CERAH working paper Supporting Conflict Transformation and Victims in Colombia An Analysis of the Official Development Assistance from 2002 To 2011 and Beyond Eric Wyss Isaza CERAH Working Paper 21 2013-2014 a Joint Centre of
Dissertation Master of Advanced Studies in Humanitarian Action Academic Year 2012-2013 Supporting Conflict Transformation and Victims in Colombia An analysis of the Official Development Assistance from 2002 to 2011 and beyond Eric Wyss Isaza Examining Board: Supervisor: Mr Gilles Carbonnier President of the Board: Mr. Amadou Diop Expert: Mr. Jean Pierre Gontard June 2013 1
Abstract This research focuses on the ODA allocated to Colombia from 2002 to 2011, as a way to understand the role of the international community in the process of conflict transformation. Using national and international data and sources, the analysis provides evidence of the approaches of different international stakeholders to assist the victims and to support the country in its journey towards peace. The results indicate that at least two thirds of the ODA addressed various conflict-related topics and that conflict victims received the highest share. They also hint to different assistance and protection strategies, and show that recovery and restoration gradually became part of the cooperation agenda. Based on these findings, the paper explores the perspectives of international cooperation for the country in the coming years and proposes strategic recommendations for future external support to the transformation of its conflict. Key Words: Colombia; ODA; International Cooperation; Conflict; Conflict Transformation; Peacebuilding; Humanitarian Assistance; Victims, Donor Policies In memory of Robert A. Wyss 2
Acronyms ACCIÓN SOCIAL Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation ACR Colombian Agency for Reintegration APC-COLOMBIA Colombian Presidential Agency of International Cooperation AUC BACRIM CCAI CRS CSDI CSO CT DAC DM DNP ECHO ELN FARC-EP FIP FTS GAO GNI GoC ICBF ICRC IDMC IGO United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia Criminal Bands/ Gangs Coordination Center for Integrated Action Creditor Reporting System Colombia Strategic Development Initiative Civil Society Organizations Conflict Transformation Development Assistance Committee Disbursement Matrix National Planning Department European Community Humanitarian Office National Liberation Army Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia- Peoples Army Foundation Ideas para la Paz Financial Tracking System United States Government Accountability Office Gross National Income Government of Colombia Colombian Family Welfare Institute International Committee of the Red Cross Internal Displacement Monitoring Center Inter-Governmental Organizations 3
IHID IMF INGO MAPP-OEA MDN NGO OAS OCHA ODA OECD PAICMA PDSD PISDP PNC QWIDS SIAOD UNDP UNICEF UNS VVG WDI WFP International Human Development Indicators International Monetary Fund International Non-Governmental Organization Support Mission of the OAS to the peace process in Colombia National Defense Ministry Non-Governmental Organization Organization of American States Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Official Development Assistance Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Presidential Programme for Integral Action against Land- mines Democratic Security and Defense Policy Integral Security and Defense Policy for Prosperity National Consolidation Plan Query Wizards for International Development Statics ODA Information System United Nations Development Programme United Nations Children's Fund United Nations System Victims and the Vulnerable Groups to the armed conflict World Development Indicators (from the World Bank) World Food Programme 4
Table of Contents Abstract I. Introduction...1 II. Conflict Transformation and the International Cooperation in Colombia...4 1. Definitions and Concepts...4 2. The Transformation of the Colombian conflict...5 a. Relevant elements about the evolution of the conflict since the end of the 90 s...6 b. Relevant elements about the humanitarian situation...9 c. Relevant elements about the International Cooperation in Colombia...11 3. ODA for Victims and Conflict Transformation in Colombia from 2002 to 2011... 14 i) General Figures of ODA... 14 ii) ODA for conflict transformation and victims... 15 a. Peace and Peacebuilding.... 18 b. Consolidation... 19 c. Illicit Crops Substitutions and Drugs... 20 d. DDR and Transitional Justice... 22 e. Mine Action... 23 f. Recruitment Prevention... 25 g. Victims and vulnerable groups... 26 III. Key results and recommendations for the future... 29 1. Summary and analysis of key results... 29 2. Lessons and recommendations for the future... 31 3. Final remarks... 35 Bibliography... 36 ANNEXES... 40 5
List of Annexes 1. ODA tables... 41 a. World ODA disbursements from 2002 to 2011 in millions of USD at current prices...41 b. ODA to Colombia from 2002 to 2010 at constant prices of 2010...42 c. ODA to Colombia from 2007 to 2011 by Sectors...42 d. Channels for ODA to Colombia from 2007 to 2011...42 e. ODA Donors to Colombia from 2007 to 2011 according to OECD data...43 2. Disbursement matrix and SIAOD technical details... 44 a. Disbursement Matrix...44 b. SIAOD...45 3. Amount of ODA allocated by donors for CT projects by topics from 2002 to 2011... 47 4. Amount of ODA allocated to victims and vulnerable groups to conflict by topics from 2002-2011... 51 a. Evolution by topics...51 b. Sub-report of humanitarian financing...54 5. Emphasis of support to Conflict Transformation by 7 Top Donors in Colombia 2002-2011... 55 6
I. Introduction For more than five decades, Colombia has faced an internal armed conflict enshrined in a changing social context and fed by diverse economic and political interests. This confrontation has brought very serious humanitarian consequences and massive human rights violations over time. The State s response and allocation of public resource for the victims and peace building activities have also increased significantly. Nonetheless, and despite these efforts, the unmet needs have proven to be greater than the national efforts to fulfill them. In this context and in addition to the political and diplomatic support, the international community has played an important and complementary role through the provision of technical, financial and humanitarian cooperation. As a result, and in spite of being classified by the World Bank as an upper middle income country, Colombia has been the main recipient of international cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean during the last decade after Haiti, according to data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This paper focuses on the Official Development Assistance (ODA) allocated to the country for the last decade, as a way to understand the role of the international community in the process of transformation of the Colombian conflict. Using national and international data, the analysis provides evidence of the approaches of different international stakeholders to assist victimized populations and to support the country in its journey towards peace. The main purpose of this research is to conduct an evidenced-based analysis of the provision of ODA for victims and the transformation of the conflict in Colombia in the last decade. The overarching question of this inquiry can thus be formulated as follows: How did the international cooperation support victims and conflict transformation in Colombia between 2002 and 2011? To answer this central question, the investigation analyzes the recent political and humanitarian context of Colombia through the lens of conflict transformation (CT). It also estimates the amount and evolution of ODA for this topic and examines the main areas of cooperation related to it. Based on the results of this research, the paper also explores the perspectives of international cooperation for the coming years, in the light of the current national and global context. It is useful to clarify that the research does not seek to assess the impacts of the ODA. Accordingly, it does not examine the results of these investments nor their suitability, or the adequacy of one approach or the other with regards to CT. It also doesn t focus on the ODA s implementing organizations. 1
Even if the armed conflict has been one of the key reasons for the focalization of Colombia by the international donor community, the available data to analyze its allocation and evolution is inadequate and misleading. Consequently, there is almost no evidenced based research that examines integrally the conflict related ODA for the country1. Three main constraints explain this situation. First, the categories in which the existing data are provided do not necessarily match the analytical needs. Namely, they might be too broad or not correspond to the object under study2. Second, these data are not detailed enough to capture the objectives of the different programs and projects3. Third, aid information provided by donors at international level to the OECD differs significantly from the one reported by their offices at national level. This research partially fills this gap for the topic of concern, offering new element of analysis and evidence to the discussion. As shown in chart 1, the period under study was notably significant in terms of the amount of the official assistance allocated to the country, since it exceeded the preceding three decades together combined. Some evidence presented in section 3A indicates that this increase was proportionally more acute than the world s ODA general rate of expansion. In addition and as developed later on, these years correspond to a very particular turning point in the recent years of the internal armed conflict, including the national and international policies to confront it. Moreover, the magnitude and seriousness of the humanitarian consequences before and during this period have probably few precedents in the second half of the 20th century in the continent. ODA to Colombia 1961-2011 (In millions of USD at 2010 constant prices) $1'200 $1'000 $800 $600 $400 $200 $0 Source: Author based on World Bank WDI Data Chart 1 1 So far, three types of analysis have generally been conducted: i) thematic-based (e.g. internal displacement), (ii) donor based (e.g. the European Union Cooperation Strategy), and (iii) international relation- based (i.e. focused on the relations between official stakeholders, but not necessarily on ODA). Hence, almost none of these approaches addresses integrally the multiple dimensions of conflict from the country perspective. 2 This is for example the case with the data from the Creditor Reporting System of the OECD or the general reports of the Government s Cooperation Agency. 3 This is the case of the Creditor Reporting System of the OECD 2
The country is today at a very crucial point in the transformation of its conflict. The agenda of the current government, the adopted transitional justice frameworks, the evolution of organized crime and the negotiations with the most powerful guerrilla, indicate a shift towards new opportunities and challenges. The international community can play an important role in this process. Because the understanding of the past is necessary to think strategically about the future, this research is also a contribution to reflect about the external support needed for the coming infrastructures for peace. Having worked in Colombia with the UN and the Government for seven years in different international cooperation programs related to peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance, the two initial assumptions of my research (that are to be challenged) are: 1. Colombia has been prioritized by donors mainly because of its internal armed conflict. 2. In Colombia, the main emphases of ODA for CT have been alternative development, regional peacebuilding programs and humanitarian assistance. The investigation uses a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. For the analysis of the transformation of the conflict in recent years and its relation to international cooperation, a literature review has been undertaken, which also nourishes the interpretation of the data s results and the discussion. The quantitative methodology consists in the processing and analysis of the main official cooperation databases (national and international). For this, and in addition to the data reported by the OECD and the World Bank, major work was conducted on the raw data of the Colombian government s ODA databases, which comprises roughly 7.500 projects officially reported by donors at national level. After this introduction, the paper presents the definitions and concepts of ODA and CT. It sets the scene analyzing the political and humanitarian context of the period under study, to understand the involvement of the international community in the conflict transformation process and its support to the victims. Section II.3 presents the results of the data analysis and discusses its main outcomes, to answer the central questions of the investigation. Finally, the third and last section of the document presents a summary of the findings and proposes strategic recommendations for the future based on the lessons of the past. The document concludes with final remarks proposing further areas of research for the topic under study. 3
II. Conflict Transformation and the International Cooperation in Colombia 1. Definitions and Concepts a. Official Development Assistance- ODA. For the purpose of this paper, the definition of Official Development Assistance is the one accepted by the OCDE, which also corresponds to the one used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This definition has been agreed by the majority of donor States, and has also been acknowledged by the Colombian Government. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) qualifies ODA as those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients ( ) and to multilateral development institutions which are: i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. each transaction of which: a. Is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b. Is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent) (OCDE 2008, 1). These flows exclude resources for: military aid, the enforcement aspect of peacekeeping, the supply of the donor s police services to control civil disobedience (although police training is included), as well as activities to combat terrorism (Ibid. 2). b. Conflict Transformation. Since the 90 s, a growing number of theorists have brought the concept of Conflict Transformation in the field of peace and conflict studies. As opposed to the idea of conflict resolution, this branch of scholars understands conflicts as an inherent element present in human societies, whose outcomes can be either negative or constructive depending on the channels and means employed to solve them (Lederach, 2003a). From this perspective, violence is one of the possible materializations of conflicts if other social, political or institutional mechanisms cannot provide alternative channels to overcome problems peacefully. Johannes Botes asserts that the notion of CT refers to the process of moving from conflict-habituated systems to peace systems (2003). As a result of the analysis of his comprehensive literature review, and even if he acknowledges that there is still no consensus on the theoretical and practical applicability of the term, two elements appear to be central to this approach. First, a conflict does not end but transforms itself, and as such evolves over time. Even if the parties have reached an agreement, the following phases to consolidate and maintain peace are crucial. Second, it is also a systemic and 4
