Case 5:15-cv-00036-LGW-RSB Document 12-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 1 of 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA DORENE DISANTO, KAREN LAWSON, ) MARGARET CARTWRIGHT, MIKE DEWINE, ) ) Plaintiff-Respondents, ) ) Case No. 5:15-cv-00036 LGW-RSB v. ) ) THOMAS L. THOMAS, ) ) Defendant-Petitioner. ) ) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR REMAND I. Relevant Procedural History In December 2014, Plaintiff Dorene DiSanto requested the services of the Lake County, Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, Child Support Division ( Lake County DJFS ) to establish the paternity of the minor child A.R.D., born in 2003. (Administrative paternity determination documents, attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit A). By Notice dated February 12, 2015, Lake County DJFS notified putative father, Thomas L. Thomas (Defendant herein) of the request to establish paternity. (Id.). On the same date, it issued an Order for Mr. Thomas to appear for genetic testing on March 17, 2015 at a laboratory in Brunswick, Georgia. (Id.). On March 18, 2015, Mr. Thomas filed a Complaint for Custody, Child Support, and Show Cause in the Superior Court of Brantley County, Georgia, Case No. 15V-078. (Brantley County pleadings, attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit B). In his Complaint, Mr. Thomas asserted that the Superior Court of Brantley County, Georgia has absolute/exclusive Subject Matter Jurisdiction to hear/decide Complaint for Civil Action[.] (Id.). 1
Case 5:15-cv-00036-LGW-RSB Document 12-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 2 of 14 On April 23, 2015, Ms. DiSanto filed a Complaint for Custody in Lake County, Ohio Case No. 2015CV00603, supported by one affidavit attesting that the child has resided in Ohio since April 2013 and by another affidavit attesting that the child has resided in Ohio with her only (to the exclusion of the father) since November 2013. (Lake County pleadings, attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit C). On the same date, Ms. DiSanto requested and received an ex parte temporary emergency custody order recognizing that under Ohio law she is the minor child s custodian. (Id.). On April 27, 2015, Ms. DiSanto both answered and moved to dismiss Mr. Thomas Brantley County, Georgia Superior Court Complaint. (Exhibit B). In her Motion to Dismiss, Ms. DiSanto averred that Mr. Thomas paternity of the minor child had not been established and that both she and the minor child were residents of the State of Ohio. (Id.). As such, she asserted that the Brantley County, Georgia Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the case. (Id.). On May 18, 2015, Mr. Thomas filed a Complaint/Counterclaim/Motion for Custody, Visitation, Child Support, Objection to DNA Testing, and Habeas Corpus of Child in the Lake County, Ohio action. (Exhibit C). In his pleading, Mr. Thomas stated, [m]y relationship to the child is that I am the child s father but NOT the Biological Father. (Id.). (Emphasis original). In addition, Mr. Thomas asserted that the Lake County Common Pleas Court lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction, because the child at issue is Native American and a Registered Member of the Penbina [sic] Nation Little Shell Band of North America[.] (Id.). On May 26, 2015, Mr. Thomas filed a Notice for Removal of Lake County, Ohio Case No. 2015CV00603 to this Honorable Court. (Notice for Removal). The crux of Mr. Thomas request for removal is his unsupported claim [t]hat this U.S. District Court retains exclusive 2
Case 5:15-cv-00036-LGW-RSB Document 12-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 3 of 14 Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Native American Child and over State Courts currently acting without Subject Matter Jurisdiction to enforce Tribal Law[.] (Id. at p. 2). Mr. Thomas requested removal under 28 U.S.C. Section 1441 through 1452, 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq., and 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 and 1332 et seq. (Id. at p. 1). Movants Lawson and Cartwright hereby request remand of this matter to correct its improper removal to this Honorable Court. II. Law and Argument A. Removal jurisdiction, generally. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, empowered only to hear those cases within the judicial power defined by Article III of the Federal Constitution and those entrusted to them by Congress. Univ. Of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405 (11 th Cir. 1999). See also, James v. CSX Transportation, Inc., Case No. CV507-17, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26420, *3 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 9, 2007), citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994). A due respect for state sovereignty and the independence of state courts demands that the federal courts exercise their right to remove cases properly before state courts only in strict conformity with the removal authority granted by Congress. Andis v. EMC Mort. Corp., Case No. 5:11-cv-171(CAR), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91986, *7-8 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 17, 2011), quoting McCaslin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., 779 F. Supp. 1312, 1314 (N.D. Ala. 1991). As such, there is a presumption against the exercise of federal jurisdiction[.] Russell Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11 th Cir. 2001), citing Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11 th Cir. 1994). [A]ll uncertainties as to removal 3
