Countering Corruption and Organized Crime to Make Afghanistan Stronger for Transition and a Good Future

Similar documents
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO 1

FIGHTING DRUGS AND CREATING ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOODS

Prepared Statement of: Ambassador William R. Brownfield Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics & Law Enforcement Affairs

TESTIMONY FOR MS. MARY BETH LONG PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

CONCEPT NOTE Anti-Corruption Measures in Afghanistan Time Frame: January 2010 December 2012

Country Summary January 2005

White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan INTRODUCTION

Letter dated 14 June 2011 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

BUILDING SECURITY AND STATE IN AFGHANISTAN: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT Woodrow Wilson School Princeton University October Conference Summary

The Afghan-Pakistan War: Status in 2009

3. Protection Payments for Safe Passage Are a Significant Potential Source of Funding for the Taliban

As the conflict in Afghanistan has evolved over the last decade, it has become apparent that

SIGAR Testimony. Future U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan. Before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control

AFGHANISTAN: TRANSITION UNDER THREAT WORKSHOP REPORT

Third Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan. (Islamabad, May 2009) (Islamabad Declaration)

Letter dated 9 September 2008 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

Letter dated 12 May 2008 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

Oral Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 21 Sep 06

Congressional Testimony

The past 18 months have been a time of significant

The Afghan War: A Campaign Overview

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNTIL RELEASED BY THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KARL W. EIKENBERRY, U.S.

Security Council. United Nations S/RES/1806 (2008) Resolution 1806 (2008) Distr.: General 20 March Original: English

The Afghan War at End 2009: A Crisis and New Realism

Communiqué of Afghanistan: The London Conference. Afghan Leadership, Regional Cooperation, International Partnership

CONCEPT NOTE Criminal Justice Sector in Afghanistan Time Frame: June 2010 July 2012

Afghanistan. With the 2014 deadline for a complete 3.5 BACKGROUND

5. Unaccountable Supply Chain Security Contractors Undermine U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy

AFGHANISTAN AFTER NATO WITHDRAWAL

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6557th meeting, on 17 June 2011*

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6629th meeting, on 12 October 2011

Official LOEs with Metrics by LOE Owner

Afghanistan. Endemic corruption and violence marred parliamentary elections in September 2010.

Center for Strategic & Regional Studies

Britain and Afghanistan: policy and expectations 1 Jon Bennett, Oxford Development Consultants June 2009

Jodi Vittori, PhD. Senior Policy Advisor, Global Witness November 15, 2017

Kabul, August (Revision 2)

Following the Money to Combat Terrorism, Crime and Corruption

EU-AFGHANISTAN JOINT DECLARATION. Committing to a new EU-Afghan Partnership. Strasbourg, 16 November 2005 PRESS

Global Anti-Corruption: Transparency in the Modern Age

STATEMENT BY. COLONEL JOSEPH H. FELTER, PH.D., USA (Ret.) CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION (CISAC) STANFORD UNIVERSITY BEFORE THE

Status quo or New Power Structure. By Dr. Hussain Yasa

Operation OMID PANJ January 2011 Naweed Barikzai 1

Foreign & Commonwealth Office AFGHANISTAN. The Rt Hon. William Hague MP Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs

THERE HAS BEEN much discussion as of late about reintegration and

Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF) Second Senior Officials Meeting Kabul, Afghanistan, 5 September Co-Chairs Statement

Q2. (IF RIGHT DIRECTION) Why do you say that? (Up to two answers accepted.)

CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5907th meeting, on 11 June 2008

FINAL/NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION

Gen. David Petraeus. On the Future of the Alliance and the Mission in Afghanistan. Delivered 8 February 2009, 45th Munich Security Conference

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7403rd meeting, on 16 March 2015

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN REGIONAL STABILIZATION STRATEGY

THE AFGHANISTAN CAMPAIGN:

U.S. ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS: A STRATEGIC PLAN AND MECHANISMS TO TRACK PROGRESS ARE NEEDED IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN

Marika Theros Iavor Rangelov. Working Paper WP 01/2010. April Field Notes from Afghanistan: Perceptions of Insecurity and Conflict Dynamics

PEACEBRIEF 10. Traditional Dispute Resolution and Stability in Afghanistan. Summary

Center for Strategic & Regional Studies

DRAFT REPORT. EN United in diversity EN 2014/2230(INI) on the current political situation in Afghanistan (2014/2230(INI))

