Professor: Bryan R. Early Class Times: Tuesdays, 5:45 8:35 PM Room: Husted 013 Email: bearly@albany.edu Office Hours: Tuesdays 1:30-2:30 PM Milne 300A Course Description RPOS/RPAD 583: Global Governance This course examines global governance as a paradigm that can be used to understand the increasing role of international law, regimes, institutions, and non-governmental organizations in international politics, an emergent subfield in international relations that studies those topics, and a normative perspective advocating greater global integration. The course begins by addressing how the major theories of international relations view the structure of international politics, the prospects for international cooperation, and the means by which cooperation occurs. The second portion of the course examines the various bodies involved in global governance, why and how they are created, and how they function. The last section of the class looks more closely at specific bodies of global governance, including the United Nations, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and European Union. This class has been designed to prepare students for their comprehensive exams in international relations and will introduce students to the key concepts, theories, and authors in the global governance subfield. As such, the capstone of the class will be a comprehensive exam that covers the entirety of the course material. Course Objectives By the end of the course, students should: 1. Understand how the major theories of international relations address the issue of global governance 2. Understand the sources of and role played by norms and international law in global governance 3. Have mastered an understanding of the roles played by international regimes, international institutions, trans-governmental networks, and non-governmental organizations in global governance 4. Know the structure, operation, and membership of the leading bodies of global governance, including the: European Union, United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and G-20 1
Required Texts Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore. 2004. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Robert Keohane. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ngaire Woods. 2007. The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst. 2009. International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance, 2 Edition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. J. Martin Rochester. 2012. Between Peril and Promise: The Politics of International Law. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Grading Students will be evaluated on the basis of their contributions to seminar discussions, the originality and quality of their presentations, and their performance on the two course exams. Class Participation: 20% Each student is expected to keep up with the assigned readings and to come to class prepared to make substantively valuable contributions to class discussions. Both the quality and quantity of students participation will be taken into account. Participation grades will be penalized for unexcused absences. Better Know an IO: 10% Each student will be responsible for giving a ten-minute presentation on an international regime, international institution, trans-governmental or trans-national network, or international nongovernmental organization of his or her choosing. For their presentation days, students will also be responsible for providing the class with a news article regarding the body they selected and a policy-relevant discussion question that relates to their article. Midterm Exam: 30% There will be a written, take-home exam that will be administered over spring break. The exam will call upon students to demonstrate that they understand the key concepts, theories, and subject matter of the class. The exam will be comprised of a series of short answer questions and a long essay on a topic that addresses one of the class s expansive themes. 2
Comprehensive Exam: 40% There will be a written, in-class comprehensive exam for the course. The exam will call upon students to demonstrate that have a mastery over the key concepts, theories, and subject matter covered in the course. It will be comprised of a series of 8-10 short answer questions and a long essay on a topic that addresses one of the course s expansive themes. Policy on Academic Honesty Do not plagiarize or cheat. If you are involved in plagiarism or cheating and are caught, the penalty will be failure in the course and you will be reported to judicial affairs. If you are not sure if something violates standards feel free to ask ahead of time. In general, it s always better to err on the side of caution. Please familiarize yourself with the undergraduate bulletin s descriptions of plagiarism. The university s official policy can be found at: <http://www.albany.edu/undergraduate_bulletin/2003-2004/regulations.html>. Also, a Accommodations Reasonable accommodations will be provided for students with documented physical, sensory, systemic, cognitive, learning and psychiatric disabilities. If you believe you have a disability requiring accommodation in this class, please notify the Director of Disabled Student Services (Campus Center 137, 442-5490). That office will provide the course instructor with verification of your disability, and will recommend appropriate accommodations. See the official policy at: <http://www.albany.edu/studentlife/dss/accommodation.html>. If you wish to discuss academic accommodations for this course please also inform the instructor as soon as possible. Course Schedule Part I: Introduction Wk1 (Jan. 29): What Does Global Governance Mean? o Dingwerth, Klaus and Philipp Pattberg. 