Transnational Dimensions of Civil War

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Transnational Dimensions of Civil War Kristian Skrede Gleditsch University of California, San Diego & Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo See http://weber.ucsd.edu/ kgledits/ & http://www.prio.no/cscw Transnational Dimensions of Civil War p. 1/1

Transnational conflict Most conflicts in contemporary world intrastate conflicts between state and non-state actors rather than interstate But many civil wars not confined within nation states, display transnational dimensions Actors themselves often transnational, e.g., Albanian insurgents States may intervene, provide support (e.g., Congo), anticipation of support may influence mobilization (e.g., Kosovo) Conflicts in one state may create externalities that increase risk of war in another state Many efforts treat interstate and civil wars as mutually exclusive categories but in practice difficult to classify many conflicts (Bosnia formally civil war, yet clear ties to neighboring states and ethnic kin; Kashmir role of Pakistan) New armed conflicts after 2000 in Uppsala data all intrastate, but clear transnational elements: Albanian revolt in Macedonia; RFDG rebels in Guinea; September 11 attacks Transnational Dimensions of Civil War p. 2/1

Transnational conflict Existing studies of civil war focus on country characteristics and treat conflicts as independent, domestic phenomena Problematic if transnational factors influence risk of civil war and we have dependence between observations Broader project on regional conflict dynamics, three key assumptions 1. States/dyads not self-contained or independent, but influenced by relations with other actors 2. Transnational factors influence risk of conflict, and cannot be reduced to attributes of individual countries 3. Regional component: Most interesting dependence is local and not system wide Transnational Dimensions of Civil War p. 3/1

Civil conflict, 1989-2001 Transnational Dimensions of Civil War p. 4/1

Transnational dimensions of civil war Previous research demonstrates geographical clustering in civil wars (e.g., Gleditsch 2002, Ward and Gleditsch 2002) Yet, know less about how external factors influence civil war onset and conflict dynamics Distinguish between possible sources of geographical patterns Direct conflict spill-over and contagion Hypotheses on specific transnational linkages Develop adequate statistical models of transnational linkages Consider the reverse Galton problem in many diffusion studies Geographical clustering may stem from other spatially clustered domestic attributes (e.g., wealth, institutions), must also consider central country specific factors known to be associated with conflict Transnational Dimensions of Civil War p. 5/1

Transnational dimensions of civil war Conflict contagion/diffusion Increase in risk when connected states are at war Hypotheses on transnational linkages that may underlie geographical clustering Transborder ethnic ties Institutions in connected states Integration/trade between states in region Country specific attributes Institutions GDP per capita ( state strength ) Ethnic heterogeneity Transnational Dimensions of Civil War p. 6/1

Specifying dependence between observations Assume that local actors and attributes most relevant Dependence takes form of a locally dependent Markov field Conditional probability of xi given x j, Pr(x i x j, j i), depends only on x j if unit j is a neighbor of i (Spatial) dependence can be specified by a graph of relations between actors, or connectivity matrix W States i and j connected (wij = 1) if within minimum distance threshold, row w i specifies i s connectivities to all other states J Allows introducing dependence in statistical model Create spatial variable that reflect regional attributes or transnational linkages based on W Transnational Dimensions of Civil War p. 7/1

Statistical model of spatial process Spatial econometrics (e.g., Anselin 1988) Introduce spatial context by r.h.s. lag or error based on W (SAR/SER maximum likelihood estimators). Presumes a continuous d.v., but conflict is a categorical d.v. Autologistic model of spatial processes (Besag 1974) Probability of conflict in i conditional on peace/war in connected states j, given by r c i,t = w (i, ) y c t # Covariates: country Xi,t, transnational Z i,t, time dependence py i,t 1 Pr ( y i,t = 1 ) = eη i 1 + e η i, where η i = γr c i,t + X i,t β + Z i,t λ + φ 1 F(py i,t 1 ) Conceptually similar to logit model (case where γ = 0) Transnational Dimensions of Civil War p. 8/1

Model estimation Difficult likelihood function (since the y i conditional on one another), but can be approximated by MCMC methods A map from an autologistic model can be defined by the model parameters θ and the sufficient statistics s(y) for y 1. Find initial estimates ψ (maximum pseudolikelihood, MPL) 2. Based on initial values ψ, run Gibbs sampler to simulate m maps of y i and derive sufficient statistics from these samples 3. Approximate MLE θ by solving score equation by Newton-Raphson m j=1 s(y m)e (ˆθ ψ) s(y m ) m j=1 e(ˆθ ψ) s(y m ) = s(y) Transnational Dimensions of Civil War p. 9/1

