Political Essay. Disaster Risk Reduction after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004: Built Back Better?

Political Essay Disaster Risk Reduction after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004: Built Back Better? Andrea Maria Roth NADEL MAS-Cycle 2010-2012 March 2012

Acronyms BBB BRR CNO DDPM DRM DRR EM-DAT GAM GNP GPP HFA IDP IMF INGO LTTE MDF MDG NDWC NGO ISDR WB Build back better Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency Centre for National Operations, Sri Lanka Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Thailand Disaster Risk Management Disaster Risk Reduction Emergency Events Database from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters Free Aceh Movement Gross National Product Gross Provincial Product Hyogo Framework for Action Internally Displaced Persons International Monetary Fund International Non-governmental Organisation Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Multi Donor Fund Millennium Development Goal National Disaster Warning Center Non-governmental Organisation United Nations Secretariat for the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction World Bank 2

Content 1. Introduction... 4 2. What is disaster risk reduction?... 5 3. Impacts, response and recovery in Indonesia... 6 3.1. The impact of the tsunami... 7 3.2. Immediate response... 7 3.3. Reconstruction and rehabilitation... 8 4. Impacts, response and recovery in Sri Lanka... 9 4.1. The impact of the tsunami... 9 4.2. Immediate response... 10 4.3. Reconstruction and rehabilitation... 10 5. Impacts, response and recovery in Thailand... 12 5.1. The impact of the tsunami... 12 5.2. Immediate response... 13 5.3. Reconstruction and rehabilitation... 13 6. Disaster Risk Reduction after the Indian Ocean Tsunami - build back better?... 14 6.1. Are the tsunami affected communities less exposed than before?... 15 6.2. Are affected communities less sensitive to tsunamis than before?... 15 6.3. Are communities, governments and aid agencies better prepared than before?... 16 7. Conclusion... 17 8. References... 19 3

1. Introduction In the early morning of December 26, 2004 an earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 on the Richter scale struck the province of Aceh, Indonesia. The seismic activity generated a massive tsunami that not only hit Aceh, but also several coastal areas in Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and India. The tsunami had an impact of unprecedented scale and scope: almost 230 000 people died, over one million people were displaced and over US$ 10 billion in damage was caused to infrastructure, houses and other properties 1. Under the leadership of UN Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery Bill Clinton, a US$ 17 billion disaster response program was set up to build back better what the tsunami had destroyed. It was one of the largest disaster recovery assistance ever mobilized for developing countries 2. The Asia Pacific Tsunami in 2004 was an extreme example of how progress towards the fulfillment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) can be wiped out by a single disaster. The case has even become more urgent as disaster risks emanating from natural hazards are increasing in frequency and severity. The number of reported natural disasters mainly drought, flood, windstorms and earthquakes has tripled in the past 30 years 3. More people are now vulnerable to natural hazards due to rapid population growth that has led to the use of marginal grounds, rapid urbanization, and unplanned settlements. Climate change is expected to further worsen the situation as it leads to more frequent and more intense extreme weather events, such as storms, heavy rainfall, and draughts. Environmental degradation through unsustainable use of natural resources, such as deforestation, also increases disaster risks. Moreover, vulnerability to disasters is closely linked to poverty. People with lower incomes are disproportionately affected. They are more likely to live in high risk areas and often lack the resources to mitigate the adverse impact of natural hazards. Disasters can also wipe out results of years of development. Therefore progress in the area of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) is an essential condition for sustainable development and achieving the MDGs. Humanitarian responses to disaster impacts now cost Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors US$ 6 billion annually or 7% percent of total official development assistance (ODA) flows, and this proportion is rising. Thus, the integration of DRR into reconstruction, recovery and development becomes highly relevant. 1 Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010: 2 2 Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010: 42 3 SDC 2008: 5 4

This essay uses evidence from post- tsunami recovery evaluations in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand to examine to what extent the theory and practice of building back better have successfully integrated DRR in affected communities and strengthened the people s resilience against disasters. It examines the following points: What were the impacts of the tsunami in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand? How did the countries respond to the disaster? What progress has been made in recovery and reconstruction two years after the tsunami? How much safer are the tsunami affected areas after the reconstruction with respect to the principle of build back better? 2. What is disaster risk reduction? The United Nation International Strategy for Distaste Reduction (ISDR) defines disaster as a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources 4. A disaster risk is an always present condition of the potential loss that occurs from a hazard 5. It is a combination Illustration 1: Disaster risk as a combination of exposure to hazards and vulnerability consisting of sensitivity and coping capacities of a livelihood and ecosystem (adapted from Robledo 2009: 4). 4 ISDR 2009: 9 5 A dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage (ISDR 2009:17). 5

