Aug. 20, 2007 VERACRUZ, MEXICO: SECURITY ASSESSMENT Veracruz is a port city located on the southwest corner of the Gulf of Mexico in Mexico's Veracruz state. One of the most populous of Mexico's gulf port cities, Veracruz has approximately 500,000 inhabitants. The metro area, which includes the town of Boca del Rio, has a population of about 700,000. The city's industrial focus has left it relatively unpopular with international tourists, though tourism -- mostly by Mexican nationals -- does constitute an important part of the city's economy. U.S. citizens in Veracruz state needing assistance should directly contact the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, not a consulate. (Veracruz does not have a U.S. Consulate.) The embassy can be reached during its business hours of 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. through the switchboard at 01-55-5080-2000. (For calls originating in the United States, dial 011-52-55-5080-2000.) The switchboard is staffed 24 hours per day; English-speaking operators can connect callers with the duty officer or the Marine security guard. Terrorism The main terrorist threat in Mexico is from the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR), a left-wing guerrilla group that operates throughout Mexico. Although the EPR has not staged any attacks in Veracruz, the group has issued communiqués from the state and has demonstrated the ability to stage multiple attacks in separate locations. The group's statements have called for attacks on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), governmental institutions, national and international economic interests, and strategic and symbolic targets. The EPR has had three main phases in its operational history. The first phase started shortly after the group was founded in 1996, and included small-arms and sniper attacks on military targets in southern and central Mexico. These attacks, which took place in the late 1990s, resulted in several dozen deaths; the victims included civilians and military personnel. The second phase was more benign, involving the regular release of lengthy communiqués denouncing the Mexican government's policies. These statements have also called for nonspecific attacks against foreign and domestic economic interests in Mexico. The third phase of EPR's operational history began more recently, and has involved a return to violent attacks as well as an increase in operational tempo. In July the group used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to attack Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) pipelines in the central states of Guanajuato and Queretaro, significantly affecting the flow of petroleum products. Several weeks later, a group of armed men fired shots at a prison under construction in the southern state of Chiapas, locking up some of the guards. And on Aug. 1, EPR claimed responsibility for two small IEDs 2007 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. 1
placed in Oaxaca, Oaxaca state. One of those detonated at the front entrance to a Sears store while another was found unexploded at a bank. The Oaxaca incidents resemble a similar trio of bombings in Mexico City carried out by EPR splinter groups in 2006. Two main aspects of this operational shift are noteworthy. First, these recent attacks have been designed primarily to cause economic damage and to send a message. They have not been intended to cause casualties or loss of life. Despite having access to weapons and large amounts of explosives, the group has planned these attacks to minimize the risk of injury. Second, EPR has demonstrated its significant operational capabilities despite probably having only several hundred active members (much lower numbers than it claims) -- the Oaxaca bombs were EPR's fourth attack in as many weeks and as many states. Although EPR is considered a threat given its statements denouncing NGOs and demonstrated operational capability, there is no indication that the group will begin conducting attacks designed to cause casualties or greater damage than before. Future EPR attacks probably will involve small IEDs placed in public places, such as near office buildings, commercial sites, banks or government facilities, and set to detonate when bystanders are not likely to be nearby. Other reports of terrorism are rare in Mexico. The United States has been concerned that international Islamist terrorists intend to travel through Mexico to reach the United States, though there have been few documented cases. For instance, a 2005 Drug Enforcement Administration report that came out in the media in August 2007 warned of a risk that supporters of Islamist terrorism might be present in Mexico and cooperating with Mexican organized crime rings for fundraising purposes. Despite these warnings, no Islamic terrorist attacks have occurred in Mexico, and there are no indications of an imminent threat of such attacks in Veracruz. The threat of terrorism is medium. 1 Crime The primary criminal threat in Veracruz state is from organized crime in the form of drug cartels and cartel-related gangs. The port of Veracruz is an important trafficking route for drugs coming from the Yucatan Peninsula on their way north toward the United States, and the powerful Sinaloa and Gulf cartels' bloody turf was so far has left 1,400 dead across the country. The cartel war has included the daily kidnapping and murder of cartel members, as well as of police and government officials paid off by rival cartels or who have refused to accept bribes. Cartel tactics are brutal, and have included beheading, dismemberment, torture, burning of victims and killing of family members. Often, videos of these acts are posted online as a warning. 2007 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. 2
