Scott Sigmund Gartner UC Davis ssgartner@ucdavis.edu January 18, 2007 Wartime Estimates of Costs and Benefits & Public Approval of the Iraq War Introduction Do people weigh a war s anticipated costs and benefits when determining their support or opposition to a conflict? A number of scholars have argued that people weight anticipated costs and benefits when forming positions on foreign policy (Boettcher and Cobb 2006; Gartner 2006; Sullivan 2006). Few studies, however, have examined the position formation process directly and tested its sensitivity to variation in anticipated costs and benefits (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2006). In this effort, I examine these processes directly to see how anticipated costs and benefits and the scope and accuracy of one s knowledge of those costs affect attitudes towards war. In particular, in examining public attitudes on the Iraq War, I examine how much information citizens have about the costs of the Iraq War, whether these estimated costs directly relate to approval of the conflict (controlling for the respondent s sense of the degree to which the goals of the campaign are important and likely to be achieved), and respondents sensitivity to increased costs. Finally, this study also helps address external validity concerns of student-based experiments. Literature A better understanding of the micro-foundations of the nexus between wartime casualties and political support is critical. Increasing casualties lead to lower levels of both national (Mueller 1973; Gartner & Segura 1998) and individual support (Boettcher and Cobb 2006; Feaver & Gelpi 2004; Gartner & Segura 2000). Research suggests that casualties influence elections in the House (Carson et al. 2001), Senate (Gartner et al 2004), and the Presidency (Voeten and Brewer 2006; Karol and Miguel n.d.). Casualties also affect leader tenure more broadly (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). The relationship between casualties and public support represents a critical link in arguments about the democratic peace (Gartzke 2001; Kadera et al. 2003; Siverson 1995; Russett 1990), diversionary theory arguments (Baum 2002), and theories of war outcomes (Sullivan 2006). Goals Despite this recent work, significant gaps remain. In particular, we don t have a good understanding about what people really know in war, and we have not yet effectively discerned how people use what they do know in war to formulate wartime policy positions. Existing studies connect casualties to opinion without specifically testing the necessary linkages to demonstrate a process of cost-benefit calculation. By contrast, this study will contribute to our understanding of foreign policy opinion formation by investigating the micro-foundations of both people s wartime knowledge and decision making.
Secondly, much of the conventional wisdom about the casualties and opinion nexus posits a temporal process that is tested cross-sectionally. Thus, there is a serious disconnect between the theoretical processes identified (e.g. Gartner and Segura 2000, Sullivan 2006) and the data analyzed. The panel study aspect of this study will help to capture more accurately the temporal dynamics underlying the attitude formation process. Finally, those few studies that match up temporal theory and analysis employ experimental work (Gartner 2006; Boettcher and Cobb 2006; see also Feaver & Gelpi 2004), which raise serious external validity concerns (see Sullivan 2006). In order to address these concerns, the questions in this module will also be part of an experimental study. Comparing the survey and experimental results will allow us to address concerns about generalizability of experiments directly and maximize both the internal and external validity of arguments about Iraq War attitude formation. Theory To address these goals, in these questions, I ask respondents about the costs and benefits of the Iraq War and then investigate their support should these costs and benefits change. Questions about cost include respondents estimates of total American casualties and whether or not a war casualty is known to them. Benefits include factors such as their value of a democratic Iraq. Finally, respondents are cued about possible changes in the costs (e.g. casualties are likely to increase or likely to decrease) and asked about their support for the Iraq War. The general theoretical argument is that individuals use the casualty data available to them to predict a conflict s future casualties. Weighing the value of these estimated casualties against a conflict s estimated objectives, individuals determine whether they support a conflict or not (for more detail on this, see Gartner 2006). These questions will help us develop a significantly better understanding of the micro-processes involved in foreign policy attitude formation. Concerns te that, in the event that US participation in hostilities has ended significantly before the pre-election poll goes into the field, I would re-word the questions in a more retrospective manner. However, should hostilities be ongoing, or should US withdrawal have occurred six months or less before the survey goes into the field, I think I could maintain the current wording. Similarly, the 5,000 and 10,000 US KIA prompts might need to be adjusted. If questions need to be cut, I would suggest deletions first drawn from (Heardcas, Cost5k, Costaq), and next from (Cnoprmpt & Costbene). Similarly, it is possible that (Veteran, Knowmil & Knowcas) are, or could be, thought of as part of the common content. Additionally, if answered yes in a current wave (Veteran, Knowmil & Knowcas) could be skipped in subsequent waves. 2
