Authoritarian Deliberation 1 Authoritarian Deliberation: The Deliberative Turn in Chinese Political Development Professor Baogang He Chair in International Studies Deakin University Melbourne, Australia baogang.he@deakin.edu.au Professor Mark Warren Department of Political Science University of British Columbia Canada warren@politics.ubc.ca The paper to be presented at International Political Science Association Congress, Fukuoka, Japan, 9 12 July 2006.
Authoritarian Deliberation 2 A. Introduction Authoritarian Deliberation: The Deliberative Turn in Chinese Political Development Deliberative democracy has been idealized as either an alternative to, or an improvement on, liberal democracy. There are two strains of deliberative democracy: liberal versus radical. A liberal model of deliberative democracy aims to improve the existing liberal institutions through a set of deliberative institutions such as citizen juries, deliberative polling and others. The radical version of deliberative democracy envisioned by Dryzek (2000, 4) resists the liberal assimilation of deliberative democracy, and reemphasize[s] oppositional civil society, and public spheres as sources of democratic critique and renewal. In both cases, deliberation appears as a deepening of democracy that already exists in its formal manifestations. This logic would seem to exclude the development of deliberative institutions under authoritarian conditions. The logic of this conclusion resides in the correct view that rights, free speech, elections and civil society are necessary conditions for effective and meaningful deliberation. Neither radical nor liberal theories of deliberative democracy pay attention to deliberation in an authoritarian environment. While the liberal theory of deliberation requires the presence of the right regime and electoral procedures, it fails to see the possibility of deliberative democratization in an authoritarian setting. The radical theory of deliberative democracy, on the other hand, overlooks the role of the state, idealizes civil societies, and even exaggerates the role of deliberation in decision-making. Within authoritarian China, we see, remarkably, the development of deliberative institutions under circumstances that would not seem to be conducive to the development of genuine deliberative democracy. In recent years consultative and deliberative institutions have been developing in China, and an increasing number of public hearings have provided people with opportunities to express their opinions on a wide range of issues pertaining to the price of water and electricity, park entry fees, the relocation of farmers, the conservation of historical landmarks, and even the famous Beijing zoo, to name a few. These public hearings appear to be comparable to the development of similar institutions within the developed democracies. We will call this phenomenon authoritarian deliberation. This is authoritarian deliberation because the leaders are not elected; deliberation takes place under one-party domination; and the state plays a significant role in developing deliberative institutions. At the same time, this is deliberative because communicative arguments and reasons, among other things, are employed to solve collective problems; participants and local leaders exchange their opinions, make counter-arguments, and change their preferences through public deliberation; and importantly, public opinions on certain issues and/or policies are formed through deliberative process. We use the notion of authoritarian deliberation to propose the following claims. First, deliberation and democracy are not the same. By disaggregating the two dimensions, we can use the concept of deliberation, understood as a kind of political force, a distinctive political phenomenon with its own logic, to identify democratic possibilities that are still in embryo, but nonetheless of potential conceptual explanatory and normative importance. While the question as to whether the appearance of Chinese
Authoritarian Deliberation 3 deliberative institutions is democratic or not is legitimate, it should not posed in a way that prevents us from understanding the democratic possibilities emerging within authoritarian contexts. Second, we reconceptualise China s political regime as deliberative authoritarianism. Deliberative authoritarianism, even though in its infancy, is a new type of authoritarianism different from bureaucratic or plural authoritarianism. This deliberative authoritarianism has altered or modified the nature of the authoritarian system in the critical area of exercising political power. The conventional conceptualization of consultative Leninism has intellectual limitations when used to describe recent political developments in China. The recent widespread participation by citizens in China goes beyond consultation to include debate, discussion, and more importantly, a mechanism for linking the results of discussion to the decision-making process. Third, although the development of deliberative institutions in China is real, it needs to be understood as an elite response to problems of governance. These problems of governance appears to be similar to the problems of command and control within the administrative arenas of developed democracies. So the establishment of deliberative institutions in China are elite attempts to generate legitimacy within complex, multiactor, high-information, high resistance environments. These environments are the consequence of recent developments. If we step back and suspend, for the moment, the divide between democratic and authoritarian regimes, and look at the logic of complex, multi-actor societies, then we will see that elites use similar devices for governance. If we do this, then we can relate deliberative democratic theory to developmental dynamics in authoritarian as well as democratic contexts. This being said, the concept is inherently unstable, and there is a contradictory logic of authoritarian deliberation. But now we can relate the conceptual instability to possible real developmental dynamics. The conceptual instability resides in the fact that it puts together two different kinds of force. In this respect, the standard insights are correct. The deliberative turn, however, identifies a real phenomenon with multiple possibilities. The term authoritarian deliberation both identifies the phenomenon, and captures its paradoxical qualities. The concept is not static, but dynamic. It can frame multiple possibilities. It highlights two possible developmental alternatives. First, these deliberative institutions might strengthen an authority, rescue authoritarianism from declining, and stabilize the system by transforming authoritarianism so that it is compatible with complex, de-centred, market societies. The key question is whether China will be locked into this new system in which there is no hope for democratic transition. Is it possible for the CCP to use these institutions to stabilize the system and maintain its domination? Second, it is possible that such a system contains the logic of democratic transition with the unexpected consequences of democracy eventuating in a cascading or path dependence effect? There is, at least the theoretical possibility that democracy can eventuate from deliberation because deliberation has shifted the basis of legitimacy with participatory and deliberative institutions unleashing the democratic force. We will illustrate several mechanisms to explore the logic of democratic transformation in the last section.
