Alternative Development Policy in the War on Drugs Building a culture of legality in the southern Pacific region of Colombia By Sarah Fields Krupp A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in Latin American Studies in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in Charge Professor Laura Enriquez, Chair Professor Alex Saragoza Professor Isha Ray Spring 2013
Table of Contents Acknowledgements i Chapter 1 - Introduction 1 Field Research 4 Chapter 2 - Literature Review 6 Drug War 7 Aerial Spraying 8 Alternative Development 10 Chapter 3 Background 13 Black Communities in the Pacific 13 Consejos Comunitarios: Political Rights 15 Coca s Introduction in Tumaco and Its Impacts 16 Alternative Development in Tumaco s Black Communities 19 Chapter 4 The Development Process in Las Varas 20 Project Description 21 La Voluntad and Violence 22 Institutional Support 23 Convincing a Community: Social Development 25 Convincing a Community: Economic Influences and Infrastructure 27 Geography and Accessibility 29 Food Security 31 Conclusion 34 Chapter 5 Conclusion 36 Bibliography 37 Appendix A Methodology 40 Appendix B Interview Schedule 41
Acknowledgements I would like to extend my sincerest thanks to all of the people who made this thesis possible. I am grateful for the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of California, Berkeley and the Tinker Foundation for funding my travel to and from Colombia as well as the Latin American Studies Department at UC Berkeley for covering the rest of my research expenses. Thank you to my wonderful committee members, Laura Enriquez, Alex Saragoza, and Isha Ray for your help throughout the research and writing process. Every conversation with you made me feel like an at times overwhelming project was possible and greatly helped me improve my thesis. I am indebted to all of the wonderful people in Colombia who helped make this research possible. My interviewees were generous with their time, patient with my questions and encouraging of my research. I hope that I have presented their comments and opinions properly and take full responsibility for any misinterpretations or misrepresentations. Finally, I cannot thank my family and friends enough for all of their support and encouragement. I would never have been able to get through my research and thesis writing without you. Dad, thanks for always believing in me, being prepared to discuss my research regardless of how little you knew about the topic. To my brother Marcus, you literally lived through the writing process with me and remained positive and supportive through it all. My fellow Latin American Studies MA students, thank you for your encouragement and discussions of my topic from its first formulations to the final editing. Sarah Weber and David Trautman, you listened to my frustrations and my successes patiently. Thank you for your friendship and support, for being my primary sounding board for ideas, and for listening patiently to all of my frustrations and successes. i
Chapter 1 - Introduction Nested among the mangrove enshrouded rivers in the southern Pacific region of Colombia, the rural, Afro-descent communities of Tumaco long neglected by the state and impoverished have been cultivating a cash crop that has reaped profits as well conflicts previously unknown in the region. That crop, coca, and the armed groups that traffic cocaine, have transformed this once peaceful region. The municipality of Tumaco has the most coca cultivation in the country and one of Colombia s highest homicide rates. 1 It is not hard to understand why Tumaco became a center for drug cultivation in recent years or why violence so easily took root in a once tranquil region. The Pacific Ocean and proximity to Ecuador make it a strategic transit corridor. The lack of state services, such as adequate roads and law enforcement, legal industry and viable agriculture make it susceptible to illicit activities. 2 Many of the region s rural communities can only be reached by boat and then only when high tide swells the rivers, which is a detriment to legal commerce and a boon to the illicit economy. Without the presence of security officials, drug-trafficking gangs and guerrillas began to penetrate these remote communities with little resistance in the late 1990s. Lastly, Tumaco s population faces profound poverty; it lacks both industry, and aside from coca, lucrative agricultural production. Because nearly 80 percent of Tumaqueños are unemployed, and the profits made on conventional agricultural products are meager at best, drug traffickers found a population that was willing to partake in the cocaine trade. 3 For all the same reasons that Tumaco became a hotbed of coca cultivation, it has also been difficult to extract from the illicit economy despite efforts by the United States and Colombian governments and the United Nations. Since 2006 the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations Office of Drug Control (UNODC) and the Colombian government have invested approximately $15 million in 13 of Tumaco s Afro-Colombian villages to wean them off coca cultivation. 4 The intent of the intervention is to coax farmers away from growing coca for the production of cocaine by offering assistance to develop viable, legal livelihoods. These initiatives are referred to as alternative development and are usually combined with more aggressive strategies, such as aerial herbicide spraying. 5 Despite these high-level interventions, there has been little improvement in the situation, according to residents and officials familiar with the communities. In most of 1 Kraul, Chris. Colombia city demands protection from drug gang, Los Angeles Times, May 24, 2012. 2 Felbab-Brown, et. al, Assessment of the Implementation of the US Govt s Support for Plan Colombia's Illicit Crop Reduction Components. US Agency for International Development April (2009). 3 United Press International, Cada vez más grave la situación en el puerto Colombiano de Tumaco, UPI español, Feb. 7, 2012. 4 This estimate includes aid from the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), USAID and the Colombian government, as well as agricultural loans to farmers who are part of the development projects. All but one of the 14 villages in Tumaco, the most recent to receive collective title, have been part of an alternative development project. 5 Alternative in this sense does not have the connotation of being non-traditional. It refers to providing a legal alternative to illicit crops. 1
