POL SCI 926 Graduate Seminar in Legislative Process Spring 2018 4:00pm 6:40pm Thursday Bolton Hall 657 Professor Hong Min Park hmpark1@uwm.edu Bolton Hall 666 Course Description This course is a graduate seminar to study politics in the U.S. Congress. Thus, our goals are both to gain an understanding of the major behavioral and institutional features of the U.S. Congress and to scrutinize political science approaches to the study of congressional politics. Ultimately, by the end of semester, we should be ready for conducting original research on congressional politics. Prerequisites It is generally assumed that all seminar participants have taken Intro American Politics and Congressional Politics in their undergraduate education (or, at least, are familiar with materials covered in these courses). Taking a graduate level American Politics Pro-seminar (POL SCI 749) would be a great resource, but not required. Textbooks and Additional Materials The following books are required for this seminar: Barbara Sinclair. 2016. Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress. 5 th edition. Washington D.C.: CQ Press. David Mayhew. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press. Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press. Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Daniel J. Hopkins and John Sides, eds. 2015. Political Polarization in American Politics. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. Steven S. Smith. 2014. The Senate Syndrome: The Evolution of Procedural Warfare in the Modern U.S. Senate. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1
In addition, during Week 13, we will need to choose ONE from the following books: Frances E. Lee. 2016. Insecure Majorities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Matthew N. Green. 2015. Underdog Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press. Tim Groeling. 2010. When Politicians Attack. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Course Requirements and Grading Each time we meet in the seminar room, we will first learn several important concepts and themes. Of course, completing the reading assignment is the first step to prepare for that task. However, in order to bolster the quality of our meeting, we would like to focus particularly on the following elements in each reading: 1) Main (theoretical) argument(s); 2) Data and methods (if it s an empirical work); and 3) Contribution(s). Then, we will discuss and debate on how to improve our research on a given topic. Of course, we will start with the limitation of each reading and we are open to most of interesting discussion topics. However, for an effective use of seminar time, we would like to answer the following questions: 1) Can we make a theoretical argument that is different from the existing literature but is equally convincing enough to explain empirical puzzles? 2) Is there a better way to empirically test our theoretical claims? 3) How can we understand congressional politics in a more systematic way? Ultimately, the final course grading will be based upon three parts: 1) Discussion Preparation Report (20%): For three of the seminar meetings (Week 4-8, 10, 12, 14-15), seminar participants are required to submit a list of questions and/or discussion topics by 9am on Thursday (via email). These should reflect a critical reading of the week s assigned readings. 2) Seminar Participation (30%): Even though not all of the seminar participants submit discussion preparation reports, all participants are required to fully engage in discussions and debates every time in the seminar room. Note that quality is more important than quantity in general. 3) Research Design Paper (50%): At the end of the semester, all seminar participants are required to submit their original research design (10 pages). Even though we will have several opportunities to discuss the details throughout the semester (research question due on 3/1 & literature review due on 4/5), a final version of the paper is due on 5/17 at noon. Seminar participants who take this course under the Pass/Fail option must receive a grade of C or higher in order to obtain a Pass on their final grade. A final grade of Incomplete will only be given under exceptional circumstances and is solely at the discretion of Professor Park. 2
In general, make-ups for any course requirements will not be given. Seminar participants who miss any requirements because of scheduled activities of an official University student organization, a religious holiday, or a verifiable illness should contact me in advance so that alternative arrangements can be made. If there is a dispute regarding a grade, re-grading is possible under two conditions: We will have a cooling period of at least two business days. Any complaints or disputes will NOT be accepted in this period. Then, all complaints must be typed and must clearly express specific concerns. These written statements must be accompanied by citations of support from course materials, i.e. required and recommended readings and/or class discussion, in order to ensure accuracy. Classroom Policies and Instructor