What s News in Tax Analysis that matters from Washington National Tax Trump and the NAFTA January 23, 2017 by Luis A. Abad and Donald Hok, Washington National Tax * President Trump s campaign platform included promises to renegotiate a number of trade deals most notably, the North American Free Trade Agreement ( NAFTA ) with Mexico and Canada. This article considers whether a president has the authority to unilaterally withdraw from the NAFTA or whether the president must seek consent or authorization from Congress, and explores other avenues the president may have to modify tariffs. During the recent U.S. presidential campaign, Republican candidate Donald Trump ran, in part, on a platform to shake up America s global trade position by promising to renegotiate a number of trade deals most notably, the NAFTA with Mexico and Canada or risk a termination of the agreement by the United States. Candidate Trump also stated he would impose taxes of 35 percent for goods imported into the U.S. from Mexico, and 45 percent for goods from China. Although it is not clear, it is possible he might have been talking about tariffs (rather than taxes), which would be reminiscent of the Smoot-Hawley Tariffs of 1930. 1 If so, such a drastic increase in tariffs would likely result in a substantial * Luis Abad is a principal with the Trade and Customs Services group of Washington National Tax ( WNT ). Donald Hok is a manager with the Trade and Customs Services practice currently assigned to WNT. 1 For the purpose of this article, it is assumed that a 35 percent tax on goods from Mexico would be in the form of a tariff on goods, rather than the border adjustable tax concept from the House Republican blueprint on tax reform. Note, however, that President Trump has described his proposal as a tax. Further, some of his advisors recently have suggested that a Trump Administration might support the border adjustments proposed in the tax reform blueprint. This also suggests that Trump may have been describing a tax law proposal, rather than a tariff. However, it is also possible that Trump was talking about tariffs, rather than taxes. In this regard, note that the blueprint s proposed border adjustments would apply to imports from all countries, not just Mexico and China. Further, in his campaign, Trump proposed a 15 percent statutory corporate rate (rather than the current 35 percent rate).
Trump and the NAFTA page 2 increase in import costs for U.S. companies, costs that consequently would be passed on to U.S. consumers in the form of higher prices for goods. 2 The potential impact of such policies may also lead our trade partners, Mexico in this case, to respond with counter tariff measures in retaliation, making it more expensive for U.S. companies to export and sell their goods in such foreign markets, possibly leading to a trade war. This issue is a concern for many companies with supply chains in Mexico. This article explores whether, as president, Trump has the authority to unilaterally withdraw from the NAFTA, or whether the United States president must seek consent or authorization from Congress before such a withdrawal, and what other avenues the President may have to modify tariffs. The Campaign Promise During a campaign speech on June 28, 2016, candidate Trump made the following statement: I m going to tell our NAFTA partners that I intend to immediately renegotiate the terms of that agreement to get a better deal for our workers. And I don t mean just a little bit better, I mean a lot better. If they do not agree to a renegotiation, then I will submit notice under Article 2205 of the NAFTA agreement that America intends to withdraw from the deal. 3 Following his November 8 election victory, President Trump s transition team made it clear that President Trump s trade promises are a priority for his presidency, and laid out a skeleton of Trump s trade policy for the first 200 days of his presidency. 4 The president also published a 7 Point Plan To Rebuild the American Economy by Fighting for Free Trade that underscores the president s campaign promise to renegotiate or withdraw from the NAFTA, a move that if undertaken unilaterally could result in litigation to resolve critical issues concerning the exercise of executive power in this regard. 5 NAFTA Article 2205 The NAFTA, a trade agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, negotiated by President George H.W. Bush and signed into law by President Bill Clinton on December 8, 1993, intended to, among other things, eliminate trade barriers, promote fair competition, increase investment opportunities, and protect intellectual property rights between the member countries. 6 Article 2205 of the NAFTA provides that [a] Party may withdraw from this Agreement six months after it provides written notice of withdrawal to the other Parties. If a Party withdraws, the Agreement shall remain in 2 Report: Trump tariffs would be catastrophic for poor, Politico (May 12, 2016). 3 Full Transcript: Donald Trump s jobs plan speech, Politico (June 28, 2016). 4 Trump transition memo: Trade reform begins Day 1, CNN (Nov. 16, 2016), available at http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/15/ politics/donald-trump-trade-memo-transition. But see NAFTA Is Here To Stay, Even Under Trump, Erik Sherman, Forbes (Dec. 6, 2016) available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/eriksherman/2016/12/06/nafta-is-here-to-stay-even-undertrump/#6fa7a5f7560f. 5 Donald Trump s 7 Point Plan To Rebuild the American Economy by Fighting for Free Trade, available at www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/trade. 6 H.R. 3450 103rd Congress: North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act; Pub.L. 103-82.