the communities, coca production has not decreased. 6 This is reflective of the pattern nationwide (and globally). Counternarcotics strategies, including aerial spraying, have failed to reduce overall drug production. 7 Of the 13 Afro-Colombian villages in Tumaco which participated in an alternative development project, just one Rescate Las Varas, a community of nearly 7,000 residents has all but eliminated coca and is no longer threatened by armed groups. 8 Here, as in the other communities, there had been a small scale development project that provided aid to a small group of farmers who promised not to grow illicit crops. But in September 2008, with the support of the Department of Nariño, the community launched Sí Se Puede Las Varas, a concerted effort to rid its territory of coca and improve the legal economy. 9 In 2010, USAID invested in the agricultural component of the project to improve the quality, productivity and quantity of the region s main cash crops: cacao, coconuts and African palm. Alternative Development projects may include infrastructure improvements and community building, but they are primarily focused on replacing illegal crops with legal cash crops. The economic development goal of an alternative development project is to provide families with an adequate source of income. In this thesis, I seek to identify the factors that contributed to Las Varas relative success and explore whether the community can serve as a model for the other villages in the region. Specifically, I ask: What characteristics of the community and the development process contributed to the eradication of the majority of coca and have begun to improve the quality of life in Las Varas? Is it possible to emulate these characteristics in the other communities? It is important to note that at the time of my fieldwork it was too early in the project to evaluate its economic impact one of the most crucial factors for the project s long tem success. The average income of coca farmers in the Pacific region is $800 a month. 10 The long-term economic development objective in Las Varas is for each household to ultimately earn two minimum wages or $640 a month. 11 At the time of my research, however, residents were struggling to buy basic necessities. I am basing my assessment of the community s progress on the following criteria: Despite financial hardship, nearly all community members interviewed attested that their overall quality of life was better. 12 Illegal armed groups no longer threatened the community and there were vast social changes, including better relations between residents, the revival of community events and an end to the excessive drinking and prostitution that coca profits had fueled. I argue that there are three overarching reasons for Las Varas success. First, the program was more expansive than the projects in Tumaco s other consejos comunitarios 6 UNODC, Colombia: Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2010. June (2011). 7 USAID, Assessment of the Implementation of the US Govtʼs Support for Plan Colombia's Illicit Crop Reduction Components. April (2009). 8 Although Las Varas is considered a coca-free community, there is still a small amount of coca cultivation. In spring 2012, Nariño government officials and Las Varas community leaders estimated that about 30 hectares of coca remained, about one to two percent of the amount cultivated previously. 9 Departments have similar functions as states in the US. Tumaco is in the Department of Nariño. 10 Interview, Estupiñan, 24 June 2011. 11 Ibid. 12 This was the common sentiment of most of the 40 residents I interviewed from June-Aug 2011. 2
and bolstered by significant institutional support with an emphasis on community building. Las Varas, unlike the other communities, had the additional assistance of the Department of Nariño government (Gobernación), which has shepherded the process and lent its political, financial and professional expertise. 13 The Gobernación strategy involved the whole community unlike the other alternative development projects, encouraging the development of networks and institutions throughout the community. It also leveraged important concessions such as a temporary suspension of aerial spraying in the territory allowing residents to eradicate coca of their own volition and engendered community trust in the government. With the help of the Gobernación, the community organized politically and socially, stimulating participation and interaction between residents. Second, the decision to end coca cultivation and pursue development assistance was made internally and autonomously by the community. As I will explain in Chapter 4, many factors played a role in the decision-making, including peer-pressure, external coercion such as aerial herbicide spraying, and decreasing profits. But, on the whole, residents considered it an autonomous choice they had made as a community. As a result, their commitment was much greater than if it had been imposed on them. In contrast to Las Varas, the other communities in Tumaco which participated in alternative development projects were selected by the state and were offered a development package contingent on eliminating illicit crops. Thus, according to leaders of several of the other communities, residents did not have the same sense of ownership and dedication to the success of the projects as the residents of Las Varas. 14 Third, Las Varas has inherent physical advantages both in terms of geography and infrastructure. Critically, about half its residents are connected to the greater municipality by road. It is one of two consejos comunitarios in Tumaco that is accessible by road; the rest can only be reached by river. The additional time and expense of traveling by boat raises the cost of development, cuts into profit margins on legal crops that must be transported and limits state presence. Whereas police can easily travel to and from Las Varas to monitor the presence of armed groups and illicit coca cultivation, they only occasionally make the costly, inconvenient trips from the urban area to the other rural communities. The factors contributing to Las Varas comparative success, both internal and external, are so interdependent as to be difficult to rank by importance. For instance, the community mobilization to eradicate coca and seek support garnered Gobernación s assistance. That assistance provided the expertise and resources that enabled the community to generate even more widespread commitment to coca eradication and development efforts. Similarly, Las Varas road transportation infrastructure and relatively concentrated population made it more difficult and less attractive for armed groups to establish a permanent presence there and in turn, relatively secure for the Gobernación staff to enter. This enabled the latter s hands-on participation. Regardless, some conclusions can be drawn from the study of this case about the necessary preconditions and intervention methods for more successful eradication and development projects. 13 Tumaco is in the Department of Nariño. Departments have a similar role as states in the US. 14 Jairo Ruben. Interview. 14 June, 2011. Tumaco; and Ari Ledesma, Rio Gualajo community council leader. Interview. 2 August, 2011. 3