of the exposure 6 to a natural or human-induced hazard and the condition of vulnerability that is present in a certain area. Vulnerability encompasses the sensitivity of livelihood assets and ecosystems towards the damaging effects of a hazard and the capacity to cope with potential negative consequences without losing the functional characteristics. Such capacities can be either internal through diversified livelihood options, micro insurances, saving and credit systems, or external through access to services and institutional support or access to education and information. ISDR defines disaster risk reduction (DRR) as the concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyseand manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events 7. A key instrument for implementing DRR at a global level is the United Nationsendorsed Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) that was adopted by all member states of the UN General Assembly 8. 3. Impacts, response and recovery in Indonesia Located in the ring of fire Indonesia ranks first out of 76 countries with approximately 5.4 million people exposed to tsunami hazards 9. In terms of economic exposure, Indonesia ranks fifth out of 76 countries. The tsunami in 2004 hit the province of Aceh in the north of Sumatra as well as other small island such as Nias and Simeulue. Prior to the tsunami, a 30-year of conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government led to the destruction of infrastructure and basic services such as health and education 10. From relative prosperity in the 1970s, Aceh became one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia 11, notwithstanding its rich gas and other natural resources. Also the island of Nias is one of the poorest regions in the province of North Sumatra with a predominantly semi-subsistence 6 People, property, systems, or other elements present in hazard zones that are thereby subject to potential losses (ISDR 2009: 15). 7 ISDR 2009: 9 8 The following five priority areas enclosed within the HFA have become a point of reference to systematically track progress in disaster risk reduction efforts: (1) Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation. (2) Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning. (3) Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels. (4) Reduce the underlying risk factors. (5) Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels. (ISDR 2007: 6) 9 Prevention Web (21.09.2011): Indonesia - Risk Profile. In: http://www.preventionweb.net, accessed 03.03.2012. 10 World Bank 2005: 14 11 The pre-tsunami poverty rate of 28.4 % was significantly higher as the national mean of 16.7 % (WB 2008: 8). 6

economy. The attainments at elementary school in Aceh and Nias were considered low and basic health facilities were in a state of neglect 12. 3.1. The impact of the tsunami Indonesia was the worst affected country by the 2004 tsunami. The estimated death toll was between 130 736 13 and 167 000 people 14 while the number of internally displaced persons (IDP) varied widely in literature between 234 255 15, 532 898 16, and 895 733 17. The World Bank estimated damages and losses from the tsunami at US$ 4.45 billion. Out of the total figure, major economic impact caused by physical damage accounted for 66 % while 34% represented loss in terms of income flows 18. However, the macroeconomic impact of the disaster on Indonesia s overall economic performance was small 19. This was because Aceh s GDP only accounted for 2.3 % of the country s total GDP in 2003. Still, the disaster had profound impact on people s lives in the affected area. In the immediate aftermath, poverty rate in Aceh increased sharply from 28.4 % to 32.6%. 3.2. Immediate response The people of Aceh and the Indonesian Government were completely unprepared for the tsunami. Indonesia lacked a tsunami warning system and most people did not recognize the receding sea as a sign of tsunami risk 20. Due to the scale of the disaster, the region's remoteness, the loss of leadership and the collapse of government institutions, local communities had to cope on their own for the first 48 hours following the tsunami. As key telecommunication and road systems had been disconnected by that time, it took longer for the Indonesian national government in Jakarta to fully realize the extent of the disaster. The Indonesian Marines was first to provide aid but it took weeks for other organisations to follow. By the third week, up to 250 organisations had responded to relief efforts but the absence of disaster preparedness and contingency plans led to poor coordination among national and international actors. The relief responses were generally not based on joint needs assessments. As a 12 Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010: 102 13 World Bank: History of Aceh Reconstruction. In: http://go.worldbank.org/qz9v2eo4v0, accessed 03.03.2012. 14 EM-DAT (2011): Indonesia Country Profile Natural Disasters. In: http://www.emdat.be/result-country-profile, accessed: 03.03.2012 15 World Bank: History of Aceh Reconstruction. In: http://go.worldbank.org/qz9v2eo4v0, accessed 03.03.2012. 16 EM-DAT (2011): Indonesia Country Profile Natural Disasters. In: http://www.emdat.be/result-country-profile, accessed: 03.03.2012 17 Jayasuriya & McCawley (2010:7) included the number of IDP caused by the earthquake in March 2005. 18 World Bank 2005: 5 19 World Bank estimated that Indonesia s GDP growth 2005 was expected to be no more than half a per cent less than the pre-tsunami growth forecast (World Bank 2005: 86) 20 In Simeulue, an island with a population of 78 000 people, only 7 people died. In contrast to the people in Aceh, the islanders recognized the receding sea as warning sign of a tsunami and run up the hills. The island experienced a tsunami in 1907. The diffusion from one generation to another saved the island from a mega loss on lives (BBC News New 2007) 7

