Cultural Diversity and Social Media III: Theories of Multiculturalism Eugenia Siapera esiapera@jour.auth.gr
Outline Introduction: What form should acceptance of difference take? Essentialism or fluidity? Universality or particularity? Recognition or redistribution? Conclusion
The normative debates The main question in normative terms concerns the management of diversity (Werbner, 2002). What is fair regarding diversity and otherness? A political question responses necessarily reflect specific positions and ideas which are politically controversial. A discussion of theories of multiculturalism can help us achieve both theoretical clarity and political compromise.
The dilemmas Theories of multiculturalism are structured around certain questions reflecting ongoing political debates on diversity. The dilemmas posed prioritise some issues and aspects over others. The three central dilemmas are: Essentialism or fluid multiculturalism? Universalism or particularism? Recognition or redistribution?
Problems The construction of multiculturalism on dilemmas ignores the dynamic nature of cultural diversity and the continuous shift in society. Also, dilemmas ignore the role of media and mediation Related issues: Diversity is too dynamic to have a single solution Democratic societies must remain open to doubt and controversy These theories are based either on abstract concepts or critical cases thus ignoring the reality of everyday life with difference Need for a poicy framework that takes into account the mediated nature of difference and the daily practices of cultural diversity.
Essentialism or Fluidity? Essentialism understands national identity as something fixed, tied to some specific traditions and history, relatively untouched by time. In contrast, liquidity treats identities as unstable and dynamic, with porous boundaries, changing over time and as a function of history and as a result of reinterpretations by the communities themselves. If we accept fluidity: How can we recognize politically certain communities? If there is any kind of reparation, then how may we determine who belongs and who doesn't? The problem is that to formulate a multicultural policy on minorities such communities should mobilize relatively fixed identities with which they can participate in the public space.
Essentialism or Fluidity? Two main exponents: Charles Taylor (1992) Bikhu Parekh (2000). Taylor: Identities build on the basis of dialogue and interaction (c.f. Hegel, G. H. Mead). Thus, one of the main requirements for the development of identity is to be recognized by others. Misrecognition leads to wounded identities and requires redress. State policy must recognize and protect group rights because it allows group members to formulate their identities in their own terms
An initial evaluation Taylor s model is based on difference rather than equality As such it forms a useful corrective to policies that impose a levelling equality but which in practice marginilize communities However, it may end up trapping people in group memberships even if they want to exit these communities. The result of Taylor s position is to raise firm borders between communities, which patrol them and which decide who belongs and who doesn t. For instance, belonging to the Canadian Quebecois community means that they will receive a Francophone education there is no choice about this.
Fluidity In contrast Parekh (2000) focuses on the internal diversity of communities. For Parekh, we need a theory that allocates equal importance to tradition, change and individual freedom. We must understand culture as a system of ideas, values and practices that enable people to make sense of their lives if they can no longer do this successfully then they cease to exist. Partaking in a culture is not an all or nothing proposition: we may accept some things, reject others, or interpret them in different way communities are always internally diverse. Community members may be critical towards their own communities, they can try to change it, resulting in a continuous dynamism of the community and its culture.
Parekh: an evaluation Two main problems: This approach cannot deal effectively with separatist groups as they don t accept dialogue, preferring isolation than reinterpretation of basic cultural tenets (Tempelman, 1999; Shachar, 2001). Broadly speaking identity politics rests on the idea that group members share a common fate and treatment, and to articulate their political demands they need to show that they are characterised by essential commonalities. This touches upon the notion of strategic essentialism (Gayatri Spivak, 1996) which holds that group members may provisionally and strategically mobilize an essential identity for political purposes.
Universalism Vs Particularism The main issue here concerns the degree to which communities must accept a common set of values in order to coexist. For some theorists (e.g. Habermas) societies can only exist on the basis of a set of common values, often inscribed in constitutional and legal systems (universalism). However, this may end up in the destruction of difference or in the imposition of a dominant set of values that reflect the dominant culture. Must we come up with several sets of laws to apply to different communities and which reflect their own traditions and values? If so, what happens in cases of conflict between traditional values and practices, as for instance, in the case of female circumcision or honour killings (particularism)
Universalism Procedural and deliberative models (Habermas, 1994): an attempt to reconcile difference and universality, through delegating difference to the domain of culture the political sphere however must be the same for all. A correctly understood theory of rights requires a politics of recognition that protects the integrity of the individual in the life contexts in which his or her identity is formed (1994: 113). In practice, this can only be done through distinguishing life contexts from political contexts The political domain must remain ethically neutral precisely in order to be able to protect the integrity of the various cultural groups and in order to enable the formation of a single political community. This neutrality is the entrenched predominant political culture of the nation itself, which comprises different ethical communities, i.e. communities with different understandings of what the good life is.
