PROGRAM: Exchange / Double Degree SUBJECT: Brazilian Political System and Institutions LANGUAGE: English PROFESSOR(S): Carlos Pereira WORKLOAD: 30h REQUIREMENTS: not applicable CONTACT/CONSULTATION HOURS: Carlos.Pereira@fgv.br 1. Course Description TEACHING PLAN The main objective of this course is to examine three central issues in comparative politics taking Brazil as a point of reference: the breakdown of democratic regimes, the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, and the impact of institutions on the operation of the Brazilian democratic government. In each of these areas, Brazil appears as an important case, either because it supports or because it undermines more general propositions that have been advanced about democracy and democratization. The breakdown of democracy in 1964 has served as a testing ground for competing theories of the strains under which democratic regimes fall apart. A number of theories of very different scope and character have been advanced to explain the emergence of the military regime that ruled the country for over 21 years. These theories range from those that privilege structural (economic or political) factors to those that emphasize the strategies pursued by specific political actors. An examination of these theories as they pertain to Brazil provide fertile ground for assessing their logical and empirical validity, and learning something about the conditions under which democracy may or may not survive. Democratization in Brazil has also served as fodder for theoretical interpretations with applications to a wide range of cases. The long and protracted process of extrication of the military from politics both suggested and illustrated the limitations and consequences of a negotiated transition to democracy. The Brazilian case prompts a number of interesting theoretical questions, mostly related to the conditions under which the authoritarian regime is likely to choose a path of liberalization, the obstacles that such a strategy is likely to encounter, and whether this path is likely to have consequences for the regime that emerges from the process of transition. Finally, the institutional configuration that emerged in post-authoritarian Brazil also served as an object of theoretical concern as it epitomizes everything that, according to the existing comparative literature, should undermine the consolidation of democracy: a presidential regime with a weak and fragmented party system; extremely permissive electoral laws that favor candidates over political parties; a fragmented congress that torpedoes presidential initiatives; presidents who not only are able to, but who have strong incentives to bypass congress and rule by decree; a pervasive pattern of clientelism and rampant economic inefficiencies. Yet, Brazilian democracy survives, and there is evidence that it survives well. Thus, the image of a system on the brink, irremediably deadlocked and unable to implement policies of any significance is far from accurate. In spite of its presidential system and other institutional features that some tend to see as a "pathology," Brazilian democracy has performed reasonably well. The question that needs to be addressed, then, is why. 2. Detailed course content The readings are divided in Required [***]; Recommended [**]; and Background 1
Dates Topic Activities 1 (bibliography/key readings, assessment, seminars, etc) October 08 Introduction October 15 Historical Overview [***] Leslie Bethell. 2000. Politics in Brazil: From Elections without Democracy to Democracy without Citizenship Dædalus 129 (2): 1-27. [***] José Murilo de Carvalho. 2000. Dreams come Untrue Dædalus 129 (2): 57-82. [***] Elisa Reis. 2000. Modernization, Citizenship, and Stratification: Historical Processes and Recent Changes in Brazil Dædalus 129 (2): 171-194. [**] Michael L Conniff and Frank D. McCann (Eds.) (1989) Modern Brazil: Elites and masses in historical perspective. University of Nebraska Press [*] Boris Fausto. 1999. A Concise History of Brazil Cambridge University Press. October 22 October 29 Preponderant Views about Brazilian Institutions and Politics Breakdown of Democracy (Economic Explanations) [*] Thomas Skidmore (1999) Brazil: Five Centuries of Change. Oxford University Press. [***] Barry Ames. 2001. The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press. Pp. 7-31 [***] Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp.166-189. [***] Bolivar Lamounier. "Brazil: Inequality Against Democracy." In Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds. Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, vol. 4. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Pp. 111-158. [***] Guillermo O'Donnell. 1994. "Delegative Democracy." Journal of Democracy. 5 (1): 55-69. January. [***] Fernando Henrique Cardoso. 1973. "Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications" in Alfred Stepan, ed. Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future. New Haven: Yale University Press. Pp.142-176. [***] Guillermo O'Donnell. 1973. Modernization and Bureaucratic- Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California. Pp. 51-111. [***] José Serra. 1979. "Three Mistaken Theses Regarding the Connection between Industrialization and Authoritarian Regimes." In David Collier, Ed. The New Authoritarianism in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1 The professor is free to conduct occasional assessements without prior notice to student(s). 2