Case 5:15-cv-00036-LGW-RSB Document 12-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 4 of 14 jurisdiction are to be resolved in favor of remand. Russell Corp., 264 F.3d at 1050, citing Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d at 1095. B. No provision of 28 U.S.C. Section 1441 through 1452 applies to provide a basis for removal. Mr. Thomas Notice for Removal cites, inter alia, 28 U.S.C. Section 1441 through 1452 as a basis for removal of Lake County, Ohio Case No. 2015CV00603 to this Honorable Court. None of said provisions apply. (Notice for Removal). 1. 28 U.S.C. Sections 1442, 1442a, 1444, and 1452 do not apply. 28 U.S.C. Section 1452 addresses removal of claims related to bankruptcy cases. 28 U.S.C. Section 1444 concerns removal of foreclosure actions against the United States. 28 U.S.C. Section 1442 speaks to the removal of actions when federal officers or agencies are sued or prosecuted and Section 1442a addresses the same issue when members of the armed forces are sued or prosecuted. This case concerns the custody and support of a minor child, born out-of-wedlock, whose paternity has not been determined. (Exhibit C). As Mr. Thomas Notice for Removal indicates, the case does not involve any claims against the United States, its officers or agencies, or a member of any of the armed forces. (Notice for Removal, p. 3-5). Thus, 28 U.S.C. Sections 1442, 1442a, 1444, and 1452 do not authorize or justify the removal of Lake County, Ohio Case No. 2015CV00603 to this Honorable Court. 2. 28 U.S.C. Section 1443 does not authorize the exercise of removal jurisdiction in this case. Mr. Thomas broad citation to 28 U.S.C. Section 1441 through 1452 as a basis for removal jurisdiction also implicates 28 U.S.C. Section 1443, which authorizes the removal of civil rights actions. However, removal under Section 1443 must satisfy a two-prong test. 4
Case 5:15-cv-00036-LGW-RSB Document 12-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 5 of 14 Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 219, 95 S. Ct. 1591, 44 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1975). First, a petitioner must show the deprivation of a right that arises under a federal law providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality. Gober v. State of Georgia, Case No. 1:06-CV-0728-TWT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24796, *4 (N. D. Ga. Apr. 17, 2006), quoting Johnson, 421 U.S. at 219-220. Second, the deprivation generally must be manifest in a formal expression of state law. Gober, supra at *4, quoting Johnson, 421 U.S. at 219-220. Mr. Thomas cannot meet either prong. Although there is no mandatory precedent addressing 28 U.S.C. Section 1443 removal of custody actions based on the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), there is persuasive authority holding that such removal is improper. See, Miller v. Bunn-Miller, Case No. SACV 11-1465-JST, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113048 (Cent. Dist. Ca. Sept. 27, 2011); and Belinda K. v. Baldovinos, Case No. 10-CV-02507-LHK, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105500 (N.D. Ca. Sept. 21, 2010). In Miller, the defendant-mother argued that removal to federal court was proper and remand was erroneous because the California Family Courts have interpreted the California Family Code in a manner inconsistent with the Indian Child Welfare Act [.] Miller, supra at *4. Her argument failed because she neither alleged nor demonstrated that the alleged inconsistency-in-practice was a formal expression of state law. Id. Moreover, the ICWA is not a federal law providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality. The purpose of the ICWA is to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families. 25 U.S.C. 1902. Thus, the purpose of the Act is not racial equality. Id. (Emphasis added). The Belinda K court similarly rejected an argument for removal based on the alleged civil rights implications of the ICWA, noting in relevant part that ICWA itself does not 5
Case 5:15-cv-00036-LGW-RSB Document 12-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 6 of 14 authorize or even contemplate the wholesale removal of state court custody determinations to federal court. On the contrary, the rights granted in 1912-13 are specifically described as rights for proceedings in State court and under State law. Belinda K, supra at *16. Indeed, only actions to invalidate the placement of Native American children under Section 1914 of the ICWA can even be said to involve a federal question. Id., citing In re Adoption of C.D.K., Case No. 2:08-CV-490 TS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51674, *8-*9 (D. Utah, Jun. 17, 2009). Here, as in Miller and Belinda K, Mr. Thomas assertion of rights under the ICWA even if it could be deemed to apply, which Movants Lawson and Cartwright dispute, see infra is legally insufficient to justify removal of Lake County, Ohio Case No. 2015CV00603 to this Honorable Court. 3. 28 U.S.C. Section 1441 does not apply. 