Authoritarian Deliberation 4 The concept of authoritarian deliberation identifies these two possible trajectories. Each is contingent, and theory cannot determine which, if either, will become dominant. It should be acknowledged that the concept of authoritarian deliberation seems more to favour a new type of authoritarianism rather than the possibility of democratic potential. Nevertheless, the new concept allows us to identify these enormously important dynamics in Chinese political development. B. The Distinction between Deliberation and Democracy Deliberative theories of democracy often assume a close association between deliberation and democracy. 1 Such an assumption is well-grounded in Western liberal democracies, but may prove to be problematic in China where a peculiar and ironic association between authoritarianism and deliberation exists. We have called this association authoritarian deliberation. Theoretically speaking, not all forms of deliberation are democratic. The Supreme Court in the United States, for example, is highly deliberative but not necessarily or obviously democratic. International deliberation practiced in sophisticated diplomacy takes place against the background of an absence of global democracy. On the other hand, parliament and legislatures may be democratic without being deliberative. Genuine deliberation in parliament is sometimes hampered and destroyed by party politics. An authoritarian type of deliberation may even exist in democratic societies. For instance, executives may encourage discussion and deliberation but make their own final authoritative decision. Oscar Wilde once said, I delight in talking politics. I talk them all day long. But I cannot bear listening to them (cited in Elster 1998, 19). Some green activists believe that the value of protecting the environment is ultimately substantive, so while they do encourage public deliberation on environmental issues, they seldom change their views and preferences through deliberation, casting some doubt on the efficacy or desirability of deliberative processes. Chinese authoritarian deliberation is authoritarian in the sense that the top leaders are not elected; therefore, deliberation takes place under one-party domination. In addition, the state plays a significant role in developing, mobilizing, and promoting deliberative institutions; deliberation takes place under conditions of authoritarianism, and the organization of any deliberative forum is under firm control by the Party. It is, however, deliberative in that arguments and reasons are presented and communicative action leads to solutions for collective problems. Participants and local leaders exchange opinions, make arguments and counter-arguments, and change their preferences through public deliberation. In deliberation, the quality of argument must be substantiated by sufficient evidence and justification, counter-arguments must be considered and responded to, perspectives of others must be exposed, and a resolution must be achieved. The process of deliberation is one in which popular will or public opinion on certain issues and policies is formed, despite an authoritarian backdrop. Authoritarian deliberation is both logically possible and empirically real. The contemporary form of neo-authoritarianism can no longer use sheer military might for 1 Elster (1998, 15) raises doubt over this assumption as he poses the provocative question: to what extent are democracy and deliberation independent of each other?