Availability I expect all students to behave professionally. I am intolerant of disruptive behavior in the classroom, including talking during class, reading newspapers, and especially the ringing of cell phones or pagers. Students engaging in disruptive behavior will be asked to leave the classroom in order to preserve the learning environment for other students. Students are expected to be civil, rational, and respectful of others opinions. Please do not intimidate, patronize, or ridicule anyone else during the course of class activities. Feel free to stop by my office during regularly scheduled office hours (Tuesdays 9:30am- 11:00am). If you are unable to attend office hours, contact me via email to arrange an appointment. I usually work in my office during work hours, but I unfortunately cannot guarantee that I will be able to meet with people who come to my office without first scheduling a time to see me. Academic Integrity No form of academic dishonesty will be tolerated. The University of Wisconsin- Milwaukee has detailed its policies on academic integrity (http://www3.uwm.edu/dept/acad_aff/policy/academicmisconduct.cfm). You should acquaint yourself with policies concerning cheating, fabrication, plagiarism, and academic interference. Any submission of work in this course constitutes a certificate that the work complies with university policies on academic integrity. Student Disabilities Any students with disabilities of any kind (e.g. physical, learning, psychiatric, systemic, vision, hearing, etc.) who needs to arrange reasonable accommodations should contact Professor Park and the Student Accessibility Center (Mitchell 112, 414-229-6287, http://www4.uwm.edu/sac) at the beginning of the semester. 3
Tentative Schedule and Readings Week 1 (1/25) Introduction We will meet and discuss the seminar plan. It includes seminar requirements, reading list, and some possible schedule adjustments. Week 2 (2/1) U.S. Congress and Legislative Procedures The objective of the week is to let you be familiar with legislative procedures and legislative jargons. Complete the reading and write a two-page summary. Barbara Sinclair. 2016. Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress. 5 th edition. Washington D.C.: CQ Press. Walter Oleszek, Mark Oleszek, Elizabeth Rybicki and Bill Heniff, Jr. 2015. Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process. 10 th edition. Washington D.C.: CQ Press. Week 3 (2/8) Theoretical Perspectives We will discuss how to research Congress. Notably, there are multiple approaches and perspectives in conducting a scientific examination of the U.S. Congress. Ultimately, you should be familiar with assumptions and premises of the rational choice institutionalism, upon which the current congressional studies will be heavily based. Richard F. Fenno. 1962. The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration. American Political Science Review 56: 310-324. Richard F. Fenno. 1973. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little, Brown. Introduction and Chapter 1. [Available via XXX] David Mayhew. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press. Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. 1996. Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. MPIFG Discussion Paper. [Available via XXX] Donald R. Matthews. 1960. U.S. Senators and Their World. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Charles Stewart III. 2001. Analyzing Congress. New York: Norton. Chapter 1. 4
S. M. Amadae and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. 1999. The Rochester School: The Origin of Positive Political Theory. Annual Review of Political Science 2: 269-295. Nelson Polsby and Eric Schickler. 2002. Landmarks in the Study of Congress Since 1945. Annual Review of Political Science 5: 359-367. Week 4 (2/15) Representation The fundamental function that Congress performs would be to represent people in the United States. Assuming that a better representation is good for American democracy (i.e. normative concerns), we will discuss an empirical aspect of this issue. Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stoke. 1963. Constituency Influence in Congress. American Political Science Review 57: 45-56. Richard Fenno. 1977. U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies. American Political Science Review 71: 883-916. Robert Weissberg. 1978. Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress. American Political Science Review. 72: 535-547. Jeseph Bafumi and Michael C. Herron. 2010. Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress. American Political Science Review 104(3): 519-542 Justin Grimmer. 2013. Appropriators not Position Takers: The Distorting Effects of Electoral Incentives on Congressional Representation. American Journal of Political Science 57(3): 624-642 Christian R. Gross, Neil Malhotra and Robert Parks Van Houweling. 2015. Explaining Explanations: How Legislators Explain their Policy Positions and How Citizens React. American Journal of Political Science 59(3): 724-743 Daniel M. Butler and Adam M. Dynes. 