The Gulf cartel has long controlled Veracruz, an important link in its supply chain for smuggling South American drugs. Only recently has cartel-related violence increased in the state, including a rise in kidnappings and attacks against government officials. Some of the most recent incidents include two firefights between gunmen and security forces in the city of Veracruz on July 25, the July 26 killing of a municipal official in the town of Zongolica, the July 26 kidnapping of a prominent businessman, and the Aug. 7 assassination of a police inspector and subsequent killing of another police officer during a high-speed chase in the state capital of Jalapa. Several recent events have heightened tensions in Veracruz and increased the already-high likelihood of violence. The cartel turf war that has raged during the past several months has brought Sinaloa operatives into the heart of Gulf territory -- including Veracruz state -- in an effort to abduct and kill Gulf enemies. Significantly, the cartels are highly selective in their targeting and generally only assassinate individuals involved in the drug trade. But firefights between rival cartels in urban areas are increasingly common -- including in port cities where drug shipments are received -- and collateral damage is a possibility. For example, two Canadian tourists in the port city of Acapulco suffered injuries in February when they were struck by stray bullets in a drive-by shooting at a hotel. Needless to say, this deteriorating security situation has put pressure on President Felipe Calderon. In response, he has deployed approximately 20,000 federal troops around the country, including in Veracruz state, to make up for local police who have recently quit or gone on strike for fear of being killed by the cartels. The heightened security presence and the unpredictability of police raids have resulted in high-speed chases and gunfights in urban areas. Innocent civilians accidentally have been shot and killed by criminals and security forces in such incidents. Further complicating the situation, the media reports only a portion of the actual violence, since cartels routinely threaten and kill journalists who cover cartel activity. Reporters Without Borders ranks Mexico as the most dangerous country for journalists after Iraq. As a result, many editors have simply chosen to stop covering drug-related crime. More recently, American journalists working in the United States who have reported on cartel violence also have received threats. Government officials in Veracruz essentially are in a state of panic regarding the deteriorating security situation, as was made clear in June by a group of striking police officers who claimed they had received orders from their superiors not to report drug-related killings. They also admitted to having disposed of bodies and cleaned up crime scenes before other investigators arrived to keep the state's crime statistics low. The officers were striking to demand better equipment and fewer hours given the increasing risk of being killed in the line of duty. Such admissions not only make it difficult to assess the level of cartel-related violence in the city of Veracruz, they also offer an example of the level of government and police corruption common nationwide. Beside the threat of cartel violence directed at rivals, widespread police corruption and the deteriorating security situation have contributed to a breakdown of law and order in many parts of Mexico, allowing other criminal groups to operate virtually unimpeded. Police corruption could result in anything from having to pay a bribe to escape a speeding ticket to being turned over to a criminal group and held for ransom. 2007 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. 3
It is important to remember that the cartels do not just make money via transporting drugs. The Gulf cartel in particular is large and complex, and maintains other sophisticated criminal operations. The most important example is kidnapping for ransom. Mexico has consistently been ranked as one of the most risky countries in the world for kidnapping, though the majority of abductions go unreported to authorities. The deteriorating security situation nationwide has allowed criminal groups unassociated with the cartels to conduct their own independent kidnapping operations. High-value targets, such as wealthy executives or foreign workers suspected of having access to money, often fall prey to these crimes. Mexico's campaign against the cartels has yielded some recent positive results against cartel kidnapping organizations. Authorities in Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas states announced in July that they had arrested members of two kidnapping gangs linked to the Gulf cartel known as Las Estacas and Los Halcones. Police said the gangs were responsible for identifying, surveilling and gathering information on potential kidnapping victims. Similar gangs associated with the Tijuana cartel have been arrested in Baja California state. The threat of crime is critical. 