Although it is premature to consider Las Varas a truly successful model because its economic development is still nascent, there are compelling reasons to examine the community s progress at this early stage: 1. New development projects funded by USAID and the Colombian government are currently being formulated for the other 13 black communities, or consejos comunitarios, in Tumaco. Proposals for these projects are, at least theoretically, informed by Las Varas experiences. 2. Las Varas may be the only case of successful alternative development in a consejo comunitario. The policies that effectively addressed the social, cultural and political characteristics in Las Varas may be applicable to Colombia s more than 120 other consejos comunitarios. If Las Varas is to be a beacon for other consejos comunitarios, gauging the efficacy and sustainability of eradication and development there is crucial. In the consejo comunitario Rio Gualajo, residents uprooted nearly all of the coca in the hope that the demonstration of their commitment would also garner the assistance of Gobernación. But the cash-poor department, with its regional office already devoting 20 percent of its time and resources to Las Varas, could not assist another community. Gualajo leaders are hoping that,with the next round of USAID funding, their community will be able to emulate Las Varas progress. Field Research The majority of my research for this study was conducted from the end of the June 2011 through early August 2011 in Las Varas and the urban zone of Tumaco. My fieldwork included semi-structured interviews with more than 40 Las Varas community members and leaders. The interviews were conducted in both group and individual settings. The interviewees were about evenly split between residents I chose by simply approaching people in the community and residents who community leaders introduced to me. I additionally conducted repeat individual interviews with three Department of Nariño officials who oversaw the Las Varas project in person while I was in Tumaco and by phone and email after I returned. The interviews with community members, leaders and Nariño officials generated the bulk of my data. Community members described their experiences with the process, each from his or her own perspective. When analyzed together, these perspectives offered a complete and nuanced picture of the changes in the community and the implantation of the project. Community leaders helped paint a more detailed picture by describing their own roles within the process. I also interviewed eleven community members in the consejo comunitario Rio Bajo Mira and, although I was not able to visit the other consejos comunitarios for security reasons, I interviewed leaders of six consejos comunitarios in the urban zone of Tumaco. The information gathered from these interviews allowed me to contrast the experience of alternative development in Las Varas with the experiences of other villages. Lastly, I conducted two interviews with officials from Tetra Tech International Development, the company that contracted with USAID to implement the alternative development projects in Tumaco. These interviews provided me with additional information on how the projects were implemented and how circumstances in Las Varas differed from the other communities. This thesis is structured in five chapters. Following this introduction, I will review the relevant, current literature, including the theories underpinning alternative development and critiques of the way it is practiced. In Chapter 2, I will provide background information that offers a brief description of counter narcotics policy in 4
Colombia, the strategy of alternative development, as well as the history and political structure of consejos comunitarios. The third chapter recounts how coca was introduced and how it transformed the region. Particular emphasis will be placed on Las Varas, as well as the impact of alternative development projects on Tumaco s communities, in this description. In Chapter 4, I will present evidence from my fieldwork to substantiate my argument that various factors both inherent to Las Varas and specific to the project s implementation contributed to its success. Finally, in the fifth chapter, I will examine the intersection of the literature and my research, as well as pose some possible implications for alternative development policy. 5
Chapter 2 - Literature Review Development projects do not operate in a vacuum. They contend with a tangled web of social, political and economic conditions. Before examining the literature specific to alternative development, I will provide a brief overview of Colombia s political economy to explain how the country became one of the world s biggest producers and exporters of narcotics. The discussion will also offer insight into the obstacles to extracting Colombia from the illegal economy. Colombia is notoriously difficult to govern, with whole regions remaining outside the grasp of the state. 15 The terrain is vast and rugged, straddling three Andean cordilleras, the Amazon jungle to the south and littoral wetlands along the Pacific Coast creating barriers to domestic communication and trade. The state s absence from much of the countryside a consequence of both geography and the orientation of the elitedominated regime unequal land distribution, armed conflict and free-market orientation have all contributed to the Colombian drug trade. 16 Although a democracy since its independence, Colombia has consistently been dominated by conservative land-owners and miners who have marginalized the peasantry. Property is concentrated among the elites with sixty-one percent of the land held by just.4 percent of the population. 