is in their favour. Considering the above facts on record, all the applicants are directed to join the investigation. Applicants No. 1 and 2 are directed to join the investigation by 10.05.2011. Applicants No. 3 & 4 are directed to join the investigation by 25.05.2011. The applicants/accused No. 1 and 2 be not arrested till 10.05.2011 and the applicants/accused No. 3 & 4 be not arrested till 25.05.2011. A copy of this order be given dasti to the applicant and to the complainant also. A copy of this order be sent to FRRO through IO. Till then LOC be kept in abeyance. 8. Ultimately, the bail application filed by the petitioners was dismissed vide order dated 31st May, 2011 wherein it was noted that the petitioners had not joined investigation and had not complied with the orders passed by the said Court. 9. Section 482 Cr.P.C. confers power upon this Court to pass order to either prevent abuse of process of Court or to secure the ends of justice or to give effect to any order under Cr.P.C. Section 482 Cr.P.C reads as under:- 482. Saving of inherent power of High Court.-Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 10. The Rajasthan High Court in Mohan Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1997 (2) WLC 755 has held as under:- 10.Under such circumstances the petitioner, and not the respondents, is clearly found to have abused the process of not only the court of the learned S.D.M., Ratangarh but also that of the Session Judge and this Court. A party who is guilty of such conduct is not at all entitled to a relief Under Section 482 Cr. P.C.

11. The Gujarat High Court in Nadirkhan Babakhan Navabkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat and another 2004 Crl.L.J. 3200 has held as under:- 14 On the one hand, the petitioner is not extending any cooperation in the investigation and has chosen to remain absconding though claiming to be a law abiding citizen and on the other hand, he is claiming benefit under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that investigation is over and charge sheet was filed. xxx xxx xxx 19 Since the only evidence available against the petitioner is the clue given by the co-accused to the investigating officer, it is the duty of the petitioner to help the investigating agency for the same rather than requesting the Court at this stage under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the complaints or deleting his name from the respective charge sheets. xxx xxx xxx 21. Keeping in mind the parameters laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment and on a thorough scrutiny of the records and proceedings of the cases, I am of the opinion that these are not fit cases in which power under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised. Hence, both these petitions are required to be rejected. 12. The Allahabad High Court in Ram Lakhan & Ors. vs. State, 1985 ACR 57, has held as under:- 18. This Court undoubtedly has discretion, under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure to extend time for payment of fine. But, it is equally well-settled that the power Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure is to be exercised mainly to prevent the abuse of process of court and to render justice in the cause (See Nathuni Ram v. State of U.P. 1983 AWC 489 : 1983 ACR 266 & Inder Deo Pandey v. Smt. Bhagwati Devi: MANU/UP/0461/ 1981:1981 AWC 314 : MANU/UP/0662/1981 :1981 ACR 173. The question is whether the application satisfied these tests. It is clear enough that by not obeying the specific directions of the Court and by postponing the payment, without surrendering into court, the applicants have abused the process of the court and have tried to bypass the course of justice. We do not think, therefore, that any discretion may be exercised in favour of the applicants by extending the time prayed for.

13. In the opinion of this Court, the petitioners while invoking inherent power of the court under Section 482 Cr.P.C cannot state that they will not submit to other provisions of Cr.P.C. In fact, the power conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C is to ensure that no person abuses the process of law and that justice is done. This Court is of the view that the petitioners who are not cooperating with the Police, cannot invoke this Court s equitable jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 14. Moreover, keeping in view the averments in the FIR and provisions of Sections 178(c), 179, 181(4) Cr.P.C., this Court is of the view that at this stage of the proceedings it cannot be said that the Delhi Police has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain and investigate the aforesaid FIR. This Court in Dinesh Kaushik vs. The State of NCT of Delhi & Anr., 2009 (2) JCC 151, has held as under:- 8. On reading of the relevant provisions of Cr. P.C. and the judgments cited above, I am of the view that though section 177 Cr P.C. states that every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed, section 178 (c) and 179 of Cr. P.C. make it clear that the court within whose local jurisdiction the consequences of the acts complained of have ensued, also has the territorial jurisdiction to enquire and try the case. In the cases referred to by the petitioner, the factum of ensuing of consequences was neither pleaded nor considered. 9. On a reading of the complaint, especially the paragraphs extracted hereinabove, I find that due to the consequences of the acts complained of under section 406 & 498A IPC, the complainant had not only to leave her matrimonial home but had also to take refuge in her parental house in Delhi. Mr. Pahwa rightly pointed out that as a consequence of the alleged acts of cruelty the complainant had even been medically treated in Delhi. Since consequences of the alleged offences have ensued in Delhi, the Delhi courts would certainly have jurisdiction under section 178 (c) and 179 of Cr. P.C. to entertain the present complaint filed by the complainant wife. 10. Moreover, from a perusal of the complaint it is apparent that on a few occasions demand of dowry has also been made at the parental house of the complainant in Delhi itself. Consequently, in my view the plea of territorial jurisdiction raised by the petitioner s counsel at this stage is both