2006. Global Governance as a Perspective on World Politics. Global Governance 12(2): 185-203. o Simmons, Beth and Lisa Martin. 2006. International Organizations and Institutions. In Carlsnaes et al. s Handbook of International Relations. Thousand Oaks: Sage. o Daniel Drezner. 2007. Chapter 1. All Politics Is Global. Princeton: Princeton University Press. o David Lake. 2010. Rightful Rules: Authority, Order, and the Foundations of Global Governance. International Studies Quarterly 54(3): 587-613. 3
Part II: Theoretical Basis of International Order, Cooperation, and Institutions Wk2 (Feb. 5): Structure, Sovereignty, and the International System o Waltz, Kenneth. The Anarchic Structure of World Politics, pp. 29-49. In Art and Jervis s International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues. New York: Pearson. o Milner, Helen. 1991. The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory. Review of International Studies 17(1): 67-85. o David Lake. 2009. Select Chapters. Hierarchy in International Relations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. o Philpott, Daniel. 1995. Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History, Journal of International Affairs 48(50): 353-368. o Krasner, Stephen. 2001. Sovereignty. Foreign Policy 122 (Jan/Feb). Accessible at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ning/archive/archive/122/thinkagain- Sovereignty.pdf Wk3 (Feb. 12): Liberalism and Neo-Functionalism o Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye. Power and Interdependence Revisited. International Organization 41(4): 725-753. o Ikenberry, John. 2009. The Three Faces of Liberal Internationalism. In A. Cooper and A. Alexandroff s Rising States, Rising Institutions. Washington, DC: Brooking Institution Press. o Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Relations, International Organization 51(4): 513 53. o Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 1995. International Law in a World of Liberal States. European Journal of International Law 6(1): 503-538. o Schmitter, Philippe C.. 2005. Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neofunctionalism. Journal of European Public Policy 12(2): 255 272. Wk4 (Feb. 19): Theories of Hegemony and Neo-Liberalism o Keohane, Robert. 1984. Chapters 1-7, & 11. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. o Axelrod, Robert and Robert Keohane. 1985. Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, World Politics 38(October): 226-254. o Dai, Xinyuan and Duncan Snidal. 2010. International Cooperation Theory. International Studies Compendium. o Ikenberry, John. 2001. Chapter 2: Varieties of Order: Balance of Power, Hegemonic, and Constitutional. After Victory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Required Reading for Students Unfamiliar with Collective Action Dilemmas o Olson, Mancur. 1965. Chapters 1&2. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 4
Wk5 (Feb. 26): The English School and Constructivist Approaches o Bull, Hedley. 1977. Chapters 1-2. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. o March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1998. The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. International Organization 52(4): 943-969. o Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore. 2004. Chapters 1-2. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. o Franck, Thomas. 1988. Legitimacy in the International System. American Journal of International Law 82: 705-759. Wk6 (Mar. 5): The Realist Critiques of the Prospects of Global Governance o Grieco, Joseph. 1998. Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. International Organization 42(3): 485-507. o Mearsheimer, John. 1994/95. The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security 19(3): 5-49. o Downs, George, David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom. 1996. Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation? International Organization 50(3): 379-406. o J. Martin Rochester. 2012. Chapters 1&2. Between Peril and Promise. Washington, DC: CQ Press. o Goldsmith, Jack and Stephen Krasner. 2003. The Limits of Idealism. Daedalus 132 (1): 47-63 Part III: The Form, Function, and Evolution of Global Governance Wk 7 (Mar. 12): International Law, Norms, and Global Governance o Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization. 54(4): 887-917. o J. Martin Rochester. 2012. Chapters 3&4. Between Peril and Promise. Washington, DC: CQ Press. o Lipson, Charles. 1991. Why Are Some International Agreements Informal? International Organization 45 (4): 495-538. o Abbot, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal. 2000. Hard and Soft Law in International Governance. International Organization 54(3): 421 456. o Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. On Compliance. International Organization 47(2): 175-205. o Von Stein, Jana. 2010. International Law: Understanding Compliance and Enforcement. International Studies Compendium Project. Wk8 (Mar. 19): Take-Home Midterm 5