17 Furthermore, the elites hold the most fertile lands, leaving peasants small plots of generally marginal land to cultivate. Even when granted title to their own property, these peasants often lack the credit and technical assistance needed to make the land productive. 18 With meager resources and little money generated from farming, they struggle to make ends meet. As a consequence, peasants are often quite desperate for a sustainable source of income, even if it is illicit, to guarantee their survival. 19 With high levels of poverty and weak state presence, it is not surprising then, that these ungoverned spaces become breeding grounds for illegal armed groups. 20 Power in much of remote Colombia lies in the hands of guerrillas, paramilitaries and narcotraffickers. 21 While the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC), a left-leaning guerrilla group 15 Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: The hunt for the world s greatest outlaw (New York: Penguin Books, 2001). 16 See Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, Foreign trade regimes and economic development: Colombia. (Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1976), introduction; Leah Ann Carroll, Violent Democracy; Bowden, and US Agency for International Development (USAID) Assessment of the Implementation of the United States Government's Support for Plan Colombia's Illicit Crop Reduction Components. Felbab-Brown, Vanda et al. 2009. 17 Center for International Policy (CIP) and Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Washington Office on Latin American Studies, After Plan Colombia: Evaluating Integrated Action, the next phase of U.S. assistance (Washington, DC, 2009) 3. 18 Alexandro Reyes Posada, Guerreros y Campesinos: El Despojo de la tierra en Colombia (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, Bogota, 2008), 21-25. 19 USAID, 30-32. 20 Colletta A. Youngers and John M. Walsh, Development First: A more humane and promising approach to reducing cultivation of crops for illicit markets, Washington Office on Latin America, March 2010; 8. 21 Ibid. 6
thousands strong, has been the greatest direct threat to the state, the right-wing paramilitaries and criminal gangs have been equally, if not more, pivotal in the drug trade. 22 Without dwelling on the origins or ideologies of the various armed groups in Colombia a topic for another thesis it is important to note that they continue to dominate much of rural Colombia, holding the monopoly on violence. As the purveyors of the illegal economy, they are able to offer peasants what the legal market and government do not: credit and a steady source of income. Drug War Though Colombia was central in the marijuana trade in the 1960s, and in cocaine trafficking by the 1970s, cultivation of the coca plant is relatively new to the country. Colombia s primary role in the cocaine trade until the late 1980s was as an intermediary trafficking country, procuring coca paste or base from Peru and Bolivia, processing and exporting it. 23 The majority of the cocaine was then shipped from Colombia s Atlantic Coast to South Florida where it was distributed throughout the United States. 24 But in the 1980s, US-sponsored counternarcotics efforts in Peru and Bolivia cut production in those countries, displacing coca cultivation to neighboring Colombia. 25 The shift in cultivation sites coincided with economic reforms within the country that further exacerbated the inequality between the landed class and peasants. 26 Like many other Latin American regimes, Colombia adopted neoliberal economic policies in pursuit of economic growth. 27 The state eliminated tariffs protecting domestic farmers, devalued the currency and channeled resources into export-led development. The policy reforms dealt a heavy blow to the already struggling peasant class. 28 Foreign food imports flooded the market, devastating small farmers, particularly coffee and grain cultivators. 29 Without the conditions to make legal agriculture viable, peasants were particularly vulnerable to the lure of cultivating illicit crops. 30 22 For a discussion of the armed groups in rural Colombia, see Carroll, Introduction; Reyes; Sanín F. Gutiérrez "Telling the Difference: Guerrillas and Paramilitaries in the Colombian War;" Politics & Society. 36.1 (2008): 3-34; and Garry Leech, The FARC: The Longest Insurgency. London: Zed Books Ltd, 2011. 23 US General Accounting Office (GAO), Drug Control: Efforts to develop alternatives to cultivating illicit crops in Colombia have made little progress and face serious obstacles (Washington, DC, February 2002), 3-7. 24 US Congressional Research Service, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and US. Counterdrug Programs (12 May 2010). Interdiction has shifted the main drug trafficking route to land, with the narcotics entering the US through Mexico. 25 Dion, 400. Within the last five years, the trend has begun to reverse itself, with coca cultivation declining slightly in Colombia and rising in Peru and Bolivia. 26 Carlos Felipe Jaramillo, Liberalization, Crisis, and Change: Colombian Agriculture in the 1990s Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 49, No. 4 (July 2001): 821-846. 27 Ibid. 28 Jaramillo. 29 Ibid. 30 Government Accountability Office, Plan Colombia: Drug reduction goals were not fully met, but security has improved; U.S. agencies need more detailed plans for reducing assistance. October 2008. 7
By 1999, Colombia was no longer simply the world s top cocaine trafficker, it was also the largest producer. 31 Reflecting the shift in roles, efforts to stop the drug trade increasingly tied Colombia to the US. Colombia had become the third highest recipient of US military aid by 1999. 32 But when results proved to be limited, the US escalated and consolidated its involvement in the country even further. Launched in 2000, Plan Colombia, a multiyear $7.5 billion counternarcotics and counterinsurgency strategy, was designed to beat back the cocaine and heroine trade and improve the country s security. 33 Spearheaded by then President Andres Pastrana, the plan s objectives were to reduce the cultivation, processing and production of heroine and cocaine by half within six years and to undercut the strength of the FARC. 34 Under Plan Colombia the government launched major aerial spraying and military campaigns in the southern departments of Caqueta and Putumayo. 35 The activity spurred a migration of displaced coca farmers and armed groups to Nariño. Many of the farmers planted coca crops in their new destication. As cultivation rose, a growing drug trade drew even greater numbers of armed actors. 