Rubeus Report 1 June 2015 This brief represents the latest in a series of concise Think- Pieces from Rubeus LTD. Kidnapping and hostage- taking in 2015 Scope This paper is an initial presentation of key findings from research conducted into salient trends in hostage taking and kidnapping threat in selected regions in 2015. It interrogates publically available (published) data on kidnappings globally and attempts to unpack this data to understand the threat and risk of kidnap in specific locations. The specific locations are selected for the level and type of kidnappings present; the historic, current and patterns of evolution; as well as the locations relevance to the international business community. This paper is focused on the kidnap threat as it pertains to the profile of medium to high net worth individuals, equivalent to the profile of business travellers and foreign civilians. However, where pertinent, observations relating to other victim profiles are included.
Preface Most studies of kidnapping trends rely on quantitative data, charting numbers of kidnaps occurring in a given country in a given year. However, datasets are often suspect (ranges in Mexico vary from around 1,000 to 100,000 per annum) or not fit for purpose (few countries publish foreign civilian kidnap incident data) and it is a commonplace assumption that the majority of kidnaps go unreported. Data is often overlaid onto a country at national level, without analysing factors like victim profile (for instance foreign civilian or local national, or criminal on criminal), incident locations or the kidnappers modus operandi employed. Such analyses preclude nuance and foster misguided evaluations of kidnap risk levels in a country. Perhaps the best example of how misleading data- base trend analysis can be is, again, evident in material relating to Mexico. Undoubtedly Mexico experiences a very high number of kidnaps, but how many incidents involve non- criminals and how many affect foreign travellers? The answer to the second question is a very low number; Mexico remains a relatively safe destination for business travellers and millions of tourists alike. To provide useful analysis of kidnap risk for foreign tourist or business travellers, key factors need to be studied: - What type of person is targeted, where, and by whom? - What is the kidnapper s motivation? - What is the status of the group and the broader political and security environment in the country? These questions inform the analytical approach that has led to this paper s key findings. It is informed by open source research, expert opinion, historical understanding of political, religious and criminal groups and the political and security environments in the countries affected. 2
Table of Contents Executive Summary:...4 1) Latin America...5 a) Mexico An upside to organised criminality?...5 b) Colombia the world s longest- running civil war drawing to a close?...6 c) Venezuela from revolution to rampant criminality...7 2) Kidnapping in MENA; local & global implications...7 a) Trigger Conflicts and reactive hostage- taking...7 b) Key regional developments...8 3) Summary - trends and Implications...10 a) Preferred targets?...10 b) When do kidnaps occur?...11 4) Conclusion...12 3
Executive Summary: In terms of times of higher kidnap risk, election periods, sudden deteriorations and outbreaks of civil conflict, the splintering of non- state groups and periods in the wake of truces often see increased taking of foreign hostages. In terms of target preferences, criminal kidnap groups favour domestic as opposed to international targets of opportunity as they are more exposed and draw less attention. For jihadist groups however, American and Jewish or Israeli targets continue to be the priority, but targets of opportunity of all nationalities will be seized, regardless of the target s government s policy on payment of ransom. In Latin America, Venezuela s rampant, disorganised criminality translates into the highest kidnap threat to foreign nationals, above Mexico and Colombia. Mexico sees larger numbers of nationals kidnapped, but the cartels are business- focused and kidnappings of foreigners are rare; should the dynamics change however, kidnapping could quickly become a significant problem for business in Mexico. In Colombia, progress towards ending the world s longest- running civil war has lowered the kidnap rate to around ten- per cent of its former level. We assess that North Africa and the Sahel will become a primary area of concern for kidnap. Instability there will become more manifest in coming years; groups operating with a jihadist agenda will seek to earn the vast ransoms achieved in recent years in the region and/or the PR value of taking Western hostages. In terms of intent, for sophisticated attackers the energy sector will remain the priority target. The global spread of Islamist ideology