holistic approach, because it seeks to address the underlying causes of tensions as well as the relationships within a society and the way it is organized. Thus, personal, relational, and structural transformation is essential to deal effectively with conflicts (Ibid.). John Paul Lederach proposes a definition that summarizes the previous elements as follows: Conflict transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships (2003b). This concept is compatible with Galtung s view, according to which the absence of violence in all its forms (negative peace) must be complemented with relief to past and present violence but also with elements to prevent future confrontations (positive peace) (in Fisher, 187-188). Behind these ideas lies the notion that peacebuilding in a divided society is a process that should not only look for achieving peace, but should also be concerned about its sustainability and the consolidation of a long term reconciliation in which the elements of justice, truth and mercy are central (Lederach 1997, 29-30). As illustrated in the coming sections, this concept is useful to understand the Colombian case, because even if the conflict has not yet come to an end, it certainly has evolved over time. In addition, major efforts will have to be made in the present and the future to achieve reconciliation and transform the state of violent conflict into a state of positive peace. 2. The Transformation of the Colombian conflict Colombia is one of the oldest and more stable democracies in Latin America. It is rich in natural resources and has counted with a growing economy in spite of its internal violence4. Today it is categorized by the World Bank as an upper- middle income country, and it is trying hard to position itself as an emerging player. Many social, political, environmental, humanitarian and economic challenges are yet to be overcome, but the country has tried hard to find a way out of violence and exclusion, to face its difficulties through the consolidation of a stronger state, and to seek for the reconciliation and inclusion of its population. In many ways and for different reasons and interests, the international community has played important roles in this process. Without the pretention of developing an exhaustive analysis, this chapter provides elements to understand the political and humanitarian dimension of the conflict during the period under study, as well as the international 4 Between 1950 and 1995, the GDP grew at an annual rate of 4.6%, the income per capita increased annually at 2.1%, the life expectancy augmented in 19 years, the primary school enrollment duplicated and the poverty incidence drop from 70% to 30% (UNDP 2003, 103). From 2000 to 2012, its human development index rose to position 91, from 0.658 to 0.719 (UNDP 2013, 149), and the economy reached with Argentina the third position in Latin America, behind Brazil and Mexico. 5
involvement in the CT process. This sets the basis to understand and interpret the results of the ODA data analysis and paves the way for the discussion in the last part of the document. a. Relevant elements about the evolution of the conflict since the end of the 90 s By the end of the 90 s, the country was facing one of its deepest economic recessions since the Great Depression, besides one of the longest armed conflict in the world. The confrontation had been occurring from decades since the creation of the guerrillas of the FARC and the ELN in the 60 s, and persisted despite of multiple intents of various governments to overcome the violence and achieve peace throughout the years. These and other left wing armed groups were also a result of previous violence processes of the 40 s and the 50 s, and easily found a cause in a system of political exclusion in a country with deep social inequalities and one of the highest wealth and land concentration in the world. At the time, similar insurgency dynamics took place throughout the whole continent. Over the years, more illegal armed actors emerged. Self-defense initiatives flourished since the 80 s and evolved until becoming powerful and organized paramilitary structures. The most notorious case was the United Self-defense Force of Colombia (AUC) that accounted for several thousands of men at the beginning of the 21st century. In addition, the rise during the 70 s and the 80 s of a powerful drug industry, converted Colombia in the main cocaine producer in the world, reaching by 2003 a share of 67% to 80% of the global market (Veillet 2005, 3). As a result, corruption spread among many branches of the State, a fierce dispute for territorial control escalated, and the majority of the illegal armed actors got involved with powerful drug cartels to finance and sustain their activities, adding another layer to this complex situation and blurring the lines of their objectives and identities5. At the time, Eduardo Pizarro characterized the Colombian confrontation as a longstanding internal and internationalized irregular armed conflict, with ideological roots and in-between low and middle range intensity, whose main victims were civilians and whose fuel derived from the trade of drugs (2004, 80). As the 2003 National Human Development Report pointed out, throughout its history the conflict disproportionally hit the marginalized country side populations (UNDP, 21). Nonetheless, the failure of the 1998-2002 Caguán peace process of President Andrés Pastrana s administration with the FARC and 5 Daniel Mejía gives a strong picture of the link between violence, drugs and the international markets, concluding that: Our estimations indicate that, on average, a 10% increase in the value of cocaine markets increases the homicide rate between 1.2% and 2%, and forced displacement rates between 6% and 10%. ( ) The value of (local) cocaine markets in Colombia increased by about 230% between 1990 and 2008 ( ). These estimates suggest that homicide rates are between 30% and 50% higher today than what they would be if illegal drug production and trafficking activities hadn t increased to the extent they did during the late 1990s (2012, 30). 6
the ELN guerrillas, along with an institutional weakness to fight illegal armed groups and to maintain control over its entire territory, had led the whole country to a situation of widespread insecurity, instability and lack of governance. For the first time, by the end of 2000 the armed violence had come very close to the Elite, reaching the gates of the capital city in the very center of the country (León 2004). By then, Colombia occupied a sad position among the most violent countries in the world (Bernal and Sanguino, in UNDP 2003, 468). After the failure of Pastrana s electoral promise of 1998 to end the conflict through peace negotiations, in 2002 Colombians elected by a vast majority the right wing candidate Alvaro Uribe Vélez, based on his campaign of frontal combat against insecurity and corruption (Gonzalez 2006). In 2003, he established the Democratic Security and Defense Policy (PDSD), with the objective to strengthen and guarantee the presence of the state in the entire territory. In 2007, this policy was revised and adjusted to the new context around the notion of territorial social recovery, and the Policy of Consolidation of the Democratic Security (PCSD) was lunched. Hence, during the next eight years, security and integrated action became the axis of both periods of his government. The PDSD represented a radical shift of the policy of overcoming the conflict through political negotiations. The failure of the Caguán process and a general rejection of the society against the illegal armed groups radically closed any dialogue options with the guerillas (FIP 2011, 9). Embedded in an emerging international context of War on Terror, the Government catalogued them as Narcoterrorist groups, denying any political status, and fought them as such. In the view of Uribe s Administration, the Democratic Security Policy was the best way to drive the country towards a situation of sustainable and durable peace 6, as long as these actors wouldn t comply with a set of clear prerequisites to engage new negotiations, which were never fulfilled during his mandate. In parallel, another key element to weaken illegal groups was put in place: a comprehensive strategy to demobilize and reintegrate illegal armed fighters. A first central step were the dialogues undertaken since the end of 2002 with the AUC, which led to a negotiation process led by the High Commissioner for Peace and to a subsequent demobilization of barely 32.000 men between November 2003 and August 2006. The other central element was the voluntary individual demobilization policy. It is important to highlight that in addition to the existing legal framework in place since 1997 to undertake peace negotiations, the Congress approved in 2005 the Justice and Peace Law to support this DDR process. In exchange for abandoning their weapons and their illegal activities while revealing the truth 6 This is for instance reflected in the first implementation principle of the PCSD: achieve security and peace. 7
and repairing the victims, the combatants would benefit from reduced sentences and would enter a reintegration program. This law also envisaged the possibility of humanitarian agreements between the Government and illegal groups (like the exchange of prisoners). According to data of the Defense Ministry, from 2002 to 2012 more than 57.000 persons from different illegal organizations entered into the DDR process, from which almost 26.000 were voluntary individual demobilizations. This had an initial impact on the reduction of national violence indicators, but since the process was implemented during the conflict, in many regions under former control of the AUC, the vacuum of power was filled by other illegal armed groups. There was also an atomization and transformation of the paramilitary structures in the country that did not fully demobilize, and the creation of violent groups classified by the Government as new Criminal Bands (BACRIM) involved with illegal activities, and by other analysts as transformed neo-paramilitary cartels (Escobar 2013). In sum, and as evidenced by studies conducted by the Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris, since 2002 the non-state armed groups have been able to adjust their strategies to respond to the increasing military capacity and pressure of the Government, and have adapted their modus operandi and strategic approaches to maintain the armed confrontation. Consequently, the tactics and organization of these groups have changed along with the geography of the confrontation, but the level of intensity of the violence is still very high, although less visible (Martínez 2013). In addition, other threats like illegal mining or the rise of the conflict in urban settings, as well as the insecurity originated from common crimes and other forms of violence have become growing challenges to address. Even if the election in 2010 of a new Government headed by Juan Manuel Santos (Uribe s Defense Minister) was based on the promise to continue and expand the achievements and policies of the former Administration, once at Office the new President established a series of measures that represented a new radical change of conception to overcome the confrontation. The first one was the recognition of an internal armed conflict. The second was the reform of the State through the establishment of new institutions and norms to address the conflict and the victims. Maybe the most notorious measures adopted were the expedition of a ten years Victims and Land Restitution Law in June 2011, with a transitional justice character, and a new legal Framework for Peace, to back-up possible negotiations with the FARC and other groups. The third measure was the establishment of a peace negotiation process in October 2012 with the FARC. The fourth was the creation of a National System for Human Rights. Finally, together with other Latin-American Presidents, the Colombian Government has seek to 8
engage the international community into a global assessment and discussion on the fight against drugs, acknowledging a failure of the traditional international approach led by the United States. At last, it is important to highlight the decision to undertake the negotiation process with the FARC without a ceasefire. Recognizing the impossibility to win the confrontation by a complete military victory over the short and medium term, it is evident that the vision of Santos Administration to CT differs from the one of his predecessor. Nonetheless, in practice this shift has not been clearly reflected on the field. Military operations haven t diminished and even if the defense policies established by Uribe were adjusted by the new government, they are still very present in its Policy of Integral Security and Defense for Prosperity (PISDP). However, the story of the confrontation and the proven capacities of illegal armed groups to transform and to adapt to new security measures, suggest that without a success of the mentioned non-military elements to overcome the conflict, violence will not finish in Colombia soon, and peace and reconciliation will hardly become a reality in the coming years. b. Relevant elements about the humanitarian situation As stated earlier by Pizarro, a reiterative element of the conflict in Colombia has been the systematic violence against the civil society and the population that do not take part in the hostilities, but that have been repeatedly targeted, caught in cross fires and disproportionately victimized. Today the Government has registered more than 5.7 million victims from the conflict. In 2004, the UN described the Colombian situation as the biggest humanitarian crisis in Western Hemisphere 7. Some of the following facts illustrate the dimension of this crisis. Colombia has produced the highest number of internal displaced population in the world. With about 4.8 million persons officially registered between 2000 and October 2012 8 (more than 10% of the entire population), almost a fifth of the world s IDP are Colombian 9,10. It is estimated that 15.000 to 50.000 individuals were disappeared between 1980 and 2005, and more than 7.000 persons were abducted between 2003 and 2012 11. Colombia is the second country in the world with more landmine incidents after Afghanistan, with 10.253 victims between 1990 and February 2013 12. 2.087 massacres have been registered since 1983 13. 7 Declarations of Jan Egeland of OCHA, in http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsid=10691&cr=colombia&cr1 8 Unit for Victims: 2012 report p.5 in http://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/images/docs/estados_financieros/octubre.pdf 9 According to the 2012 IDMC report figures (2013). 10 It is however important to highlight the fact that these numbers are accumulative and the number of new persons displaced each year has decreased significantly (even if they remain very high). Hence, if Colombia accounts for 17% to 19% of the world IDP, in 2012 it produced less than 4% of them according to the 2012 IDMC report. 11 Guzman et al. (2010, 103) and Ministry of Defense 2013, Achievements of the PISDP, in http://www.mindefensa.gov.co 12 Presidential Program for Land Mines, in http://www.accioncontraminas.gov.co (last consultation: 23.04.2013) 9
Moreover, according to official sources more than 1.5 million IDP and 3.000 victims of landmines are children and more than 5.100 of them have demobilized from non-state armed groups 14. This reflects the active illegal involvement of minors in the conflict. The report of the Secretary General to the Security Council denounced a widespread and systematic recruitment and use of children by non- State armed groups in Colombia and their involvement for intelligence purposes by the national army (UNGA 2012, 24). In addition, the Constitutional Court declared that the conflict was threatening numerous ethnical groups with their physical or cultural extinction 15. This has been the case for many afro-colombian and indigenous communities. Finally, as emphasized by the OHCHR, great concerns have been raised not only by these crimes (some of which could amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity according to the High Commissioner s report), but also by the participation of state agents in some of these violations and by a generalized state of impunity (2003). Up to 2013, as a result of the changing dynamics of the conflict summarized in the prior section, as well as the multiple efforts of the State to protect and guarantee the victims rights, the humanitarian situation has substantially improved in the last few years 16. A comprehensive set of policy instruments were put in place to assist victims and the majority of indicators of violence have significantly decreased. The confrontation has reduced its geographical extension, moving to the borders of the country. However, as positive as these improvements might be, and even envisaging a success of the peace negotiation process, many violations of human rights and serious humanitarian concerns remain, in a time when new conflict dynamics and new threats are emerging. The discussions held at the 2013 Colombian Universal Periodical Review in Geneva and the report of the NGOs to the Human Rights Council evidenced serious preoccupations, notoriously with regards of the impact of the conflict on women ( the use of sexual violence as a tactic of war (p. 5)), on ethnic minorities, on human rights defenders, and the persistence of a widespread state of violence and impunity 17. It is however important to underline the fact that the civil society has also been at the core of the CT in Colombia, in spite of the multiple victimizations endured. Grass root organizations, community leaders, academics, social organizations, NGOs (national and international), the Church, medias and journalists, indigenous groups, human right defenders, all have individually and collectively protected 13 Human Rights Observatory of the Vice-presidency, in http://www.semana.com/especiales/proyectovictimas/crimenesde-la-guerra/masacres-desplazamiento/index.html 14 ICBF Director declarations, April 2013, in http://www.cmi.com.co/?n=103243 15 Sentence t-025 of 2004, Act 004 and 005 of 2009 and 16 For instance, these positive results have been notably recognized by the latest 2013 OHCHR inform of Colombia. 17 See the 2013 reports of the NGOs and OCHCR at http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/cosession16.aspx 10