2016. How Politicians Discount the Opinions of Constituents with Whom They Disagree. American Journal of Political Science 60(4): 975-989 Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1983. Effects of Public Opinion on Policy. American Political Science Review 77: 175-190. James A. Stimson, Michael B. Mackuen, and Robert S. Erikson. 1995. Dynamic Representation. American Political Science Review 89: 543-565. Lawrence S. Rothenberg and Mitchell S. Sanders. 2000. Severing the Electoral Connection: Shirking in the Contemporary Congress. American Journal of Political Science 44: 316-325. Justin Grimmer. 2013. Representational Style in Congress: What Legislators Say and Why It Matters. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Justin Grimmer, Sean J. Westwood and Solomon Messing. 2015. The Impression of Influence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 5
Week 5 (2/22) Three Perspectives on Standing Committees The two most important organizations within Congress are standing committees and political parties, which were never mentioned in the Constitution. This week, we will first discuss politics in committees. In particular, we focus on (1) to whom committees are responsible, (2) what functions committees serve for, and (3) how we can understand committees in a more theoretical way. Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1979. Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models. American Journal of Political Science 23(1): 27-59. Barry R. Weingast and William Marshall. 1987. The Industrial Organization of Congress. Journal of Political Economy 96: 132-163. Keith Krehbiel. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Chapter 3. [Available via XXX] Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkely: University of California Press. Chapters 4-5 and 7-8. Kenneth Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power. American Political Science Review 81: 85-105. Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. Collective Decision-Making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3: 287 335. Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel. 1989. Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee. American Journal of Political Science 33: 459 490. Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1994. Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House. Legislative Studies Quarterly 27: 191-217. Kenneth Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast. 1994. Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. Legislative Studies Quarterly 19: 149-180. David Fortunato. 2013. Majority Status and Variation in Informational Organization." Journal of Politics 75(4): 937-952. Christopher R. Berry and Anthony Fowler. 2016. Cardinals or Clerics? Congressional Committees and the Distribution of Pork. American Journal of Political Science 60(3): 692-708. Week 6 (3/1) Two Perspectives on Political Parties This week is devoted to study political parties. Specifically, we will discuss (1) why parties form at first (goals and motivations), (2) what parties do (strategies), and (3) how we can understand parties in a more theoretical way. 6
John H. Aldrich. 1995. Why Parties? Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapter 2. [Available via XXX] David W. Rohde. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapters 1-2. [Available via XXX] Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2, 3 and 5. [Available via XXX] Jeffery A. Jenkins and Nathan W. Monroe. 2014. Negative Agenda Control and the Conservative Coalition in the U.S. House. Journal of Politics 76(4): 1116-1127. Jesse Richman. 2015. The Electoral Costs of Party Agenda Setting: Why the Hastert Rule Leads to Defeat. Journal of Politics 77(4): 1129-1141 Joseph Cooper and David W. Brady. 1981. Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn. American Political Science Review 75: 411-425. Steven S. Smith. 2007. Party Influence in Congress. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 5. Jesse Richman. 2011. Parties, Pivots, and Policy: The Status Quo Test. American Political Science Review 105(1): 151-165 Jeffery A. Jenkins and Nathan W. Monroe. 2012. Buying Negative Agenda Control in the U.S. House. American Journal of Political Science 56(4): 897-912 Jeffery A. Jenkins and Nathan W. Monroe. 2016. On Measuring Legislative Agenda-Setting Power. American Journal of Political Science 60(1): 158-174 Assignment #1: Each of you will need to write at least one paragraph or two to introduce the research question for your research design paper. It should be typed, and double spaced with 1-page limit. It would be important to know that you should email your research question to all seminar participants by 9am on 3/1. In class, everybody will have an opportunity to get some feedback both from me and your classmates. Week 7 (3/8) Where s the Party? Keith Krehbiel has argued (he still does ) that the effect of political parties in the U.S. Congress is an observational equivalence to that of ideology. We will discuss what this means and how his argument has shaped research agenda in congressional politics. Keith Krehbiel. 1993. Where s the Party? British Journal of Political Science 23: 235-266. Sarah A. Binder, Eric D. Lawrence and Forrest Maltzman. 1999. Uncovering the Hidden Effect of Party. Journal of Politics 61: 815-831. 7