and the associated proliferation of small arms attacks that lead to hostage situations, perpetrated by self- starter radicals, is a key concern for coming years. The recent hostage sieges in Sydney and Paris are representative of the shape of hostage incidents to come. Because of the highly- connected international nature of militant networks, conflicts in one part of the world will provoke revenge kidnaps of Western civilians in another. As such, trigger conflicts in MENA should be closely monitored; events therein will impact on security and kidnap threat elsewhere. The Energy and Extractive industries will remain the most affected sectors globally, because of their risk exposure but also because of their association with foreign economic interests that so often rile rebel and militant groups. 4
Libya has recently seen more medium/high net worth foreign civilians kidnapped than any other North African country and will continue to de- stabilise North Africa and the Sahel; Algeria s control of its domestic insurgents will be tested by ISIS- inspired and Libya / Sahel- based elements. In the Gulf, Saudi Arabia will limit the extent of the ISIS/Syria- blowback but the cross- border threat from Al Qaeda in Yemen will be harder to mitigate. The paper is organised into three sections. The first looks at three countries in Latin America, the region perhaps most traditionally linked with kidnapping. The second section examines developments in key countries in MENA and the final section summarises and extrapolates key implications. 1) Latin America Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela all have significant association with kidnapping and a study of the distinct trends in each country provides revealing insights into the types of threat these different typologies represent. a) Mexico An upside to organised criminality? Although estimates vary significantly, Mexico experiences an extremely high number of kidnaps. One international consultancy estimates that kidnappings rose to 8,000 in 2014 which was the highest ever reported ; 1 meanwhile a national statistics agency calculated around 120,000 people were estimated to have been victims of kidnapping in 2013. 2 Regardless of these discrepancies, against this background, it appears surprising that the kidnapping of business travellers or tourists is very rare. However: The majority of kidnaps are inter- criminal, relating to the drug trade. Compared to other countries, the crime environment in Mexico is often very organised; business- focused cartels are rational actors who will avoid unnecessary law- enforcement pressure. Drug crime pays; cartels do not necessarily need to diversify into kidnapping foreigners. Mexico s security environment is therefore unusual; it has a substantial criminal fabric comprised of disciplined actors, with good reason not to kidnap foreigners. Should circumstances change however, criminal networks as powerful as the Mexican cartels could easily transition to threaten soft foreign targets. Such a change could be provoked by: 1 https://www.ihs.com/articles/videos/kidnap- homicide- latin.html 2 http://www.insightcrime.org/news- briefs/mexico- victimization- survey- highlights- reporting- gap 5
Government security policy splintering previously disciplined cartels, prompting less- controlled, cash- hungryelements to kidnap foreigners. Senior cartel actors deciding to target foreigners because of foreign involvement in counter- cartel activity. This would most effect American interests. Some sources suggest the splintering is underway, although an uptick in foreigner kidnap is yet to be seen. The kidnapping threat to foreigners in Mexico is therefore currently latent, but the threat could increase quickly given cartels capabilities, geographicalreachand political and financial influence. b) Colombia the world s longest- running civil war drawing to a close? Colombia was once synonymous with kidnapping. In the year 2000 over 3,500 kidnaps were recorded; in 2013, 305 were reported and by 2014 less than 300. Data accuracy is questionable, with a percentage of kidnaps going unreported, but there is consensus that the environment has improved dramatically. Various factors are responsible for the improvement: Peace talks between the Colombian Government and the FARC, the largest leftist rebel group, to end the world s longest- running civil war FARC officially renouncing kidnapping The governments newfound control of terrain in which the state formerly had a weak presence More sophisticated policing techniques also play their part. It will be important to monitor the progress and aftermath peace talks between the government and FARC to ensure that: Thepeace process survives inevitable bouts of conflict The guerrilla demobilisation provides sufficient opportunity for former fighters to keep them away from the revenue- generating kidnap trade The FARC does not splinter, with criminal or hard- line elements reverting to former practices. The ELN, Colombia s second- largest rebel army, is yet to come into the fold; they are more ideologically committed than the FARC and harbour a deep antagonism for the energy industry. Colombia s special adviser to the Peace Process notes: they are more ideological and entirely economic. Their territory covers areas of mining and energy resources, blowing up pipelines, kidnapping and menacing foreign mining and energy people. 