consequence there were aid spill-overs in some intervention sectors, such as medical assistance, and shortages in less accessible areas and less popular sectors, such as water supply. 3.3. Reconstruction and rehabilitation Post-tsunami rehabilitation in Indonesia was strengthened by high donor funding, political stability through the cessation of the conflict, and targeted aid which focused on education and construction of new houses all of which were not present prior to the disaster. The total pledges for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and Nias are estimated at US$ 8.5 billion, which is much larger than the initial estimate of damage and losses of US$ 4.45 billion. The peace treaty between GAM and the Indonesian government signed in April 2005 was an unexpected benefit from the tsunami disaster and an essential part of a successful reconstruction process in Aceh. Another success factor for the recovery was the establishment of a mechanism to coordinate the activities conducted by this large number of agencies. The Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) was a one-stop shop for the coordination of all agencies and donors. A positive example was the Multi Donor Fund (MDF) that unified over 15 bilateral agencies and could reduce transactions cost significantly. Still, many organizations were not very keen to be coordinated and rated visibility and accountability to their headquarters higher than aid effectiveness through alignment and harmonization. Most agencies also lacked contextual knowledge, facilities and stakeholder networks, as the Indonesian government restricted their access prior to the tsunami. The main priority in the early reconstruction period was the reconstruction of houses. BRR targeted to reconstruct 108 00 houses in 2006 and exceeded the nationwide annual rate of house construction. The spike in demand resulted in increased wages for construction workers and timber prices. The reconstruction of the education and health system reached a higher level higher than before the tsunami. The reconstruction activities and the end of the conflict that followed the disaster facilitated a decline of the poverty rate below pre-tsunami levels to 26.5 % by 2006. However, there were also areas that were not given much attention. Livelihood restoration programs did not get high ratings by beneficiaries. 21 At the household level, access to drinking water and sanitation facilities was insufficient and the 21 Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010: 34 8

risk of transmitting diseases was still high. The reconstruction of basic infrastructure was compared with the progress in other sectors relatively slow 22. 4. Impacts, response and recovery in Sri Lanka Like Thailand, Sri Lanka is not situated in the ring of fire and thus it is less exposed to tsunamis than Indonesia. The high population density in the coastal areas makes Sri Lanka more exposed to tsunamis than Thailand. With 203 051 people exposed to tsunami hazards Sri Lanka ranks 14 th out of 76 countries 23. In terms of economic exposure, Sri Lanka ranks 27 th out of 76 countries. The potential losses of US$ 150 million account a small fraction or only 0.13 % of the country s estimated annual GDP of US$ 115.1 billion 24. The Asia Pacific tsunami in 2004 hit the eastern (Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Ampara), north-eastern (Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu) and south-eastern (Mambantota, Matara und Galle) coast of Sri Lanka. The disaster struck the northern and eastern provinces which have been plagued by one of the longest-running civil wars in Asia. The conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had far-reaching humanitarian, economic and social consequences for the region: over 65 000 people have died; nearly a million citizens have been displaced; private and public properties and economic infrastructure have been destroyed; local economies and community networks have been disrupted; and health and educational outcomes have deteriorated 25. The tsunami occurred just two years after a cease-fire agreement was signed in February 2002 and subsequent temporary cessations of hostilities led to slow economic recovery in the conflict areas. 4.1. The impact of the tsunami Sri Lanka was the second worst affected country by the tsunami after Indonesia. The tsunami waves impacted almost two-third of Sri Lanka s coastlines 26. 35 399 people died 27 27 000 of them were fishermen while another 1.019 million people were internally displaced 28. The economic cost was estimated at US$ 1.3 billion. Given the small size of the 22 Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010: 105 23 Prevention Web (21.09.2011): Sri Lanka - Risk Profile. In: http://www.preventionweb.net/english/countries/statistics/risk.php?cid=162, accessed 03.03.2012. 24 CIA (06.03.2012): The World Factbook 2011, Sri Lanka. In: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/index.html, accessed 03.03.2012. 25 Ilanla Tamil Sangam (2008): Poverty in Sri Lanla. Ilankai Tamil Sangam, USA. In: http://www.sangam.org/2008/12/poverty_map.php?uid=3193, accessed: 03.03.2012. 26 UNEP (2005): 58 27 EM-DAT (2011): Sri Lanka Country Profile Natural Disasters. In: http://www.emdat.be/result-country-profile, accessed: 03.03.2012 28 By mid-2005 this number has come down to around 500 000 (Jayasuriya &McCawley 2010: 124). 9