Trump and the NAFTA page 3 force for the remaining Parties. 7 Thus, if the U.S. chooses to withdraw from NAFTA, it need only give the other member countries the requisite notice. The key question, however, is whether the president can unilaterally invoke article 2205 without the consent or approval of Congress. The U.S. Constitution conveys authority to both the president and Congress in dealing with foreign affairs. Article II, section 2, of the U.S. Constitution provides that the president shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur 8 At the same time, however, the Constitution grants Congress Power To lay and collect Duties [and] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations. 9 Moreover, Congress may delegate certain authority to the president to negotiate trade agreements by statute. Thus, the Constitution by itself may not necessarily be instructive on the issue at hand. The specific international agreement and enabling law must also be considered to assess which governmental body has the authority to withdraw the United States from the NAFTA. International Agreements Under the Constitution, the United States can become a party to an international agreement by treaty or by international agreements other than treaties. 10 A treaty is an international agreement whose entry into force with respect to the United States takes place only after the Senate has given its advice and consent. 11 Although what actually constitutes a treaty is unclear, 12 the process for ratifying a treaty requires consent of two-thirds of the senators present. 13 On the other hand, international agreements other than treaties include agreements made pursuant to either the provisions of an existing treaty, legislation (i.e., congressional-executive agreements), or the constitutional authority of the president (i.e., sole executive agreements). 14 The NAFTA was entered into pursuant to two enabling statutes: Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 ( OTCA ) and the Trade Act of 1974. 15 These acts provided that agreements such as the NAFTA shall enter into force with respect to the United States if (and only if) after entering into the agreement, the President submits [to Congress] [] an implementing bill... and the implementing bill is enacted into law (the so-called fast track procedures ). 16 7 The NAFTA Secretariat (Nov. 14, 2016), available at https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/home/legal-texts/north-american-free- Trade-Agreement?mvid=1&secid=d5a8ba07-1fb2-4f28-88d0-a8eac08611a2. 8 U.S. Const. Art. II, Section 2. 9 U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Section 8. 10 U.S. Department of State, 11 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 723.2-2. 11 11 FAM 723.2-1. 12 See Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001). 13 Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides the president, with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur. 14 11 FAM 723.2-2. 15 H.R. 4848 (100 th ): Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (19 U.S.C. 2901 et seq.); Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2101 et seq.). 16 19 U.S.C. 2903(a); 19 U.S.C. 2112(e).
Trump and the NAFTA page 4 Under the fast track procedures, Congress authorizes the president to submit a trade agreement implementing bill to Congress, which can be approved or denied by Congress but cannot be amended or filibustered. 17 Thus, the NAFTA is considered to be a congressional-executive agreement, 18 essentially legislation, enacted into law by the NAFTA Implementation Act ( NIA ) because it was approved by a simple majority in both houses of Congress in November 1993 (not two-thirds of the Senate, as would be required for a treaty ), and signed into law by then-president Clinton. 19 Accordingly, pursuant to the legislative power vested in Congress by article 1, section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, absent a lawful delegation of authority to the president, only Congress has the authority to repeal existing laws, including the NIA. The NIA does authorize the president to proclaim such modifications or continuation of any duty, such continuation of duty-free or excise treatment, or such additional duties, as the President determines to be necessary or appropriate to carry out or apply articles 302, 305, 307, 308, and 703 and Annexes 302.2, 307.1, 308.1, 308.2, 300-B, 703.2, and 703.3 of the [NAFTA]. 20 Section 125(b) of The Trade Act of 1974, as amended through P.L. 114-125 (enacted February 24, 2016), also authorizes the president to at any time terminate, in whole or in part, any proclamation made under this chapter, 21 which would include the NAFTA preferential tariff rates proclaimed pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 6641 (December 15, 1993). However, neither the NAFTA nor the NIA is a presidential proclamation, nor are they entered into force by proclamation. As a result, these provisions would not appear to authorize the president to unilaterally terminate NAFTA per se. Moreover, the NIA does not explicitly authorize the president to unilaterally invoke article 2205 of the NAFTA to withdraw from the agreement without congressional approval. Like the Constitution, the NIA is silent on the matter of who has the authority to abrogate a treaty or international agreement. Similarly, the enabling authorities, the OTCA and Trade Act of 1974, are not explicit on this point. OTCA is silent as to who has the authority to terminate a congressionally approved trade agreement; 22 and the Trade Act of 1974 appears to reserve that authority for Congress with respect to certain countries under specific circumstances. 23 Notwithstanding the ambiguity in these statutes, generally, in the absence of specific statutory language, Congress reserves the power to repeal the NIA and, arguably, to withdraw 17 See 19 U.S.C. 2191. 18 Jane M. Smith, Daniel T. Shedd, and Brandon J. Murrill, Why Certain Trade Agreements Are Approved as Congressional- Executive Agreements Rather Than Treaties, Congressional Research Service (Apr. 15, 2013) available at www.crs.gov. 19 The bill was passed in a vote in the U.S. House of Representatives on November 17, 1993, and the U.S. Senate on November 20, 1993, after which it was signed into law by President William Clinton on December 8, 1993. H.R. 3450 103rd Congress: North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act; Pub.L. 103-82. 20 19 U.S.C. 3331; See also 19 U.S.C. 2111, and 19 U.S.C. 2902, the basic authority for trade agreements, generally provide the same. 21 19 U.S.C. 2135(b). 22 See 19 U.S.C. 2135 (Termination and withdrawal authority). 23 See 19 U.S.C. 2904 (Termination and reservation authority; reciprocal nondiscriminatory treatment), which requires the president to recommend to Congress legislation for the termination of trade agreements when a major industrial country does not reciprocate trade concessions.