themselves, confronted adversity, and triggered spaces and processes of peaceful coexistence and dignity. Their resilience and capacities have led to a vivid social movement for peace, and have contributed establishing regional and local peace infrastructures in the midst of conflict. International cooperation has been an important source of support for many of them (Paladini 2012). c. Relevant elements about the International Cooperation in Colombia Upon its arrival to office in 1998, President Pastrana called on the international community to back-up the country in its intention to undertake large scale efforts to reach peace, promote development and fight drug trafficking. This decision represented a fundamental change in the attitude of the Government18. But, determined to achieve peace, he invoked the shared responsibility of the world on the issue of drugs and the need of the region to contain imminent spillover threats of the conflict beyond the borders of the country (Rosen, 2012; DNP 2006, 10; Bernal in UNDP 2013, 468). As a result and even if the country had received international cooperation since the late 60 s19, many countries increased their support to Colombia. Consequently, the ODA rose substantively from 1998 throughout the following decade as already shown in chart 1. Nevertheless, each foreign government s approach to provide support differed from one another. This divergence responded not only to their own capacities and external policies interests, but also to their interpretation of the best ways to back-up a CT process. The post-9/11 order and Uribe s strategic shift to address the conflict since 2002 deepened this divergence even more. As shown by Eduardo Posada, the denial of recognizing an internal armed conflict and the manner of addressing it as a criminal narcoterrorist fight had at this level profound effect: It is not a semantic discussion, nor a theoretic or abstract debate. In this case, the clarity of the concepts has above all practical reasons. First, there is an interest in the path chosen to achieve peace domestically. Any selected concept would define the nature of the conflict and condition the options to address its solution. Second, there is an interest in the light of the formal relations between the country and the external world. The application of IHL has traditionally been determined by the characterization of the conflict. Finally, there is an interest from the perspective of the informal relations with the international community, because this definition can imply one type of intervention or another (in Pizarro 2004, 27)20. Perhaps the results of the negotiations between Bogotá and Washington since 1998, as well as the support of the peace process with the FARC by the EU, signified a turning point of the relative 18 Augusto Ramírez Ocampo, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, described in 2003 this historical attitude: The Colombian Government was always reluctant to accept peace-related international cooperation (governmental and non-governmental). When we first suggested its necessity in 1994, a large choir of voices raised to oppose it, claiming that it was an exclusive matter of the Colombians because it directly affected our national sovereignty (in UNDP 2003, 465). 19 See the publication of Acción Social (2008) for further information about the story of the international cooperation in Colombia and the evolution of its national cooperation institutions since 1968. 20 All the quotes of the paper are translated by the author if the original texts are not in English. 11
isolation of the country to confront its internal conflict. In 1999, Pastrana presented Plan Colombia to the international community, as a 6 years integral strategy to promote peace, fight drug trafficking and foster development (especially in rural areas through alternative development). 65% of the $7.5 billion plan would to be financed by the national budget, and the rest by the international community. Bill Clinton backed-up Plan Colombia, with an initial support of $1.3 billion 21. Nonetheless, during its negotiations, the US Congress fundamentally altered Plan Colombia and transformed it into an antinarcotics policy (Rosen 2012, 47). The Bush Administration also supported this strategy, although the Colombian Government, with the arrival of Uribe to office in 2002, managed to shift Plan Colombia from an antinarcotics plan to a counter terrorist plan (Tickner 2003, 79). This assistance was extended beyond Plan Colombia. After an initial support to the establishment of the Democratic Security Consolidation Policy, in 2009 the U.S. Embassy lunched the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) to coordinate U.S. assistance to Colombia s consolidation efforts (and other policies) among all U.S. development, diplomacy, and defense agencies operating in Colombia (Hartzell et.al, 1). Consolidation thus became a central strategy to support the evolution of Plan Colombia. The non-military components roughly amounted to 20% of the US cooperation, and focused on the rule of law and the judicial reforms, and the promotion of economic and social progress (mainly with alternative development, IDP and former combatants reintegration), (GAO, 2008). In total between 2000 and 2011, the United States disbursed around $8 billion to finance its assistance to the country 22. This represented an increase of 800% compared to the billion provided during the previous decade (Rosen 2012, 18). In few years Colombia became US closest ally in the region. Even if Pastrana s initial idea with Plan Colombia was to lunch a sort of Marshall Plan for the country to be supported by all the international community (Rosen op.cit, 41), the EU officially rejected it. In the view of the European Parliament, beyond the military dimension the prevailing situation and conflict in Colombia have a social and political dimension whose roots lie in economic, political, cultural and social exclusion. It warned that Plan Colombia contains aspects that run counter to the cooperation strategies and projects to which the EU has already committed itself and jeopardize its cooperation programmes and that stepping up military involvement in the fight against drugs involves the risk of sparking off an escalation of the conflict in the region, and that military solutions 21 It has to be noted that 35% of this amount was invested in the region, but out of Colombia (Acevedo et.al. 3). 22 Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, The Colombia Strategic Development Initiative Factsheet 2012, in the US Department of State web page: http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2012/187926.htm. 12
cannot bring about lasting peace23. Nonetheless, it reaffirmed its intention to support the government s peace efforts through programs aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict, with projects of human rights, alternative development, humanitarian aid, social development and institutional strengthening. An emphasis was also put on increasing the rule of law and the system of justice, together with a trade agenda. Between 2002 and 2011, the EU committed 323.9 millions in Colombia (DRN 2012). Over the decade, other donors also contributed in one way or the other to support the country s effort to deal with its internal conflict, with different levels of alignment to the priorities established by the National Government24. Not only did individual EU member states develop their own bilateral cooperation strategies, but other Asian countries like Japan and Korea, or various southern countries of Latin America and China (recently) participated in the process through south-south cooperation. Multilateral banks, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the Andean Development Corporation, the IMF and the World Bank also became important financial sources, some of them offering significant concessional loans related to development and peace. Finally, the United Nations System (UNS) has also been very active in the country with the continuous visits of special rapporteurs and high level officers, with the Colombian participation in international human rights bodies and with the permanent presence of 23 agencies in the country. It did not only seek to strengthen and monitor the State with regards to its international obligations, but also provided humanitarian protection and supported in many ways the victims and civil society organizations (CSO). Even if next section focuses mainly on the ODA segment of the international cooperation provided during the period of analysis, it is important to highlight that the Government did not only look for international assistance in terms of ODA and internal security, but also in terms of varied cooperation outside its borders. Indeed, Uribe s 2002 defense policy made an emphasis on the need of other countries to collaborate actively in operations against transnational crime and drug trafficking, intelligence and information sharing, and fight against terrorism (MDN 2002, 62). As a result, maybe one of the most successful victories of the Colombian Government against the FARC, the ELN and the 23 European Parliament Resolution on Plan Colombia and support for the peace process in Colombia, (February 2001), in http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/europa/parlamento/pecoleng01feb.html 24 The Government s Agency in charge of the International Cooperation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released two National Cooperation Strategies between 2002 and 2010, and engaged into a permanent dialogue with the donors at a bilateral level, and with the Group of Friends of the Peace Process and later with the so called G24 group at a multilateral level. For the period under study, this second multilateral political forum was known as the LondresCartagena- Bogotá process, and included the participation of CSOs. The London Declaration of July 2003 was a key manifestation of this political support and alignment with the GoC s efforts. See more in MRE 2009; Acción Social 2008; and UNDP s web page at: http://www.pnud.org.co/sitio.shtml?apc=m-a-1--&x=51705. 13
AUC during the decade was of a diplomatic nature. Following the US, more than thirty countries added them in their terrorist lists (including the EU after harsh reluctance), leading them to isolation, economic sanctions and a very significant international loss of political prestige and recognition. 3. ODA for Victims and Conflict Transformation in Colombia from 2002 to 2011 i) General Figures of ODA 25 During the 10 years-period examined, Colombia was the 29 th ODA recipient country in the world and was second in America after Haiti, according to OECD data (see annex 1a). According to this same source, the sum of international disbursements for the period reached $8.165 million (whereas the amount reported by the donors national offices to the Government rises to $4.036 million 26,27 ). These flows represented around 0.5% of the country s Gross National Income and 2.2% of the Central Government $1'200 $1'000 Expenses. It is noteworthy to mention that neither Source: Author with OECD and GoC data of them comprises south-south cooperation flows, considered for decades as strategic by the GoC 28. Chart 2 shows a significant increase in ODA flows to the country since 2002. From this year, the disbursements rose from $438 million to $1.130 million in 2011. In real terms, the increase was 87% until 2011, at an average of 13% per year (see annex 1b). A comparative look with a relatively similar country and the rest of the world confirms that Colombia s increase of international cooperation was proportionally more acute during this period of time. As an ODA recipient, the country passed from position 59 in 2000 to position 23 in 2011. Charts 3 and 4 reflect this situation. $800 $600 $400 $200 $0 ODA to Colombia 2002-2011 (millions of USD at current prices) 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 OECD Data (QWIDS) GoC data (SIAOD) Chart 2 25 All the data used and referred in this chapter where obtained in January 2013 and come from the following databases: APC-Colombia: Sistema de Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo (SIAOD) and Disbursement Matrix (DM); World Bank: World Development Indicators (WDI); OECD: Query Wizards for International Development Statics (QWIDS) and Creditor Reporting System (CRS); UN-OCHA: Financial Tracking System (FTS); UNDP: International Human Development Indicators (IHDI). All the graphs, calculations and analysis were made by the author based on raw data from these databases. 26 If not stated otherwise, all data of the paper on international flows are rounded disbursements in millions of USD. 27 The difference between these data is explained in the Disbursement Matrix section of Annex 2. 28 E.g. President Santos has established the consolidation of south-south cooperation as a one of the Government seven key challenges, especially in the provision of cooperation to other countries. He decided to increase in 2012 the resources from USD 1 million per year to USD 8 million (see the Colombian National Cooperation Strategy 2012-2014). 14
900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 Proportional change in current ODA from 1990 to 2009 Peru vs. Colombia vs. The World 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 World Colombia Peru ODA for Colombia and Peru 1960-2010 (In real terms) 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 COL PER Source: Author based on WDI data Chart 3 Source: Author based on WDI ata Chart 4 During the second lustrum, two thirds of the resources were assigned to the social sector, while roughly 9% was intended for humanitarian aid and less than 20% to the economic and the productive sector, according to OECD data (see Annex 1c). To do so, from 2007 more than 52% was channeled to the public sector, 17% to NGOs and CSOs, and about 11% to multilateral organizations (see Annex 1d). Nonetheless, only 0.6% of the funds were disbursed through the modality of budget support, while 84% used a project-type approach. In the last five years of the period under study, the major donor by far was the United States with 53%, followed by Spain (9%), France (8%), the UE institutions (6%) and Germany (5%) (see annex 1e). It is worthy to note that Europe as a whole accounted for almost 40 per cent of the overall contributions, aggregating the UE and its member states (see the disbursement matrix section of annex 2). ii) ODA for conflict transformation and victims According to data officially reported by donors to the GoC at national level, during the period covered by this study, almost 7.500 new projects of an approximate value of $10 billion were financed 29. Around $4.5 billion of these resources came from the international community and $5.5 billion came from national sources. This section analyses the ODA component of these 7.500 projects, as a way to evidence and understand an important part of the international support to CT in Colombia. 29 Unless stated otherwise, all the analysis of this section is based on data from the SIAOD/GoC database. This information is periodically reported by Official Institutions to the GoC, and registered in the SIAOD system. For further details on these data refer to the SIAOD section of Annex 2. 15