country, total damage and losses corresponded to 4.5 % of the GDP. Damage to physical property and infrastructure caused the largest economic losses: as much as 100 000 houses were destroyed and two-thirds of the nation s fishing boats were wrecked. The tourism sector suffered US$ 200 million in losses while the fisheries sector lost US$ 130 million. Although there is no specific data on the impact of disaster at the provincial level, paradoxically, the macroeconomic impact of the tsunami on Sri Lanka s overall economic performance was positive. Foreign cash inflows from external assistance brought a measure of stability to the economy which had been straining under growing macroeconomic imbalances 29. 4.2. Immediate response Sri Lanka had never experienced a natural disaster that is comparable to the 2004 tsunami in terms of casualties and economic damage and was completely unprepared for it. However, there was a large presence of international agencies in the country mainly working on conflict-related relief and development for many years. These organizations were able to respond to the disaster more quickly than in Indonesia and Thailand (Cosgrave 2007: 18). The Sri Lankan President also moved swiftly to set up a Centre for National Operations (CNO) and appointed three national task forces 30 to lead and coordinate the response 31. Coordination mechanisms existed wi2thin and among government, UN, and non-government organizations (NGOs) but there was no national disaster management plan or structure in place before the tsunami. There was also a concern from the beginning on how assistance could be channelled to LTTE-controlled areas. However, basic relief supplies did manage to get through to affected people in conflict areas during the early phase of relief effort. 4.3. Reconstruction and rehabilitation The total pledges for post-tsunami reconstruction and rehabilitation in Sri Lanka amounted to US$ 3.4 billion and consisted of loans, grants and debt moratorium from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 32. However, mobilizing relief and recovery efforts in the affected areas were hampered by the peace and order situation. Coordination among governmental agencies, between numerous donor agencies and with the LTTE continued to be a major issue. The initial attempt to establish a mechanism for aid-sharing between the Sri Lankan government and LTTE failed. Whilst the LTTE was unwilling to accept any arrangements 29 Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010: 123 30 The three Taske Forces - Task Force for Rescue and Relief (TAFRER), the Task Force for Logistics and Law and Order (TAFLOL), and the Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN) - amalgamated into the Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA) in November 2005 (Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010: 128, 152). 31 Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010: 125 32 Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010: 145 10

that weakened its political and administrative power, communities and parts of the government refused any deal that could appear to provide a de facto recognition of the LTTE. Several major donors declined to channel their aid to the LLTE that is proscribed, designated or banned as a terrorist group by their governments. The conflict with the LLTE and the Sri Lankan government also intensified soon after the disaster struck and handicapped reconstruction in the northern and eastern provinces. Due to serious capacity constraints and cost escalations, the reconstruction of infrastructure was very slow that by the end of 2006, at least 50% of reconstruction projects had not even started. The centrepiece of post-disaster reconstruction in Sri Lanka focused on permanent housing. As a precautionary move, the government declared a construction buffer zone between sea and land. This means there will be no infrastructure constructed within the buffer area which covered 100 meters on the south and southwest coast and 200 meters in the east and north coast. There were two methods of funding housing reconstruction after the tsunami. The owner-driven housing reconstruction through the grant-based national programme proved to be much more effective than donor-driven housing reconstruction. By the end of 2006 out of 79 184 required houses 49 531 owner-driven houses and 14 488 donor-driven houses were completed. Quality of housing and access to services was often reported to be worse than before the tsunami. Progress in conflict areas were much slower with only 50 % of houses reconstructed by the end of 2006 and in the Northern Province only 20 %. According to official resources, around 75 % of the affected families regained their main source of income by the end of 2005 although their income was reported to be lower than their pre-tsunami income. Due security reasons the livelihood recovery programs was slow in the eastern province. Security concerns also affected recovery in the tourism sector even where damage to tourist-related infrastructure was lower as visitors remained reluctant to return due to peace and order problems. In contrast, the fisheries sector recovered relatively swiftly even though it was one of worst affected sectors. By the end of 2006, as much as 13 190 boats were replaced and 9 555 repaired and fisheries harvest had been restored to 70 % of the pre-tsunami level 33. Again the quality was often reported to be worse than before. 33 Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010: 144 11