3 As such, where areas of ELN operation overlap with energy sector interests, the risk will clearly endure. Colombia continues to have significant law enforcement issues in particular urban and rural areas so the kidnap threat, whilst enormously reduced, will linger; for the 3 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/15/colombia- end- in- sight- longest- running- conflict 6
average business traveller however, the situation has improved almost beyond recognition. c) Venezuela from revolution to rampant criminality Compared to the relatively ordered dominance of Mexico s security environment by business- like cartels, Venezuela s crime scene is anarchic. Venezuela has supplanted Colombia as the South American kidnap capital and Venezuelans are pessimistic about the outlook for the country. Central to the unpredictability and violence of Venezuela s security environment are the casually organised criminal groups. Such elements have less to lose and are more often associated with significant proportion of hostage deaths. Statistics are not necessarily reliable but when combined with the wealth of reliable anecdotal reporting, a clear consensus emerges. According to veteran and reliable analysts, an average day in Caracas will see 20-40 express kidnaps (short- term kidnappings involving rapid payment of small ransoms, or an escorted trip to the cash machine) and approximately 50 carjackings. 4 Some reporting states that kidnappers will not target foreigners because of the law- enforcement attention this would bring. However, this assessment is undermined by involvement of corrupt Venezuelan security forces in kidnappings. Further, there have been at least two recent kidnappings of foreign diplomats and a German businessman was shot and killed in a possible bungled kidnap attempt; Venezuelan gangs are also capable of pursuing less high- profile targets on the basis of nationality and on a copycat basis. 2014 saw thirty kidnappings of residents of Portuguese descent, four of whom were killed during a two- week period in July. With the economic and political outlook looking both bleak and with no prospect of improvement in the security environment, the kidnap threat in Venezuela looks highly likely to increase in 2015. 2) Kidnapping in MENA; local & global implications Although in global terms the number of jihadist kidnaps of foreign civilians or high net worth individuals is extremely low, the Islamist kidnap threat is worthy of consideration for several reasons. Their core MENA area of operations is large, often overlapping with strategic energy resources and their kidnaps often garner an extremely high public profile and result in lethal outcomes. a) Trigger Conflicts and reactive hostage- taking Specific MENA theatres are racked with conflict and not necessarily highly visited by HNWI or large numbers of conventional (and un- protected) business travellers. 4 http://www.insightcrime.org/news- briefs/venezuela- kidnapping- figures- mask- true- scale- of- problem 7
However, the catalysing nature of these conflicts for the globally inter- connected 21st century jihadist networks makes them deeply influential in determining levels of kidnap threat in different countries across the globe. Self- starter militants in countries far from these trigger conflicts do not need to wait for permission to mount non- complex hostage- taking operations in revenge for, to give an example, a Coalition anti- ISIS offensive in Iraq/Syria. These reactive hostage- taking operations can happen quickly. 5 Consequently observers need to anticipate what might be called trigger events, such as an attempt to retake Mosul from ISIS, or an escalation in international military activity in Syria. These will increase the threat of retaliatory kidnappings or hostage takings across the globe. These can occur in areas more traditionally associated with militant violence like Algeria, or in countries either new to this type of threat like Australia, 6 or less associated with it like France. 