Trump and the NAFTA page 5 from the NAFTA under its broad constitutional powers to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Thus, should President Trump move to unilaterally withdraw from the NAFTA without congressional approval, it is likely that interested parties may challenge the matter, and the issue would be litigated before the federal courts. Judicial Precedent The federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have on several occasions declined to resolve similar questions regarding executive authority to terminate international treaties. In 2001, President George W. Bush withdrew the United States from the 1972 Treaty Between the United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (the ABM Treaty ). 24 Similar to article 2205 of NAFTA, the ABM Treaty contained a withdrawal clause upon six months notice, which President Bush invoked on December 13, 2001. 25 Thirty-two members of the House of Representatives filed an action in the District Court for the District of Columbia arguing that the president did not have the authority to terminate the ABM Treaty without the consent of Congress. In dismissing the complaint, the court concluded, in part, that the issue of whether the president can terminate a treaty without congressional consent was a nonjusticiable political question best left for resolution to the political branches of our government. 26 In Goldwater v. Carter, members of Congress challenged President Jimmy Carter s authority to terminate a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. 27 A plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court voted to dismiss the case, albeit on different grounds. Several of the justices, however, took the position that the question presented was political, and therefore nonjusticiable because it involves the authority of the President in the conduct of our country s foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action of the President. 28 In addition, Justice Rehnquist wrote in his concurring opinion that while the Constitution is express as to the manner in which the Senate shall participate in the ratification of a treaty, it is silent as to that body s participation in the abrogation of a treaty. 29 Similarly, in Beacon Products Corp. v. Reagan, the federal District Court of Massachusetts relied on the plurality opinion in Goldwater in holding that a constitutional challenge to [the President s] unilateral termination of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with Nicaragua, without congressional consent, raised a political question and therefore, was not reviewable by the court. 30 24 Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002). 25 Article XV of the ABM stated that [e]ach Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of [the] Treaty jeopardized its supreme interests. 26 Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 33 (D.D.C. 2002). 27 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 28 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002. 29 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1003 (Rehnquist, J., concurring opinion). 30 Products Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1198-99 (D. Mass. 1986).