28 U.S.C. Section 1441 authorizes removal only of actions of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction. Henson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 261 F.3d 1065, 1070 (11 th Cir. 2001), quoting 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(a). According to the Henson court, [t]hat phrase means that actions are not removable unless they originally could have been filed in federal court. Id., quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1987). See also, Cotton v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402, F.3d 1267, 1280 (11 th Cir. 2005). The U.S. District Courts have original jurisdiction in only two (2) kinds of actions: those based on diversity of citizenship, under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332; and those in which a claim involves a federal question, under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331. 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(b) and (c). As more fully argued hereinbelow, neither provision authorizes removal in this case. However, even if either Section 1331 or 1332 applied, the removal at issue would nonetheless fail. 6
Case 5:15-cv-00036-LGW-RSB Document 12-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 7 of 14 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(a) authorizes removal only to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(a). (Emphasis added). Here, Mr. Thomas sought to remove an action pending in Lake County, Ohio, which lies within the venue of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, not in the embrace of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Waycross Division. Thus, Mr. Thomas removal fails to comply with 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(a). See, Howell v. State of Maine, Case No. 2:14-cv-00108-NT, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78993 (D. Me. Mar. 27, 2014), holding section 1441 does not permit removal to a district or division other than the one that embraces the place where the action is pending in state court. Id. at *3. See also, Cardona v. Mohabir, Case No. 14 Civ. 1596(PKC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35624 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2014), holding, [t]he procedural limitation on removal to districts other than the district embracing the place where the state court action is pending was not slipped into the law books while otherwise attentive counsel was nodding. The requirement was set forth in the Judiciary Act of 1789 (at section 12), which on September 24, 2014 will celebrate its 225th anniversary. Id. at *1. For this reason, 28 U.S.C. Section 1441 does not authorize or justify the removal of Lake County, Ohio Case No. 2015CV00603 to this Honorable Court. However, the removal also fails for want of the requisite indicia that any U.S. District Court would have had original jurisdiction over the action. See, Henson, Caterpillar, and Cotton; and 28 U.S.C Sections 1441, 1331, and 1332. 7
Case 5:15-cv-00036-LGW-RSB Document 12-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 8 of 14 C. 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 does not apply and thus does not provide a basis for removal. Mr. Thomas claims that 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 justifies this Court s exercise of removal jurisdiction. (Notice for Removal, p. 1). He is mistaken. Section 1331 confers on the U.S. District Courts original jurisdiction over claims that involve a federal question. Federal question jurisdiction refers to civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Stone v. Bank of New York Mellon, N.A., Case No. 13-15433, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6449, *3 (11 th Cir. Apr. 20, 2015), quoting 28 U.S.C. Section 1331. A case aris[es] under federal law within the meaning of 1331... if a wellpleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 689-90, 126 S.Ct. 2121, 165 L.Ed.2d 131 (2006), quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). See also, Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1310 (11 th Cir. 2001). When a Section 1331 federal question exists, removal is effectuated by and through 28 U.S.C. Section 1441. As argued hereinabove, Mr. Thomas attempt at Section 1441 removal fails because he removed Lake County, Ohio Case No. 2015CV00603 to a U.S. District Court that does not embrace Lake County, Ohio. However, that defect aside, 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 does not justify removal in this case. An out-of-wedlock minor child s paternity, custody, and support are matters controlled entirely by state law. Neither Ms. DiSanto s Complaint nor Mr. Thomas Counterclaim seeks relief that depends on resolution of a question arising under the U.S. Constitution, U.S. treaties, 8
Case 5:15-cv-00036-LGW-RSB Document 12-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 9 of 14 or the U.S. Code. For the reasons stated infra, Mr. Thomas invocation of the ICWA does not alter this analysis or its outcome. As such, his removal was improper. See, Henson, Caterpillar, and Cotton; and 28 U.S.C Sections 1441 and 1331. D. 28 U.S.C. Section 1332 does not apply and thus does not provide a basis for removal. Mr. Thomas citation to 28 U.S.C. Section 1332 as a basis for removal of Lake County, Ohio Case No. 2015CV00603 to this Honorable Court is equally problematic. District courts only have original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332 where the civil action is between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Respert, Case No. 5:15-CV-183, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88433, *4 (M.D. Ga. Jun. 30, 2014), quoting 28 