7 b) Key Regional Developments Certain countries in the region have key implications for kidnap threat and merit specific focus. i) Yemen; destabilisation and implications for Saudi Arabia Yemen is home to Al Qaeda s most active and capable franchise (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)), which has an established track record for the kidnap of Western civilians. ISIS and AQAP will seek to use Yemen as a springboard to prepare attacks, potentially involving hostage- taking in the Gulf countries and Horn of Africa. If the sophistication of its counter- terrorism capabilities is maintained, Saudi Arabia will limit the Syria blowback that is underway. Syria- linked returnees will continue to threaten the peace but are not likely to mount kidnap operations per se as a priority; low- complexity small arms attacks or sectarian assault on Shiites are more likely. 8 However, attempted assaults on facilities that would include hostage- taking cannot be ruled out. More gravely, the Kingdom s ability to counter the threat posed byinfiltration of more patient, experienced, and sophisticated AQAP operatives from Yemen is less certain. Therefore, any substantial expansion of AQAP capabilities as 5 An example of a rapid response occurred in Algeria in 2014: ISIS Mosul campaign in June 2014 and the Coalition air offensive that followed galvanised ISIS- inspired activity globally: on the 10 th September, President Obama authorised the expansion of airstrikes into Syria; on the 22 nd September an Algerian ISIS- linked group, Jund al- Khalifa (the Soldiers of the Caliphate ) announced the kidnapping of a French tourist, Herve Gourdel. They demanded a halt to the bombing campaign and then, on the 24 September 2014, beheaded their hostage. 6 The Lindt café hostage taking in Sydney in December 2014 was the first violent Islamist incident in Australia and offers a clear example of the type of kidnap self- starters are able to execute. 7 In a situation not dissimilar to the Lindt Café siege, Ahmed Coulibaly killed four hostages in a kosher supermarket in Paris in January 2015, pledging his allegiance to ISIS in his martyrdom statement. 8 ISIS returnee capability will not necessarily match intent; Saudi intelligence capabilities should prevent the type of attack the Kingdom seen in 2003 and 2004, when multiple vehicle bombs and large groups of attackers stormed compounds in Riyadh and Khobar. 8
a result of the war in Yemen should trigger a review of anti- kidnap security measures, particularly in Riyadh, Jeddah and the more restive and target rich Eastern Province. ii) North Africa post- Arab spring The Arab spring, Gadaffi s fall, the spread of ISIS and these factors in confluence with various indigenous and long- standing drivers of insecurity, have altered the nature and geography of the kidnap threat in North Africa. It could be argued that the region is now no longer the secondary theatre in terms of incubation of militant kidnap groups. In a post- Arab spring 2015, groups are developing in North Africa in a similar manner to the emergence of groups in the post- 9-11 / post- Iraq war Gulf environment. The following countries, geographies and groups demand specific attention. iii) Libya attracting militants and exporting kidnappers Around 35 kidnap incidents targeting foreigners with a diplomatic / business traveller profile were reported between February 2014 February 2015, placing Libya in the No.1 ranking for North African kidnap threat in quantitative terms. 9 A significant proportion of the kidnaps, both actual and attempted, targeted diplomats, as groups attempted to capture high value foreign targets. The rate of high- profile foreign civilian kidnap may drop as international involvement in the country is scaled back and those foreigners remaining step up security management to an effective deterrent level; however on- going deterioration in the environment will allow militant groups to develop their capability and this will have serious implications for regional and European security. iv) Algeria security undermined by its neighbours The instability of Algeria s neighbouring countries has undermined the otherwise strong state s relatively successful counter- insurgent campaign. Algeria has seen two notable recent kidnap incidents (the first being the Herve Bourdel case, discussed above) and both were influenced by external factors. In the highest profile incident, which was one of the largest ever attacks on the hydro- carbon sector, a veteran Al Qaeda- linked kidnapper, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, stormed the In Amenas facility in Southern Algeria, 50 kilometres from the Libya border, in 2013. The sophistication of the In Amenas attack, with large numbers of highly equipped gunmen, operating so boldly and across borders in the region is entirely emblematic of the type of kidnap threat fostered by instability in the Sahel. Veteran militants, highly motivated by vast ransoms received in recent years, are benefiting from the at best un- governed spaces and at worst on- going conflicts (Mali, Libya) in which they can prepare sophisticated assaults. 9 Based on incidents counted on a case- by- case basis in verifiable open source reporting. 9