Combating Corruption in a Decentralized Indonesia EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Drug Lords and Domestic Terrorism in Afghanistan [NAME] [DATE]

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6738th meeting, on 22 March 2012

religious movement that effectively ruled Afghanistan from the mid-1990s until the United States1 military intervention in

Voices of Moderate Islam (VoMI)

Afghanistan at the End of 2011: Part One - Trends in the War

Afghanistan. Working environment. Total requirements: USD 54,347,491. The context

Legislative Newsletter

AFGHANISTAN: THE PAST, THE PRESENT, AND OUR FUTURE

Facilitating Human Security in Afghanistan Problems, Opportunities and Perspectives. Opening Presentation for the Panel Discussion 2

DRAFT REPORT. EN United in diversity EN 2009/2217(INI) on a new strategy for Afghanistan (2009/2217(INI)) Committee on Foreign Affairs

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4251st meeting, on 19 December 2000

3.1. Afghanistan. Background AFGHANISTAN UNAMA 03/2002 ISAF 12/2001. HQ EUPOL AFGHANISTAN 06/2007 Rawalpindi. Qurghonteppa (Kurgan-Tyube) Kerki

Afghanistan beyond 2014: Elections, Political Settlement, Reforms Recommendations from Afghan Civil Society

Money is ammunition; don t put it in the wrong hands

Group Chairs: Jerry Hyman, Dale Erickson & Dr. Michael Baranick. Rapporteur: John Applebaugh UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. Border Management Cooperation in Drug Control. Outline Action Plan. April 2008 Work in Progress

I. INSTITUTIONAL BUILDING / NATIONAL ANTI-DRUG STRATEGY

Narco-Terrorism : Blurring the Lines Between Friend and Foe

The parliamentary elections in Afghanistan were the final event of the

Indian-Pakistani competition in Afghanistan: Thin line for Afghanistan?

CORRUPTION AND CONFLICT INTEGRITY WATCH AFGHANISTAN. Lorenzo Delesgues

Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review

An assessment of NATO s command of ISAF operations in Afghanistan

Regime Collapse and a US Withdrawal from Afghanistan

6. Insurgency: Theory and Practice

The Need for a Political and Economic Transition Strategy in Afghanistan. Report from July 2011 Trip to Kabul, Afghanistan

sigar Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Quarterly Report to the United States Congress

General Assembly Security Council

Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

CIVILIAN-MILITARY COOPERATION IN ACHIEVING AID EFFECTIVENESS: LESSONS FROM RECENT STABILIZATION CONTEXTS

Afghan Local Police-An Afghan Solution To An Afghan Problem

Husain Haqqani. An Interview with

CURRENT GOVERNMENT & ITS EXISTING PROBLEMS AND THE WAY TO GET RID OF IT

Afghanistan: The Failed Metrics of Ten Years of War

Transparency is the Key to Legitimate Afghan Parliamentary Elections

July Special Report; Vulnerabilities to Corruption in the Afghan Attorney General s Office HIGHLIGHTS. Kabul-Afghanistan

Statement of the Council of Presidents and Prime Ministers of the Americas

AFGHANISTAN LEGAL COUNTRY PROFILE

Afghanistan and the Uncertain Metrics of Progress Part Six: Showing Victory is Possible

Transcription:

Countering Corruption and Organized Crime to Make Afghanistan Stronger for Transition and a Good Future We will work to fight corruption more effectively and further reform government institutions to render them more efficient, transparent, and accountable. We will enforce rule of law and pursue further judicial reforms. - President Hamid Karzai, Bonn Conference, December 2011 1

Strategic Context Coalition Strategic National/ International CoG: Coalition cohesion & political will to continue Counter Corruption Strengthens Afghanistan and Donor Support Neutralizing criminal penetration in ANSF and state functions critical to transition strengthens GIRoA GIRoA Decreasing corruption is critical to GIRoA legitimacy and to coalition cohesion and international will to support $ GIRoA CoG: GIRoA Legitimacy in eyes of people, world IRRG International Community ISAF ANSF CPNs NARC INS The Afghan people Anti-GIRoA Forces In Afghanistan Counter Corruption Weakens the Enemy Hardens GIRoA against resurgent Taliban and other actors vested in state weakness Decreases ISAF/IC contracting $ spillage to the Taliban, criminals Decreases narcotics trade funding to the Taliban, Warlords Decreases willingness of Afghan people to actively/passively support the Taliban Haq ISI Anti-Afghan Forces In Pakistan HiG Quetta Shura Taliban Enemy Sources of Strength: Taliban Senior Leadership/Illicit funding; support (or 2 of the Afghan people سند apathy) غیرمحرم// فقط برای استفاده رسمی 2

