UN Security Council IMUN 2011 Chair: Darren Ng THE QUESTION OF SOMALIA
The Question of Somalia Background The Republic of Somalia is situated in the Horn of Africa, the eastern-most part of the African Continent. Widely regarded as a failed state, poverty, violence and anarchy have been the three key elements ruling Somalia since the outbreak of the 1991 Somali Civil War between the Transitional Federal Government and several Islamist factions. Of great concern to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the resolution of two major issues most commonly associated with Somalia today maritime piracy and civil anarchy both of which have occupied the Security Council's attention on an astounding number of resolutions involving peacekeeping and regulatory endeavours. 1 History Present-day Somalia attributes its formation to colonial developments following World War II. The British protectorate British Somaliland was merged with the Trust Territory of Somalia (under Italian administration), formerly Italian Somaliland, to form the short-lived Somali Republic. In 1969, just nine years after the formation of the Somali Republic, a Marxist-Leninist military junta, led by Major General Siad Barre, launched a coup d'état that resulted in the bloodless deposal of the constitutional government. Somalia's succeeding years as the Communist-organised Somali Democratic Republic saw improvements such as in literacy rates, a centralisation of the economy, and the social reorganisation of clanism, as part of Scientific Socialism, an ideology with a Marxist basis. As the Cold War drew to a close, however, the collapse of the authoritarian socialist government plunged Somalia into clan conflict in the 1980s. The violence in Somalia during the Civil War period arose largely out of clan-based political dissidence, which strove to remove Siad Barre from office. The subsequent Somali Revolution and failed 1 nomaddesposyni. "Persecution in the Horn of Africa." (accessed May 23, 2011) http://nomaddesposyni.wordpress.com/2011/03/22/persecution-in-the-horn-of-africa/
counter-revolution resulted in the death of Siad Barre and the declaration of secession by Somaliland (former British Somaliland region) from Somalia. The state of violence continued, however, as various clanbased political factions vied for control of the country. Ultimately, the United Nations deigned to send humanitarian aid and peacekeeping missions to relief the humanitarian crisis, establish a ceasefire and to restore the order of government (UNISOM I, UNITAF and UNISOM II in UNSC Resolutions 733, 746, 751, 767, 775, 794), all of which proved to be ultimately unsuccessful. Infrastructural development efforts with IMF funding and UN support have mostly also failed, illustrating the dire need for a restoration political order before anything can be properly done. The establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004 in Kenya was the next attempt to restore order to Somalia. Established via elections with various clan factions, the purpose of the TFG was to ensure the return of constitutional democracy to Somalia through the elimination of oppositionist movements. The main rival faction to the TFG was the kryptocratic administration of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a federation of courts aiming to impose Sharia law on Muslim-majority Somalia. With Ethiopian military and American advisory help, however, the ICU lost its southern Somalia territory to the TFG, and the ICU ended up splintering into various factions. However, the dispersal of the ICU did not see a cessation to hostilities, as Islamist insurgencies began guerrilla warfare against Ethiopian and Somali forces, and clan-based conflict continued unhindered. To aid the TFG and ensure the continuance of humanitarian endeavour, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) was established in 2007 by the African Union and later further authorised by the United Nations Security Council to fulfil what the original United Nations peacekeeping missions failed to do. An agreement was eventually reached in 2008 between the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), the predominant offshoot insurgent group, to ensure a peace between the opposing factions. However, the Djibouti Agreement later proved it was not a sufficient effort, as other Islamist groups then raised in opposition to the TFG. Today, several ICU-offshoot insurgent groups represent the largest remaining threat to the TFG. As of 2010 the majority of the old ICU territory (South Somalia, including approximately 40% of Somalia's capital Mogadishu) remains under the control of these insurgent groups,
forming the tentatively named Islamic Emirate of Somalia, which maintains an active opposition against both the TFG as well as all forms of Western aid. These insurgent groups, in particular Al-Shabaab, have been labelled as terrorist by handful of Western countries, because of their possible affiliation to Al-Qaeda and their similarities to the Taliban of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Predominant Issues There are a couple of pressing issues which need to be solved with immediacy to put an end to the Somali situation. Absence of Civil Order The largest problem in Somalia remains to be the obstruction of democratic procedure and perhaps any form of internationally-condoned political stability by oppositionist movements. The collective opposition, termed the Islamic Emirate of Somalia, is a haphazard coalition of disparate Islamic groups whose union is derived only from the collective purpose of the rejection of Western intervention and TFG authority. To this end there are regular clashes between Islamist militia, allegedly aided militarily (by provision of arms, materiel and manpower) by foreign mujahideen, Al-Qaeda and Eritrea 2, and the Republic of Somalia under the ARS-TFG coalition, with limited support from Ethiopia, Kenya and the Western governments of the United States, France and Italy. Also significant is the African Union support for the TFG in the form of the AMISOM, which has been proven to be an increasingly decisive factor in these clashes. Of note, in July 2010, as a result of Ugandan support for AMISOM, Al-Shabaab coordinated