It is plausible to anticipate similar assaults, including attempted hostage taking, at such remote energy infrastructure sites in the Maghreb / Sahel region in coming years and Belmokhtar and his Mourabitoun group have recently publicly stated their interest in further attacks on energy infrastructure. 10 3) Summary - trends and Implications Whilst local circumstances will always need close attention, more global insights can be extracted from the research and analysis conducted. a) Preferred targets? For Criminal Kidnappers: Disorganised criminal kidnappers are highly opportunistic, targeting individuals in the wrong place at the wrong time but more organised kidnappers will reconnoitre targets because of their perceived wealth. Further, such kidnappers often target business owners or middle management profile victims of certain ethnicity on the basis that particular nationalities are more likely to have access to ransoms than natives. For example, Caracas in 2014 saw kidnappers select Portuguese citizens because of their mercantile association. These examples underscore the role played by appearance and how much personal information is shared publicly (increasingly important in today s digitalised information- sharing world). For jihadist kidnappers: American and Israeli or Jewish hostages hold immense PR value for jihadist groups and as such will top a preferred target list. Criminal groups will also know that these nationalities will command the highest prices if they look to sell them up the chain to jihadists groups. Below American and Jewish targets sit Western nationals with prominent foreign policy roles in MENA. UK nationals might top this list, because of the UK s close alliance with the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, and be followed by French, Italian, Australian, Scandinavian and other Christian and Anglo- Saxon nations. French hostages will be of particular demand in North Africa because of their current and historic involvement in the region. Prioritizing nationals who will be ransomed? It has been suggested that jihadist kidnappers favour hostages from nations who pay ransoms. 11 However, the argument that an American or British citizen would not be seized because their governments don t pay ransoms is problematic; their PR value alone might outweigh any concern over risk- versus- reward for the group. Further, the execution of a US / UK hostage might unlock significant funding that would more than compensate for a lack of ransom. 10 In a December 2014 report Belmokhtar exhorted jihadis to attack oil installations and provided instructions based on the lessons his cadres learned at In Amenas. 11 See discussion of this issue here: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming- citizens- europe- becomes- al- qaedas- patron.html?_r=0 10
Targeting specific sectors? Jihadists have a proven track record of attacking energy- sector targets. This will continue and will be implemented by other ideological groups worldwide (e.g. such as the ELN in Colombia, as noted above). However, it cannot be supposed that a target would be prioritised purely because of their profession. Exposure, pattern setting and nationality, as always, will all play key roles in target selection. Self- starter targeting trends in The West Attacks on Jewish targets, especially in Europe, are more of a focus for contemporary attackers than they were for more sophisticated Al Qaeda operators in the early 2000s. 12 The same elements also focused more on bomb attacks but recent years have seen a growing focus on small arms storming attacks. Inevitably some of these storming attacks will see hostages taken. As a result, jihadist- related hostage incidents are also arguably more likely in 2015 than, say, 2005. b) When do kidnaps occur? With regard to the timings of increased kidnap risk, it is possible to discern certain trends: Sudden deteriorations in security environments Sudden deteriorations in security environments are often overlooked and regularly cause kidnaps. Foreign civilians working in countries presume their long- standing safety in a particular country will not be prejudiced by a sudden deterioration caused by, for example, inter- ethnic tensions which have nothing to do with them. Such developments regularly form the backdrop for foreign civilian kidnaps. Post- truce, even in the wake of a successful peace process De- mobilised fighters need to be re- integrated into society. If former fighters do not have the means to generate income the kidnapping of wealthy foreigners will offer a revenue stream. When groups splinter As noted in Mexico, for example, should cartels cohesion weaken the threat to foreigners could rise significantly. Before and during Election periods Foreign or high profile hostages offer groups an opportunity to grandstand outside an electoral process whilst ransoms afford less scrupulous politicians the opportunity to buy votes 13. Jihadist operators previously have also exploited opportunities to influence elections, including in Western Europe, and it would not be outside the 12 Amongst other incidents, the hostage siege in the Jewish supermarket in Paris in January 2015 exemplifies this trend. The same generation is also focused on security force targets; UK press has regularly featured threat warnings regarding intent to kidnap security forces. 13 In early 2015, analysts pointed to the likelihood of increased piracy and kidnap in the Gulf of Guinea and on the mainland as politicians sought to boost their coffers ahead of Nigerian election season. 11