Habermas This separation of the political from the cultural, leads Habermas to argue that there are two levels of integration, the political and the cultural one. Political integration requires that all citizens accept the main political values as enshrined in the politico-legal institutions and systems of the country. Cultural integration, on the other hand, requires a full endorsement of the way of life, the practices, and customs of the local culture (ibid., 138). Cultural integration is not necessary for coexistence; political integration however is a necessary condition. Political integration is referred to as constitutional patriotism and it requires the loyalty of citizens to the political system whilst allowing for cultural heterogeneity.
Habermas: evaluation The main problem is that Habermas overlooks the political relevance of culture. Constitutional patriotism implies that cultures coexist more or less harmoniously, leading parallel lives as it were, and enjoying the protection of the state and its constitutional principles. But is this the case? Habermas argues that cultures can only survive if they submit their principles to rational justification this ensures their dynamism, but also renders some obsolete (esp the religious ones) In doing so, Habermas extends the application of the discourse principle, politicizing cultural diversity. This politicization ultimately favours the dominant culture, which appears to make more sense. In other words, constitutional patriotism ultimately results in the imposition of one set of values, thereby suppressing and dominating difference.
Particularism Patricularism: the point is to preserve the integrity of different cultures; This can be done through prioritizing value pluralism over the acceptance of a single overarching, universalizing set of values. The problem with universalism is that acceptance of dominant values is in fact a kind of masked hegemony (c.f. Marx: the ruling ideas are the ideas of the ruling class).
Pluralism John Gray (1997): value pluralism can accommodate deep cultural diversity, as it accepts all values and traditions. When there is conflict, there is no overarching set of values to which one can refer. This is because there is no basis for arguing that one set of values is better. [but how can conflicts be resolved?] Dealing with issues such as exit or conversion is dealt within communities themselves. Value pluralism acts as a guarantee that cultural diversity is upheld, as preserving plurality is in the end self preservation.
Evaluating Pluralism How can we live together in a radically pluralist context? Its logical conclusion is a kind of apartheid, whereby communities exist in parallel, going their separate ways. Where and how can they co-exist, act together, communicate, and even seek redress for perceived injustices? How, and where, can arbitration take place when differences arise between communities? There are no immediate answers to these issues. Media can serve as intermediaries between communities, and also can greatly contribute in constructing common worlds and to build bridges across and over boundaries.
Recognition or Redistribution? What do minorities want? recognition of their particularity, their specificity, and full redress of the misrecognition, misrepresentation and insults they have suffered? redistribution of wealth and power in ways that they consider fairer? Both? The problem is that these demands rest on contradictory principles of justice For redistribution, justice is equality For recognition, justice is acknowledgement of difference, hence leading to different treatment
Recognition or Redistribution? Fraser (1997; 2000; Fraser and Honneth, 2003): A shift from addressing material equality to addressing cultural domination. Does this shift represent a lapse into false consciousness? Or does it, rather, redress the cultureblindness of a materialist paradigm? (1997: 11-12) Fraser proposes the concept of perspectival dualism: address both misrecognition and inequality Economics and culture only analytically distinct in practice inseparable Misrecognition addressed through deconstruction of injured identities Inequality addressed through redistribution of wealth
Participatory Parity What if demands for recognition and redistribution are in conflict? Fraser suggests the norm of participatory parity, i.e. The idea that all members of society interact as peers Participatory parity then becomes the norm through which demands are adjudicated. E.g. the ban of the hijab in France: does it erect barriers to participation of women in public life? Or does it, instead, promote participation through ensuring equality?
Fraser: an evaluation An ingenious attempt to reconcile apparently contradictory conceptions of justice. However, perspectival dualism overlooks the reliance of economic divisions on moral (( right ) and ethical ( good ) understandings of justice Honneth (1995; 2003): recognition must be placed at the centre of multiculturalism as social justice.
Honneth Honneth: demands for redistribution derive from demands for recognition. Groups enjoy prestige, power and material wealth only to the degree that society thinks they are worth it. Misrecognized identities receive less => if they are properly recognized, they will receive their dues. E.g.: access to top jobs are restricted to ethnic minorities because they are systematically misrecognized. No reason to divide demands into symbolic and material, since they are both derivatives of recognition. Recognitive justice is then considered to include redistributive justice
Evaluation The main problem here is: how can we tell which demands are legitimate? hompson, 2006); In addition, redistribution is not the immediate and inevitable result of recognition, but often requires more struggles. However, this perspective directly engages the media: demands for recognition take place in the public sphere, and various communities present and justify their demands publicly. Hence, discussions of media representations are crucial, since they may contribute to an understanding of misrecognized identities and help redress injustices. But we must keep in mind that media are not neutral reflections of society: they are actively involved in producing and constructing our societies.
Conclusions The main conclusion is that we must keep discussing these positions, both analytically and politically any solution can only be temporary. We must also keep in mind the constitutive role of the media in all this, as overlooking them may result in somewhat naïve positions. Politically, societies need to keep open the means by which such struggle between positions can take place We turn back to the media as the institutions of the public sphere, within which contestation, as well as presentation of views, images and positions can take place.