2 War and Insurgency Mexico faces no significant military threat from foreign countries. Domestically, the country has dealt with a number of small festering insurgent groups that are more of a nuisance than a continued threat. The most important of these is the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN). EZLN supports peasants' rights and opposes any governmental or nongovernmental institutions or policies that it believes threaten the peasantry. EZLN is not known to have a presence in Veracruz state (its base of support is primarily in Chiapas state) or to be capable of -- or even planning -- any actions in Mexico. The threat of war and insurgency is low. 3 Political Instability The 2006 presidential contest between Felipe Calderon and Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador resulted in allegations of voter fraud after the results showed Calderon won by less than 300,000 votes. Lopez Obrador responded to the official vote count by declaring himself the "official" president of Mexico and vowing to start a parallel government. His movement quickly lost momentum, however, and most Mexicans now view him with disdain. Calderon, on the other hand, consistently has had high approval numbers thanks to his unprecedented moves to pursue organized crime in the country aggressively. Regional political issues present a potential concern throughout the country. The 2006 crisis in neighboring Oaxaca state, where an annual teachers' protest spiraled out of control into a full-scale insurrection requiring federal police forces to restore order, did not see the same level of violence in 2007. Demonstrations consisted mainly of protest marches, with police clashes occurring occasionally. The leaders of last year's Oaxaca protests remain imprisoned, which could explain the relatively low level of unrest. The threat of political instability is low. 4 2007 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. 4
Miscellaneous Threats Veracruz state normally receives its highest average monthly rainfall in August and September, and mudslides are common, especially in rural areas. Although mudslides do not generally affect Veracruz city, mudslides can affect roads leading to and from the city. Low-intensity earthquakes are common in this part of Mexico, though they rarely cause structural damage or injuries. Higher-intensity earthquakes are a possibility. As is any port city located on the Gulf of Mexico, Veracruz is at risk of hurricanes. For example, Hurricane Stan affected Veracruz state in 2005 after crossing over the Yucatan peninsula. The miscellaneous threat level in Veracruz is medium. 5 1. Terrorism threat levels. Low: No known credible threat. Medium: Potential but unsubstantiated threats by capable indigenous or transnational actors. High: Demonstrable history and continued potential for militant attacks against generalized targets. Foreigners and/or foreign facilities are not specifically targeted. Critical: Demonstrable history and continued likelihood of militant attacks. Foreigners and/or foreign facilities are specifically targeted. 2. Crime threat levels. Low: Relatively low crime rate, mainly property or petty crime. Medium: Generally high crime rate with incidents of property crime that specifically targets foreigners, low potential for violence. High: Generally high crime rate with incidents of property crime that specifically targets foreigners, probability of violence and moderate risk of physical crime. Critical: Extensive criminal activity targeting foreigners with a high possibility of physical crime, including violence and kidnapping; heavily armed criminal elements abundant. 3. War and Insurgency threat levels. Low: No or relatively low threat of violent insurgency. Medium: Nearby insurgency with the potential of affecting city, region, country or transportation network. High: Insurgency within the city, region or country but with little direct effect on foreigners. Critical: Insurgency within the city, region or country directly threatening foreigners. 4. Political Instability threat levels. Low: No or minimal visible activity directed against the government. Medium: Sporadic street demonstrations, largely peaceful. High: Routine large-scale demonstrations, often affecting traffic and having the potential for violence. Critical: Endemic strikes, protests and street demonstrations almost always affecting traffic with a high probability of associated violence. 5. Miscellaneous threat levels. Low: Little or no known threats posed by disease, weather, natural disasters, transportation hazards or other dangers. Medium: Moderate level of risk posed by some or all of these threats. High: Considerable danger posed by some or all of these threats. Critical: Extremely high level of danger posed by some or all of these threats. 2007 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. 5