realms of the possible to see their use of a high- profile kidnap to attempt to influence election outcomes. 14 In the wake of significant events in trigger conflicts Internationally connected jihadist operators will seek to respond in their home countries to events in their affiliate s core areas of operation (e.g. Iraq, Syria) and where capability permits such incidents may involve kidnaps or hostage- taking. 4) Conclusion For financially- motivated kidnappers, who will always be more lethal in areas affected more by disorganised crime than organised crime, opportunities offered by weak law enforcement and poor risk management will endure. Many of these crimes are economically motivated so down- turns or poverty will increase the amount of kidnaps occurring. It is positive that basic and tactical mitigation measures (such as avoidance of pattern- setting, maintenance of a low profile, avoiding more affected areas at night, denying access to information on your movements and travel intention etc.) can help minimise the exposure to the risk they pose. Mitigating the risk posed by kidnappers of political, religious or ideological motivation, requires a more strategic approach. These groups tend to have a more sophisticated and deliberate approach so, where possible, counter- measures need to be physical and tactical but also involve more intelligent steps (such as sound corporate social responsibility programs and good workforce relations, reputation management, community and government engagement, information sharing amongst a wide network and regular re- evaluation of risk levels). Notably, even when dealing with hardened actors, the prospect of financial gain can ultimately open space for resolution. Even ISIS exchanges captives for ransoms, although core Coalition nations, for example, would need to come up with massive sums to have chance of buying their nationals back. Finally, some sources suggest that in global terms kidnapping is increasing; the statement depends on data tracking a crime that is so widely un- reported but it is plausible that kidnapping of tourists and business travellers will increase as globalisation sees the wealthy traveller consistently push out into more risky territory. Additionally, kidnap techniques themselves are in constant development; our ever- increasing exposure to modern communications and information technology is offering new opportunities that are already being exploited by kidnappers and this too will play a significant role in the evolution of kidnapping in the 21 st century. 14 The Atocha bomb attacks in Madrid, Spain in 2004 occurred three days before a general election and are often credited with having contributed to the defeat of the Conservative government. 12
Rubeus Report This analysis represents a brief Think-Piece from Rubeus Ltd. Please contact us for further details or other reporting requirements: contactus@rubeusltd.com Disclaimer: Rubeus Ltd makes no warranty or representation that this report/brief/website will meet your requirements, that it will be of satisfactory quality, that it will be fit for a particular purpose, that it will not infringe the rights of third parties, that it will be compatible with all computer systems, or that it will be secure. Whilst every reasonable endeavour has been made to ensure that all information provided will be accurate and up to date, Rubeus Ltd makes no warranty or representation that this is the case. We make no guarantee of any specific results from the use of this website. No part of this report or website is intended to constitute advice and the content of this report or website should not be relied upon when making any decisions or taking any action of any kind. Commercial use of the information on this website is permitted, however Rubeus Ltd makes no representation or warranty that the content of this website is suitable for use in commercial situations or that it constitutes accurate data and / or advice on which business decisions can be based. Whilst every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that any and all descriptions of services available from Rubeus Ltd correspond to the actual services available, Rubeus Ltd is not responsible for any variations from these descriptions. 13