Authoritarian Deliberation 5 full compliance. Instead, it appeals to the very idea of democracy and science. The system must rely on modern science and technologies, and must appeal to reason rather than force. The wide appeal of the idea of people s consultation in Suharto s Indonesia and today s China testifies to this mix of authoritarian backdrops and democratic procedures. Deliberation is not necessarily reserved for liberal democracies. Authoritarian regimes want to share the fruit of this special political device for their own political rule and governance. The device of deliberation is an attractive mechanism for solving difficult issues and delegate power. Consultation and deliberation reduce social conflicts and the level of opposition, and facilitate compliance with and implementation of state policy. Public deliberation can be an effective decision-making process, an effective conflict-resolution device, and a means to overcome polarization. All these factors influence the Chinese governance-driven local democratization program. One may quickly dismiss the notion of authoritarian deliberation as selfcontradictory and undemocratic. But such a notion should not be so easily dismissed. A critical theory of deliberative democracy, such as the one elaborated by Dryzek, together with, or even competing with, a liberal theory of deliberative democracy, must figure out appropriate strategies to transform authoritarian deliberation into democratic and inclusive deliberation. China s rich experience offers theorists such an opportunity to accomplish this potential. C. The Chinese Paradox: Development of deliberative and participatory institutions Our discussion should begin with an acknowledgment that there are different pictures of China - a repressive China where the government suppresses dissident groups, controls intellectual activities, and closes down some internet discussion forums; a corrupt China where local officials take any opportunity to seek payment for services offered; a rising China that poses a threat to world peace; a China in political crisis where daily social protest will end the CCP regime sooner or later, and many others. While all these different pictures are partially true, they overlook and ignore an alternative picture of a deliberative China where political development has taken a deliberative turn and an authoritarian deliberation or deliberative authoritarianism has emerged. While this picture no doubt is also partial, it is an accurate and useful insight for recognising a general trend and for grasping the paradox of China's political development. Moreover, this picture is consistent with the actual rapid economic and social development of China. While the shooting and killing of citizens still happens from time to time, such occurrences have become infrequent, accidental and marginal. In comparison, deliberation and citizen engagement represents the recent national trend. China is an authoritarian regime that still maintains a Leninist political structure and has resisted large scale democratization in the last decades. Surprisingly, however, Chinese national leaders have encouraged and promoted village elections, in particular for village representative assemblies which act as major institutions in the decision making process. Since the middle to late 1990s, some villages have developed village representative meetings wherein major decisions on village affairs are discussed, debated, and deliberated upon by village representatives. In Fujian Province in 2004, for example, the provincial government issued an official document that requires each village to hold
Authoritarian Deliberation 6 at least four village democratic and public meetings a year; and its 26 articles detail all procedures with regards to the selection of the participants, the proceeding of the meeting, the role of chairperson, note-taking, and linkages with village decision-making processes. 2 Local urban communities have also developed a number of new participatory and deliberative institutions. The Chinese consultative meeting or public hearing is designed to get people s support for local projects and to be a forum for people s opinions. The popular conciliation or mediation meeting is designed to solve various local problems and conflicts. In the Shangcheng district of Hangzhou, a consensus conference or consultation meeting is held once a month. Citizen evaluation, first introduced in Shangdong and Shengyang, and then in Shanghai and Hangzhou, is designed to give the ordinary people an opportunity to rate and evaluate the performance of local cadres. The rating seriously affects the political career or the level of performance bonus of local cadres. Interestingly, the western notion of 'collective bargaining' was translated into 'gongzhi jitixianshang ', literately, consultative and deliberative system on salary. 3 In the 1990s Jiansu Province widely introduced this system in which workers are entitled to certain rights to discuss and bargain their salaries and welfare with factory managers. In 2001 the Ministry of Labour and Social Security promulgated an official regulation on how to carry out collective bargaining in a Chinese way in which full consultation and discussion are the main mechanisms to solve disputes over wages. 4 An empirical study shows that the decision on the allocation of new departments to workers and managers was through the staff and workers representative council where the staff and workers representatives engaged several months discussion and deliberation in one state-owned factory (Unger and Chan 2004). Wenling City s progress is a good example of successful integration of deliberative institutions. It is a county-level city with a vibrant private economy. In 2004, it was awarded the national prize for Innovations and Excellence in Local Chinese Governance. From 1996 to 2000, more than 1,190 deliberative and consultative meetings were held at the village level, 190 at the township level, and 150 in governmental organizations, schools, and business sectors. Such meetings are called kentan, meaning sincere heart-to-heart discussion. Some meetings were one shot discussions; that is, single sessions dealing with only one topic. Others were continuing discussions about more complex matters or a series of matters. For example, five deliberative meetings were held to deal with the relocation of the fishery industry. Some meetings were just consultative without connecting with decision-making directly, while others were wellconnected to policy decision-making through the local People s Congresses. The development of participatory and deliberative institutions in Wenling City has involved four stages (Mo Yifei and Chen Yiming 2005). In the first stage, local leaders found that traditional ideological mobilization did not work as a mode of persuasion. In 1996, therefore, a democratic heart-to-heart forum was invented to give villagers a genuine opportunity to express their grievances and complaints. the villagers who 2 http://www.sanduao.com/danjian/jcdj/nc/files/20.htm. 3 See http://www.people.com.cn/gb/shizheng/20010108/372883.html; http://home.jsinfo.net/xinhua/web/zhengfu/suining/news/20050831_11.htm. 4 People's Daily, 8th January 2001, p. 2.