U.S.C. Section 1332. Where, as in the present case and Respert, there is no evidence of an amount in controversy, it is impossible for the removing party to satisfy the Section 1332 standard. Thus, even if Mr. Thomas removal of the Lake County, Ohio action to a Georgia federal court was not fatally defective under 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(a), Section 1332 in no way justifies the exercise of removal jurisdiction. See, Henson, Caterpillar, and Cotton; and 28 U.S.C Sections 1441 and 1332. E. 25 U.S.C. Section 1901 et seq., the Indian Child Welfare Act, does not apply and thus does not provide a basis for removal. While 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331, 1332, and 1441 through 1452 represent little more than the unattainable potential for valid removal in the present case, the essence of Mr. Thomas argument for removal is that the ICWA, codified at 25 U.S.C. Section 1901 et seq., demands it. (Notice for Removal, p. 2). It does not. In fact, the ICWA has no application here. 9
Case 5:15-cv-00036-LGW-RSB Document 12-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 10 of 14 1. Absent an admitted or established father-child relationship, the child does not qualify as Native American based on Mr. Thomas heritage. Mr. Thomas invokes the ICWA on the basis of his own and through him the child s Native American lineage. (Exhibit C). Mr. Thomas does not claim that the child is of Native American descent on his mother s side. However, Mr. Thomas denies paternity of the child (asserting he is the child s father but NOT the Biological Father ) and objects to DNA testing. (Id.). (Emphasis original). Thus, Mr. Thomas Native American blood if any does not carry through to the child. Furthermore, he lacks status under the ICWA, which defines a parent as any biological parent or parents of an Indian child and expressly excludes the unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or established. 25 U.S.C. Section 1903(9). (Emphasis added). Thus, the ICWA does not apply to the matters at issue in this case. 2. The ICWA applies only to cases involving children of federally recognized Native American tribes. Even if Mr. Thomas had admitted paternity, however, the ICWA would not apply in the present case because the Penbina [sic] Nation Little Shell Band of North America in which Mr. Thomas claims membership is not a federally recognized Native American tribe. (Id.). Assuming that Mr. Thomas intends to refer to the Pembina Nation Little Shell Band does not correct the problem. Indeed, the unanimous authority of the federal courts appears to affirm that the Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North America is not federally recognized. Neal v. State of Arizona, Case No. CV-09-8203-PCT-JAT, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8443, *6 (D. Ariz. Jan. 13, 2010), citing Reed v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assoc., 212 Fed. Appx. 707, 708 (9 th Cir. 2006); Mulder v. Lundberg, 154 F.App'x 52, 55 (10 th Cir. 2005); Delorme v. United States, 10
Case 5:15-cv-00036-LGW-RSB Document 12-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 11 of 14 354 F.3d 810, 814 n.6 (8 th Cir. 2004); U.S. v. White, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112171, 2008 WL 4816987, 3 (W.D. Mo. 2008); U.S. v. Stowbunenko-Saitschenko, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20137, 2007 WL 865392, 1 (D. Ariz. 2007); Richmond v. Wampanoag Tribal Court Cases, 431 F.Supp.2d 1159, 1167-69 (D. Utah 2006). The Neal decision also cites 74 FR 40218-02 as the Bureau of Indian Affairs publication listing Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, which lists over 560 such tribes, none of which are the Little Shell Band. Neal, supra at *6. See also, Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Norton, 389 F.3d 1074 (10 th Cir. 2004), as amended (10 th Cir. Feb. 16, 2005), *cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 333, 163 L.Ed.2d 46 (2005), holding that: The law governing Federal recognition of an Indian tribe is, today, clear. The Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994 provides Indian tribes may be recognized by: (1) an Act of Congress; (2) the administrative procedures set forth in part 83 of the Code of Federal Regulations[;] or (3) a decision of a United States court. Id. at 1076, quoting Pub. L. No. 103-454, Section 103(3), 108 Stat. 4791; and citing United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F.3d 543, 547-48 (10 th Cir. 2001). Once recognized, the tribe is placed on the Department of the Interior s list of recognized tribes. 25 U.S.C. Sections 479a(3), 479a-1; 25 C.F.R. Section 83.5(a). Neither the Penbina nor the Pembina Nation Little Shell Band has been recognized by an act of Congress. United States court decisions unanimously deny the purported tribe recognition. Moreover, it is not among the recognized tribes in the 25 C.F.R. Section 83.5(a) list appearing at 80 FR 1942 and promulgated under 25 U.S.C. Sections 479a(3) and 479a-1. To qualify as an Indian child within the meaning of the ICWA, a child must either himself be or have eligibility to be the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. 25 11