Trump and the NAFTA page 6 Should President Trump unilaterally attempt to withdraw from the NAFTA, it is possible the federal courts may continue the trend of dismissing the issue on the basis that it raises a nonjusticiable political question. Thus, the issue potentially may be settled by some other aspect of the political or democratic process. However, it is notable that the cases discussed above involved a treaty, which may be distinguishable from a congressional-executive agreement, such as the NAFTA, which arguably is the province of Congress. Tariff Rates without NAFTA Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the NAFTA is terminated (either with or without congressional consent or authorization), the next question is: How high can tariff rates be raised on goods from Mexico? Candidate Trump repeatedly stated that he intended to increase the tax on imports from Mexico to 35 percent. In the event that the United States withdraws from the NAFTA, the current preferential NAFTA duty rates will remain in effect for one year. However, the president may, by proclamation, restore the pre- NAFTA duty rates. The president must then, within 60 days after the withdrawal, provide Congress recommendations as to the appropriate rates of duty for all articles which were affected by the termination or withdrawal. 31 Any increase to the NAFTA preferential rates would generally be limited to the Most Favored Nation ( MFN ) rate of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States ( HTSUS ). Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( GATT ) 1947, which establishes the principle of the MFN and adopted in the World Trade Organization ( WTO ) Agreement to which the United States is a signatory, states that: [A]ny advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties. 32 Thus, under the WTO Agreement, specific goods imported from Mexico generally cannot be subject to higher tariff rates than goods from any other WTO-member country (i.e., the rate would be limited to the general column 1 MFN duty rate of the HTSUS). As discussed below, however, the president could potentially circumvent the MFN duty limits under exceptional circumstances. Alternatives to NAFTA Termination Even if the NAFTA is not terminated, or if the president lacks the authority to unilaterally withdraw from the NAFTA, the president has additional authorities to reshape the NAFTA and modify tariffs with respect to Mexico. As previously discussed, the president may at any time terminate or modify any proclaimed NAFTA preferential tariff rates as the president determines to be necessary or appropriate. 31 Trade Act of 1974, section 125(e); codified at 19 U.S.C. 2135(e). 32 19 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
Trump and the NAFTA page 7 Depending on the authority invoked, a presidential tariff modification may or may not be subject to congressional consultation requirements. 33 Thus, it would appear the president can increase tariffs on Mexico without necessarily withdrawing from the NAFTA, subject to the limits imposed by the WTO agreement (i.e., the general MFN duty rate), as discussed above. However, in addition to the aforementioned tariff authority afforded to the president under the NAFTA, there are other statutes that the president may potentially invoke to modify and increase tariffs on imports from Mexico, effectively circumventing the lower preferential tariff rates under the NAFTA and potentially above the MFN duty rates required under the WTO Agreement. 34 These extraordinary tariff measures require that specific circumstances be present, generally of an economic or national security nature, in order to trigger the enabling presidential authority. These statutes include the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 35 and the Trade Act of 1974, 36 which, generally speaking, would provide the president the authority to impose limited remedies, such as tariffs or quotas, upon a finding of an adverse impact on national security related to imports or discriminatory trade practices against the United States. There are also statutes that provide the president with more expansive authority under extreme circumstances, such as war and national emergencies. For example, the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 ( TWEA ), 37 which delegates the president broad wartime powers to regulate international commerce; and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 ( IEEPA ), 38 which authorizes the president to declare a national emergency and regulate international trade. 39 Arguably, certain conditions presently exist that may be invoked to trigger said extraordinary measures, for example, pointing to current U.S. deficits, other trade imbalances, the general war on terror, or the specific conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. These conditions could also potentially permit the president to raise tariff rates beyond the MFN rates pursuant to the security exceptions of the WTO Agreement, 33 Presidential tariff modification made under 19 U.S.C. 3331(b) are subject to the prerequisite consultation and layover requirements of 19 U.S.C. 3313(a). 34 See FN 33 discussing the security exceptions to the GATT. 35 19 U.S.C. 1862. 36 19 U.S.C. 2101 et seq. 37 50 U.S.C. App. 5(b). 38 50 U.S.C. Chapter 35. 39 50 U.S.C. 1701(a) states that the president s authority under the IEEPA may be exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat. The IEEPA does not, however, define what conditions are required to constitute a national emergency. Similarly, the TWEA does not define the term national emergency, leaving it to the president s discretion. In U.S. v. Spawr Optical Research, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit stated that the TWEA contained no standards by which to determine whether a national emergency existed or continued; in fact, Congress had delegated to the President the authority to define all of the terms in [50 U.S.C. app. 5(b)(3)] including national emergency, so long as the definitions were consistent with the purposes of the TWEA. 685 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1982).