Authoritarian Deliberation 7 experienced this democratic forum soon discovered,however, that it was only a forum for discussion, not decision-making. Their political enthusiasm decreased, the turn-out rate dropped, and disillusionment followed. In the second stage, in order to continue to attract people, the local officials turned this discussion forum into a decision-making mechanism. By 2000, local leaders would respond to questions of participants, and make decisions on the spot. The third development, in 2004, was a democratic discussion forum attended by the deputies of the local People s Congress. Local leaders had discovered that if the issue being considered was controversial, decisions made in deliberative meetings gained support from some, but faced opposition from others. In order to defuse its responsibility and gain legitimacy for the policy on any controversial issue, the local party organization decided that deputies of the local People s Congress should vote on certain difficult issues in a deliberative meeting with the result of voting constituting a final decision that overrode the authority of the local party secretary. Leaders held the view that the only reliable and indisputable source of legitimacy is democratic voting, which generates a basis for public will on certain disputable issues. This is an institutional innovation that combines deliberative institutions with the empowerment so sorely lacking in much experimental deliberative democracy in the West. In the fourth stage, in 2005, Wenling introduced China s first experiment in Deliberative Polling on a budget issue, adopting the methods of social science to deliver a scientific basis for public policy. Wenling officials realized the deficiencies of their deliberative meetings, such as unscientific representation and insufficient time for a full discussion. Accordingly, they accepted advice from James Fishkin and Baogang He to use a random sampling method to select the participants to avoid selection bias, and to provide well-balanced information to all the participants, who would spend an entire day deliberating over the town s budget. The practice of holding public hearings has also developed at the national level. In 1996, the first national law on administrative punishment introduced an article stipulating that a public hearing must be held before any punishment is given. Another, the famous article 23 of the Law on Price passed by China s National Congress in December 1997, specified that the price of public goods must be decided through public hearing. This was followed by the Law on Legislature, passed in 2000, which requires public hearings to be an integral part of the decision-making process for all legal regulations and laws. More than 50 cities have now held legislative public hearings. On September 29, 2005, a public hearing was held by the National People s Congress Standing Committee to decide whether the central government should raise the personal income-tax threshold. Consultative and deliberative processes have also taken place at the National People's Congress where major laws and policies are drafted and proposed by experts and then fully deliberated by a congressional special committee. They are then submitted to the NPC standing meeting where deputies engage in a long process of discussion and deliberation. Facing the challenge of political survival in modern China today's Chinese leaders have become consultative and now appeal to deliberative institutions for their legitimacy.
Authoritarian Deliberation 8 D. Governance-Driven Deliberation: the Logic of Complex Societies in China and the West In facing a number of serious challenges growing autonomy and regional inequality arising from the market economy; daily social unrest and protests; serious problems of rampant corruption and the weakening of the state's administrative capacity, the CCP confronts real and perceived threats to its existence. Its responses are a mix of measures ranging through selective coercion, limited village elections, and participatory and deliberative institutions. The purposes of such institutions are multiple: to co-opt the forces outside the Party, to mobilize popular participation, to civilize power, to improve administrative capacities, to reduce and control conflict, to develop new control mechanisms, to gain legitimacy for public policies, and to stabilize the system, institutionalizing uncertainty through the use of clear and unambiguous procedures. The Chinese government has adopted various strategies to contain collective actions through prohibiting any unofficial national associations, punishing those who are the organizers of collective action, and disciplining those local officials who are corrupt or incapable of controlling social protests. At the same time, the Chinese government also introduced a public hearing system, and participatory and deliberative institutions to reduce social protest and strengthen the government s ruling capacities. These participatory and deliberative institutions are seen as necessary for strengthening the state s administrative capacities while at the same time providing a new source of legitimacy. These institutions are perceived not only as stabilizers for maintaining local order and solving problems arising from the tension between the expanding market and the community, but also as an effective means for developing what President Hu Jintao calls a harmonious society. Rapid economic development has given rise to unequal distribution, rampant corruption, a high rate of unemployment, a high level of mobility and migration, an increasing crime rate, and community disorder. In short, social control and local stability have become serious problems. In this context, both national and local governments pushed for development of urban residential communities and village committees, encouraging citizen participation in order to build an orderly polity. Through the political experiments of deliberative institutions, those in charge discovered that regular and frequent participatory and deliberative meetings have solved communityrelated problems, avoided major mistakes in public policy-making, and saved money, personnel, and time in governing local affairs, reducing the number of the people s petitions and complaints. In this regard, deliberative institutions can be seen as a valve to release the pressure upon the fast moving machine that is modern China. Indeed, the deputy Party Secretary Xia Anguo of Zhejiang Province saw deliberative polling methods as an effective tool to reduce social conflicts and therefore issued an official document to endorse the deliberative polling experiment at Zeguo town in 2005. 5 Moreover, the maintenance of local security has become a participatory institution of sorts not dissimilar from Fung s (2004) interesting observations about Chicago s local participatory school policing system. The unemployed in China have been organized to form security forces, and voluntary teams of party members are encouraged to patrol three times a day in their local area. This local security system can be seen as a 5 Zhejiang government's document, Zhejiang Social Security Governance, no. 21, 28 June 2005.