Wk9 (Mar. 26): Mechanisms of Global Governance o Karns, Margaret and Karen Mingst. 2009. Chapters 1-3 and Chapter 6-7. International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. o Kahler, Miles. 2009. Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance, pp. 1-20. In Miles Kahler s Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance. Cornell: Cornell University Press. o Pevehouse, Jon, Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin Warnke. 2005. International Governmental Organizations, pp. 9-24. In Paul Diehl, ed., The Politics of Global Governance: Third Edition. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Wk10 (Apr. 2): The Design, Formation, and Death of Bodies of Global Governance o Ruggie, John. 1982. International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic System. International Organization 36 (2): 379-415. o Mitchell, Ronald. 1994. Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance. International Organization 48(3): 425-458. o Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. International Organization 55 (4): 761-799. o Downs, George, David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom. 1998. Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism. International Organization 52(2): 397-419. o Cupitt, Richard, Rodney Whitlock, and Lynn Williams Whitlock. 1996. The (Im)mortality of International Governmental Organizations. International Interactions 21(4): 389-404. W11 (Apr. 9): The Role and Function of Bodies of Global Governance o Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal. 1998. Why States Act through Formal International Organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(1): 3-32. o Haftel, Yoram and Alexander Thompson. 2006. The Independence of International Organizations: Concepts and Applications. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(2): 253-275. o Mitchell, Sara and Paul Hensel. 2007. International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements. American Journal of Political Science 51(4): 721-737. o Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2000. "Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks," pp. 177-205. In Byer s Role of Law in International Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Part IV: Specific Bodies of Global Governance Wk12 (Apr. 16): Collective Security, the League of Nations, and the United Nations o Miller, Lynn. 1999. The Idea and Reality of Collective Security. Global Governance 5(3): 303-332. o Karns, Margaret and Karen Mingst. 2009. The United Nations: Centerpiece of Global Governance. International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 6
o Johnstone, Ian. 2003. The Role of the UN Secretary-General: The Power of Persuasion Based on Law. Global Governance 9(4): 441-458. o Thompson, Alexander. 2006. Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission. International Organization 60(1): 1-34. o Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore. 2004. Genocide and the Peacekeeping Culture at the United Nations. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. o J. Martin Rochester. 2012. Chapter 6. Between Peril and Promise. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Wk13 (Apr. 23): Regional Organizations o Karns, Margaret and Karen Mingst. 2009. Regional Organizations. International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. o Blomberg, Elizabeth, John Peterson, and Alexander Stubb. 2008. Select Chapters. The European Union: How Does it Work? Oxford: Oxford University Press. o Moravcsik, Andrew. 2000. The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe. International Organization 54(2): 217-252. o Linos, Katerina. 2007. How Can International Organizations Shape National Welfare States: Evidence from Compliance with European Union Directives? Comparative Political Studies 4(5): 547-570. Wk14 (Apr. 30): International Financial Bodies o Woods, Ngaire. 2007. The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. o Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore. 2004. Expertise and power at the International Monetary Fund. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. o Beeson, Mark and Stephen Bell. 2009. The G-20 and International Economic Governance: Hegemony, Collectivism, or Both? Global Governance 15: 67-86. o J. Martin Rochester. 2012. Chapter 7. Between Peril and Promise. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Part V: Conclusion Wk14 (May 7): How Global Governance Matters and Wrap-Up o Karns, Margaret and Karen Mingst. 2009. Innovations in Global Governance for the Twenty-First Century. International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. o Alexander Wendt. 2003. Why a World State Is Inevitable. European Journal of International Relations 9(4): 491-542. o J. Martin Rochester. 2012. Chapter 9. Between Peril and Promise. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Final Exam (May 14): HS 013-5:45-8:15PM 7