their first suicide bomb attack on Kampala, the Ugandan capital. The incident prompted the African Union to consider expanding the mandate from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement, which was later abandoned under United Nations pressure. The mandate of the AMISOM has been officially extended by the United Nations to last until 2011; however, considering the situation, an indefinite extension is a more accurate description. As of yet the only practical method for re-establishing democratic procedure is the elimination of the Emirate insurgencies by force; however, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, these insurgents are traditionally hard to locate. AMISOM's current mandate does not include the role of enforcing peace, but merely facilitate humanitarian aid provision. The Somali government coordinates most operations against these insurgencies, and as of yet remains highly dependent on outside aid. 2 "Somalia accuses Eritrea of assisting Al Shabaab." SomaliSwiss Community.Somalida Switzerland. (accessed May 23, 2011) http://somaliswisstv.com/2011/05/07/somalia-accuses-eritrea-of-assisting-al-shabaab/
Because of insurgent control of seaports and airports in the Emirate, the arms embargo imposed on Somalia in UNSC Resolutions 733 & 751 (both 1992) have been largely ineffective in crippling the insurgencies. The United Nations Monitoring Group of the Somali arms embargo reported in 2011 that commercial arms imports from Yemen, financed by Eritrea and independent Arab and Islamic donors, have militarily sustained the Islamic insurgencies despite the ongoing arms embargo. This also reflects the larger arms trade issue that has traditionally been crippling African economies and stability. Humanitarian & Refugee Issues One of the largest concerns in Somalia is the current humanitarian situation. At present the World Food Programme (WFP) operates in Somalia, of which 95% of their areas of operation are controlled by al- Shabaab. A recent report states that, as a result, an approximate 30% of the aid is diverted to military purposes, where corrupt Somali aid distribution agencies form a cartel controlling the flow of aid to Somalis, thereby ensuring regional control. 3 Essentially, with aid distribution difficult and affected by corruption, humanitarian efforts are in effect impeded by Islamist insurgencies, who make regular attacks on aid distributors in defiance of the situation. This paralysis is also largely affected by the ongoing diplomatic situation. Somali refugees also contribute to the humanitarian problem. As of 2010, there are approximately 600,000 Somali refugees in neighbouring Kenya, Djibouti and Yemen, and 1.4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). The source of this refugee problem remains in large part the increasing violence between the TFG and Islamist factions. To note, the well-known drought conditions of Somalia also make it difficult to maintain or regulate agriculture, and the majority of the population adopt pastoral lifestyles. However, pastoralism has maintained a border dispute problem between Ethiopia and Somalia, where armed Somali herdsmen frequently venture into the historically Somali grazing land of Haud and Ogaden, which Britain granted to Ethiopia in 1954. This border dispute remains unsettled, and might be difficult to leave unresolved. Additionally, the economic considerations of providing aid and sustaining peacekeeping efforts are also major considerations in continuing aid effort. One thing, however, remains clear; without a definitive centralisation of enforcement, such as what a government could provide, there is little that can develop domestically with the lack of control. 3 "Somalia's aid problem." Newser Headline News. (accessed May 23, 2011) http://www.newser.com/article/d9n26hp80/ap-enterprise-somalias-aid-problem-protection-money-stolen-ammo-extending-20-yearconflict.html
Somali Piracy The largest international trade problem is Somali piracy. The main cause of Somali piracy was the combination of illegal fishing by other countries in the Somali sea region, as well as illegal dumping of toxic waste in Somali waters, leading to immense decrease in fish populations. This led Somali fishermen to look for alternative sustainment, which manifested in the form of piracy. The lucrative lure of piracy is evident in Somalia, as ransom payments help to attract an increasing pirate population. With the lack of central government authority, the only substantive anti-piracy interventions were made by the autonomous government of Puntland, which remain limited, illustrating the need for a centralised governing authority to implement such initiatives. The international community have pursued a more aggressive form of prevention, in the form of the Combined Maritime Forces (Task Force 150, CTF-150; Task Force 151, CTF-151; Task Force 152, CTF-152), an initiative to patrol and conduct anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of the Horn of Africa, now specified as the Maritime Security Patrol Area. In recent years the dramatically increasing area of operations for piracy has been the only indicator of a currently correct direction, lacking only extensive international (possibly UN-level) coordination in the issue. Evidently, however, piracy has provided two positive economic benefits for some parts of Somalia. With the risk of piracy, foreign fishing trawlers have avoided Somali waters, with the subsequent effect of recovery from overfishing in the area. In this way, the pirates have achieved freedom of Somali waters from exploitation. In addition, impoverished Somali towns have benefited from on-shore spending from pirates, which have rejuvenated the local economy and raised local living conditions to a limited extent. Moreover, most firms are willing to pay up these ransoms instead of attempting to challenge these pirates. In essence, the ransom demands are often a miniscule fraction of the actual net worth of the seized cargo, thus the cost lost in not paying the ransom far supersedes that gained by paying it, even aside from other considerations such as implicated human costs. The international community has not done anything to prevent this, and perhaps for good reason.