Authoritarian Deliberation 9 modern form of the Baojia system, but with a democratic and participatory component. Indeed, the citizen-driven security system has reduced the crime rate significantly within well-established residential communities. In one community, fourteen bicycles were stolen before the introduction of the system; since the introduction of the system the stealing has stopped. This local security system (together with the Houku and Daiwei systems) also partially explains why China s rapid economic development has not been accompanied by the slums and squatter areas seen in Brazil, Chile, Kenya, and many Asian cities. In facing the pressures associated with the rapid democratization in Eastern Europe and Asia, Beijing has tried to develop a new art of ruling that combines administrative order with a consultative mechanism that will bring governments and people together, improve the relations between cadres and the masses, and achieve good governance in local politics. To be sure, Beijing has used deliberative institutions as a form of moderate democracy to avoid a radical and substantial political reform that would directly challenge the political power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It is believed that deliberative institutions are peripheral and marginal, so they do not undermine the power of the CCP. Asking citizens to come to deliberative meetings does not pose any threat to the regime. Chinese leaders dabble with participatory and deliberative institutions in order to resist national elections. By paradoxical contrast, smart politicians in the West manipulate the institutions of electoral democracy to exclude radical democratic movements. The Chinese governments at national and local levels have encouraged the development of a mild form of democracy. As a result, mobilized, consultative, and deliberative institutions have developed even faster than the competitive electoral institutions at the township level and beyond. Still, the inherent logic of deliberative institutions may push China past the moderate form of democracy that was intended by Beijing. Local leaders have various motivations and incentives for pushing the development of deliberative institutions. In a complex society astute local leaders recognise their need for the mechanisms of deliberative institutions to deal judiciously with complex issues, and to share or reduce responsibility. When the party secretary makes a final decision, he/she shrewdly realizes that I decide implies I have to responsible. Increasingly smart local leaders adopt the deliberative forum as a decisionmaking process because we decide implies included citizens are also responsible. Deliberative processes are seen as a way to reduce the pressure and burden upon local officials who have to make tough decision concerning budgets and community planning. It is also a way to avoid or reduce accusations that leaders have taken kickback bribes from developers. In addition, policy formed through such public consultation and deliberation is easier to implement. Otherwise legitimate individual resistance to tough decisions like reallocation of land and removal of farmers are much easier to override if the policy is generated through community-based reason or consultation. Some officials aim to achieve a genuine consensus so as to gain legitimacy for certain policies, to reduce social conflicts, and even to win personal honour. Others see deliberative institutions as an effective tool to bring about democratic management and monitoring. Still others, however, are under great pressure to introduce these institutions to ease the tension between cadres and the masses. For example, one interviewee said he had to hold
Authoritarian Deliberation 10 consultation or consensus meetings to satisfy the demands of residents, who would otherwise give officials an extremely low mark in citizen evaluation meetings. Pressure also comes from the private sector. In some local counties or townships in Zhejiang, private tax contributions constitute more than 70 percent of the local budget. Private businessmen and interest groups desire to express their views about public policies that affect their economic life. As a result, consultation meetings and other institutions are organized in response to the demand from the private sector. Political achievement is also an important motivation for local leaders. In recent years, some local leaders who have promoted village, township, or urban residential elections have advanced their political careers. When local leaders improved electoral procedures in Fujian, Jilin, and other provinces, there was little room to further innovate with election procedures. Local leaders in Wenling, therefore, concentrated their efforts on the development of deliberative institutions. Songmen Town in Wenling City was the first to implement and develop deliberative institutions. Its leaders were awarded innovation prizes, first from Wenling City, and then from a national body in 2003. As a result, they have continued to develop and improve the existing institutions. By comparison, leaders pressured from above to introduce similar deliberative institutions felt they could not achieve anything new. They lacked strong incentives, and the deliberative institutions in place in those localities are only a formality. In the comparative context, deliberative institutions are designed to deal with similar governance issues in Western societies. They attempt to address the legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy, to