5. Impacts, response and recovery in Thailand Unlike Indonesia, Thailand is not situated in the ring of fire and is ranked 54 th out of 76 countries with only 3 487 people exposed to tsunami hazards 34. In terms of economic exposure to tsunami risks, Thailand ranks only 42 nd out of 76 countries. The potential losses of US$ 20 million account for only a small fraction (0.003 %) of the country s annual GDP estimated at US$ 609.8 billion. The tsunami hit six provinces on the Andaman coast in southern Thailand including Phang Nga, Phuket, Krabi, Ranong, Satun and Trang. A fast economic development mainly through the tourism and fisheries sectors reduced head-count poverty ratio from 41 % in 1986 to 9.9 % in 2002 35 and helped reducing vulnerability. The most affected populations were the fishing communities living near coastal areas, the Moken 36 ethnic group and the migrant workers from Myanmar. The expanding shrimp aquaculture and rubber plantations were also affected and suffered from the vast degradation of ecosystems brought by the tsunami. 5.1. The impact of the tsunami Compared with Indonesia and Sri Lanka, the impact of the tsunami in Thailand was relatively low in terms of casualties, affected people and property damage. The total number of affected people was estimated at 58 550 while the total casualties were estimated at 8 345 people 37. In PhangNga, Phuket and Krabi, the proportion of foreign casualties was very high. In the most affected province PhangNga, out of 5 880 casualties at least 2 228 were foreign nationals 38. Unlike Sri Lanka and Indonesia, the major economic impact in Thailand was not due to damage to physical infrastructure and property which was estimated at US$ 508 million, but from losses suffered by the production sector which was estimated at US$ 1.69 billion - mainly from tourism and fisheries 39. Health sector facilities also had very little damage. As such, the macroeconomic impact of the disaster on Thailand s overall economic performance was small. Damage and loss accounted for only 1.4% of total GDP although the effect was more pronounced at the provincial level. In PhangNga, the total economic 34 Prevention Web (21.09.2011): Thailand - Risk Profile. In: http://www.preventionweb.net/english/countries/statistics/risk.php?cid=162, accessed 03.03.2012. 35 NESDB (2004): 8 36 The moken sea gypsies are an endogenous ethnic minority group. Approximately 10 000 Moken are suffering from extreme poverty and lack of proper health care and education because they are not recognized as nationals of Thailand (Alertnet, Plan International 2008). 37 EM-DAT (2011): Thailand country Profile Natural Disaster. In: http://www.emdat.be/result-country-profile, accessed: 03.03.2012 38 ADPC 20xx: 3 39 Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010: 171 12

impact corresponded to over 80 % of the Gross Provincial Product (GPP), in Phuket, Krabi and Trang between 60% and 79.9 % and in Ranong and Satun between 4% and 19.9 % 40. 5.2. Immediate response The tsunami-affected areas in Thailand are well accessible from the metropolitan Bangkok region and as the damage to roads and bridges was relatively minor, the emergency relief supplies were delivered quickly. It should also be noted that although relief supplies from the capital arrived quickly, communities from nearby areas did the life-saving and immediate relief during the first two days 41 after the tsunami struck. On 26 December 2004 a Tsunami Victim Relief Center was established to coordinate the relief efforts of civil, military and police authorities, NGOs and civil volunteers. Distribution of donated aid and supplies was centralized through the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) and delivered by the army. Local administrations were responsible for cleaning up debris along the beaches to give confidence to tourists concerned about their safety. It is widely accepted that Thailand led an effective and immediate relief effort and response 42 to the 2004 tsunami. 5.3. Reconstruction and rehabilitation The Thai government turned down offers of financial assistance from foreign governments, including offers of debt relief from Europe, though it accepted technical assistance. The government feared that acceptance of debt relief might hurt Thailand s credit rating and thus discourage capital inflows. The overall government budget allocation for tsunami relief and reconstruction was nearly US$ 1.7 billion. This is corresponds to 170 % of the estimated economic impact and reflects the intention of build back better. The income from tourism activities in Krabi, Phuket and PhangNga declined dramatically after the tsunami. The main reason for the drop was not the physical damage, but rather the initial reluctance of tourists to visit the tsunami-affected area. But within two years after the tsunami, tourism revenues regained the pre-tsunami level as infrastructure was rebuilt and tourists started arriving. The tsunami also paved the way for environmental and disaster preparedness projects in the affected areas. It gave an impulse to accredit the ecosystem services of mangrove ecosystems in reducing tsunami risks which led to broad campaigns for 40 ADPC 20xx: 21 41 Cosgrave 2007: 18 42 Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010: 171 13