November 05 Breakdown of Democracy (Non-economic Explanations) Pp. 99-164. [**] Albert Hirschman. 1979. The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for Economic Determinants. In David Collier, Ed. The New Authoritarianism in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pp. 61-98. [*] Michael Wallerstein. 1980. "The Collapse of Democracy in Brazil: Its Economic Determinants." Latin America Research Review 15(3): 3-43. [***] Youssef Cohen. 1994. Radicals, Reformers, and Reactionaries: The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Collapse of Democracy in Latin America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pp. 53-97. [***] Ollie Andrew Johnson III. 2001. Brazilian Party Politics and the Coup of 1964. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. Pp. 11-51 & 111-130. November 12 [*] Alfred Stepan. 1978. "Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil" in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Eds. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp. 110-137. Democratization [***] Thomas Skidmore. 1989. "Brazil's Slow Road to Democratization: 1974-1985" in Alfred Stepan (ed.). Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 5-42. [***] Adam Przeworski. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 66-79. [***] Timothy Power. 2000. Political Institutions in Democratic Brazil: Politics as a Permanent Constitutional Convention. In Peter Kingstone and Timothy Power Eds. Democratic Brazil: Actors, Institutions, and Processes. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Pp. 17-35 [**] Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman. 1995. The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp.25-74. [**] Bolivar Lamounier. 1989. "Authoritarian Brazil Revisited: The Impact of Elections on the Abertura" in Alfred Stepan, ed. Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 43-79. [*] Frances Hagopian. "Democracy by Undemocratic Means? Elites, Political Pacts, and Regime Transition in Brazil" Comparative Political Studies 23(2): 147-171, 1990. [*] Glillermo O Donnell and Philippe c. Schmitter. 1993. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Washington: John Hopkins University Press. 3
November 19 November 26 December 03 Form of Government Political Parties Electoral Systems [***] Juan J. Linz. 1993. "The Perils of Presidentialism" in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds. The Global Ressurgence of Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp.108-126. Also published in: Journal of Democracy 1, 51-69, 1990. [***] Scott Mainwaring. 1993. "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination. Comparative Political Studies 26:198-228. [*] Matthew Soberg Shugart and Scott Mainwaring. "Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate" in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds. Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. pp. 12-54. [**] Timothy J. Power. "The Pen is Mightier than the Congress: Presidential Decree Power in Brazil" in John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds. Executive Decree Authority. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. pp. 175-196. [***] Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully. 1995. "Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America" in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, Eds. Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Pp. 1-36. [***] Scott Mainwaring. 1995. "Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracies." In Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, Eds. Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Pp. 354-398. [***] Argelina Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Institutional change and the performance of the Brazilian Multiparty Presidentialism. Paper presented at IPSA Meeting. [***] Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1998. "The Inverse Relationship Between Party Strength and Executive Strength: A Theory of Politicians' Constitutional Choices." British Journal of Political Science 28:1-29. [**] Kenneth M. Roberts and Erik Wibbels. 1999. "Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Latin America: A Test of Economic, Institutional, and Structural Explanations." American Political Science Review 93(3): 575-590, September. [*] Scott Mainwaring. 1998. "Electoral Volatility in Brazil." Party Politics 4(4): 523-545, October. [***] John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1994. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas." Electoral Studies 14(4): 417-439. [***] Barry Ames. 2001. The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil. Ann Arbor: 4