mobilize citizens to debate political issues, and above all they are a useful tool for dealing with complex issues in a complex society. Very strikingly, deliberative meetings in both China and Australia are elite-led processes and the sustainability of these institutions depends upon a strong leadership whose commitment to the deliberative forum is vital. In both China and Australia, the development of deliberative institutions faces similar problems: how to motivate leaders to use deliberative meetings to address a wide range of issues; and how to inspire ordinary citizens to participate in the deliberative process. Despite these similarities, the differences are crucial. The Chinese political, legal and cultural underpinnings of these participatory and deliberative institutions are different from those in the West. The Chinese political system is authoritarian, and its legal system is still constrained by the CCP's domination. The Chinese government creates a public sphere wherein the autonomy of individual agency is absent, and the autonomy of civil society is very weak. Culturally speaking, 'deliberative democracy' is translated as 'xianshang' which denotes the meaning of consultation and discussion; public hearing is translated as tingzheng literally meaning 'listening to the discussion of people'. The Chinese indigenous term of deliberation 'kaitai' means 'a sincere talk', or 'heart-to-heart talk.' None of these Chinese terms presuppose popular sovereignty, instead they have a different normative presupposition based upon order and harmony. Consent and equality are not inherently built into the concept 'xianshang minzhu', the Chinese translation of deliberative democracy. This raises the question of whether Chinese understandings of deliberative norms are compatible with Western ones. For example, in China the state grants the privilege of consultation. Moreover, in Western society there is no trade-off between democracy and deliberation. Deliberation and democracy are conceptually consistent and mutually
Authoritarian Deliberation 11 supportive in the notion of deliberative democracy. Deliberation does not threaten the political regime of liberal democracy, if anything it enhances it. By contrast, in the Chinese context, deliberation and authoritarianism are conceptually contradictory; and deliberation is seen, not as an enhancement of the existing regime but as a mechanism for democratization and regime change. In this Chinese context, deliberation raises the question of whether it is really possible to develop democracy from authoritarian deliberation. There is a trade-off between authoritarianism and deliberation. E. The Contradictory Logic of Authoritarian Deliberation 1: Deliberative Authoritarianism Authoritarian deliberation as described above illustrates the dark side of deliberation, deidealizes deliberative democracy, and provides a realist assessment of the operation of deliberation. While allowing, even encouraging deliberation at the local level the Chinese authoritarian system nevertheless constrains the scope of deliberation, and develops a highly mobilized form of deliberation. The deliberative institutions cannot discuss constitutional matters and politically sensitive issues cannot be brought to the table of deliberation. Neither can the deliberative institutions translate or evolve into any kind of political movement. The deliberative experiments are localized, and are well managed so as to prevent them from expanding or moving into other areas thus threatening the control of the regime. This explains why most experiments take place in local town or urban communities. Without the benefit of elections, these institutions are not able to remove corrupt officials. Moreover, the absence of freedom of the press and lack of a political opposition prevents the development of a fully deliberative system It seems that China in some way mimics Singapore s authoritarian model, but goes beyond it, developing a uniquely Chinese model of deliberative authoritarianism quite different from military or plural authoritarianism. Deliberative authoritarianism has altered and modified the nature of China s authoritarian system in the critical area of exercising political power in unexpected ways. In the last decades the CCP has expanded its power down to, and recruited its new members from, new urban communities, village, private factories and even high schools It attempts to maintain its monopoly on power and does not want other parties to share that power or challenge it. While the extent of post-totalitarian power has been developed and expanded into almost every aspect of Chinese life, the way in which the power has been exercised has been modified, and to some extent, civilized. The following discussion is a summary of the ways in which power is exercised. (A) Under deliberative authoritarianism, coercion has been tamed and regulated. Coercive force is carefully and selectively used in the area of crushing political dissidents. While the authoritarian state of China no longer sends people to labour camps, it appeals to the use of discussion and deliberation to solve daily problems. (B) The CCP recognises the need to avoid the arbitrary use of political power in the decision-making process. The power has been decentralized and diversified, therefore, so that the concentration of political power in one single man is avoided. The concentration of power in one hand will lead to low efficiency and resistance," commented Mo Yiming, deputy head of the department of propaganda in Wenling city.
