SPEECH/07/642 Olli Rehn EU Commissioner for Enlargement Enlargement as an instrument of the EU s soft power Anna Lindh Award Ceremony 19 October 2007
Regards from Lisbon. I am glad to return to Brussels for the occasion of this year s awarding of the Anna Lindh prize for academic research on European foreign and security policy. We all remember the energy with which Anna Lindh worked to achieve her vision for European foreign policy. I will always appreciate what she did to promote enlargement, especially during the Swedish Presidency of 2001, which helped to lay the groundwork for the success of the fifth enlargement of the EU. It is a great pleasure to congratulate Dr Karen Smith on this award, and I second the praise of Professor Christopher Hill in his laudatio. In parallel with the EU expanding its frontiers, Karen Smith s research on European foreign policy has expanded the frontiers of international relations. Dr Smith was one of the first academics to consider external policies holistically, looking at the impact of the EU s various policies together, rather than just focusing narrowly on the development of CFSP or ESDP. Her attention to the effects of EU policies on the ground is very welcome, reminding us in Brussels that foreign policy is not just a matter of building new institutions, but rather about making a difference in the real world. As Enlargement Commissioner for nearly three years now, I am convinced that enlargement is at the core of the EU s soft power its power to transform its nearest neighbours into functioning democracies, market economies, and true partners in meeting common challenges. Enlargement has proven to be one of the most important instruments for European security. It reflects the essence of the EU as a civilian power, extending the area of peace and prosperity, liberty and democracy. The EU has achieved far more through its gravitational pull than it could ever have done with a stick or a sword. We have seen our soft power at work in Central and Eastern Europe over the past 15 years. Now it seems self-evident that the countries that emerged from communism in 1989 and 1991 would become stable democracies with fast-growing economies, firmly anchored into the EU. But in reality, this looked like a highly uncertain outcome in the 1990s, and things could have gone badly wrong. The EU s guiding influence and the firmness of our commitment to the eventual membership of these countries was essential to anchor their reforms and progress. Let s remember this fresh historical experience over the years ahead. In the EU s current debate about enlargement, there often seems to be an assumption that there is no cost to questioning the commitments that the EU has made. Unfortunately, this is not true. Every time that countries gain the impression that the process may not lead to membership, it diminishes the power of our conditionality. We see this erosion at in Turkey, where the support for EU membership has declined from 65% to 40% since 2004, correspondingly diminishing our political leverage. As Karen Smith s research has shown, Europe can project its civilian power of democratic and economic transformation only if the logic underpinning its policies remains credible. The geo-strategic and economic reasons for the EU to continue enlarging are much more easily understood when considered in global terms than in local politics. The prospect of joining the Union can be a powerful catalyst for stabilisation, reconciliation and reform in countries facing difficult problems. The accession process provides these countries with a political anchor, with economic opportunities, with financial assistance and with guidance through a host of policy dilemmas. 2
This help from the EU makes it much more likely that the countries will navigate their difficult reform course successfully. They usually manage to achieve greater stability and a faster pace of reforms as a result, which benefits the European Union greatly by giving us greater security and more economic opportunities in opening markets. It also provides us with more capable partners to tackle problems such as transnational crime and cross-border environmental threats. The EU itself is therefore among the primary beneficiaries of the enlargement process. That is why we have an enormous interest enlightened self-interest, I d say in ensuring that both sides remain committed to the process throughout its long time-frame. I invite you, as political scientists and historians, to consider the counter-factual: How would the EU fare if we stopped our process of enlargement? When reflecting on the pros and cons of the current policy, we should also consider the costs of nonenlargement. Would the EU be better off without the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as stable, democratic and increasingly prosperous members? Would the EU be better off with a Turkey that turns its back on us and rejects democratic values? I strongly believe not. Can we afford the Western Balkans to become a new ghetto inside Europe? That is what we risk if we call into question the commitments at the heart of our accession process. The EU will have to be engaged in the Balkans, whether we like it or not. It is much more effective and cheaper to keep these countries on track by guiding them towards EU membership than by sending soldiers to enforce the peace or by running international protectorates in the region. We also have a historic opportunity to influence Turkey s development facilitating the development of an open society with fundamental freedoms there, and building a sturdy bridge between Europe and the Muslim world. It is in our own interests for Turkey to