James Snyder, Jr. and Tim Groseclose. 2000. Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll- Call Voting. American Journal of Political Science 44: 193-211. Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2001. The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress. American Political Science Review 95: 673-687. Barbara Sinclair. 2002. Do Parties Matter? In Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress: New Perspectives on the History of Congress. Edited by David W. Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins. Stanford: Stanford University Press. [Available via XXX] Eric D. Lawrence, Forrest Maltzman, and Steven S. Smith. 2006. Who Wins? Party Effects in Legislative Voting. Legislative Studies Quarterly 31: 33-69. Jeffrey A. Jenkins and Timothy P. Nokken. 2008. Partisanship, the Electoral Connection, and Lame-Duck Sessions of Congress, 1877-2006. Journal of Politics 70: 450 465. Keith Krehbiel. 1998. Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart III. 2001. The Effect of Party and Preferences on Congressional Roll-Call Voting. Legislative Studies Quarterly 26: 533-572. Jeffrey A. Jenkins, Michael H. Crespin and Jamie L. Carson. 2005. Parties as Procedural Coalitions in Congress: An Examination of Differing Career Tracks. Legislative Studies Quarterly 30: 365 389. Steven S. Smith. 2007. Party Influence in Congress. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 6. Week 8 (3/15) Voting and Ideal Point Estimation Poole and Rosenthal (1997) made a significant step by estimating ideology for every congressional member. As we can easily expect, this has significantly changed the whole world in congressional politics. Therefore, we will learn how to do ideal point estimation, at least in an intuitive way. Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapters 1-3. Appendix A, B. Voteview.com [Especially, the section of Data and Software] Joshua Clinton, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers. 2004. The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data. American Political Science Review 98: 355-370. Adam Bonica. 2013. Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace. American Journal of Political Science 57(2): 294-311 8
Keith T. Poole. 2005. Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Joshua D. Clinton, Anthony Bertelli, Christian R. Grose, David E. Lewis, and David C. Nixon. 2012. Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies, Presidents, and Congress. American Journal of Political Science 56(2): 341-354 Michael Peress. 2013. Estimating Proposal and Status Quo Locations Using Voting and Cosponsorship Data. Journal of Politics 75(3): 613-631. Kosuke Imai, James Lo, and Jonathan Olmsted. 2016. Fast Estimation of Ideal Points with Massive Data. American Political Science Review 110(4): 631-656. Week 9 (3/22) No Class. Enjoy Spring Break Week 10 (3/29) Unidimensional Congress? Is the U.S. Congress unidimensional? Poole and Rosenthal (1997) argue yes. We will discuss controversies regarding unidimensionality vs. multidimensionality. Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 11. Mark S. Hurwitz, Roger J. Moiles and David W. Rohde. 2001. Distributive and Partisan Issues in Agriculture Policy in the 104th House. American Political Science Review 95: 911 922. Talbert, Jeffery C. and Matthew Potoski. 2002. Setting the Legislative Agenda: The Dimensional Structure of Bill Cosponsoring and Floor Voting. Journal of Politics 64: 864 891. Michael Crespin and David Rohde. 2010. Dimensions, Issues, and Bills: Appropriations Voting on the House Floor. Journal of Politics 72: 976-989. Jason M. Roberts, Steven S. Smith, and Stephen R. Haptonstahl. 2016. The Dimensionality of Congressional Voting Reconsidered. American Politics Research 44(5): 794-815. John H. Aldrich, Jacob Montgomery and David Sparks. 2014. Polarization and Ideology: Partisan Sources of Low Dimensionality in Scaled Roll-Call Analyses. Political Analysis 22(4): 435-456. Duncan MacRae. 1958. Dimensions of Congressional Voting. Berkeley: University of California Press. Aage Clausen. 1973. How Congressmen Decide. New York: St. Martin s Press. Clyde Wilcox and Aage Clausen. 1991. "The Dimensionality of Roll-Call Voting Reconsidered." Legislative Studies Quarterly 16: 393-406. 9