Authoritarian Deliberation 12 In this context, deliberative and participatory institutions are seen as an effective way of avoiding mistakes in decision-making process. (C) The Center encourages local officials to develop participatory and deliberative institutions to curb rampant corruption, reduce coercion, and promote reason-based persuasion. It invites ordinary citizens, experts and think tanks to participate in the decision-making process. The party is appealing to the concept of compliance with the law through a deliberative forum. The party officials start the process by requesting a governmental organization to establish a deliberative meeting or forum. The government then passes the results of such a deliberative meeting to local legislative institutions that finally endorse the result in legislature or regulation. Despite the absence of general elections, through the potency of communicative power the party s decision enjoys both popular and legal support. Thus legitimacy is established for the exercise of political power. The authenticity of the exercise of political power is seen to derive not purely from ideology and economic development, but also from deliberation and consultation. (D) In the politics of introducing deliberative forums, power relations have been subtly changed. For example, the random selection of participants excluded some Party members who complained about the exclusion: the core of the party disappears, and major issues are not decided by the Party. Local township leaders, however, used the fact that the village elected representatives included some Party members to dismiss such a complaint. In addition, local leaders give up a bit of their political power, for example, in making a final decision on projects, or in selecting participants for the deliberative meeting. They gain additional power, however, because participatory and deliberative institutions create legitimacy and make compliance easy. Of course, it is difficult to give up some power under the condition of the exchange between power and money. (F) In order to maintain stability, the center has granted a set of rights to citizens including the right to own property, the right to elect committees, the right to manage local funds, the consumption right, and the right to consent (peasants must sign an official document to agree on the relocation of farmers before any action to be taken). In particular, in Fujian province, the government allows citizens to initiate a meeting if one can collect the supporting signatures of one fifth of adult villagers or one third of village representatives. In Wuhan city, residents are also granted such a right to initiate meetings and even to nominate the chair person. All these rights set limits upon the exercise of political power, reduce the possibility of corruption and find a way of establishing a harmonious society. Of course, participatory and deliberative institutions do not change the locus of power; the power is still held firmly by the Party. In the end, the Party makes a decision on whether it will hold any deliberative and participatory meeting, and whether such a meeting will be able to make a final decision on any given policy. F. The Contradictory Logic of Authoritarian Deliberation 2: Deliberation-led Democratization 6 6 While there is potential for democratization, it is also possible for China to have a combined worse outcome, that is, the creation of an organization to co-opt the rich and other citizens, while allowing present statist stakeholders domination over and manipulation of, for example, briefing and survey materials.
Authoritarian Deliberation 13 Stephen Macedo (1999, 4) poses the question: Is deliberative democracy best conceived of, as it usually is, as an alternative to the liberalism of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin? A liberal would hold that deliberative democracy cannot replace liberal democracy. By contrast, Dryzek argues that deliberative democracy is an alternative to liberal democracy; and that deliberative democracy ought not to be assimilated by liberal constitutionalism. This debate frames two different ways of considering what constitutes an appropriate democratic strategy in China. A liberal would hold that the liberal model of democracy is the only available choice and liberal representative democratic institutions have preceded deliberative institutions in most Western countries. Accordingly, therefore, China should first develop liberal democracy, in particular, electoral and competitive politics: there is no hope of developing deliberative democracy in China when the basic liberal elements of democracy are lacking. The resultant strategy is that China should make a regime change, meaning the end of the CCP's rule and the introduction of national and general elections. An alternative and competing view is that deliberative institutions and meetings themselves constitute a form of democracy in which local people participate and make important decisions on their own. It is argued that this process of citizen-empowerment, rather than a simple matter of regime change, is a crucial element in democratization in China. Indeed, the idea of deliberative democracy appeals to some Chinese leaders and intellectuals because it goes beyond electoral democracy. Li Junru, vice-president of the Central Party School, openly advocated deliberative democracy (Li. 2005). The Central Party School's official journal Study Times published an editorial endorsing the deliberative polling experiment in Zeguo, Wenling, China in 2005. 7 Officials in Zhejiang Province, Taizhou prefecture city, and Wenling city all promoted the deliberative democracy experiments in their official documents as a way of reducing and containing social conflicts. For some Chinese intellectuals the deliberative and consultative style of democracy is much better than the electoral and conflictual model of liberal democracy (Lin Shangli 2003). Several reasons account for this. Deliberative and consultative institutions have historical precedents. The Chinese are used to having such heart-to-heart dialogue as a way of solving daily problems in communal life. Deliberative democracy is not seen to be about civil society against the state, but rather as collaborative governance between officials and citizens. Additionally deliberative democracy is seen as a kind of administrative reform, where the development of a scientific and democratic decisionmaking process can help to improve and enhance administrative capacity. Deliberative institutions do not emphasize competitive elections and may, therefore, be more easily accepted by the authoritarian state. Given that the Chinese state has encouraged the development of deliberative institutions, there is a possibility of developing deliberative democracy in China without having an electoral democracy first. The assumption that China cannot develop deliberative democracy is mistaken. Chinese deliberative institutions, although weak, deficient, and constrained by an authoritarian regime, have emerged and developed, and will continue to develop even under one-party domination. In the current climate in which national leaders suppress opposition and public spheres of debate, the state s sponsored deliberative institutions can 7 Study Times, 12 December 2005, p. 1.