Data, sample, measures Previous studies single year, broader sample 1946-2001 New PRIO/Uppsala conflict data with lower threshold (25+ deaths) Transnational variables Regional Polity mean, count of transborder groups (MAR), volume of local trade (expanded IMF) Country specific variables Polity (linear, u-curve), ethnic heterogeneity (Vanhanen) Control for time dependence Exponential decay of time at peace at t 1 Transnational Dimensions of Civil War p. 10/1

Estimates for autologistic model MCMC estimates Logit estimates Covariate Coefficient estimate Standard error Coefficient estimate Standard error (Intercept) -4.321 0.441-3.360 0.437 Conflict history (φ) 4.710 0.144 4.750 0.149 Democracy (β 1 ) 0.007 0.007-0.005 0.007 Ethnic dispersion (β 2 ) 0.009 0.003 0.011 0.003 Ln GDP per capita (β 3 ) -0.024 0.057-0.152 0.053 Population (β 4 ) 0.001 <0.001 0.002 <0.001 Regional democracy (λ 1 ) -0.033 0.015 Transborder groups (λ 2 ) 0.039 0.012 Regional trade (λ 3 ) -1.928 0.683 Adjacent conflict (γ) 0.313 0.105 Model fit (MCMC estimates) N = 5070, LR-χ 2 = 2457.8, df=9 Transnational Dimensions of Civil War p. 11/1

Substantive implications of results Political factors More democratic regions are less prone to conflict, but country specific democracy not clear effect by itself (Alternative specifications no evidence for inverted u-curve, only if transition codes recoded as midpoint) Ethnic factors Conflict more likely the greater the population not in the dominant group Conflict also more likely the higher the number of transborder ethnic groups Economic factors Ln GDP per capita small impact, not consistent But large effect of trade with other countries in region Conflict unlikely in more integrated regions, may also proxy for developed/state capacity Transnational Dimensions of Civil War p. 12/1

10 Conflict by democracy and regional democracy -10-5 0 5 10 Country democracy 5 0-5 Regional democracy -10 Transnational Dimensions of Civil War p. 13/1 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 P(conflict)

Fearon & Laitin Model Adding transnational factors to model in Fearon, JD & D Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science Review 97:75-90. Time dep. 3.449 (0.170) Local trade -0.029 (0.013) GDP per capita -0.071 (0.029) Contig. groups. 0.020 (0.017) Ln population 0.250 (0.057) Regional dem. -0.041 (0.017) Ln % mount. terr. 0.115 (0.052) Adjacent conf. 0.539 (0.152) Island 0.111 (0.189) Oil 0.369 (0.185) New state -1.261 (0.310) Instability 0.160 (0.152) Polity 0.018 (0.011) Ethnic frac. 0.679 (0.304) Religious frac. 0.114 (0.331) Intercept -7.331 (0.530) Transnational Dimensions of Civil War p. 14/1

Model classification MPL Predicted MCMC Predicted Observed No Yes No Yes No 3685 272 3680 277 Yes 227 886 201 912 MCMC estimates better than MPL Out of sample prediction to 2000 conflict data based on 1946-99 parameters and 1999 data (condition on predicted conflicts in 1999) identifies 89% obs. correctly Regional factors appear to reflect persistent features, not simply fit to idiosyncracies of sample Transnational Dimensions of Civil War p. 15/1

Contribution of transnational factors Conflict history clearly matters a great deal Does model do well only because of time or do transnational factors make substantial contribution? Evaluate contribution of transnational covariates plus contagion term by Bayes factors, or ratio of posterior probabilities given data M1 : Logit without transnational factors, M 2 : Autologistic model estimated by MCMC Raftery (1995) proposes approximating the Bayes factor for some model Mk through Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC): BIC k = χ2 k0 + p kln (n) BIC M 1 = 4691.73; BIC M 2 = 4852.032 Bayes factor approximation is BIC M 1 BIC M 2 = 160.302 Well above > 10, Raftery s threshold for strong evidence for M2 over M 1 Transnational Dimensions of Civil War p. 16/1

Implications and conclusions Transnational linkages exert important influences on civil wars Regional covariates at least as important as country attributes emphasized in other work Good and bad neighborhoods, differences in risk of conflict cannot be reduced to country specific attributes Extensions New more specific data on external linkages and non-state actors, expanding Uppsala data Analyses of interaction processes in regional conflicts Geo-coded conflict and ethnicity data How civil conflicts influence relations between states Network characteristics Agent based modeling/simulation Transnational Dimensions of Civil War p. 17/1