36 In turn, the drugtraffickers, paramilitaries and guerrillas encouraged peasants to cultivate coca. 37 By 2007, armed groups and violence became commonplace and coca cultivation reached 18,000 hectares one-fifth the national total. 38 Plan Colombia officially ended in 2007. Since then, the US-Colombian counternarcotics strategy has had several different names. It is commonly known as the National Consolidation Plan, but is still often simply referred to as Plan Colombia. 39 Most of the counternarcotics funding has continued to been spent on security training military and police officers and purchasing helicopters and other equipment and aerial spraying to destroy the coca crops. 40 31 María Clemencia Ramírez, Aerial Spraying and Alternative Development in Plan Colombia: Two sides of the same coin or two contested policies? Harvard Review of Latin American Studies (Boston: Harvard University, spring/summer 2005). 32 Ibid. 33 US State Department Support for Colombia factsheet." http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs_000328_plancolombia.html As of 2009, $6.5 billion of it was spent according to the Center for International Policy. (Isacson and Poe, 2009) 34 GAO report, 2008. 35 Felbab-Brown et al., 2009, 81. 36 Felbab-Brown et al., 2009. 37 Felbab-Brown et al., 2009. 38 Felbab-Brown et. al, 2009, 81-82 39 The Colombian state has since established the Center for Integrated Consolidated Action (CCAI in Spanish) an agency that is responsible for coordinating the security and development efforts. There are three phases to this new approach that the government correlates with traffic light colors. The first phase (red), consists of securing the area with police and military officers and driving out armed groups. In the yellow phase, the intent is to maintain order and begin to restore institutions. Lastly, in the green phase, the goal is to establish state institutions and public services. For a detailed explanation, see Isacson and Poe. 40 Youngers and Walsh; Adam Isacson, The US Military in the War on Drugs, in Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (eds.), Drugs and Democracy in Latin America : The Impact of US Policy, (London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2005), 15 60. 8
Aerial Spraying For as long as aerial spraying has been a strategy in the war on drugs, it has drawn criticism. Left-leaning organizations have lambasted the practice as an inhumane and environmentally destructive practice. 41 Beginning in the 1990s, however, a more mainstream voice of opposition emerged. These critics do not oppose aerial spraying per se, but argue that it should only be used when farmers have legal economic alternatives. 42 They contend that it is cruel and ineffective to destroy farmers sole livelihoods. Otherwise, the United Nations concluded in a 2005 evaluation that "illicit crops should be eradicated only when viable alternatives exist for households participating in alternative development. 43 According to the World Bank, wholesale eradication unaccompanied by economic development is unethical and ineffective: There is a moral, political and economic case for having alternative livelihoods programs in place before commencing eradication." 44 There is a growing consensus that aerial spraying as the primary tool for stemming cultivation is not only unethical, but actually undermines the goal of eradication. 45 Aerial spraying often simply encourages migration as farmers desperate to find a new source of income flee, adding to the already alarming rate of displaced Colombians. 46 The herbicide used destroys food and legal cash crops, undercutting food security and any stream of licit income that families had. With no other options, the farmers will often press deeper into the jungle to cultivate coca again. Additionally, for many farmers aerial spraying is one of their first encounters with the state. Thus, it sparks distrust and resentment toward the government. 47 A report prepared for USAID argued that forced eradication in the absence of alternative livelihoods fosters a positive relationship between the population and the armed actors. 48 The peasants, according to the report, look toward the illegal groups for protection against the government, and refuse to provide intelligence on the armed actors to the state. 49 However, aerial spraying is not seen as entirely counter-productive. Some critics of the current practices argue that aerial spraying is a necessary tool when combined with legal income opportunities. They say that without the threat of forced eradication, farmers have little incentive to adopt legal crops that may not also offer a steady source of income. 50 41 Many groups argue that the use of herbicide has environmental costs, contaminating the soil and water. For an overview, see Judith Walcott, Spraying Crops, Eradicating People. Cultural Survival Quarterly, (Winter: 2001) 26., 4; 29-37. 42 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Thematic Evaluation of UNODC Alternative Development Initiatives, (New York, 2005); and World Bank, Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty. A Country Economic Report, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit South Asia Region, World Bank, Report No. 29551-AF, 2004. 43 UNODC 2005, 14. 44 The World Bank, Afghanistan State Building, Sustaining Growth and Reducing Poverty, February 2005, 82. 45 Felbab-Brown et. al 2009; and Youngers and Walsh. 46 Youngers and Walsh, 9. 47 See Felbab-Brown 2011. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 9