Weight of ODA related to Conflict Transformation in Colombia 2002-2011 ODA Related to Conflict Transformation in millions of USD 2002-2011 Others not directly related Total related to Conflict Transformation 100% 80% 60% 50 % 40% 20% 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 0% Total related to Conflict Transformation Source: Author with GoC/SIAOD data Others not directly related Chart 4 Chart 5 Looking at the results of the data classification in charts 4, the first striking element is that about two thirds of the ODA ($3 billion) were assigned to almost 4.800 projects ODA For Conflict Transformation in Colombia 2002-2011 Millions of USD explicitly linked to CT30. The rest ($1.5 billion) was addressing other topics such as environment, governance, development or indigenous groups31. In addition, the trends evidenced in chart 5 show that the period s general increase of resources targeted especially conflict related projects, although also the non- $1'200 1055 $1'000 717 $800 $600 $400 $200 237 68 298 351 398 76 $0 related ones, especially at the end of the period. The second key element evidenced in chart 6 is that out of the projects directly Source: Author based on GoC/SIAOD data Chart 6 30 This proportion is probably even higher for two reasons. First, many projects from different nature were targeting conflict affected populations, but did not explicitly mention conflict-related objectives in their object. Second, as discussed later, there seems to be an important sub-report of humanitarian projects. See Annex 2 for more explanations. 31 See Annex 2 for an explanation of the classification methodology and the determination of the topics. 16
related to CT, at least $1 billion was allocated to support victims and vulnerable groups, and more than $717 million were destined for peacebuilding projects. The rest was allocated to support the National Consolidation Plan, to illicit crops substitutions strategies and to the DDR process (and its transitional justice mechanisms). Much less was destined to mine action and children recruitment prevention32,33. The third interesting element captured in charts 7, is the evolution of ODA by topics. The rest of this section examines this evolution for each one of these seven areas, analyzing the main donors as well as the trends and the nature of the projects financed in each one of these groups. Special attention is given to the Victims topic because of its importance and diversity, evidencing different strategies to support them. Annex 3 gives further details about each topic s evolution and their top donors contribution. Amount and Proportion of ODA for Conflict Transformation Topics in Colombia 2002-11* In millions of USD at current prices $500 Victims and vulnerable groups $400 Peace and Peacebuilding National Consolidation Plan $300 Ilicit crops substitution and drugs $200 DDR & TJ $100 $0 2002 Mine Action 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Recrutment Prevention 100% Victims and vulnerable groups Peace and Peacebuilding National Consolidation Plan Ilicit crops substitution and drugs DDR & TJ Mine Action Recrutment Prevention 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Source: Author base on GoC/SIAOD data *The cathegory "others related to CT" is excluded from these charts 2010 2011 Chart 7 32 As further discussed in Annex 4b, it is important to note that the weight of the Victims and vulnerable groups category is even probably higher than reflected in chart 6 because of the under-report of humanitarian assistance projects to the GoC. It is also necessary to highlight that the fight against drugs was apparently also not completely reported to Colombian Cooperation Agency, as discussed in its respective section. 33 As explained in the classification methodology of Annex 2, in chart 6 some projects can be present in more than one of these categories. For instance, the rehabilitation of a landmine victim would be included in Mine Action and Victims. 17
a. Peace and Peacebuilding. At the beginning of the decade, major resources were allocated to peacebuilding initiatives 34. As shown in chart 8, the EU, Sweden, Spain and the UNDP put in place large scale regional programs to support the capacities of civil society organizations and public institutions to build peace and governance at local level in the midst of conflict regions. Strategies to rebuild social networks were seen as a way of building resilience and recovering institutional channels to foster social participation and to deal $80 $70 $60 $50 $40 $30 $20 $10 $0 2002 Top Donors' ODA for Peace and Peacebuilding 2002-2011 In millions of USD at current prices 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Source: Author with GoC/SIAOD data 2009 2010 2011 EU GERMANY SWEDEN UNDP SPAIN Chart 8 with conflicts while avoiding violence. These projects also supported many local development initiatives to give sustainability and complement those social processes. Since the middle of the decade and after an important prior experience with the central Government to strengthen the decentralization process as a mean to foster regional development, Germany also lunched major programs to support peaceful coexistence. There was a clear focus on working in partnership with the state and the civil society, to bring them together and contribute to the improvement of their interaction for common goals on participation, local development and nonviolence. During the second part of the period this logic was sustained and even increased in 2009, but there was also a clear extension of the support to other branches of the State (like the Prosecutors Office to strengthen its ability to fight impunity and to stand for the victim s rights). On the other hand, many donors established direct channels to finance exclusively civil society initiatives on human rights, peaceful coexistence and empowerment for the protection and enforcement of rights. For instance, Sweden and Spain put in place a multiple financial instruments, as well as the 34 In this entire chapter, the data of the SIAOD reflect the new projects approved by the donors in a given moment of time. Hence, the complete value of a multi-year project will only appear once in the year that it has been signed by the donor, although its funds might be spend throughout all the years of its implementation. See annex 2 for more details. 18
EU through it non-programmable funds (which normally wouldn t have to be negotiated with the Government). Hence, even if more than 90% of the funds were compromised through programs above $1 million, 75% of the projects for peace and peacebuilding were under that amount. There was also a constant international support to finance initiatives that sought a peaceful way out of the conflict through peace talks and negotiations. Even if the National Government blocked any possibility to foreign countries to dialogue or have contacts with illegal armed groups without its authorization and control 35, the international community constantly supported the Church, the Academia and CSOs to dig for possibilities of ending the conflict through non-military means. On the other hand, when the Executive asked for international support to this kind of processes, there was always a prompt affirmative response by one or more countries. This was for instance the case of hostage liberations, the monitoring phase of the DDR process with paramilitary groups, and the preliminary negotiations for humanitarian exchanges and peace talks with the guerillas. These types of support were not necessarily resource intensive in terms of ODA, but had a significant political impact in terms of backing-up and legitimizing these processes. Countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, Brazil, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland as well as the ICRC and the Organization of American States (OAS) have been particularly active in this field. b. Consolidation Even if the concept of consolidation was present since 2002 in the Government s official documents, the policy took a major role from the beginning of Uribe s second mandate in 2006, harmonizing security objectives, with local development processes and the presence of the State in areas were it had historically been absent. The establishment of the National Consolidation Plan (PNC) in 2009 sought to be the Strategic Leap that would cristalyze this articulation and convert it into a progressive and irreversible process in socially recovered territories 36. This allignement of the military and security institutions with the humanitarian, social and development sectors, while being a natural, legitimate and necessary purpose from the point of view of the State, it was seen with many reserves by a large part of the international community and by many national social actors. Among the main concerns were the humanitarian consecuences of the implementation of 35 This provision included the UN and the humanitarian actors, except the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 36 See Presidential Directive No. 1 of the 20 th of March 2009. 19
the consolidation policy, and the effective rol and control of the coordination between civil and military authorities on the ground (FIP, 2010, 6). Mainly the USA and Holland supported cooperation projects related to the Consolidation Plan. They initialy contributed with many small and middle scale projects of rural development, institutional capacity and infrastructure in different parts of the country 37. In 2010, reflecting the enforcement of the Strategic Leap, major integral projects were lunched in the areas prioritized by the PNC. Following the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative, USAID disbursed considerable resources, focused in five strategic $250 $200 $150 $100 $50 $0 Top Donors' ODA for Consolidation 2002-2011 In millions of USD at current prices 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 HOLLAND corridors in which there remain significant security, coca eradication, rule of law, poverty, displacement, Source: Author with GoC/SIAOD data Chart 9 and economic development challenges 38 (USAID 2009, 2). From a perspective of geographical focalization and integration, the programs focused especially in rural production and legal livelihoods, in capacity building, access to basic services and infrastructure. In the spirit of the CSDI, these programs sought to be articulated with other efforts such as illicit crops substitution, making it difficult to make a clear separation between consolidation and alternative development. Nonetheless, because the US was not the only donor supporting the substitution efforts, the following section addresses this issue separetly. c. Illicit Crops Substitutions and Drugs USA By far, the main donor in the field of illicit crops substitution was the United States. These data provided to the Cooperation Agency of the Government are here probably underestimated 39. About half of its cooperation to Plan Colombia during the 2005-2008 period focused on counter narcotics efforts (USAID 2009, 1). From 2000 to 2008, USAID provided nearly $500 million to implement alternative 37 Holland concentrated its efforts in La Macarena region (one of the historical sanctuaries of the FARC). 38 The CSDI corridors include: 1) Montes de Maria; 2) Narino/Putumayo Corridor; 3) Central Corridor (from La Macarena in Meta west to Buenaventura); 4) Bajo Cauca/Catatumbo Corridor; and 5) Uraba/Northern Choco Corridor (USAID 2009, 2) 39 Indeed, the projects registered in the SIAOD represent only about a fifth of the amount reported to the OECD under the Narcotics sub-sector, where the USA covers almost 100% of the global disbursements of all donors in this area. It is reminded that as ODA, this does not take into account the military and the police components of the assistance. 20
development projects, as a key component of the U.S. counternarcotic strategy in Colombia ( ). Since 2000, it focused on encouraging farmers to manually eradicate illicit crops and providing assistance to those who did through licit, short-term, income-producing opportunities (GAO 2008, 48). As mentioned earlier, this was later revised and Top Donors' ODA for Illicit crops substituion & drugs 2002-2011 balanced with other components for local development and governance with the establishment of the CSDI, leading to a significative increase in the investements to In millions of USD at current prices $100 $80 support the National Consolidation Plan since 201040. Focusing in the strategic corridors, $60 since major $40 HOLLAND programmes: the Adam project for individuals, $20 UNODC communities, and the private sector to develop $0 2006 it developped two CANADA USA licit crops with long-term income potential (such as cacao and specialty coffee) while Source: Author with GoC/SIAOD data Chart 10 supporting social infrastructure activities, and the MIDAS project to promote private-sector led business initiatives and work with the Colombian government to make economic and policy reforms intended to maximize employment and income growth (Ibid, 49). Evenso, chart 10 shows that rhe component of alternative development remained present until the end of the decade to complement the military and other non-oda assistance provided by the US to erradicate and fight drugs. For instance, aerial spraying and manual erradication of illicit crops are still widelly used throughout the country. During this period, other donors have also implemented projects of alternative development or studies on drug issues, including trafficking and drug addiction. For instance, Canada has provided cooperation to small livelihoods projects in communities affected by the production of illicit crops. In 2003, it also established a fund to finance sustainable projects for income generation and local development. On the other hand, Holland also financed projects of alternative development, especially in the Macarena region where it supported the Consolidation Plan. 40 In its 2008 report of Plan Colombia to the Senate, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated: Program activities in the past have relied heavily on the use of aerial spraying as a key tool for driving down coca cultivation levels, and the vast bulk of U.S. counternarcotic assistance has gone to eradication and interdiction efforts. However, coca cultivation reduction goals were not met. As a result, Congress directed a decreased emphasis on aerial eradication, while directing that more be spent on alternative development and in other nonmilitary program areas (p. 71). 21
Finally, since 1999 UNODC has permanently monitored the evolution of drug crops in Colombia, and has also developed projects with the Government to strengthen its capacities to define and monitor strategic measures and plans to reduce their production in the country. On the evolution of the drugs policies, it is worth to mentioned that even if in 2000 the Government had the goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics in 50% by 2006 (one of the main objective of Plan Colombia), it did not achieve it. Recent studies led to the conclusion that in this regards, the results of the Plan are mixed: the cultivated areas have decreased since 2007, but the productivity of lands used to produce cocaine has increased (Mejía 2012, 21)41. d. DDR and Transitional Justice Before the demobilization process of the AUC in the early 2000, DDR was practically not on the donors agendas (nor on the Government s). UNICEF had some initiatives for the reintegration of demobilized children and minors, and was supported at a small scale by some countries. But the progress of the negotiations with the paramilitaries meant a shift in the priorities of the Government and its demands in terms of ODA to the international community. Hence, from 2004 and just after the first demobilizations, Sweden supported the establishment of the OAS mission (MAPP-OEA) set to verify and monitor the process, and to accompany victimized communities. It also cooperated with the Academia and NGO s to monitor the process, as more donors did. Other countries such as Spain, Germany and the US also collaborated with the OAS throughout the whole decade. The attention for demobilized children did not rise substantially over the years. Some significant projects from Canada, the EU or the US were established, but they did not attract the same attention as the socio economic reintegration projects for the adults ex-combatants. Indeed, after the last AUC paramilitary structures were collectively dismantled in 2006 and the individual demobilizations consolidated as a key element in the GoC s counter insurgency strategy, the US lunched a major program to support DDR in Colombia. Apart from training and income generation projects for adults and minors (which were also funded by other donors like Japan or the EU), its main focus was the reinforcement of the newly created High Office for Reintegration (ACR), who sought to establish a 41 From a broader perspective, and despite recognizing a relative effective fight against drugs, President Santos stated: sometimes one feels riding on a static bicycle. One looks around and it is the same. The panorama has changed, but the problem persists. But after sentencing a failure on the global war against drugs, he later added: In the Colombian case it is totally clear to me that while we discuss, and if we find alternatives with the international community, in the meantime we do not have a different option than pursuing our fight the way we have in the last year (quoted in the Semana magazine and in the Presidency media press release (in: http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/santos-la-guerra-global-contradrogas-ha-fracasado/268962-3 and http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/prensa/2013/marzo/paginas/20130307_14.aspx). 22