restoration and afforestation of mangroves 43. The Thai government also invested US$ 5 million in an early warning system. Deep-sea buoys that detect tsunami waves and send signals to the National Disaster Warning Center (NDWC) that is responsible for alerting the public via the 55 constructed tsunami warning towers were installed. Many communities were given radio sets for emergency warning and tsunami escape route signs along exposed coast were installed. Public infrastructure was reconstructed very quickly. Local roads were repaired almost immediately while telephone communication and electricity distributing systems were back to normal within days 44. Various government and private agencies were allocated responsibility for repairing or rebuilding houses in each province. The construction of the 3 558 houses was largely completed by mid-2006 and reconstruction activities did not lead to increases in construction material prices. Compared with the Thai economy, the increasing demand in construction materials was relatively small and transportation costs did not increase due to the proximity of the affected areas to the metropolitan Bangkok region. The government allocated a total of US$ 1.487 billion in post-tsunami reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts, a vast amount of which was allocated for soft loans for entrepreneurs and small businesses. While overall reconstruction and rehabilitation was speedy, the main criticism to the Thai government s post-tsunami response was criticized on equity issues. Minority ethnic groups like the Moken could not access assistance because they do not have Thai citizenship. Widows could not meet eligibility criteria for temporary housing because they could not show legal proof of house ownership before the tsunami. Households headed by widows and women were unable to restore their livelihoods because employment assistance focused on areas that predominantly employ men 45. 6. Disaster Risk Reduction after the Indian Ocean Tsunami - build back better? Build back better is an often heard slogan coined by Bill Clinton, former United States President and UN Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery. Mr. Clinton himself defines it as follows: building back better means making sure that, as you rebuild, you leave communi- 43 See http://www.mangrovesforthefuture.org/; http://mangroveactionproject.org/about 44 Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010: 178 45 Shott 2011: 8,9,18 14

ties safer than they were before disaster struck 46. It is a very vague and normative definition that gives space for interpretations and could raise high expectations among beneficiaries of disaster relief and recovery programs. Therefore the approach can only be implemented through a dialog involving all stakeholder groups. This was often not the case as many examples illustrated. Another challenge of BBB is time constraints. How much longer can be waited for a saver reconstruction of infrastructure, houses and livelihood? Despite these constraints, this chapter evaluates whether the reconstruction and recovery efforts after 2004 tsunami reduced risk exposure, lessened vulnerability and improved disaster preparedness among the affected communities. 6.1. Are the tsunami affected communities less exposed than before? A tsunami is a natural hazard that cannot be prevented, but the scale or severity of its impact can be substantially lessened by reducing exposure. Exposure to tsunami can be reduced through land use regulations that ban settlements in high risk areas, environmental interventions such as reforestation and ecosystem management, and through engineering techniques such as the construction of dams to avoid flood or hazard-resistant construction. In Indonesia, land-use regulation has been included in the Indonesian Master Plan for Action, but there is no evidence on its implementation. In Sri Lanka, the reconstruction of houses was tied to land-use regulation that prohibits construction of houses within 200 meters from the cost. According to the National HFA Progress Reports 2009-2011 only Indonesia attained a substantial achievement but with recognized limitations in operational capacities 47 in using land use planning as a means to reduce community exposure to tsunami. Both Thailand and Sri Lanka attained institutional commitment, but neither of them has implemented multihazard risk assessment 48 in vulnerable communities. In all three countries, the effort placed on mangrove restoration to reduce community exposure to tsunamis has raised significantly. However, there is no reliable data about the scale of restored mangrove or their survival rate in the affected communities. Thus, there is no evidence that communities are now less exposed to the risks than before the tsunami. 6.2. Are affected communities less sensitive to tsunamis than before? The sensitivity of livelihood assets and ecosystems towards the damaging effect of a tsunami is a risk element and a decisive parameter of vulnerability. There are many aspects of sensi- 46 ISDR 2006: 1 47 Triutomo 2011: 9 48 Chandradasa 2011: 10-11; Sangaunpong 2011: 8 15