There are, however, many documented cases where alternative development project sites have been destroyed by aerial fumigation. 51 Whether the prevalence of such cases is because the aerial spraying program is not carefully administered, coca is interspersed within the project areas or there is drift from nearby spraying is a matter of dispute. 52 Regardless, when alternative development projects are sprayed with herbicides, participants lose their newly-planted legal crops and often their faith in the government and the aid agency. 53 The result is that projects are abandoned and millions of dollars wasted. 54 Alternative Development Alternative development has been a relatively small part of the US-Colombian counternarcotics strategy. 55 Of the more than $7 billion US dollars spent on security 56 and antidrug initiatives as part of Plan Colombia, slightly more than $500 million has funded alternative development. 57 This comprises the single largest portion of non-military aid included in the plan. Although it is just a fraction of Plan Colombia s budget, alternative development is the carrot in a policy that is otherwise all stick. Assessments of alternative development projects by the US Government Accounting Office (GAO), academics and non-governmental organizations have found that most projects fail to achieve their goals of community-wide coca eradication and sustained economic development. 58 The overall ineffectiveness of alternative development projects is perhaps unsurprising in light of the needs in coca-growing communities and the additional challenges that illegal economies bring. In fact, it is unrealistic to expect positive results in violent frontier areas, where most of the coca is grown, basic services are lacking, and government presence is ephemeral. 59 Development projects sponsored by outside agencies are often unsuccessful even when they are not forced to contend with the additional challenge of an illegal economy. 51 See Youngers and Walsh, 17; and Felbab-Brown et al. 2009, 26-29. 52 The various perspectives are represented in Francisco E. Thoumi, US AID Annex 4 ; Youngers and Walsh; Jason Thor Hagen, "Alternative Development Won't End Colombia's War" (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, 1 May, 2001). http://www.fpif.org/articles/alternative_development_wont_end_colombias_war. 53 Transnational Institute, Alternative Development Overview, 2006; Youngers and Walsh, 14. 54 Felbab-Brown et. al 2009, 34. 55 USAID is not the only actor involved in alternative development in Colombia. The United Nations Office of Drug Control (UNODC), the European Union, and other governmental agencies, as well as nonprofits, have also collaborated with the Colombian government on alternative development projects. 56 What Future for US-backed Plan Colombia? British Broadcasting Corporation, 12 June 2010 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10208937. 57 Felbab-Brown et. al, 6. 58 For example, see Youngers and Walsh, US General Accounting Office (GAO), Drug Control: Efforts to develop alternatives to cultivating illicit crops in Colombia have made little progress and face serious obstacles (Washington, DC, February 2002), and GAO: Drug Control: US nonmilitary assistance to Colombia is beginning to show intended results, but programs are not readily sustainable, (Washington, DC, July 2004). 59 Hagen. 10
The failure of rural development projects is not a new or unrecognized phenomenon. 60 As Ferguson makes clear in his book about Lesotho, a beleaguered African country that is desperately poor despite a plethora of aid agencies and programs, development projects rarely translate into gains for the intended beneficiaries. 61 Rural development projects are to be found scattered liberally across the African continent and beyond; and, in nearly every case, these projects seem on inspection to be planned, implemented and justified in very nearly the same way as they are in Lesotho. What is more, these projects seem to fail with almost the same astonishing regularity that they do in Lesotho. Indeed, the shortcomings in policy and implementation of alternative development include a dearth of resources, the limited breadth and duration of the assistance, and the absence of state services and control. 62 Yet, despite acknowledgement of the need for much larger investments by aid agencies, alternative development projects, by their very nature are short-term and relatively limited. Most USAID projects range from two to three years. This means that assistance, both financial and technical, has usually ended before the first harvest. 63 Thus, project objectives tend to be short-term goals that do not ensure economic sustainability. 64 A development project is considered complete when the crops are planted and farmers receive their training. Often the aid agencies do not adequately plan for the commercialization of the crops produced or account for how the farmers will transport them to markets. 65 In the case of Colombia, addressing deficits in transportation is critical as most coca-producing regions are inaccessible by highway and far from any realistic market. 66 Despite this need, building ports and highways is beyond the capacity of the smallscale alternative development projects in Colombia. 67 One of the most widely criticized aspects of alternative development in Colombia is the government s requirement that farmers eradicate all of their illicit crops before receiving assistance. 68 The policy has the perverse consequence of discouraging the farmers most dependent on coca from participating because they do not have a source of income to sustain them during the transitional phase. Additionally, the policy increases the likelihood that projects will fail, as described below. 69 With numerous obstacles to 60SeeJames Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development", Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2007 ). 8-9. 61Ibid. 62 See the introduction of the USAID 2009 assessment for a detailed overview of the problems with alternative development. 63 Felbab-Brown et. al, 12. 64 GAO 2004, 10-15. 65 Youngers and Walsh, 13. 66 Francisco E. Thoumi, "Illegal drugs in Colombia: From illegal economic boom to social crisis." The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 582.1 (2002): 113. 67 Ibid. 68 See Linda Farthing and Benjamin Kohl. Conflicting Agendas: The Politics of Development Aid in Drug-Producing Areas. Development Policy Review 23.2 (2005) 183-198; Felbab-Brown et. al 2009 Conclusion and Recommendations; and Youngers and Walsh. 69 See Youngers and Walsh, 18 and Felbab-Brown, 2. 11