comprehensive reintegration strategy of the former fighters over a medium and long term approach. The ACR was also supported on a smaller scale by donors such as Holland and Germany. In addition, important projects also provided cooperation to the justice sector, in particular to strengthen the legal mechanisms created as part of the transitional justice instruments designed for the demobilization process of the AUC. This was basically done through the support of the institutions in charge of applying the provisions created by the Peace and Justice Law 42 (in particular the Prosecutor s Office, the Public Ministry and the Ministry of Interior) or supporting the provision of legal advising for victims to $140 $120 $100 $80 $60 $40 $20 $0 Top Donors' ODA for DDR and its Trans. Justice in Colombia 2002-2011 In millions of USD at current prices GERMANY HOLLAND SPAIN EU SWEDEN increase their ability to access truth and justice. Almost all the main donors cooperated in this line bilaterally or Source: Author with GoC/SIAOD data Chart 11 multilaterally through the establishment of a transitional justice fund led by UNDP-Colombia. Finally, it is important to note that few projects supported community reintegration. Apart from the support to the ACR strategy for community based reintegration, and some EU programs for peacebuilding or reconciliation, it seems that there was a tendency to work separately either with the perpetrators, or more frequently with the victims. In general, few programs worked integrally with the communities that hosted the victims and the demobilized combatants, but that did not belong to any of these two categories. e. Mine Action USA The data suggest that even being the second country in the world with more landmine accidents since 1990, Colombia did almost not attract the attention of the international community for Mine Action in the period under study. Only until 2005 some significant initiatives were established, although sources 42 The Law 975 of 2005 is commonly referred to as the Peace and Justice Law, and gave the legal basis for the demobilization process of the AUC. It also included for the first time transitional justice elements in the Colombian legislation. 23
like Canada, UNICEF, UNDP, Switzerland and the ICRC had financed since 2002 relatively small projects, mostly related with the assistance of victims. In this category, the main international supports were directed at strengthening the institutional capacities at national level, especially of the Presidential Programme for Integral Action against Anti-personal Landmines (PAICMA). The EU cooperated with the Programme since 2005, and prolonged its support until the end of the period, with a significant project in 2011 aimed at further developing the national policy against landmines and extending its action throughout the territory. Japan also supported PAICMA and provided equipment to hospitals and rehabilitations units, and some technical assistance for demining. 25 20 15 10 5 0 Top donors for Mine Action in Colombia 2002-2011 Millions of USD at current prices 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Source: Author with GoC/SIAOD data 2011 NORWAY JAPAN SPAIN USA EU Chart 13 Another emphasis was put on education on landmine risk management and awareness raising. Spain, Norway and the EU financed NGOs, UNICEF and the Red Cross to work with CSOs at national and local level on prevention strategies for communities affected by the presence of landmines. They also financed projects for persons that suffered accidents with these explosives. Some projects focused on providing them legal support and orientation, and many of them provided humanitarian assistance to victims. Apart from specific initiatives, few efforts were done in rehabilitation. Spain, the EU, Belgium, Switzerland and most of all the USA cooperated in this area, especially in the second half of our period of analysis. The absence of serious cooperation in demining is notable. Demining will probably become an issue of interest for the Government with the land restitution efforts ahead, as well as an interesting cooperation topic for donors, taking into account the recent legislation allowing private companies to carry out such activities, since most of them come from the donor s countries. Nonetheless, so far and during the period under study, this task was carried out by the military, and the international assistance provided for this purpose was therefore not included as ODA. 24
f. Recruitment Prevention The prevention of the involvement of children in the armed conflict has been the area with less support from the international community in the agenda of CT in Colombia in the last decade. The data shows only three significant projects since 2008 in terms of ODA (from the US, Canada and Sweden), as well as the permanent work of UNICEF especially since the second half of the decade. Before 2008, only Sweden and the EU reported some medium scale projects on this topic. 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 Top donors for Recruitment Prevention in Colombia 2002-2011 Millions of USD at current prices UNICEF EU CANADA SWEDEN USA The cooperation was mainly provided in two areas. The first one was the development of a national policy for the prevention of forced recruitment of 0.0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Source: Author with GoC/SIAOD data Chart 14 children by armed groups. Since 2005, Colombia decided to participate in the monitoring mechanism of the UN for the follow-up of the situation of children at risk of getting involved in the conflict (Res. 1612/05). Since, it has established an inter-sectorial commission in 2007 to provide policy guidance on recruitment prevention, and has developed some legislation covering this issue. With the permanent assistance of UNICEF, almost all the donors have supported this effort at national level, and in fewer cases at regional level too. To do so, some cooperation has also been allocated to conduct studies at national and regional level in order to better understand the dynamics of forced recruitment, as well as the main challenges and risks threatening children in different places. The second emphasis was put on concrete initiatives of prevention in regions with high risks of forced recruitment. Some projects supported integral strategies of secure environments for children, while other adopted sports, cultural or social approaches for that same purpose. USA and Canada also financed projects to provide licit alternatives for income generation, licit production and economic livelihoods for minors. In this line, USAID and IOM also worked on with national institutions to support training centers in rural areas. Many of the projects reported here were often designed to work at the same time on forced recruitment and on reintegration of demobilized children, reducing in fact even more the actual resources available for prevention. 25
g. Victims and vulnerable groups The victims and the vulnerable groups to the armed conflict 43 (VVG) received the highest share of the official development assistance to Colombia from 2002 to 2011. The international community supported them over every other topic in all the areas of cooperation. With more than a $1 billion, they received almost a quarter of the resources of all the projects officially reported to the Colombian Government, and about a third of all the investments in conflict transformation 44. It is important to evidence that there were many ways of supporting the VVG. The results of the data classification summarized in chart 15 shows six main areas of work during the last decade. Chart 15: International Support for Victims and Vulnerable Groups in Colombia by topics 2002-2011 CSO Empowerment & Strengthening 7% Truth, Justice & Reparation 11% Others 4% Land and property Protection and Restitution 3% Relocations, Returns, Integration and Rehabilitation 13% Protection & Assistance 43% Socioeconomic Recovery & Job Training 19% Source: Author based on GoC/SIAOD data The first interesting element reflected in this chart, is that even if the topic of protection and assistance was the most significant one in terms of investments, more than half of the resources were allocated in other longer term components. Moreover and as discussed below, even if this category included 43 Not all the people or groups vulnerable to the conflict get to be victimized. For instance, children at risk of being recruited might be vulnerable to this risk, but might also not become victims if they are finally not forced to get involved with an armed group. 44 Annex 4 presents the trends of the evolution of ODA for each one of these six topics, as well as the main donors for victims and vulnerable groups to the conflict. As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the amount of resources given for humanitarian assistance was probably even higher than the one reflected in the SIAOD because of a sub-report to the Government on this topic. For instance, ECHO s have disbursed annually about 12 million in the last years for humanitarian projects (including for disasters), but these were not recorded in the database for our period of analysis (it is now since 2011). Part B of Annex 4 presents a brief discussion on this sub-report of humanitarian financing in Colombia. 26
humanitarian relief, in fact it went beyond it encompassing a wider scope of protection. Nonetheless, the fact that only 7% of the funds were dedicated to the empowerment and strengthening of civil society organizations also indicates that most of the assistance was thought to be provided through public institutions or NGOs. Few was thought to strengthen directly the civil society s own protection mechanisms, which usually constitutes the first source of resistance and response against violence. The second appealing result is that about a third of the resources in this component were invested in the recovery of the victims. This included: (i) economic recovery (mainly through job trainings, productive initiatives, employment creation strategies and small business development); (ii) psychophysical recovery (mainly through physical rehabilitation and psychological treatment), (iii) social recovery (mainly through education programs, sociocultural projects, and community based integration and reconciliation initiatives). To a lesser extent, it also included some housing projects and living conditions improvements, some integral programs for returns or local integration, and some prevention programs for vulnerable populations on different topics and for specific vulnerabilities (i.e. health, sexual violence, accompaniment of indigenous communities at high risk, recruitment prevention and child demobilization). The third important element also reflected in chart 16, is that after the 2003-2006 AUC demobilization process and the subsequent establishment of transitional justice instruments in the national legislation, there was a growing influx of 160 140 120 100 80 ODA FOR VICTIMS AND VULNERABLE GROUPS IN COLOMBIA 2002-2011 USD at current prices 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Protection & Assistance Socioeconomic Recovery & Job Training Relocations, Returns, Integration and Rehabilitation Truth, Justice & Reparation cooperation to support the realization 60 of the victims rights to truth, justice 40 and reparation. Some of these 20 CSO Empowerment & Strengthening resources were destined to strengthen 0 Land and property Protection and key Colombian institutions in this Restitution process (in particular the National Source: Author based on GoC/SIAOD data Chart 16 Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation, the Prosecutor s Office and the Public Ministry), but also national and international NGOs working on legal advising for the victims and for human rights. 27
Another significant element is reflected in the resources provided for the protection and restitution of the lands and properties stolen or illegally acquired from the IDPs and other victims. This topic had received very little attention from the State and the international community in the past, but started to attract some cooperation from the World Bank and UNHCR from 2002 and 2003, and posteriorly gained more international attention since the creation of a program for the land and patrimony protection. Hence, since 2005 this became a topic of national and international interest which became even more attractive since the expedition of the Victims and Land Restitution Law in June 2011. The mentioned program became the Restitution Unit of the Agriculture Ministry in charge of the implementation of a central part of this law, in a country where the victims have been deprived from more than 6 million hectares of land. Even if this result is very important (and cannot be attributed only to international cooperation), during the decade under study, this was the topic with less ODA invested in the global support given to the victims and the vulnerable groups (less than 4%). Finally, and to get back to the point mentioned earlier, it is interesting to note that the international support for the victims protection did not rely exclusively on humanitarian relief. Indeed the revision of the cooperation projects could be summarized in four (simplified) humanitarian protection approaches. First, through the support of the public institutions in charge of the response for the victims (i.e. the Social Solidarity Network, Acción Social, the Colombian Family Welfare Institute or the territorial authorities). Second, through the support of non-governmental state institutions in charge of the defense of the victims rights and with the ability to compel the national and sub-national governments to act (i.e. the Public Ministry, the Constitutional Court, the Ombudsman Office). Third, through the support of national and international organizations who could be physically close to the victims and other vulnerable populations in their own territories (i.e. humanitarian organizations, NGOs, the Church). As such they served to advocate for their rights and protection at local level, denounce abuses to the authorities and the international community, to orient and link the victims to the national protection instruments (like the IDPs registry), and to be present on the ground in order to try whiteness and deter gross violations of human rights. The forth protection approach was the provision of humanitarian relief, which also permitted to be close to the victims while providing basic aid. The high costs of the logistics, the materials and the distributed goods explain the relative high weight of the means invested for the provision of the assistance, compared to the activities of the other three approaches. The ICRC program and the WFP s Prolonged Rescue Operation were the most important ones in terms of funds and extent. Lastly, some organizations like the UNHCR strategically used these four protection approaches in parallel. 28