tivity arising from various physical, social, economic, and environmental factors. The most relevant aspects of sensitivity for the tsunami reconstruction and recovery process was the rebuilding of houses, restoration of livelihoods and in the case of Sri Lanka and Aceh, also conflict management. The most successful effort has certainly been made following the peace agreement in Aceh that constituted the basis for livelihood recovery. Poverty in the province of Aceh dropped below the pre-tsunami rate mainly as a result of job opportunities related to reconstruction activities and the relative stability following the peace accord. As a whole, the weakest factor for sensitivity in Aceh seems to be the insufficient reconstruction of houses. In contrast, the failed Memorandum of Understanding for aid sharing between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE led to an intensification of the conflict that impeded an effective reconstruction in the northern and eastern provinces and thus communities in these areas are not safer than before the tsunami. In Thailand, there was no conflict problem in the affected communities and overall sensitivity is much lower than in Sri Lanka or Indonesia due to a comparably higher development standard before and after the tsunami. Nevertheless, the most sensitive groups like ethnic minorities and women have been discriminated by government aid programs. Thus, it is very likely that these minority groups have become even more vulnerable after the tsunami. 6.3. Are communities, governments and aid agencies better prepared than before? The future the risk of tsunamis remains high. In this respect, the most important factor for DRR is to ensure that communities, government and international agencies are better prepared for a tsunami. Preparedness includes public awareness of disaster risk and response and the establishment of functioning early warning systems and contingency plans with regular training drills and rehearsals. The preparedness of local communities is crucial as the first 48 hours after a tsunami are critical for saving lives. According to the HFA National Progress Report all three countries have elaborated a countrywide public awareness strategy to stimulate a culture of disaster resilience and school curricula include disaster risk reduction and recovery concepts and practices. Since June 2006 all three countries have been connected to the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System 49. Still, a tsunami is not easy to predict especially when the earthquake that triggers the tsunami is not sensed in the affected areas. In Indonesia and Thailand, not all communities are equipped with tsunami early warning 49 BBC 2006 16

equipment such as warning sirens 50. Sri Lanka ranks best in terms of adequate community level public awareness system with diverse means of communication 51. Despite all these efforts, there is no reliable information about the level of preparedness in terms of contingency plans, procedures and resources in place in the three countries and even the HFA Country Progress Reports give very inconsistent and contradictory statements. 7. Conclusion The tsunami affected areas in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand had very different levels of exposure and vulnerability to a tsunami hazard. In Indonesia, which is the only country in the ring of fire, the probability of occurrence is highest in terms of frequency and intensity. It is the country with the highest number of exposed people at 5.4 million and has the highest economic risk exposure calculated at 1% of GDP. Thirty years of conflict between the GAM and the Indonesian government also led to the high poverty rate of 28.4% in Aceh, further increasing the affected population s vulnerability. In Sri Lanka, the high population density in the coastal areas cause a high level of exposure of people (203 051) but economic risk exposure is much lower at 0.15 % of GDP. Just like in Indonesia, the conflict situation in the affected areas increased vulnerability especially in the northern and eastern provinces. Thailand is the least exposed to tsunami hazards among the three countries being studied with only 3 487 people and 0.02 % of the GDP at risk. With the exception of ethnic minorities and poor fishing communities, vulnerability in Thailand is also much lower than in Indonesia or Sri Lanka. Not surprisingly, the differences and degrees of risk in the three countries corresponded to the impact of the 2004 tsunami. Indonesia had the biggest impact in terms of lost lives (estimated 130 736-167 000 people); people affected (estimated 234 255-895 733), and economic damage (US$ 4.45 billion). In Sri Lanka 35 399 people died, 1.019 million people were affected and the economic impact amounted to US$ 1.3 billion. Thailand had the lowest impact with 8'345 casualties, 58'550 affected people and an economic loss of US$ 508 million. In contrast to Indonesia and Sri Lanka, the economic impact in Thailand was due to productivity losses and not from direct damage to infrastructure and property. Despite the varying degrees of risk exposure and vulnerability, the tsunami response was similar in all three countries. None of them had a functioning tsunami warning system in 50 Jakarta Post 2011; Sangaunpong 2011: 10 51 Chandradasa 2011: 13 17