become ever more European, given the country s standing as an anchor of stability in a troubled region. Turkey faces difficult dilemmas at present, and we have to keep the country committed to the EU track at the same time. Turkey faces continual cross-border terrorist attacks from the PKK, which is on the EU list of terrorist organisations. The Commission understands Turkey s need to protect its citizens. We urge Turkey and Iraq to tackle this problem through cooperation between the relevant authorities and by respecting international law. We have to keep the Balkans and Turkey motivated throughout the long process, so our commitment must not waver. We must keep the engine running on the EU side, so that people in the countries feel the pressure and seize the opportunity to keep working on their own preparations. The EU s transformative power depends on our credibility in offering integration in return for major reforms. Our word must be our bond - pacta sunt servanda. It is very important that we continue opening chapters in the accession negotiations without delay, to demonstrate that the process is moving forward. We should never make it easy for the nationalists to claim that there is no point continuing to work on the EU agenda, because the EU will never let their country in. That argument would destroy the strategic bargain of accession in return for meeting the conditions that gives enlargement policy its substantial transformative power. 3
Our aim is to ensure that the countries undertake deep reforms which become irreversibly absorbed into the fabric of public life, not just cosmetic changes when a deadline approaches. For that reason, we are deploying measures to encourage better governance, economic and social development, increased people-to-people contacts, and strengthening of civil society. As you know, the progress of the enlargement countries themselves in meeting the conditions is the key determinant of whether and at what pace each can move towards membership of the Union. Ladies and Gentlemen, There is no headlong rush towards rapid accessions in the near future. The next likely country to join is Croatia, with others at different points along a long road. During the long period of preparations ahead, our biggest challenge is to keep these countries motivated to pursue their reforms, and to become better partners for us in tackling common challenges such as cross-border crime and environmental problems. A couple of weeks from now, on 6 November, the Commission will present its enlargement package, in which we assess all the enlargement countries on their own merits. Our strategy paper will examine the current challenges and propose adjustments to the enlargement process, taking into account lessons learned from previous enlargements. The aim is to ensure a tighter focus on the areas where the countries need to make urgent progress. We also take the EU s integration capacity into consideration. That is why the success of the Inter-Governmental Conference preparing the Reform Treaty is important for enlargement. I welcome in particular the fine-tuning of the wording of Article 49 on accession. This should underline the fact that enlargement continues to be a key policy of the Union, based on clear and well-established conditions. The inclusion of a commitment to promote European values in the Reform Treaty is an important opportunity for us to explore the Union s values in greater detail, to set them out more clearly, and to ensure that all Member States both new and old are fully committed to respecting those values. European values are not something that just concerns countries that want to join the EU, but all of us in Europe. The new Treaty also provides an excellent opportunity to improve the Union s institutional architecture for external policy in general. A High Representative who chairs Council meetings on external relations and a shared external action service will allow us to conduct a more coherent foreign policy. 4
I see these institutional reforms as a means of increasing the EU s smart power, by combining its soft power with hard instruments better. The EU needs to improve its crisis management capabilities. I am very aware of this because of the security challenges in my own portfolio. The Balkans was the region where the Common Foreign and Security Policy began, and it is the region where we are now developing new instruments. For example, the ESDP rule of law mission in Kosovo will be the largest civilian mission that the EU has ever undertaken. This is just one of the preparations currently underway to deal with Kosovo s future status. This issue is the most profoundly European security challenge facing us at the moment. Neither Russia nor the United States is so directly affected by the situation in the Balkans as we Europeans are. If this process fails, it is Europe that will pay the price. The negotiations under the aegis of the EU-US-Russia Troika due to end on 10 December are the final chance. The EU is ready to turn every stone, and even more, to facilitate a negotiated solution. We expect the same from both sides and our international partners. I would like to conclude by thanking the Institut für Europäische Politik and its partner foundations in setting up the International Research and Training Programme on European Foreign and Security Policy Studies. Academic work in this field is sorely needed to find out the facts about the EU s external influence. I have made the case for enlargement as one of the EU s most successful foreign policies, and a central instrument of its soft power. I look forward to hearing whether your research bears out this conclusion. Thank you. 5