Actions to Keep Money Intended to Help The Afghan People From Strengthening Criminals Afghan First Initiative Contract Actions ISAF continues to drive action to ensure our money does not support Criminal Patronage Networks or the insurgency Reviewed nearly 1200 high-value, high-risk contracts involving nearly 700 companies, valued at approximately $27B, in the past quarter (April-June, 2011) Identified approximately 170 contracts potentially linked to CPNs or insurgents Host Nation Trucking HNT contract [$2.16 billion] will expire in September 2011; the National Afghan Trucking (NAT) contract will replace it The number of prime contractors will increase at least threefold, ensuring greater transparency and rewarding corporate responsibility Debarred 78 companies and individuals 145 cases opened, 38 convictions Next Steps: Establish Acquisition Accountability Office to coordinate oversight of all U.S. military and civilian contracts Expand vendor-vetting and joint investigations Enact U.S. Wartime Contracting legislation UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO 3

The Threat of Corruption and Organized Crime SUBVERT The level of corruption in Afghanistan today represents a potentially fatal threat to the ISAF mission, because it: Alienates key elements of the population Discredits and weakens the government and security forces Subverts state functions and rule of law Robs the state of revenue Creates barriers to economic growth Preserves Taliban regenerative capacity Perpetuates Afghan dependence Undermines international support Corruption is more a problem of political will than capacity Slide developed with Afghan partners INSURGENCY State Institutions and Justice CRIMINAL NETWORKS Sets conditions for NARCOTICS UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO 4

CRIMINAL PATRONAGE AND PROTECTION SYSTEM PAYMENT TO MAINTAIN POSITION Provincial Chief of Police, Border Commander or similar official PAYMENT Political Protection PRESSURE FOR APPOINTMENTS PAYMENT District Chief of Police or Border Police Key Traffickers ± 25-50 key traffickers LINE OF CRIMINAL CONTROL PROTECTION Payment to FEE Local commanders or Police Chief PAYMENT TO AVOID ERADICATION FARMERS/SMALL SCALE TRADERS ± 200-250 traffickers ± 500-600 mid-level traders ± 10,000 15,000 local traders ±350,000 families involved in poppy cultivation UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5

THE NATIONAL COST OF NARCOTICS Obstructs justice Retards economic development Undermines state institutions Strengthens organized crime Victimizes the Afghan people Perpetuates insecurity Destroys state reputation Empowers warlord politicians We cannot allow this country to be influenced by mafia and narcotics-related activities. It kills our economy. It destroys our reputation. So we are going to work against it. H.E. Hamid Karzai UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 6

Organized Crime at Borders, Airports and Customs Depots: Stealing From Afghanistan Diversion of Customs revenue; extortion, bribery, narcotics smuggling, visa fraud, money laundering. Diversion of Customs revenue; insurgents crossing border, smuggling, narcotics weapons explosives smuggling, bribery, extortion. Torah Gundi Hairatan Mazar-e-Sharif Diversion of Customs revenue; narcotics, weapons explosives ammunition smuggling, bribery, extortion, fuel smuggling, illicit taxation. Shir Khan Bandar Afghan Air Force Corruption: Bribery, extortion, narcotics smuggling, visa fraud, money laundering. Bulk cash flow out of country estimated $10m a day Islam Qalah Herat Kabul Torkham Gate Gulam Khan Zaranj Diversion of Customs revenue; narcotics weapon smuggling, kidnapping, bribery, extortion, bulk cash flow out of country. Kandahar Weesh Chaman Diversion of Customs revenue; Insurgents crossing border, insurgent logistics and communications, narcotics weapons explosives smuggling. Border Crossing Point Inland Customs Depot Airport 7

Negative influencers Protection networks Political subversion IMPUNITY FRUSTRATES RULE OF LAW PERPETUATES Ineffective Justice System -- Delegitimizes GIRoA -- Undermines security ENABLES Advisors restricted Laws selectively enforced Judicial access restricted Criminal Patronage Networks IMPUNITY Political Interference and Corruption Justice/Security capture Justice for sale ($$) No incentive for judicial improvement Injustice -- Disaffects the population STRENGTHENS -- Fuels the insurgency Inconsistent calls for reform -- Status quo ALLOWS Blocked prosecutions Vacated sentences Illegal restitution Early releases SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 8 8