December 10 December 17 Congressional rules How does the Brazilian president govern? University of Michigan Press. Pp.41-135. [**] Timothy J. Power and J. Timmons Roberts. "Compulsory Voting, Invalid Ballots, and Abstention in Brazil." Political Research Quarterly 48(4): 795-826, December 1995. [*] Scott Mainwaring. 1999. Rethinking party systems in the Third Wave of Democratisation: The case of Brazil. Stanford University Press [***] Argelina Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Presidential power, legislative organisation and party behaviour in Brazil. Comparative Politics. 32: (2). [***] Carlos Pereira & Bernardo Mueller (2000) A Theory of Executive Dominance: The Committee System in the Brazilian Congress. Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais. 15 (43): 45-68. [***] Carlos Pereira (2000) Why Brazilian legislators have decided to clean up their sidewalks: The Influence of the Brazilian political institutions on the process of state reform in Stuart Nagel (ed) Global Political Policy Marcel Dekker. [**] Argelina Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi. 2001. Congress and decisionmaking in democratic Brazil. Paper prepared for the Conference Fifteen Years of Democracy in Brazil. Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, London, February 15-16. [***] Octávio Amorim Neto. 2002. Presidential Cabinets, Electoral Cycles, and Coalition Discipline in Brazil. In Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif Eds. Legislative Politics in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 48-78. [***] Carlos Pereira and Bernardo Mueller. 2002. Strategic Behavior in a Coalition-Based Presidential System: Executive-Legislative Relations in the Budgetary Process in Brazil. DADOS [**] Argelina Figueired and Fernando Limongi. "Constitutional Change, Legislative Performance and Institutional Consolidation." Brazilian Review of Social Sciences, Special Issue 1:73-94, October 2000. [***] Barry Ames. The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2001. pp. 139-266. [**] Carlos Pereira. 2002. Institutional Conditions for Presidential Success in the Legislative Arena: The Brazilian Electoral Connection. Centre for Brazilian Studies - Oxford Working Papers Series, nº CBS-27-02. 5
3. Assessment procedures This course depends heavily on students' participation. Students are required to read all the assigned material prior to class and are expected to actively participate in class discussions. Evaluation will be based on class participation (10%), an in-class mid-term exam (40%), and a take-home (24 hrs.) final exam (50%). 4. General guidelines for the graduate program As a general rule relating to the ethical principles and the code of conduct which steer its academic environment, EBAPE sets down the following: Autonomy and responsibility correspond to values which, when transformed into action, highlight the importance of EBAPE s mission of producing and disseminating knowledge of Administration. Consequently, it is the professor s responsibility to conduct roll call at every class, and absences will only be justified if they comply with the applicable legislation (see details in the Student Manual). We recommend that the use of communication equipment such as cell phones, radios and similar equipment should not be permitted in the classroom, so as to avoid interfering with the teaching and learning processes, but professors can use their discretion on this ruling, where applicable. Resorting to fraudulent measures of any kind on the part of students during any of the evaluation phases will lead to a zero grade being awarded and the immediate referral of the case to the program department for examination of the facts. i 5. REQUIRED READINGS The readings are divided in Required [***]; Recommended [**]; and Background (Please see the Detailed course content) 6. Professor s mini-résumé Carlos Pereira is a Professor of political economy and public policy at the Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration EBAPE at Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV). Currently he is a visiting fellow in the Latin America Initiative, Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development programs at Brookings Institution. Recently, he was an assistant professor of comparative politics in the department of political science at Michigan State University and professor of the Sao Paulo School of Economics at Getulio Vargas Foundation. He also worked as a visiting professor of the department of economics at the University of Sao Paulo-USP and in the department of politics at Colby College. In addition, he worked as associate researcher at Oswald Cruz Foundation-Fiocruz and Candido Mendes University-UCAM. Moreover, he has been involved in many consultancy and research projects with interdisciplinary research teams at the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Department for International Development DFID/UK, Coperación Andina de Fomento CAF etc. i The student is guaranteed the right to a full defense as per the School s internal regulations 6