Authoritarian Deliberation 14 be seen as a beam of light for democratic hope. Developing deliberative institutions is seen as a democratizing strategy, a step toward local democracy. Authoritarian deliberation contains some forms and elements of inchoate democracy, and therefore exhibits a potential logic for developing into local democracy. Below we highlight several mechanisms at work. It is worthwhile noting that we should not focus on the official purposes of deliberative institutions, but on the unexpected consequences, mechanisms, and processes. 1. The state cannot manage all things effectively, and it has to generate public participation. Deliberation provides a sort of legitimacy for government and its policies, helps to achieve better governance, and, in a period of rapid transition, lays down a new moral ground for dealing with a set of social problems. In the quest for legitimacy public opinion is seen as constituting a new source of power. Deliberative democracy is a model of public policy formation or public judgement. The elevation of scientific reason as a policy making mechanism will tame and regulate the state s coercive power, and consequently the source and even structure of power will change in the long term. 2. To achieve the above mentioned functions, the processes of deliberation itself need increased legitimacy. Among other innovations a wider inclusiveness and representation is needed and this in turn demands the institutional reform of the universal adoption of the technique of random selection of participants. 3. In a market dominated economy citizens don t want to waste their time. There is a need to amalgamate the process of deliberation with the decision-making process, thus economising on time and resources and making deliberation an essential component in the decision making process. In addition, political competition makes these institutions more genuine, and eventually fake deliberative institutions are likely to be eliminated. 4. Deliberative institutions change citizen s expectation. When people become used to having consultative meetings, they become discontented if they are deprived of them. Indeed, this already happens at village level. The logic of democratic potential begins with the granting of a right by the state and continues with the demanding of these rights by citizens. In the end such rights become a part of daily life not to be taken away at will by the Party. In addition, deliberation creates an artificial environment of equality, a democratic learning tutorial where citizens learn the necessary skills for discussing all political issues, for negotiating and for reaching compromises. Deliberation empowers and cultivates citizens, help them to develop deliberative capacities. 5. So far positive feedbacks and spillover effects have increased the confidence of the local Party organization and local officials in using these institutions to solve various social problems. Public consultation and deliberation have been extended to the land issue, a politically sensitive issue. Additionally, Wenling leaders have attempted to institutionalize the system to avoid the end of the democratic experiment when leaders have changed. The structural view that the CCP can not be democratized without giving up power inhibits an open-minded examination of the above mechanisms. As we have
Authoritarian Deliberation 15 already discussed, it is true that the existing power structure does place constraints on deliberation but the process of deliberation nevertheless contains elements of democratization. For instance, the random selection of representatives militates against manipulation and bolsters the idea of political equality; the process of getting different people together to discussing common issues increases community engagement and contact and helps to create social trust; and the process of discussion provides an opportunity for the exchange of opinions between local officials and citizens. All of these enhance the development of collaborative governance to solve practical issues. The above discussion of the democratic potential of authoritarian deliberation indicates that the Western models of democratic transition are problematic. In the 1980s in Eastern Europe democratization started from civil society outside the political regime but this conventional civil society model does not fit with China. The path toward democracy is significantly different from the conventionally recognized electoral path. Chinese democratization is likely to start within the system with the Chinese state creating public forums to discuss public policies, giving rise to a deliberative form of democracy. This is a Chinese version of the public sphere where the struggle of civil society against the state is absent and importantly where public opinions on certain issues are formed within a public deliberative forum which eventually becomes part of decisionmaking process. In the democratization transition literature, the presence of a democratic moment or breakthrough is often assumed. In Poland, for example, there was a crucial moment in which the labour movement did not recognize official unions and they unified together against the state. After that, the democratization process started dramatically. The idea that democratization is meaningful only if a breakthrough is achieved is problematic in the Chinese context. Chinese experience demonstrates the possibility of incremental democratization without the conventional idea of a democratic breakthrough. Alternatively, the critical moment can be understood as the changing combining of contradictory elements in such a unique way that the composition of the mixed regime changes. That is, the moment comes when the colonization of participation by administration is significantly decreased and the democratic elements are sufficiently increased so that the authoritarian forces are weakened and the mix regime changes. An incremental model is better proposition than rapid regime transition as the latter is more likely to cause China to suddenly dissolve into political collapse. In fact, the Chinese mixed regime defies regime transformation theory. It is entirely possible for China to bypass the Polish model of regime change. Indeed, China s regime has already changed significantly as it has evolved into a deliberative authoritarianism. G. Conclusion The deliberative turn identifies a real phenomenon with multiple possibilities. The term authoritarian deliberation both identifies the phenomenon, and captures its paradoxical qualities. It describes the complex system or the present configuration of China s recent political development. It is an analytical tool for seeing the trajectory of China s political development. It is useful for us to understanding the process of China s political development. The concept of authoritarian deliberation allows us to disaggregate the