Case 5:15-cv-00036-LGW-RSB Document 12-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 12 of 14 U.S.C. Section 1903(4). Because the statute defines Indian tribe to mean only those tribes, bands, nations, and other organized groups or communities recognized as eligible for the services provided to Indians by the Secretary [of the Interior], the absence of recognition for the Penbina, or Pembina, Nation Little Shell Band renders the minor child in this case not an Indian child under the ICWA. 25 U.S.C. Section 1903(4) and (8). Again, the ICWA does not apply to the matters at issue in this case. 3. The ICWA does not apply to cases in which custody is contested between the child s parents. Even if Mr. Thomas and the child qualified as Native American members of a federally recognized tribe, the ICWA still would not apply in the present case. By definition, the child custody proceedings to which the ICWA applies all concern the placement of an Indian child away from his parents and his tribe, in derogation of the stability and security of the tribal family. 25 U.S.C. Section 1903(1), 1912, and 1913; Miller, supra at *4. Nothing in the language or spirit of the ICWA renders it applicable to a custody dispute between parents, even if one claims Native American lineage and the other does not. See, John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999); and Shirado v. Foote, 2010 N.D. 136, 785 N.W.2d 235 (ND 2010). The John court held that the ICWA s express exclusion of custody awards in divorce proceedings from the 25 U.S.C. Section 1903 definition of child custody proceedings extends to the determination of custody between unmarried parents, citing a Department of the Interior comment on a draft of the ICWA that the protections provided therein are not needed in proceedings between parents. Id. at 747, citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386, at 31. In support of its conclusion, the John court cited a Bureau of Indian Affairs Guideline, 44 FR 67,584, 67,587 (1979), indicating that the divorce exception is intended to apply to all domestic relations proceedings, so long as custody is awarded one of the child s parents. Id. In addition, the John 12
Case 5:15-cv-00036-LGW-RSB Document 12-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 13 of 14 court relied on Walksalong v. Mackey, 250 Neb. 202, 549 N.W.2d 384, 387 (Neb. 1996), holding that the ICWA does not apply to disputes between unmarried parents. John, supra at 747. In Shirado, as in the present case, one parent claimed Native American heritage and the other did not. Shirado, supra at P2. In Shirado, as in the present case, the putative father was not listed on the child s birth certificate and had not acknowledged or established paternity at the time he sought a custody order. Id. The Shirado court held that the ICWA applies only to child custody proceedings as defined in 25 U.S. C. Section 1903 to include foster care placements, terminations of parental rights, preadoptive placements, and adoptive placements, not an initial custody determination between parents. Id. at P9, citing In Re DeFender, 435 N.W.2d 717, 721 (S.D. 1989). Under John, Walksalong, Shirado, and DeFender, the ICWA does not apply to the matters at issue in the present case, which involves an initial determination of custody between a biological mother and a putative father. See also, 25 U.S.C. 1903. 4. In any case, the ICWA does not confer jurisdiction on this Honorable Court. Putting aside all of the substantive defects recited above, even if the ICWA could be applied in the present case, it would not justify Mr. Thomas removal of Lake County, Ohio Case No. 2015CV00603 to this Honorable Court. Contrary to Mr. Thomas argument, the ICWA does not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts. On its face, the ICWA confers jurisdiction over qualified child custody proceedings involving an Indian child and the rights of his parent (as all of those terms are statutorily defined) on tribal courts. 25 U.S.C. 1911(a). Consequently, the ICWA does not apply as a basis for removing Case No. 2015CV00603 from Lake County, Ohio as Mr. Thomas requested. 13
Case 5:15-cv-00036-LGW-RSB Document 12-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 14 of 14 III. Conclusion There is a presumption against the exercise of federal jurisdiction, particularly on removal, not only because the federal courts have limited jurisdiction as specifically outlined by the U.S. Constitution and the U.S. Code, but because of the sovereignty of the several states and the independence of their courts. Russell Corp., Burns, Univ. Of S. Ala., James, Kokkonen, Andis, and McCaslin, all supra. Thus, all uncertainties as to removal jurisdiction are to be resolved in favor of remand. Russell Corp., 264 F.3d at 1050, citing Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095. In the present case, Defendant-Petitioner Thomas L. Thomas has not cited a single valid, cognizable basis for the exercise of removal jurisdiction. Therefore, Movants Karen Lawson and Margaret Cartwright respectfully request that this Honorable Court GRANT their Motion and remand this matter to the Lake County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas. Respectfully submitted this 23 rd day of June, 2015. BRANNEN, SEARCY & SMITH, LLP /s/ Beverly G. O Hearn BEVERLY G. O HEARN Georgia Bar No. 287650 22 East 34 th Street/P.O. Box 8007 Savannah, GA 31412-8002 Phone: (912) 234-8875 and WILLIAMS & PETRO CO., L.L.C. /s/ Richard A. Williams RICHARD A. WILLIAMS Ohio Bar No. 0013347 338 S. High Street, 2 nd Floor Columbus, OH 43215 Phone: (614) 224-0531 Attorneys for Karen Lawson and Margaret Cartwright 14