Sources Baum, Mathew A. 2002. "The Constituent Foundation of the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon." International Studies Quarterly. 46(2): 263-298. Boettcher, William A. and Michael D. Cobb. 2006. Echoes of Vietnam? Casualty Framing and Public Perceptions of Success and Failure in Iraq. The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 50(6): 831-854. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Carson, Jamie, Jeffrey Jenkins, David Rohde, and Mark Souva 2001. The Impact of National Tides and District-Level Effects on Electoral Outcomes: The U.S. Congressional Elections of 1862-63. American Journal of Political Science. 45(4):887-98. Feaver, Peter D. and Christopher Gelpi. 2004. Choosing Your Battles: American Civil- Military Relations and the Use of Force. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. Gartner, Scott Sigmund and Gary M. Segura. 1998. War, Casualties and Public Opinion. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(3): 278-300. Gartner, Scott Sigmund and Gary Segura. 2000. Race, Opinion and Casualties in the Vietnam War. The Journal of Politics. 62 (1):115-146. Gartner, Scott Sigmund, Gary M. Segura and Bethany Barratt. 2004. Casualties, Positions and Senate Elections in the Vietnam War. Political Research Quarterly. 53(3): 467-477. Gartner, Scott Sigmund. 2006. Casualties and Public Support: An Experimental Analysis. Presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Philadelphia, PA. Gelpi, Christopher, Peter D. Feaver, Jason Reifler 2005 Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq. International Security Winter. 30(3): 7-46. Kadera, Kelly M., Mark J. Crescenzi and Megan Shannon. 2003. "Democratic Survival, Peace and War in the International System." The American Journal of Political Science. 47(2): 224-247. Karol, David and Edward Miguel. Date. Iraq War Casualties and the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election. Unpublished manuscript. Mueller, John E. 1973. War, Presidents and Public Opinion. NY: John Wiley and Sons. Russett, Bruce. 1990. Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sullivan, Patricia L. 2006. Sustaining the Fight: A Cross-Sectional Time Series Analysis of Public Support for Ongoing Military Interventions. Presented at the Reopening the Black Box of War Conference. The University of California, Davis. Voeten, Erik and Paul R. Brewer. 2006. Public Opinion, the War in Iraq and Presidential Accountability. The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 50(6): 809-830. 3
Iraq War Instrument Module [warimpt] The stated mission of US forces in Iraq today is to establish a stable democracy friendly to the United States. In general, how important is it, do you think, that we achieve this goal? <1/ not > <2/ little > <3/ somewhat > <4/ very > t important at all t very important Somewhat important Very important <8/ DK > Don t know <9/ > or Missing [warwin] How likely is it that we achieve this goal? <1/ vunlikely > Very unlikely <2/ unlikely > Somewhat unlikely <3/ likely > Somewhat likely <4/ vlikely > Very likely Don t know or Missing [estcost] Given what you have read in the paper or seen on TV, about how many US soldiers would you say have been killed in our efforts in Iraq? {NOTE: Allow for an open-ended response code actual number} 4
[cnoprmpt] Thinking back to the start of the war, are these total costs so far <1/ more > <2/ same > <3/ less > More than what you expected About what you expected it would take. Less than what you expected <8> Don t know <9> {NOTE: SPLIT SAMPLE next two questions. Half the subjects should receive [warviewa], and half should receive [warviewb]} [warviewa] Both the administration and military leaders believe, and evidence suggests, that the worst is behind us, and that the situation is likely to improve. Under these circumstances, what is your view of the current US effort in Iraq? <1/ stoppose > <2/ oppose > <3/ favor > <4/ stfavor > Strongly oppose Somewhat oppose Somewhat favor Strongly favor Don t know/no opinion 5
[warviewb] Most military leaders believe, and evidence suggests, that the cost in American lives is likely to get worse before it gets better. Under these circumstances, what is your view of the current US effort in Iraq? <1/ stoppose > <2/ oppose > <3/ favor > <4/ stfavor > Strongly oppose Somewhat oppose Somewhat favor Strongly favor Don t know/no opinion {NOTE: SPLIT SAMPLE ENDS. All subjects should receive next question} [costbene] When all is said and done, do you think what the US achieves in Iraq will have been worth the costs in terms of lives and injuries? 6
{SPLIT SAMPLE If the answer to [costbene] is punch 2 ask BRANCH A, all others ask BRANCH B} {BRANCH A} [cost5k] Would you still think our achievements were worth it if total dead were 5000 or greater: {If the answer to [cost5k] is punch 1 no, end branch and skip to [veteran], otherwise ask [cost10k].} [cost10k]. Would you still think our achievements were worth it if total dead were 10000 or greater: {End Branch A skip to [veteran].} {BRANCH B} [costwmd] Had US forces discovered verifiable evidence that Iraq had, or was pursuing, weapons of mass destruction, would Iraq then have been worth the costs? 7
[costaq] Had US forces discovered verifiable evidence that Iraq had cooperated with Al Qaeda, or someway was connected to the events of 9/11, would Iraq then have been worth the costs? {End BRANCH B.} [veteran1] Are you a veteran of, or currently serving in, the armed services? If veteran1=yes, skip on subsequent waves [knowmil] Do you personally know someone friend, close neighbor, or family member serving in Iraq? If knowmil=yes previously, skip in subsequent waves [knowcas] Do you personally know someone friend, close neighbor, or family member who has died in Iraq? 8
If knowcas=yes previously, skip in subsequent waves {Ask next question if the answer to [knowcas] is punch 1, otherwise END} [heardcas] Have you heard if someone in your community has died in the fighting? If heardcas =yes previously, skip in subsequent waves 9