United Nations Actions The United Nations have adopted a variety of solutions to combat the above predominant issues. In recent years the attention has shifted from dealing with Somalia's insurgency problem to dealing with Somali piracy. Apart from reaffirming its support of earlier resolutions and producing reports on Somalia's development, the United Nations has also affirmed its support of AMISOM and appealed to its member states to contribute technically and financially to AMISOM, and has also expressed the possible conversion of AMISOM into a UN peacekeeping mission. With regard piracy, the United Nations have adopted resolutions infringing on the sovereignty of Somalia to allow for nations to eradicate piracy through sea and land occupation efforts. A court in neighbouring Kenya was instituted in 2010 to trial Somali pirates, but its lack of regional jurisdiction and constitutional support, despite UN funding, 4 has not been successful because the varying attempts by different maritime security initiatives have not jointly instituted any form of punitive measure, nor pro-actively brought these pirates to such courts, preferring instead to release the pirates back onto the Somali coast. The most recent initiative, by Russia, was UNSC Resolution 1918 adopted in 2010 to criminalise piracy and explore the option of establishing a regional tribunal for sentencing pirates, as part of a deterrence initiative. Fortunately, with the institution of such UN-affiliated organisations such as the International Maritime Organisation and the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 5 (established 2009, UNSC Resolution 1851), there is already an existing framework upon which further actions could build upon. However, considering the continuing situation in Somalia, and considering that there is as of yet no cessation of rampant piracy, the United Nations has not achieved their goal in eradicating both problems. 4 "Kenya court rules no jurisdiction over international piracy cases." JURIST - Legal News and Research. (accessed May 23, 2011) http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/11/kenya-court-rules-no-jurisdiction-over-international-piracy-cases.php 5 The four Working Groups in the Contact Group are: Military and Operational Coordination, Information Sharing, and Capacity Building (chaired by UK), Judicial Issues (Denmark), Strengthening Shipping Self-Awareness and Other Capabilities (US) and Public Information (Egypt). Refer to Possible Reference (xi).
Chair's Note Delegates should note that the Chair expects possible solutions that have the goal of the complete eradication of all three major problems. For the first predominant issue, it is clear that the increasing mandate of AMISOM is helping the TGF gain a greater foothold in Somalia, and thus should be continued. However, should AMISOM be UN-coordinated instead? Or should its mandate be increased to peace enforcement? Considering the development of the situation since 1992, should something like the shortlived UNITAF be once again suggested? On the other hand, more diplomatic options could be considered, such as active negotiations or demilitarisation of the region. Considering that the stabilisation of the diplomatic situation involves the active cooperation between all dissatisfied factions in Somalia, negotiations could to a certain extent address these problems. It should also be noted that independent Somaliland has been established with relative stability despite facing similar problems of clan conflicts; it might perhaps be helpful to delegates to consider that resolution option. Delegates must also consider the political considerations of the Horn of Africa (HOA) region; in particular the ongoing conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The establishment of political security and stability is paramount before venturing into any other aspect of the conflict resolution. After resolving the political and diplomatic aspect of the Somali conflict, the Council would then have to consider extensive socio-economic policies to establish a respectable economy in Somalia, to remove the need for humanitarian aid and any kind of resort to piracy. To offset the financial disparity between piracy and any suggestive forms of alternative development, delegates should also consider certain forms of punitive policies to deter the development of rampant piracy. As a clue, the delegates should understand that Council dynamics are highly influenced by international support. Should technical assistance or aid be conditional, and should military assistance to Islamist factions be effectively broken, the cooperation between the TFG and Islamist factions might be more possible to broker. There is also the added consideration of what is more important to solve. Without the support of the Somali people, the TFG would be unable to form a credible government that would resolve civil anarchy, illustrating that resolving the socio-economic dimension of the issue is more vital. On the other hand, with the limited political will and de facto control of the TFG and a disparate range of warlords and Islamist factions vying for power, a political resolution might be required to be reached first for anything to happen at all. Because the socio-economic and political dimensions of the matter are interdependent, delegates might want to consider implementing various socio-economic and political solutions in tandem, whilst clearly defining the short, mid and long term goals of their resolutions.
It is hence the duty of the council to responsibly re-evaluate the situation to develop ideas that would tackle these problems. The basic framework has evidently been already laid out, but poor decision making and a lack of political will has made the resolutions unsuccessful. As with recent resolutions, all agreed operatives should focus more on the specifics to handle every aspect of the Somalia problem.
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