legal economic development, forcing farmers to eradicate their primary source of income long before they can hope to earn a legal livelihood, leaves the farmers destitute for years. 70 Even under the best circumstances, most of the crops that replace coca, such as cacao or coffee, take several years to produce harvests. In the interim, the income in many of the former coca communities often plummets 80% from their already povertylevel. 71 In some instances, total coca eradication has led to nutritional deficits. 72 Although USAID provides some food aid, it is only for a short period of time. As a result, only farmers who have sufficient resources for legal livelihoods available prior to eradicating are likely to weather the gap between eradication and the time when alternative development efforts start generating income. 73 Thus, the zero-illicit policy often compels cash-strapped farmers to abandon the project and return to growing illicit crops. 74 In recommending an end to the zero-illicit policy, a report commissioned by USAID concluded that it complicated the already fraught relationship between coca growers and the state. 75 Having had few positive experiences with both their own government and the US government which sponsors the aerial spraying program residents are distrustful of the official assurances of forthcoming aid. For them, building trust is a gradual process and that requires sustained assistance as the farmers transition from coca. 76 If the Colombian and US governments worked to build trust, rather than mandating that peasants take a leap of faith, alternative development would be much more appealing. 77 As it stands now, the projects operate in small clusters where residents motivated by increasing amounts of violence and tired of aerial spraying agree to eradicate coca. 78 The reach and efficacy of alternative development projects have also been hampered by security issues. Security threats drove USAID from the areas most densely cultivated with coca in the early 2000s. USAID shifted its focus to communities that did not contend with armed groups. However, this also meant that most projects were implemented in regions with little to no coca cultivation, thereby not greatly impacting the communities most entrenched in coca farming. 79 With improvements to security in certain regions due to Plan Colombia, USAID is once again implementing alternative development projects in vulnerable areas, but the armed groups continue to make it difficult to operate. 80 Residents who live among armed groups are reluctant to associate 70 Felbab-Brown et. al 2009, 8 and Ramírez. 71 Felbab-Brown, 2. 72 Felbab-Brown et. al 2009, 48. 73 Felbab-Brown et. al 2009. 74 Felbab-Brown et al. 2009, 48. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid, 48. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid, 22-24. 79 GAO, 2008. According to the report, USAID defined these communities as vulnerable, to the appeal of coca cultivation. 80 Felbab-Brown et al. 2009, 9-14. 12
themselves with the government or cooperate with aid agencies because they fear retaliation. 81 The criminal groups continue to restrict the free movement of people and goods, impeding the access to markets necessary for the economic development aims of projects. 82 Chapter 3 - Background This chapter provides a framework for understanding the political, cultural and economic conditions of the consejos comunitarios and how alternative development projects operate within them. It will address some of the problems that impeded the projects implemented in Tumaco s other consejos comunitarios, offering a contrast to the relative success of the project in Las Varas described in my research. 83 Lastly, it will detail the history of coca production in Tumaco and its effects on the community of Las Varas. Using residents testimonies to recreate aspects of the community life offers insight into why Las Varas eradicated coca, why residents largely considered the project successful and why the social processes involved in the project were critical to the outcome. Black Communities in the Pacific In the tropical, southern Pacific region of Colombia, not far from the Ecuadorian border, black communities have made their homes and livelihoods along the inlets that flow east from the ocean. They inhabit areas that are difficult to access by land. Historically, their isolation was strategic. 84 Some of the communities were founded centuries ago by escaped and freed slaves. Others were settled long after the abolition of slavery by landless blacks, who were able to gain access to the land because these undeveloped, remote spaces were unwanted by others. 85 The consejos comunitarios vary in size and population. In Tumaco, the populations range from fewer than 400 residents to nearly 7,700 inhabitants. 86 The villages are arranged in hamlets or veredas which are traditionally tightly-knit communities, each at least nominally represented by an elected committee. 87 The homes in the veredas are clustered together much like an urban neighborhood. The houses are small and box-like, usually constructed by the dwellers from wood. Some have long stilt legs, suspending them above the water when the tide swells the rivers. The farms are in a separate part of the community. The separation of the homes and farms has made for a 81 Hagen; and Isaacson. 82 Felbab-Brown et al. 2009, 22. 83 The descriptions of the alternative development projects in most of the consejos comunitarios are based primarily on interviews with community leaders that I conducted in Tumaco s urban core. I was unable to visit most of the consejos comunitarios due to security risks, making it difficult to interview ordinary community members. 84 Historical information about the black communities was gathered from unpublished contextual documents provided by the GobernaciónArturo Escobar; and Territories of Difference: Place, Movements, Life, Redes. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). 85 Ibid. 86 Victor Mejia, Gobernación official. Interview. 14 June 2011. 87 The following description of the services in consejos comunitarios is derived from observation and dozens of personal interviews with residents and leaders of consejos comunitarios in Tumaco from July- Aug. 2011. 13
clear delineation of gendered spaces. Women work in the home raising the children, cooking and cleaning, while men work on the farms. 88 Women often know very little about their family s farm unless they have taken over its management because they are widowed or separated from their husbands. Subsistence agriculture and fishing have long sustained Tumaco s black communities. 89 Most families buy staples such as rice and other necessities with their earnings and complement their diets by growing fruit and vegetables including yucca, oranges, plantains, as well as fishing and hunting small animals such as mountain rats, armadillos and foxes. Since they sustain themselves through diverse activities, not just farming, rural blacks are more often referred to, and refer to themselves, as recogedores or gatherers, rather than as farmers or campesinos. In Tumaco, communities have traditionally relied on meager profits from selling coconuts or cacao to purchase the rice and other staples that supplement their subsistence activities. Most grow both crops, but each community tends to focus most of its resources on one crop, a practice that residents attribute to ancestral tradition. Farmers also grow and sell plantains, which are used as a shade crop for cacao. For some, small-scale forestry as well as fishing and crabbing are important sources of income. 