III. Key results and recommendations for the future 1. Summary and analysis of key results The data analysis confirms the initial hypothesis that international donors increasingly prioritized Colombia since the beginning of the failed peace process with the FARC in 1998, climbing from that year 44 positions in the ranking of ODA recipients up to place 23 in 2011 45. The finding according to which at least two thirds of the projects reported to the Government have a direct relation to the conflict also corroborates the fact that the armed confrontation has been the principal reason to attract ODA during the decade under study. The classification of these projects into categories reflects a multiplicity of approaches to support the victims and the transformation of the conflict. Depending on their own interests and their bilateral negotiations with the Government and other stakeholders, the donors have prioritized different related topics. Chart 17 helps to visualize these approaches for the top seven donors of CT in Colombia 46. Some of the most protruding facts derived from the results of the research are summarized below. First, certain topics have received the attention of many donors; others have only gotten the decided support of few sources, while others were almost not prioritized by the international community. The first category contains the humanitarian assistance and protection of the VVG and the peacebuilding 45 Other countries that reached the level of middle income countries stopped receiving cooperation for that reason, whereas ODA grew in Colombia because of the conflict and the drugs, even having reached the level of upper-middle income country. This combination probably explains the escalation in the ranking of ODA recipients. 46 See Annex 5 for further details about each one of the top donors emphasis on CT, in absolute and relative terms. 29
initiatives. The second category contains the alternative development, the national consolidation plan and the DDR and its transitional justice mechanisms. The topics lacking general support were the prevention of child recruitment and the action against landmines. This finding is notorious given the gravity of both phenomenon in the country, their humanitarian impacts and the reiterative international condemnation of both practices. It could also reinforce a hypothesis reflected in chart 7 according to which the evolution of ODA depends in part of the resonance of some particular milestones in the evolution of the conflict and the country s political life (i.e. the end of the peace process, the demobilization of the AUC, the establishment of the Strategic Leap, the expedition of the Victims Law, etc). Probably both topics belonging to category three have indeed little political value. Second, all the donors used simultaneously different avenues to contribute to CT. These avenues were not only constituted from their choices in terms of the topics upheld, but also on the ways to back them up. The case of the projects for the protection and assistance to the VVG is in this sense illustrative; a same donor or international organization could implement in parallel diverse strategies towards the government: support and strengthen its capacities, pressure it via NGOs or institutions of control, influence it bringing issues to the agenda, or even substitute or complement its duty to protect with the provision of humanitarian relief, when it hasn t been able to assist a particular vulnerable group. A third element somehow related to the last one, is that the international and the humanitarian community have also used many ways of supporting the VVG. Even if Colombia has a crisis that amounts to have the world highest number of IDP and more than 5.5 million victims, the external response has gone beyond the provision of humanitarian relief. Indeed, about 32% has been destined for recovery, 21% for restoration and empowerment, and 43% for protection and assistance. As discussed in the document, this last category included relief but also other protection strategies. This finding somehow contradicts part of the second initial hypothesis of the research, according to which the provision of humanitarian assistance would have been one of the areas most supported by ODA. Fourth, even if the research does not seek to examine the impact nor the results of the cooperation, the process have led to deduce that the amount of the investment does not per se define the effects of an initiative or its contribution to the transformation of the conflict. For instance, the paper has mentioned how the topic with fewer investments in the victims category (land protection and restitution) has converted after a few years into the institutional Unit in charge of one of the central policies for CT in the coming years: the Victims Law. Another example is the political, logistical and technical support 30
given by countries such as Venezuela, Brazil, Cuba, Norway or Switzerland to facilitate humanitarian or peace agreements between the Government and non-state armed groups. Lastly, in the previous paragraph the word contribution is highlighted to bear in mind that the international efforts have been important, but very marginal in terms of the total expenses made with national resources. As discussed in the second chapter, the proportion of ODA amounts to 2.2% of the public expenses. The analysis of the context has also shown the leading role of the country to define priorities and to raise international support to back them up. The formulation and funding of Plan Colombia by the Pastrana s Administration, the shift of the Plan s objective from an antinarcotic strategy to a counterinsurgency strategy by President Uribe, and the establishment of transitional instruments centered on the victims during Santos mandate, illustrate this point. In addition, other national non-state actors have also been able to define priorities and raise international and governmental support. The experience of the regional peace and development programs developed and led by the Church and the CSOs in the Magdalena Medio region is a good example, since they later became EU s and Sweden s principal investment during the decade, and also received a lot of support from the UN, the World Bank and other donors, including the Government. Nonetheless, it is important to underline that in most of these and other cases, the international community has used its cooperation and political leverage to support and shape these policies in different ways. In particular, it has done so by: (i) bringing issues to the political agenda, (ii) advocating for the respect of international standards and obligations, (iii) influencing the policies and their orientation, (iv) exercising pressure for a particular cause, (v) providing flexible resources to ease institutional changes, and (vi) financing underfunded programs or initiatives. Understood like this, and examining ODA together with other foreign policy instruments, one can better dimension the potential role of the international community in the process of transformation of the conflict. 2. Lessons and recommendations for the future Colombia seems to come close to a turning point in the story of its conflict. Even without an agreement with the FARC (or any other armed group), this transformation has accelerated since the beginning of the century. Of course a successful negotiation process would probably bolster this change towards a more peaceful future, if the required conditions are established. Part of the necessary infrastructure to sustain this change can be reinforced with a strategic support from the international community. Perhaps some lessons derived from the research and certain thoughts linked to the analysis developed so far can provide useful considerations for the future of the Official Development Assistance in Colombia for CT. The rest of this section proposes five strategic recommendations in this direction. 31
First of all, it is necessary to acknowledge the fact that the country has reached a peak of influx of resources that will hardly be sustained in the future, at least for conflict transformation topics. Today the international context of DAC donors is undermined by a serious economic situation and by a new geopolitical context. But on the other hand, the country s situation has considerably evolved. From being considered as a weak state in 1999, today the economic and social panorama has significantly improved. The armed confrontation has also evolved, and the State which now counts with a strong military apparatus has been able to recover control over most part of its territory. Consequently, the EU has already declared that Colombia will no longer be focalized with its programmable bilateral funds (which are the most sizeable ones). Others countries like Norway are no longer present in the country or are reconsidering their permanence in the future. On the other hand, other donors are making a shift of their agenda with Colombia in areas such as trade, environment and private business. After a visit of the US Vice President to Bogota in May 2013, the US Ambassador declared that both countries had started a new relationship since it had been denarcotized47, and the resources of Plan Colombia had gradually been reduced (though still maintained). The Vice President mentioned a future partnership based on social inclusion, human rights, energy and science48. A month earlier, USAID s Administrator affirmed that its country would support the peace process and highlighted its support for rural development in the future, emphasizing on bringing private foreign investments to Colombia49. Second, because the peace and the stability of the region depend to a large extent on the country s own stability, there are still possibilities to attract ODA in the coming years for CT. As discussed in chapter 2, the persistence of very serious threats of violence, summed to national and transnational organized crime (old and new), as well as a concerning humanitarian situation derived from a critical balance of human rights violations and social exclusion, still poses difficult challenges that should concern the entire International community. Furthermore, even if the Government reaches a peace agreement with the FARC and the ELN, the maintenance and consolidation of such peace is a critical yet unstable issue. The experience shows that half of the countries in post-conflict situation fall back into confrontations within the five next years (Prandi 2010, 25). A real transformation of a conflict in terms of reconciliation and positive peace will depend largely on the years following an agreement, and are then also a matter of interest and concern of the international community. At the 47 Interview to Ambassador Peter Michael McKinley by El Espectador Magazine, May 25 th of 2013, available at: http://www.elespectador.com/-noticias/politica/articulo-424168-se-ha-desnarcotizado-relacion-colombia 48 th Speech of US Vice President Joe Bidden in Bogota on the 27 of May of 2013, available at: http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/05/20130528148024.html#axzz2uck9yipi 49 th In El Espectador magazine of April 29 of 2013, available at: http://m.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/articulo419215-estados-unidos-un-socio-estrategico-el-plan-colombia-usaid 32
same time, other topics not related to CT could also receive growing ODA support (i.e. environment and climate change, entrepreneurship, extreme poverty, science, research and innovation, and others). Third, major ODA investments will only target Colombia depending on the Government s ability to mobilize the International community at the highest political level around a common strategic vision. The boost of cooperation since the early 2000 s was largely explained by the leadership and diplomatic capacity of Pastrana s Administration to gain the political support of his homologues abroad and to convince the US and the EU parliaments to invest in Colombia for a common purpose (i.e. Plan Colombia or the regional peace initiatives). Today, most chiefs of State have expressed their support to the negotiations. Maybe more time and resources will be needed to get the engagement of influent parliamentarians and to define a new cooperation framework able to mobilize new international commitments. Fourth, many avenues can contribute to conflict transformation, and a renewed cooperation in this field would have to build upon prior efforts already supported during years of investments in peacebuilding initiatives. The research has shown that the drivers of the conflict and its consequences can be addressed simultaneously from many perspectives. This also includes programs that are not directly targeting the transformation of the conflict, but that are crucial for the reintegration of the fighters, the recovery of the victims and the reconciliation of the society. Education, income generation, land reform and rural development programs are good examples of the latter. It is a responsibility of the Government, its Cooperation Agency and the donors to strategically ensure the coherence, complementarity and impact of all of these initiatives combined. The data have also evidenced that at least two thirds of the country s ODA in the past decade have been invested in the field of CT. Hence, besides focusing on developing additional required initiatives, new investments should also strengthen and consolidate the existing infrastructures for peace developed in the past. It can be noted that the identification, definition and implementation of these strategic projects should be defined taking into account a representative range of national and regional voices. Fifth and last, Colombia should not look outside it boarders only focusing on ODA, but on all the range of international instruments and opportunities that can be far more significant that foreign official assistance alone. This has indeed a twofold consideration: the significance of the resources and the foreign strategic vision of the country. The first one has to integrate what Vicenç Fisas calls the dividends of disarmament, which come from the reduction of 30% to 50% of the military expenditure 33
after a peace agreement (2011, 27). To be complete, in the medium and long term it should also include the increase of the countries economy. A brief estimation indicates that the annual Colombian peace dividend could be in the short term at least three times the ODA of 2011 (which was the highest in the last 40 years), and in the medium and longer term, rise up to eight times this amount50. This figure, together with the fact that the ODA has represented only 0.5% of the country s GNI in the last 10 years, show that the efforts to fund peace will mainly be national. Now, as discussed in the first part of this chapter, even if the cooperation will be marginal in terms of investments, it could still be highly important and useful if well and strategically oriented. It will also remain quiet essential for CSOs that mainly receive support from the international cooperation and not from the State. This includes the provision of humanitarian protection and assistance, when the Government fails to provide it. The second consideration is that ODA represents only a small part of the benefits that Colombia can get from the rest of the world. In economic terms, areas like trade, foreign direct investment (from and for the country) and international finance can have a much wider impact than ODA on the well-being of the society. These impacts can be either positive or negative depending on the regulations and public policies to frame them. The Government s attention should then be directed at making sure that the results of the investments for the post-conflict (including ODA), are not swept away by other stronger forces, but reinforced by them. This is vital even without a peace agreement. This second consideration also encompasses non-economic dimensions, because the international community should overall not be seen and treated as a bank. As the experience of the last 15 years has shown, the potential of the non-oda aspects of the international cooperation can be very powerful in the process of achieving peace and reconciliation, if treated with an appropriate leadership, vision, investment and commitment. Areas such as regional and transnational security, political support, diplomatic leverage, intelligence, neutral mediation, observation of human rights and other legal international obligations, impartial surveillance of agreements, judicial collaboration, capacity building, knowledge sharing and horizontal partnerships, are all types of cooperation through which the international community could also make major contributions to transform the conflict in the short, medium and long term in Colombia. 50 Riveros notes that most of the economic research indicates that the conflict has cost 1.5% to 2% of the GDP s growth (2013). In 2011, Colombia s GDP was USD 333.4 billion (1.5% of this is amount is USD 5 billion). On the other side, a study of the liberal party in 2012 estimated the cost of the conflict in the last decade in almost USD 100 billion (http://www.portafolio.co/economia/el-alto-precio-pesos-del-conflicto-armado-colombia). Annually, 30% of this sum amounts to more than USD 3 billion per year. The total result is around USD 8 billion. 34