misconceived on facts and untenable in law. The present petition is, therefore, dismissed, but with no order as to costs. 15. The Supreme Court in A.V. Mohan Rao and Another v. M. Kishan Rao and Another (2002) 6 SCC 174 has held as under:- Reading of the complaint petition and the materials produced by the complainant with it in the light of provisions in the aforementioned sections it cannot be said that the allegations made in the complaint taken in entirety do not make out, even prima facie, any of the offences alleged in the complaint petition. We refrain from discussing the merits of the case further since any observation in that regard may effect one party or the other. The allegations made are serious in nature and relate to the power company registered under the Act having its head office in this country. Whether the appellants were or were not citizens of India at the time of commission of the offences alleged and whether the offences alleged were or were not committed in this country, are questions to be considered on the basis of the evidence to be placed before the Court at the trial of the case. The questions raised are of involved nature, determination of which requires enquiry into facts. Such questions cannot be considered at the preliminary stage for the purpose of quashing the complaint and the proceeding initiated on its basis. It is relevant to note here that from Sections 4 and 188 of the Criminal Procedure Code it is clear that even if the offence is committed by a citizen of India outside the county the same is subject to the jurisdiction of courts in India. [See Central Bank of India Ltd. v., Mobarik Ali Ahmed v. The State of Bombay, and Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India). 16. Further, the Supreme Court in Lee Kun Hee, President, Samsung Corporation, South Korea and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2012) 3 SCC 132 has held as under:- 32...In Section 179 aforesaid, two phrases need to be noticed: firstly, anything which has been done, with reference to the offence; and secondly, consequence which has ensued, also with reference to the offence. Both the aforesaid phrases substantially enlarge and magnify the scope of jurisdiction contemplated under Section 179 aforesaid, so as to extend the same over areas contemplated by the two phrases. 33. Insofar as the present controversy is concerned, the offence(s) alleged in the complaint emerge from the fact, that even though the complainant faithfully performed its obligations under the agreement/contract dated 1-12- 2001, the accused dishonestly/fraudulently/falsely denied/avoided the reciprocal obligation(s) which they were obliged to perform thereunder. In

our view, the words anything which has been done, for the present controversy, would extend to anything which has been done in furtherance of the execution of the agreement dated 1-12-2001. The facts constituting the performance of obligations by the complainant actually constitute the foundational basis for the criminal accusation levelled against the accused (in refusing to honour the corresponding obligation). The instant foundational basis for establishing the commission of the offence, in our view, would fall within the ambit of the words anything which has been done used in the aforesaid provision. In the absence of the instant affirmation of the factual position, in the present controversy, the culpability of the accused cannot be established. 34. In the complaint it is asserted that the contracted goods/product were/was supplied by JCE Consultancy from Ghaziabad in India. The factum of having supplied the goods/product to Samsung, Dubai through Sky Impex Ltd., is sought to be established not only through a delivery receipt dated 28-1-2002 (issued by the intermediary buyer, Sky Impex Ltd.), but also, on the basis of the bill of exchange executed on 1-2-2002 by Samsung, Dubai (the ultimate beneficiary) constituting the payment for the goods/product purchased. The factum of supply of goods from Ghaziabad (in India) to Dubai (in the United Arab Emirates), as an essential component of the offence(s) allegedly committed by the accused, in our view, is relatable to the words anything which has been done used in Section 179 aforesaid. This factual position, in our view, is sufficient to vest jurisdiction under Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with a competent court at Ghaziabad. 35. Besides the aforesaid, under Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, even the place(s) wherein the consequence (of the criminal act) ensues, would be relevant to determine the court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, even the courts within whose local jurisdiction the repercussion/effect of the criminal act occurs would have jurisdiction in the matter. 17. The judgments cited by learned counsel for petitioners are inapplicable to the facts of the present case. The said judgments have not taken into account the impact of the Sections 178(c), 179 and 181 (4) Cr.P.C. which arise for consideration in the present case. It is pertinent to mention that the judgment in Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia & Others (supra) itself says that it has been passed in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case.

18. Accordingly, the present petition and the pending application are dismissed with costs of Rs.25,000/- to be paid to Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee within a period of eight weeks. Sd/- MANMOHAN, J NOVEMBER 29, 2012