Week 11 (4/5) No Class. Professor Park attends the Midwest Meeting. Assignment #2: Even though we do not meet in class, each of you will need to submit the literature review for your research design paper. It should be typed, and double spaced with 5-page limit. It would be important know that you should place the hard copy to my department mailbox (not to all seminar participants) by the end of 4/5. Week 12 (4/19) Party Polarization Party polarization became one of the key themes in recent decades. We will discuss various aspects of party polarization. Daniel J. Hopkins and John Sides, eds. 2015. Political Polarization in American Politics. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. [It is important to note that this book came from the Monkey Cage discussion. Each chapter will be fairly short in length, but it has suggested readings. Whenever needed, you are encouraged to read these additional materials.] Mark D. Brewer, Mack D. Mariani, and Jeffrey M. Stonecash. 2002. Northern Democrats and Party Polarization in the U.S. House. Legislative Studies Quarterly 27: 423-444. Barbara Sinclair. 2006. Party Wars: Polarization and the Politics of National Policy Making. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge: MIT Press. Week 13 (4/19) Partisan Messaging Party polarization has transformed the way in which political parties talk to voters and the mass media. Some call it partisan messaging. Seminar participants will divide into three groups, each of which will be in charge of discussing one of the following books. Although the books discuss more than just partisan messaging, our discussion will be limited to partisan messaging. Option 1: Frances E. Lee. 2016. Insecure Majorities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Option 2: Matthew N. Green. 2015. Underdog Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press. Option 3: Tim Groeling. 2010. When Politicians Attack. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10
Week 14 (4/26) Rules and Procedural Development in the House Rules are known to be crucial in shaping final policy outcomes. In this week, we will discuss the dynamics in procedural development in the House. Sarah A. Binder. 1996. "The Partisan Basis of Procedural Choice: Allocating Parliamentary Rights in the House, 1789-1990." American Political Science Review, 90: 8-20. Eric Schickler. 2000. Institutional Change in the House of Representatives, 1867-1998: A Test of Partisan and Ideological Power Balance Models. American Political Science Review 94: 269 288. Hong Min Park. 2015. Studying Rules Changes in the U.S. House: Evidence from an Alternative Empirical Models. Congress & the Presidency 42(1): 28-49. Jason M. Roberts and Steven S. Smith. 2007. The Evolution of Agenda-Setting Institutions in Congress: Path Dependency in House and Senate Institutional Development. In Party, Process, and Political Changes: Further New Perspectives on the History of Congress. Edited by David W. Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins. Stanford: Stanford University Press. [Available via XXX] Bryan W. Marshall. 2002. Explaining the Role of Restrictive Rules in the Postreform House. Legislative Studies Quarterly 27: 61 85. Roberts, Jason M. 2010. The Development of Special Orders and Special Rules in the U.S. House, 1881-1937. Legislative Studies Quarterly 35: 307-336. Sarah A. Binder. 1997. Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eric Schickler and Andrew Rich. 1997. Controlling the Floor: Parties as Procedural Coalitions in the House. American Journal of Political Science 41: 1340 1375. Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1997. Toward a Theory of Legislative Rules Changes: Assessing Schickler and Rich s Evidence. American Journal of Political Science 41: 1376-1386. Eric Schickler. 2001. Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Week 15 (5/3) Rules and Procedural Development in the Senate Filibuster and Senate procedures have been controversial recently, but we do not know much about it. This week, we will discuss both historical and contemporary aspects of Senate procedures in depth. Steven S. Smith. 2014. The Senate Syndrome: The Evolution of Procedural Warfare in the Modern U.S. Senate. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 11
Sarah Binder and Steven S. Smith. 1997. Politics or Principle: Filibustering in the Senate. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Sarah A. Binder and Steven S. Smith. 1998. Political Goals and Procedural Choice in the Senate. Journal of Politics 60: 398-416. Gregory Wawro and Eric Schickler. 2004. Where s the Pivot?: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the Pre-cloture Senate. American Journal of Political Science 48: 758-774. Gregory Wawro and Eric Schickler. 2006. Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gregory Koger. 2010. Filibustering: A Political History of Obstruction in the House and Senate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Anthony J. Madonna. 2011. Winning Coalition Formation in the U.S. Senate: The Effects of Legislative Decision Rules and Agenda Change. American Journal of Political Science 55(2): 276-288. Week 16 (5/10) Presentation of Research Design Project Each of seminar participants will present their research design project in front of the class. Ideally, each verbal presentation should last for 15 minutes, possibly with the help of technology (i.e. presentation slides or handouts). Non-presenting students should be prepared to give helpful feedbacks. Assignment #3: You should email your presentation materials to all seminar participants by 9am on 5/10. The format and length are up to you. Week 17 (5/17) Due Date for Final Version of Research Design Paper Assignment #4: You should email me the final version no later than 5/17 at noon. 12