3. Final remarks This document is issued in a critical moment of the peace negotiations between the Government and the FARC, and after a decade of fundamental policies and events regarding the internal armed conflict. Knowing where we come from is key to inform the decisions of the future. In 2003, after reviewing the literature on conflict transformation, Johannes Botes concluded: What seems to be left out of the discussion thus far, and indeed out of most of the literature on conflict transformation, is any in-depth discussion of the role of third parties or conflict intervenors. Questions about who are transformationalists and why they are performing their professional and social roles seem largely unaddressed. The moral and ethical foundations of outsiders who are endeavoring to transform individuals, relationships, or systems in societies of which they are not a part should be part of this ongoing debate around the term and its application. It does not seem sufficient for peace and conflict theorists or practitioners to report ( ) that they are informed by a conception of the good, which drives their desire to do good to others by transforming them. This research is an academic contribution in this direction. It certainly doesn t answer many of the questions raised by Botes, but it provides some evidence and an aggregate analysis to think about it from one of the dimensions of the international cooperation. In this sense, it showed that in Colombia, between 2002 and 2011, at least two thirds of the ODA officially reported were related to the existence of its internal armed conflict. These resources represented a drastic increase of influx of international cooperation for the country. The document also analyzed the evolution of this ODA in the light of the progress of the confrontation, and found that donors contributed through different avenues to its transformation. They privileged the VVG over every other topic, using as well diverse approaches, which included humanitarian relief, but also recovery, restoration and other forms of protection. The paper finally proposed a set of recommendations for the future cooperation for conflict transformation. In the coming years, more investigations should be conducted to assess the results and the impacts of the Official Development Assistance in the field of peacebuilding and conflict transformation. This will give elements to deeply understand the roles of the International community in its quality of outsider transformationalist, and to focalize better its complementary and marginal efforts. Lederach summarizes the importance of this issue with great sharpness: How do we help heal broken humanity? is a question that cannot be dismissed as a luxury or as the work of ex post facto humanitarian actors; it is central to the heart of conflict transformation- if the conflict is actually to be transformed and the transformation sustained over time (2010, 32). It seems that the Colombian society has taken the decision to transform the course of its history of violence and exclusion and restore the dignity of the people who have unfairly suffered and endured it. Hopefully, they will take the right choices and count with a decided and respectful international community, to finally heal its broken humanity. 35
Bibliography Acevedo, B.; Bewley-Taylor, D.;; Youngers, C. 2008. Ten years of Plan Colombia: An Analytic Assessment, Briefing Paper 16, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme. Acción Social, 2008. Cuarenta años de la institucionalidad de la cooperación internacional en Colombia, in http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/documentos/40_a%c3%b1os.pdf Agencia Presidencial de Cooperación Internacional de Colombia, 2012. Estrategia Nacional de Cooperación Internacional de Colombia 2012-2014, in http://www.apccolombia.gov.co/documentos/enci-2012-2014.pdf Álvarez S.; Rettberg A. 2008. Cuantificando los efectos económicos del conflicto: una exploración de los costos y los estudios sobre los costos del conflicto armado colombiano, Bogotá: Colombia Internacional Ávila, A. 2013. Del Caguán a la Habana. Corporación Nueva Arcoíris, Bogotá. Botes, J. 2003. Conflict transformation: a debate over semantics or a crucial shift in the theory and practice of peace and conflict studies?, The International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol.8, Number 2, in http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol8_2/botes.htm Cardona, D. Ardila, M. 2005. Colombia y su mundo externo: dinámicas y tendencias Colombia y su política exterior en el siglo XXI, Colombia, CEREC. Castañeda, D. 2012. Peace Laboratories in Colombia: the European Approach to Peace-building. Institut d Etudes Politiques de Paris CCAI. 2010. Resumen ejecutivo del plan nacional de consolidación, http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/documentos/reporte_eject_pnc_2010_vf.pdf DRN. 2012. Evaluation of the Commission of the European Union s co-operation with Colombia: Final report, in: ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2013/1315_vol2_en.pdf Fisas, V. 2011. Anuario procesos de paz 2011, Escola de Cultura de Pau, Editorial Icaría. Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona Fischer, D. 2007 Peace as a Self-Regulating Process. In Webel, C.; Galtung, J., Eds. 2007. Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 187-205. Fundación Ideas para la Paz. 2011. Balance de la Política Nacional de Consolidación Territorial, Serie Informes No. 14, Bogotá, in http://www.ideaspaz.org/images/consolidacionweb.pdf Diego Cardona Editores. 2011. Colombia, una política económica en transición. Friederich Ebert Stifung en Colombia. 36
Departamento Nacional de Planeación. 2006. Balance Plan Colombia 1999-2005, Dirección de Justicia y Seguridad, Bogotá. Escobar P. 2013. Los carteles neoparamilitares que mandan en Colombia, Corporación Nuevo Arcoiris, in http://www.arcoiris.com.co/2013/03/los-carteles-neoparamilitares-que-mandan-encolombia/ GAO. 2008. Plan Colombia: Report to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate. In http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0971.pdf Gonzalez, F. 2004. El Fenómeno Político de Álvaro Uribe Vélez, Institut de recherche et débat sur la gouvernance, Paris (in http://www.institut-gouvernance.org/es/analyse/fiche-analyse-245.html). Guzman, D.; Sanchez, N.; Uprimny, R. 2010. Las víctimas y la justicia transicional: están cumpliendo los estados latino americanos con los estándares internacionales? (p. 95-125) Fundación para el Debido Proceso Legal ed. Hartzell, C.; Lamb, R; McLean, P.; Mendelson, J.; Olano, M.C. 2011. USAID/OTI s initial governance response program in colombia: final evaluation, USAID, in http://csis.org/files/publication/110701_colombia_evaluation.pdf ICRC 2012. ICRC Annual report 2011, in http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/annualreport/icrc-annual-report-2011.htm IDMC and NRC 2013. Global Overview 2012: People internally displaced by conflict and violence in http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/global-overview-2012 Lederach, JP. 1997. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C. Lederach, JP. 2003a. "Conflict Transformation.", Beyond Intractability. Eds. Burgess G.; Burgess, H. Conflict Information Consortium, Colorado University http://www.beyondintractability.org/biessay/transformation Lederach, JP. 2003b. "Defining Conflict Transfoamtion." Center for Justice and Reconciliation, in http://www.restorativejustice.org/10fulltext/lederach Lederach, JP. 2010. Strategic Peacebuilding: An Overview, in Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World, Philpott, D.; Powers, G. Ed. Oxford University Press, New York. Leon, J. 2004. El cerco de Bogotá. El Malpensante (September October 2004 edition). Marín, E. 2009. OING y derechos humanos en Colombia: Un golpe ineludible y vigoroso de la sociedad civil. Bogotá: Colombia Internacional, Pp. 70 85 37
Mejía D. 2012. The War on Drugs Under Plan Colombia, in Zedillo, E.;; Wheeler, H. Eds. 2012. Rethinking the War on Drugs Through the US-Mexico Prism. Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, New Heaven. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. 2007. Política de Consolidación de la Seguridad Democrática. Bogotá, in http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/colombia2007.pdf Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. 2003. Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática. Bogotá, in http://www.oas.org/csh/spanish/documentos/colombia.pdf Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. 2009. Tercera Conferencia Internacional sobre Colombia: Proceso Londres- Bogotá- Cartagena. Bogotá, in http://mre.cancilleria.gov.co/wps/wcm/connect/e4ba1d8044be8fdeb195bb88679c5b6d/contenid o+memoriasfinal.pdf?mod=ajperes Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2003. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia, in http://www.hchr.org.co/documentoseinformes/informes/altocomisionado/informe2002_eng.pdf Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2013. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia, in http://www.hchr.org.co/documentoseinformes/informes/altocomisionado/informe2012en.pdf Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2011. Bussan partnership for effective development co-operation Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.2008. Is it ODA? OECD November Factsheet, in http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/34086975.pdf Paladini Adel, B. 2012 From Peacebuilding and Human Development Coalitions to Peace Infrastructure in Colombia, in Unger B.; Lundström, S.; Planta, K.; and Austin B. (eds.). Peace Infrastructures Assessing Concept and Practice. Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series No. 10. Pizarro Leongómez, E. 2004. Una democracia asediada, balances y perspectivas del conflicto armado en Colombia. Editorial Norma, Bogotá. Prandi, M. 2010. De los conflictos armados a la construcción de paz, in Prandi, M. and Lozano, J. (eds). La RSE en contextos de conflicto y postconflicto: de la gestión del riesgo a la creación de valor. Escola de Cultura de Pau Presidencia de la República- Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. 2003. Política de Defensa y de Seguridad Democrática, Bogotá, in http://www.oas.org/csh/spanish/documentos/colombia.pdf Presidencia de la República, 2009. Directiva Presidencial No. 1 del 20 de marzo de 2009, in http://www.accioncontraminas.gov.co/documents/directiva_presidencial%20_salto_estrategico.pdf 38
Riveros, A. 2013. Crecimiento económico y conflicto interno en Colombia, in La Razonpublica.com, http://www.razonpublica.com/index.php/recomendado/3521-crecimiento-economico-yconflicto-interno-en-colombia.html Rosen, J. 2012. «Plan Colombia and Beyond: Pastrana to Santos- 2000 to 2012". University of Miami Open Access Dissertations, Paper 880. Tickner, A. 2003. Colombia and the United States: From Counternarcotics to Counterterrorism," Current History 1026, no.661. Trindade, M. 2009. International Cooperation and Internal displacement in Colombia: facing the challenges of the largest humanitarian crisis in South America Sur - Rede Universitária de Direitos Humanos United Nations Development Programme. 2003. Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano: El Conflicto: Callejón con Salida. Panamericana Formas e Impresos S.A. Bogotá. United Nations. 2012. The Secretary-General s Five-Year Action Agenda in http://www.un.org/sg/priorities/sg_agenda_2012.pdf United Nations Development Programme. 2013. Human Development Report 2013: The Rise of the South, in http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2013/ United Nations General Assembly. 2012. Children and armed conflict: report of the Secretary- General. Document A/66/782S/2012/261, in: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4fd706472.html United Nations Economic and Social Council. 2012. Trends and progress in international development cooperation: Report of the Secretary General in: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=e/2012/78 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1612 of 2005 On children in armed conflict. Document S/RES/1612, in: http://www.refworld.org/docid/43f308d6c.html USAID, 2009. Concept Paper: Strategic Development and Enhanced Livelihoods Initiative, in http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnado962.pdf Veillette, C. 2005. Plan Colombia: A Progress Report. CRS Report for Congress, in http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/rl32774.pdf 39
ANNEXES 40
1. ODA tables a. World ODA disbursements from 2002 to 2011 in millions of USD at current prices Global ODA in Millions 2002-2011 at current prices Year Recipients 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Grand Total 1 Iraq 113 2'288 4'651 22'057 8'889 9'204 9'884 2'791 2'192 1'904 63'974 2 Afghanistan 1'310 1'594 2'311 2'838 2'962 4'965 4'875 6'235 6'426 6'711 40'227 3 Nigeria 298 308 577 6'409 11'428 1'956 1'290 1'657 2'062 1'813 27'798 4 Congo, Dem. Rep. 1'175 5'417 1'919 1'882 2'197 1'357 1'766 2'357 3'543 5'522 27'134 5 Ethiopia 1'324 1'626 1'828 1'928 2'034 2'558 3'329 3'819 3'525 3'563 25'535 6 Vietnam 1'280 1'772 1'846 1'913 1'845 2'511 2'552 3'732 2'940 3'514 23'905 7 Tanzania 1'270 1'725 1'772 1'499 1'883 2'822 2'331 2'933 2'958 2'445 21'639 8 Pakistan 2'105 1'072 1'440 1'615 2'180 2'270 1'550 2'769 3'013 3'509 21'522 9 India 1'758 730 774 1'876 1'384 1'391 2'117 2'500 2'806 3'220 18'556 10 West Bank & Gaza Strip 972 1'042 1'161 1'016 1'360 1'717 2'470 2'817 2'519 2'444 17'517 11 Mozambique 2'219 1'048 1'243 1'297 1'639 1'777 1'996 2'012 1'952 2'047 17'230 12 Sudan 305 620 994 1'826 2'048 2'121 2'566 2'351 2'076 1'138 16'045 13 Uganda 725 998 1'216 1'192 1'586 1'737 1'641 1'785 1'723 1'580 14'185 14 Bangladesh 906 1'395 1'414 1'319 1'221 1'515 2'071 1'226 1'415 1'498 13'979 15 Ghana 686 983 1'419 1'151 1'243 1'165 1'307 1'582 1'693 1'815 13'044 16 Indonesia 1'305 1'772 132 2'534 1'318 904 1'231 1'047 1'393 415 12'049 17 Kenya 393 523 660 759 947 1'327 1'366 1'776 1'629 2'474 11'854 18 China 1'497 1'359 1'716 1'814 1'248 1'488 1'480 1'129 646-796 11'581 19 Serbia 2'085 1'320 1'158 1'066 1'578 840 973 624 660 596 10'899 20 Zambia 811 775 1'130 1'172 1'468 1'008 1'116 1'267 914 1'073 10'734 21 Egypt 1'312 1'017 1'553 1'034 900 1'136 1'741 999 592 410 10'694 22 Morocco 353 573 770 732 1'102 1'221 1'451 930 993 1'237 9'362 23 Haiti 156 213 299 426 582 702 912 1'120 3'065 1'712 9'185 24 Cameroon 606 886 791 414 1'719 1'926 549 648 541 623 8'702 25 South Africa 511 656 629 690 715 807 1'125 1'075 1'031 1'274 8'513 26 Mali 425 559 588 721 866 1'019 964 984 1'089 1'271 8'486 27 Senegal 443 457 1'070 698 865 870 1'069 1'016 928 1'052 8'467 28 Burkina Faso 440 541 643 693 901 950 1'001 1'083 1'062 990 8'305 29 Colombia 438 800 515 621 1'005 723 972 1'059 901 1'130 8'165 30 Jordan 563 1'326 603 708 573 640 738 740 954 959 7'805 31 Nicaragua 517 843 1'240 763 740 840 741 773 621 695 7'773 32 Cote d'ivoire 1'068 254 161 91 247 171 626 2'402 845 1'437 7'301 33 Rwanda 363 335 490 577 603 723 934 934 1'032 1'278 7'269 34 Bolivia 689 938 785 643 850 476 628 725 675 759 7'170 35 Malawi 378 518 506 573 723 744 924 771 1'023 798 6'958 36 Madagascar 374 546 1'263 913 782 894 843 444 470 409 6'937 37 Turkey 279 165 285 396 566 792 1'116 1'362 1'047 839 6'847 38 Sri Lanka 343 672 506 1'161 786 615 731 703 580 611 6'708 39 Cambodia 485 518 485 536 529 675 743 721 734 792 6'219 40 Nepal 343 467 425 424 527 603 697 854 818 892 6'050 41 Lebanon 203 534 266 230 819 979 1'070 580 448 432 5'562 42 Liberia 55 107 213 222 260 701 1'251 513 1'419 765 5'508 43 Honduras 421 394 658 690 594 464 564 456 574 624 5'440 44 Niger 300 480 548 522 544 544 612 469 745 649 5'414 45 Bosnia-Herzegovina 556 542 686 549 535 599 467 414 510 425 5'283 46 Georgia 314 230 313 292 356 380 888 907 625 550 4'855 47 Benin 219 300 394 347 399 474 641 682 689 677 4'823 48 Somalia 153 176 201 240 396 394 766 662 498 1'096 4'581 49 Zimbabwe 199 187 187 373 278 478 612 736 732 718 4'501 50 Congo, Rep. 58 69 115 1'425 258 119 485 283 1'312 254 4'379 Grand Total 58'067 67'589 74'968 101'644 99'535 100'057 113'291 114'992 119'730 121'399 971'272 Source: Author with OECD/QWIDS data 41