Counter Corruption & COIN Principles 1) Legitimacy is the main objective Countering corruption increases GIRoA legitimacy (CoG) in the eyes of the Afghan people and the IC and decreased active/passive support for insurgents 2) Unity of Effort is essential Common understanding of corruption problem as basis for action; joint venues with GIRoA, interagency, international community 3) Political factors are primary ISAF counter-corruption efforts grounded in an understanding of Afghan politics. Scale of corruption function of current (unsustainable) political settlement; CPNs have political and criminal agendas 4) Understand the environment Last Updated: DEC 2011 POC: CTC-A ISAF LOO#4 drives understanding of the NEXUS of INS, CPNs, and narcotics trade and associated lines of authority/deference/ antagonism; flows ($, precursors, drugs, weapons, people); political connections; licit and international business connections 9

Counter Corruption & COIN Principles 5) Intelligence drives operations ISAF LOO#4 has changing paradigm from pure military intel to Intel, info, and evidence & write for release to drive evidence-based operations. 6) Isolate insurgents from their cause and support 7) Security under the Rule of Law is essential Criminalize insurgency; reduce active and passive support for INS, INS finance, freedom of action Arrest and reverse criminal penetration and make security ministries, judicial sector resistant to and insulated from CPN interference and subversion. Develop sanitary corridors for investigation and prosecution. 8) Prepare for a Longterm Commitment Last Updated: DEC 2011 POC: CTC-A Harden Afghan institutions against the resurgent capability of the Taliban. Create a positive vision of the future and unleash civil society in support of transparency and accountability. Build increasingly capable Afghan anti-corruption institutions and organizations with political support 10

CJIATF-Shafafiyat Mission Shafafiyat, in coordination with the International Community and in support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Fosters a common understanding of the corruption problem Plans and coordinates ISAF anti-corruption efforts Integrates ISAF anti-corruption activities with those of key partners to support the development of an active and honest administration. * *H.E. President Hamid Karzai, London Conference, January 2010 11

Keys to Success Improve intelligence and understanding of the problem Implement COMISAF s COIN Contracting Guidance Integrate law enforcement and military efforts Internationalize counternarcotics and anticorruption efforts Institutionalize reforms UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO 12

Afghan-led Counter-Corruption Measures to Help Transition Success Suspend, investigate, and prosecute officials accused of colluding with the insurgency, the narcotics trade or being complicit in egregious corruption Ban reinstatement of public officials removed for corruption; address negative leader recycle problem with GIRoA Enforce vetting of key positions and merit-based hiring regulations for central and provincial government officials Investigate illegal acquisition of land and authorize prosecution of those implicated Investigate conflicts of interest in the business activities of provincial and district officials Investigate allegations of provincial government involvement in contract extortion 13

Afghan-led Counter-Corruption Measures to Help Transition Success Use vendor vetting for provincial and district contracts Enforce asset declaration for customs officials, police chiefs/dcops, and senior government officials Support Counter-Narcotics Police Afghanistan and Afghan Law Enforcement units in disrupting the narcotics trade and encourage transitioning provinces and districts to pledge to become poppy free during transition Enforce Afghan laws prohibiting the maintenance of personal militias Use Public Trials to promote transparency and accountability in the judicial sector Examine and codify unofficial "tarifs" 14

Other Actions to Support Transition Include Transition as a factor in counter-network targeting to prioritize and focus our collective efforts to help Afghanistan have successful and irreversible transition With coalition and Afghan vetted law enforcement, conduct aggressive counter-network operations during the harvest and ushr collection season to deny money to enemies of the people Conduct investigations and operations versus CPNs who are stealing from the people of Afghanistan Work with the new Attorney General Office special cases committee to prosecute major corruption cases Increase focus on Afghan-led, evidence-based investigations and prosecutions Assess the degree of criminal penetration in the judicial sector and remove criminals Use the President Karzai s Executive Commission on Borders, Airports, and Customs depots (BACD) to help reverse criminal capture of BACD and disrupt narcotics networks and the drugs-for-weapons trade in transitioning provinces Consider CNPA increases in Tranche 3 locations that are undermined by the narcotics trade/associated criminal networks Support positive actors who are helping make transition successful 15

Discussion 16