90 Yet, the profits earned for crops, lumber and seafood are restricted by limited market access and inadequate infrastructure. The region is not well connected to regional, national or international markets, transportation costs are high and there is no local infrastructure to transform the crops into higher value products, such as processed chocolate or packaged coconut water. Transporting the crops from the consejos comunitarios to urban centers, most of which is done by river, is costly and inefficient. Even in the two consejos comunitarios that are accessible by land, the roads do not traverse the entire territory. Travel by boat, usually a canoe with a motor attached, is about four times more expensive than covering the same distance by land. 91 It also must be timed to the eight-hour tide cycle that controls the river flows because during low tide, the rivers become unnavigable. The traditional farming methods of the black communities have included lowdensity cultivation and little crop maintenance. For instance, there are about 200 to 300 cacao trees per hectare on an average farm in Tumaco s black communities whereas upwards of 900 is recommended for commercial farms. 92 Few of the farmers have received training on crop management and tend to do little upkeep such as pruning, resulting in low yields and quality. This lack of care has been inconsequential in the communities ability to sell their crops because the cacao beans are sold to Casa Luker, a company that makes low-grade Colombian chocolate. 93 However, communities receive 88 In the more than two dozen interviews with women I conducted from June-Aug. 2011, just two women worked in the farm. Both were separated from their husbands. This observation was confirmed in 4 July 2011 interview with Las Varas community council leaders Jose Felix Cruel and a 7 July 2011 interview with Gobernación offical Eugenio Estupiñan. 89 Subsistence agriculture does not exclude cash crops. Most households grew small quantities of cacao, coconuts and/or African palm to sell but made barely enough for their basic necessities. 90 Small river crabs, or jaibas, are common in local cuisine. 91 This was the common estimate that Tumaqueños would give. 92 Mejia and Gustavo Adolfo Mindineros, Las Varas resident and agricultural techician. Interview. 12 July 2011. Tumaco. Many community members said their land was sparsely planted with cacao trees simply because that was the way their ancestors had done it. It is likely that the custom developed due to a tangle of factors, including sustainability, curbing the spread of plant diseases and an inability to access credit. 93 Interview. Gustavo Adolfo Mindineros.12 July 2011. Tumaco 14
little money for their cacao from Casa Luker because they have limited amounts to sell and no other prospective buyers to drive up prices. As a result, the money earned from cacao, even with a guaranteed buyer, does not bestow Tumaqueños with financial security. Until the alternative development projects, African palm, used for cooking oil and biofuel, was one of the few agricultural products in the region to receive significant national and international support. Farmers were able to access aid and credit for its cultivation. 94 The disregard for the agricultural livelihood of the region is emblematic of the profound state neglect of the rural Pacific. The only government service provided to the rural communities in Tumaco is education, which is inadequate at best. 95 Several times a week school teachers travel from the urban area and offer classes, often in a one- or tworoom school house to multiple grade levels. Most children do not graduate from high school. With such limited educational opportunities, it is not uncommon for residents to be illiterate or have poor literacy skills. As a consequence, it can be difficult for them to negotiate with the government and find work other than farming. In addition to the educational inadequacies, the communities lack access to running water. There is no waste management or sewage system. And although some communities have a facility intended as a health clinic, none of them are functioning. 96 In the swaths of the communities that have electricity, it is because the residents coerced the local utility company to provide it or a cluster of households pooled resources to buy a generator. The deficits in education, infrastructure and basic services, deprive residents of the resources to improve their lives and earn an adequate living cultivating legal crops. Consejos Comunitarios: Political Rights The 14 black communities in Tumaco are recognized as consejos comunitarios granting them special rights as semi-autonomous entities. The 1991 Constitution and subsequent legislation, Law 70, institutionalized collective and autonomous right based on the notion of ethno-cultural difference for indigenous and black communities. 97 Through this legislation, black communities in unoccupied national lands (tierras baldías) in rural and riparian areas where Afro-Colombians live in conformity with their traditional systems of production were made eligible to apply for collective land titles. 98 The collective rights do not preclude individual property ownership by residents. Rather, they forbid outsiders from acquiring property in the territory and require that before any 94 Garry Leech. "The Oil Palm Industry: A Blight on Afro-Colombia." NACLA Report on the Americas 42.4 (2009): 30. 95 Data on the services provides is derived from multiple personal interviews with consejos comunitarios residents and Gobernación officials from Jul-Aug 2011. 96 The communities do have their own midwives. But much of the traditional practices of the curanderos and their knowledge of medicinal plants has been lost. It was not clear to me exactly why. However, I was told leaders that when families had enough money, particulary during the coca boom, they chose to pay for medical care and medicine in the city of Tumaco. 97 Adopted in 1993, Ley 70 fullfilled provisions in the 1991 Colombian Constitution that mandated legislation recognizing black ethno-territorial rights. Ley 70 applies only to black communities in the Pacific region. 98 1991 Colombian Constitution, Transitory Article 55. 15