b. ODA to Colombia from 2002 to 2010 at constant prices of 2010 (in millions of USD) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 586 967 599 699 1095 746 965 1062 901 1096 8716 Source: World Bank Indicators c. ODA to Colombia from 2007 to 2011 by Sectors (in millions of USD at current prices) Production Sectors 12% ODA to Colombia by Sectors 2007-2011 Other 8% Humanitaria Aid 9% Economic Infrastructure & Services 6% Social Infrastructure & Services, 65% Source: Author with OECD/CRS data d. Channels for ODA to Colombia from 2007 to 2011 (in millions of USD at current prices) Channels of ODA for Colombia 2007-2011 Millions of USD Public Sector 2007-2011 52.3% NGOs & Civil Society 17.2% Other 12.1% Multilateral Org. 10.8% Undefined 7.5% PPP 0.1% Grand Total USD 4664 Source: Author with OECD/CRS data 42
e. ODA Donors to Colombia from 2007 to 2011 according to OECD data (in millions of USD at current prices) ODA for Colombia per donor 2007-2011 in millions of USD 3000 2500 2491 2000 1500 1000 500 0 433 352 280 244 148 130 104 73 62 61 286 Source: Author with OECD/CRS data 43
2. Disbursement matrix and SIAOD technical details a. Disbursement Matrix The disbursement Matrix is filled with the information reported by the donors national offices to the GoC. These data differs in a very significant way from the ones reveled by the OECD, since at national level only about 50% of the funds are reported in comparison to international reports (USD 8.165 to the OECD vs. USD 4.036 million to the GoC for the period under study). This difference reported by the donors national offices to the GoC and their Head Quarters to the OECD may correspond in part to the reasons listed below. 1. The offices at national level do not record the decentralized cooperation as the HQs do. 2. HQs allocate funds to INGOs at international level that are many times not reported by national offices (E.g.: humanitarian organizations, multilateral organizations and international funds). 3. The costs of operations of the donors are barely reported at national level. 4. Some non-programmable funds are not reported by donors at national level (this is for instance the case for some multilateral funds and many EU funding mechanisms). 5. Some concessional loans considered as ODA by the OECD are not reported at national level as ODA (the case of France is a notorious example). 6. The exchange rates used for the calculations may differ. 7. For different reason (intentional or not) the donors do not always report all their projects Official bilateral disbursements reports of top donors for Colombia from 2007 to 2011: Discrepancies between National and International level reports In Millions of current USD Top 10 Donors OECD/CRS reports GoC/DM reports Difference in USD % of funds reported at national level % of the overall discrepancy 1. United States 2491 864-1627 35% 72% 2. Spain 433 245-188 57% 8% 3. France 352 36-316 10% 14% 4. EU Institutions 280 198-83 70% 4% 5. Germany 244 137-107 56% 5% 6. Netherlands 148 143-5 96% 0% 7. Sweden 130 102-28 79% 1% 8. Canada 104 83-21 79% 1% 9. Switzerland 73 57-16 78% 1% 10. Norway 62 38-24 61% 1% Rest of donors 348 515 167 148% -7% TOTAL 4664 2416-2248 52% - Source : Author with OECD and GoC data 44
b. SIAOD i. About the Data The SIAOD is the system used by the Colombian Government to register all the new projects that are going to be financed by official donors in a given year. The information of the projects is filled by the donors or the International Organization themselves and then sent to APC-Colombia on a regular basis (at least once a year). The Agency then uploads this information in the SIAOD and makes it available to the public in the International Cooperation Map (http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/new_mapa/). This System contains each year s new projects financed by the donors. Since they usually are implemented in several years, the amount doesn t correspond to the year s disbursements but to the total value of a project. Hence, a 3 years project will only appear once, in it s the first year. APC-Colombia generously shared its entire SIAOD database with the author in order to analyze it for this research. Only the projects of the period financed by official donors (including official international organizations and excluding decentralized cooperation) for the period of the time of the study were kept. The projects of south-south cooperation do not appear in this database, nor do the projects funded by ECHO. The resulting database for this study counts for 7.471 projects valued in more than USD 10 billion (USD 4.517 million from international resources and USD 5.529 million from national counterparts). ii. Classification Methodology The GoC classifies the SIAOD projects according to the main topics defined by the Country s International Cooperation Strategy in place. Nonetheless, for a period of time that covers more than one Strategy, the changes in the categories are problematic for the analysis since there is no continuity between one strategy and the other that permits to keep track of the trends and evolution of the topics. Moreover, the categories used are too broad and do not necessarily permit to make sub-classifications of interest. Finally, these pre-established classifications might not be designed in a useful way for the analytical purposes of this research. For the above reasons, and in order to better understand the trends of international cooperation for CT in the country in the period under study, the author analyzed the 7.471 projects 51 and established a new classification as follows: 1. Directly related to CT or not (4.789 vs. 2.682 projects). 2. If related to CT, in which of these categories: - Recruitment Prevention - Mine Action - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration & Transitional Justice (DDR & TJ). 51 The analysis was based on the name of the project, its general objective and beneficiaries. 45
- Illicit crops substitution and drugs - National Consolidation Plan - Peace and peacebuilding - Victims and vulnerable groups - Others 3. What kind of projects have been put in place for victims and vulnerable groups: - Protection & Assistance - Socioeconomic Recovery & Job Training - Relocations, Returns, Integration and Rehabilitation - Truth, Justice & Reparation - Civil Society Organizations Empowerment & Strengthening - Land and property Protection and Restitution - Others It is important to note in the first step, that only the projects with an explicit reference to one of the categories of CT were included. This is why it is called directly related to CT. Nonetheless, probably many projects that do not explicitly refer CT elements in their objectives are indeed tackling conflict issues or focusing their work in population especially affected or exposed to the conflict, or because of its geographic location in a conflict affected area. This is for instance the case of some projects for indigenous communities highly vulnerable to conflict, whose general objectives mention the strengthening of their organization capacities but do not mention conflict explicitly. As a result, the number of projects that are tackling conflict issues is probably higher than the 4.789 ones identified, but these were not included in the first category in the sake of the methodological rigor. The topics of step 2 and 3 were established by the author based on logical possibilities of categories of projects linked to conflict related issues, their usefulness in terms of the paper s discussion, and on a broad observation of the projects in the database. It is also consistent and compatible with the policies identified by the 2003 UNDP National Development Report as central to address the conflict (negotiation, security, local conflict solutions, narcotics control, DDR, strengthening of local governments, justice, humanitarian action, and victims) (2003, 149). Moreover, in the second step, one project can belong to more than one category. For instance, the rehabilitation of a landmine victim will be classified in Mine Action and in Victims and Vulnerable groups, whereas a project of landmine awareness raising will only be classified in the Mine Action category. Lastly, in the third step each project belongs only to one category. Now, many projects tackle several issues at the same time or are willing to be integral. In this case, they are classified in the category where major emphasis seems to be on. It is important to acknowledge that a limitation of the methodology is that the information provided in the database is limited, and hence some projects could be classified in categories that could maybe be revised with more information. 46
3. Amount of ODA allocated by donors for CT projects by topics from 2002 to 2011 Total for CT ODA for Conflict Transformation in Colombia 2002-11 Millions of USD at current prices Top 10 Donors for Conflict Transformation 2002-11 Millions of USD at current prices $800 $700 $600 USA EU SWEDEN $500 SPAIN $400 $300 $200 $100 WFP GERMANY CANADA HOLLAND UNDP $0 SWITZERLAND 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 $0 $200 $400 $600 $800 $1'000 Peace and Peacebuilding ODA for Peace and Peacebuilding in Colombia 2002-11 Millions of USD at current prices Top Donors for Peace & Peacebuilding 2002-11 Millions of USD at current prices $180 $160 $140 $120 $100 $80 $60 $40 EU GERMANY SWEDEN UNDP SPAIN SWITZERLAND HOLLAND USA $20 CANADA $0 KOREA 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 $0 $100 $200 $300 $400 47
National Consolidation Plan $250 ODA for Consolidation in Colombia 2002-11 Millions of USD at current prices Top Donors for Consolidation in Colombia 2002-11 Millions of USD at current prices $200 $150 USA $100 $50 HOLLAND $0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 0 100 200 300 400 Mine Action $30 $25 $20 $15 $10 $5 $0 ODA for Mine Action in Colombia 2002-11 Millions of USD at current prices 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Top 10 Donors for Mine Action in Colombia 2002-11 Millions of USD at current prices EU USA SPAIN JAPAN NORWAY CANADA SWITZERTLAND UNICEF BELGIUM GERMANY 0 5 10 15 20 25 48
Recruitment Prevention $25 $20 $15 $10 $5 $0 ODA for Recruitment Prevention in Colombia 2002-11 Millions of USD at current prices 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 USA SWEDEN CANADA EU UNICEF SPAIN BELGIUM IOM ILO Top 10 Donors for Recruitment Prevention in Colombia 2002-11 Millions of USD at current prices 0 5 10 15 20 25 DDR & Transitional Justice $140 $120 $100 $80 $60 $40 $20 ODA for DDR & TJ in Colombia 2002-11 Millions of USD at current prices Top Donors for DDR & TJ in Colombia 2002-11 Millions of USD at current prices USA SWEDEN EU SPAIN HOLLAND GERMANY $0 JAPAN 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 0 50 100 150 49
Illicit Crops Substitution and Drugs ODA for Illicit Crops Substitution in Colombia Millions of USD at current prices Top Donors for Illicit Crops Substitution and Drugs in Colombia Millions of USD at current prices $100 $80 $60 $40 $20 $0 USA UNODC HOLLAND CANADA UNDP 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 $0 $100 $200 $300 Victims and Vulnerable Groups $250 ODA for Victims and Vulnerable Groups in Colombia 2002-11 Millions of USD at current prices Top Donors for Victims and Vulnerable Groups in Colombia 2002-11 Millions of USD at current prices $200 EU $150 USA WFP $100 SWEDEN $50 SPAIN CANADA $0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 UNHCR SWITZERLAND HOLLAND GERMANY UNDP NORWAY 0 50 100 150 200 250 50
4. Amount of ODA allocated to victims and vulnerable groups to conflict by topics from 2002-2011 a. Evolution by topics Total for VVG TOP 10 DONORS FOR VICTIMS AND VULNERABLE GROUPS IN COLOMBIA 2002-2011* Millions of USD at current prices NORWAY UNDP GERMANY SWITZERLAND HOLLAND UNHCR CANADA SPAIN SWEDEN WFP USA EU 250 200 150 100 50 0 ODA FOR VICTIMS AND VULNERABLE GROUPS TO THE CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA 2002-2011 Millions of USD at current prices 2002200320042005200620072008200920102011 Source: Author with GoC/SIAOD data 0 50 100 150 200 250 * The SIAOD does not include ECHO data which is a significant funder of humanitarian assisaance in Colombia Source: Author with GoC/SIAOD data 160'000'000 140'000'000 120'000'000 100'000'000 80'000'000 60'000'000 40'000'000 20'000'000 0 ODA FOR VICTIMS AND VULNERABLE GROUPS IN COLOMBIA 2002-2011 USD at current prices 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Source: Author with GoC/SIAOD data Protection & Assistance Socioeconomic Recovery & Job Training Relocations, Returns, Integration and Rehabilitation Truth, Justice & Reparation CSO Empowerment & Strengthening 51
Protection and Assistance 150 ODA FOR PROTECTION AND ASSITANCE IN COLOMBIA 2002-2011 Millions of USD at current prices 100 50 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Source: Author with GoC/SIAOD data Socioeconomic recovery and job training 100 80 60 40 20 0 ODA FOR SOCIOECONOMIC RECOVERY AND JOB TRAINING IN COLOMBIA 2002-2011 Millions of USD at current prices 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Source: Author with GoC/SIAOD data Relocations, returns, integration and rehabilitation 40 ODA FOR RELOCATIONS, RETURNS, INTEGRATION AND REHABILITATION IN COLOMBIA 2002-2011 Millions of USD at current prices 30 20 10 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Source: Author with GoC/SIAOD data 52
Truth, justice & reparations 40 ODA FOR TRUTH, JUSTICE & REPARATIONS IN COLOMBIA 2002-2011 Millions of USD at current prices 30 20 10 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Source: Author with GoC/SIAOD data CSO empowerment & strengthening 20 ODA FOR CSO EMPOWERMENT & STRENGTHENING IN COLOMBIA 2002-2011 Millions of USD at current prices 15 10 5 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Source: Author with GoC/SIAOD data Land and property protection and restitution 15 ODA FOR LAND AND PROPERTY PROTECTION AND RESTITUTION IN COLOMBIA 2002-2011 Millions of USD at current prices 10 5 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011-5 Source: Author with GoC/SIAOD data 53
b. Sub-report of humanitarian financing There seems to be a sub-report of humanitarian projects to the Colombian Cooperation Agency, mainly due to the fact that some of these funds are not decided in the same way that other bilateral resources. Indeed, some donors decide the allocation from their headquarters (i.e. Norway, Sweden) or some do not use the programmable instruments (i.e. EU-ECHO). Some donors also use international pooled funds (i.e. OCHA s CERF and ERF) or finance humanitarian organizations at headquarter level (i.e. ICRC and many other humanitarian organizations) and these do not report to the Government because they are not official donors. Part of this sub-report is also probably intentional. The projects for protection and assistance included in the SIAOD amount to USD 456 million for the 2002-2011 period, and to USD 310 million for the 2007-2011 period. A good alternative to estimate humanitarian funding is found in the OECD data (which are the basis for the Global Humanitarian Assistance reports from Development Initiatives) or in OCHA s Financial Track System (keeping in mind that they include relief for disasters which are not included in the analysis of this paper). ODA for Humanitarian Aid to Colombia 2007-2011 in millions of USD at current prices Activity 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total General Disaster prevention and preparedness 0 0 2 1 3 6 Emergency food aid 11 15 18 11 19 74 Emergency/distress relief 88 61 57 61 56 324 Reconstruction relief 1 1 4 2 3 11 Relief co-ordination; protection and support services 3 5 6 6 3 23 Total general 103 83 87 81 85 439 ODA for Humanitarian Aid to Colombia 2002-2011 In Millions of USD at current prices 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Grand Total Colombia 20 37 25 42 38 50 42 58 76 64 452 Source: Author with OCHA/FTS data Year The difference in the reports between both tables suggests that OCHA s data (which are very close to the ones of the SIAOD) are maybe also underestimated. For instance, they report that USD 14.4 million were channeled thought ICRC for Colombia in 2011, while ICRC reports almost USD 37 million for that same year s operation (ICRC, 2012 332). According to the FTS, these funds were channeled through 111 international organizations, the most important ones being (in order): ICRC, UNHCR, WFP, IOM, NRC, OCHA, UNDP, Diakonie, UNICEF, Caritas Germany and ACF). 54
5. Emphasis of support to Conflict Transformation by 7 Top Donors in Colombia 2002-2011 IN ABSOLUT TERMS IN RELATIVE TERMS (% OF THEIR OWN PORTAFOLIOS FOR CT) Total 55