Trump and the NAFTA page 8 which provide for the protection of [the United States ] essential security interest in time of war or other emergency in international relations. 40 Other Customs Consideration Regarding the NAFTA Should President Trump invoke article 2205 to withdraw from the NAFTA, this could also affect other general provisions of the NIA relating to general customs compliance. For example, Title VI of the NIA, commonly known as the Customs Modernization Act (or Mod Act ), amends important trade laws concerning customs compliance and enforcement in the United States. Section 637 of the Mod Act modified 19 U.S.C. 1484 to impose the reasonable care compliance standard upon U.S. importers when making entry of goods. 41 Thus, the repeal of the NIA could potentially have a disruptive impact on importers and the trade compliance community in the United States, even if they are not importing from Mexico, as well as governmental enforcement actions. Fortunately, one possibility is that, notwithstanding withdrawal from the NAFTA, Congress could decide to not repeal the NIA and allow the law to remain on the books. Although it would be considered a dead statute with no practical effect with respect to tariffs for Mexican goods, it would maintain the other customs compliance provisions of the Mod Act in place. Alternatively, Congress could consider legislating a partial repeal of the NIA to preserve only certain sections of the NIA such as the Mod Act. 42 The NIA actually includes language that would automatically repeal some provisions of the NIA should a withdrawal from the NAFTA occur. 43 The NIA is silent, however, as to the remaining provisions, but presumably those provisions would remain in effect in the absence of specific legislation to repeal them. Thus, notwithstanding the U.S. s withdrawal from the NAFTA, there appears to be several alternatives to safeguard important provisions of the NIA, or Mod Act. Conclusion It remains to be seen what President Trump s final proposals on international trade, the NAFTA, and Mexico in particular, will be. Although the Constitution and NIA are silent on the matter of who has the authority to abrogate an agreement such as the NAFTA, Congress reserves the power to repeal the NIA vis-à-vis its legislative 40 Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994), annexed to the WTO Agreement, provides for security exceptions. That section states, in relevant part, that [n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations. See 19 U.S.C. 3511(d) which provides congressional approval to of the GATT 1994. 41 19 U.S.C. 1484 (requires U.S. importers to exercise reasonable care to enter, classify, and determine the value of imported merchandise and to provide any other information necessary to enable U.S. Customs and Border Protection to properly assess duties, collect statistics, and determine if any other applicable legal requirements are met). 42 For example, section 107 of the NIA effectively suspended the United States-Canada Free Trade Implementation Act of 1988 ( US-CA FTA ) by modifying the US-CA FTA s repeal provision. 43 Section 109(b) of the NIA states that [d]uring any period in which a country ceases to be a NAFTA country, sections 101 through 106 shall cease to have effect with respect to such country.
Trump and the NAFTA page 9 authority and, arguably, also to withdraw from the NAFTA under its broad powers to regulate commerce with foreign nations. However, the matter is not entirely clear, and each trade agreement or treaty that President Trump may attempt to terminate will have to be considered on a case by case basis, as the nature of the agreement, enabling authority or congressional delegation of authority, may differ. Nonetheless, should the Trump administration attempt to unilaterally invoke article 2205 of the NAFTA without seeking congressional approval, such a unilateral presidential exercise of power may potentially be subject to prolonged legal challenge. In such a case, as stated by the U.S. Supreme Court, [I]t would be error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. 44 Thus, the Court has left open the possibility for judicial review, and the matter could be tied up in litigation for years. This could leave importers and exporters uncertain about the long-term prospects, costs, and compliance obligations of doing business with Mexico. It could result in disruptions to supply chains. It is also possible that Mexico may not wait for the matter to be adjudicated before it begins imposing retaliatory tariffs, making goods more expensive for American consumers. This was the experience learned following the Smoot-Hawley Tariffs of 1930, when many economists viewed the retaliatory tariffs by America's trading partners to cause a significant reduction in American exports, by some estimations by more than half. 45 According to former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke, "Economists still agree that Smoot-Hawley and the ensuing tariff wars were highly counterproductive and contributed to the depth and length of the global Depression." 46 Ultimately, the matter could become a moot issue since Congress is currently controlled by the same party as the president, but even that is not a certainty since Trump s trade policy has received a chilly reception by some congressional Republicans, fearing a possible trade war, and others, including House Speaker Paul Ryan, R-Wis., who favor tax reform over tariffs. 47 It would seem that the most predictable course of action for the trade community (and supply chains), would be to attempt to reshape the NAFTA using clearly established executive authority, or to obtain congressional consent or authorization to terminate the NAFTA. 44 Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. at 43, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). 45 According to one article published by the Foundation for Economic Education ( FEE ), U.S. exports was reduced from $7 billion in 1929 to $2.4 billion in 1932 as a result, in part, by retaliatory tariff impositions by the U.S. s trading partners. Theodore Phalan, Deema Yazigi, and Thomas Rustici, The Smoot-Hawley Tariff and the Great Depression, Foundation for Economic Education (Feb. 29, 2012). U.S. imports, similarly, declined by up to 20 percent following enactment of the Smoot- Hawley tariffs, and fell another 40 percent during the following two years. The Battle of Smoot-Hawley, The Economist, (Dec. 18, 2008) available at http://www.economist.com/node/12798595. 46 FRB: Speech--Bernanke, Monetary Policy and the Global Economy--March 25, 2013 available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20130325a.htm 47 House G.O.P. Signals Break With Trump Over Tariff Threat, NY Times (Dec. 5, 2016); Ryan Dismisses Tariff Talk and Plugs Tax Reform, Tax Notes Today (Jan. 5, 2017).
Trump and the NAFTA page 10 The information contained in this article is of a general nature and based on authorities that are subject to change. Applicability of the information to specific situations should be determined through consultation with your tax adviser. This article represents the views of the author or authors only, and does not necessarily represent the views or professional advice of KPMG LLP.