place. People were completely unprepared and did not recognize the receding sea as a sign of tsunami risk. In all three countries, local communities had to cope on their own during the critical first 48 hours following the tsunami. Thailand had the best case scenario because the affected areas were easily accessible to national and international assistance due to its proximity to the capital. In contrast, access to the affected areas in Sri Lanka was hampered by the conflict with the LLTE which affected response and recovery efforts. In Indonesia, the destruction of communication and road systems, the loss of leadership and the collapse of government institutions hindered a swift response. None of the three countries had a functioning contingency plan that led to a lack of coordination during the early stage of recovery. Given the unequal circumstances before the tsunami and the different scales of impact, the recovery two years after the tsunami progressed unequally, too. The economic power of the Thai government allowed the country to recover economic and infrastructure losses in a shorter period of time. Reconstruction of houses was completed and the revenues from fisheries and tourism regained the pre-tsunami level two years after the tsunami hit. In Sri Lanka, recovery and reconstruction in the south was almost completed but the conflictridden areas of the northern and western provinces lagged behind with only 50 % of the houses reconstructed two years after the disaster. Although these areas suffered bigger damages than the southern province, the major reason for the delay was rooted in the conflict with the LTTE that deepened after the initial attempt to establish a mechanism for aidsharing with the Sri Lankan government failed. In Indonesia, the peace treaty between GAM and the Indonesian government signed in April 2005 was one of the few unexpected benefits from the tsunami and an essential pre-condition for a successful reconstruction process in Aceh. The projections for the reconstruction of houses were, however, exaggerated. The demand for construction workers and timber exceeded the supply and led to a sharp increase in prices but at the same time reconstruction work stimulated the local economy and led to a decline in poverty level below the pre-tsunami level. With respect to the build back better approach, the following conclusion can be drawn. As neither of the countries possesses a multi-hazard risk assessment, there is no evidence that exposure to tsunami is reduced due to the tsunami recovery work. In Aceh, the ratification of the peace treaty and the reduction of the poverty rate contributed to a reduction of vulnerability. In Sri Lanka the exclusion of the LTTE from the reconstruction and recovery assistance intensified the conflict in the north and east provinces that increased vulnerability in the area. In Thailand, the discrimination of marginalized groups like the Moken and women- 18

headed households from the government s reconstruction and recovery programs increased the vulnerability of the minority. The reconstruction and recovery certainly led to an increase in preparedness for a future tsunami event to some degree, but there is no reliable information about the level of preparedness in terms of contingency plans, procedures and resources in place, as even the HFA Country Progress Reports give very inconsistent and contradictory statements. 8. References ADPC, Asian Disaster Preparedness Center ( - ): The Economic Impact of the 26 December Earthquake and Indian Ocean Tsunami in Thailand. http://www.adpc.net/maininforesource/dms/thailand_assessmentreport.pdf, accessed: 03.03.2012. Alertnet; Plan International (28.12.2011): 7 years after tsunami, Moken still on the fringes of Thai society. In: http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/7-years-after-tsunami-moken-stillon-fringes-of-thai-society/, accessed 03.03.2012. BBC News (10.03.2007): Saved by tsunami folklore. In: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/6435979.stm, accessed: 03.03.2012. BBC News (28.06.2006): Asia tsunami warning system ready. In: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5126710.stm, accessed: 03.03.2012. Chandradasa,Uwl (2011): Sri Lanka, National progress report on the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (2009-2011). Disaster Management Centre, Colombo. http://www.preventionweb.net/english/countries/asia/lka/, accessed: 03.03.2012. CIA (06.03.2012): The World Factbook 2011, Sri Lanka. In: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html, accessed: 03.03.2012. Clinton, William J. (2006) Lessons learned from tsunami recovery, Key Propositions for- Building Back Better.Office of the UN Secretary Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery, New York. In: http://www.recoveryplatform.org/assets/publication/tsunami%20reocvery/key%20pr opositions%20for%20building%20back%20better%20-%20tsunami%20-%20un.pdf, accessed: 03.03.2012. Cosgrave, John (2007): Synthesis Report: Expanded Summary. Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, London. In: http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/syn_report_sum.pdf, accessed 03.03.2012. EM-DAT (2011): Indonesia Country Profile Natural Disasters. In: http://www.emdat.be/result-country-profile, accessed: 03.03.2012. EM-DAT (2011): Sri Lanka Country Profile Natural Disasters. In: http://www.emdat.be/result-country-profile, accessed: 03.03.2012. 19

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